SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL',' NO 7, 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 30, 1966
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS C~IVISION
TRANSLATION
~'w::~~r 9~5 30 I.larch 1966 I
SET,ECT ~' TRANSLATT,ONS FROM "~ip7~ENNA~tA MYST.' ~~" No 7 ~ 163.
. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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TIONS FROM OY3~NNAYA MYtiL'
Te s ue No 7, ,TUly l . 3
Voyenna~a~ (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the
USSR Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's Military Pub-
lishing HouBe, Moscow. The selected translations, below are from
issue No 7, fly 1963, which was signed for the press 5 Jl.ine 1963.
Table of Contents
Page
An Evaluation of the Results of the Jluze plenum
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party USSR
The Aims and Co:~tent of the Theory of Operations
Research
1
20
The Factors of Space and Time in. Military Qperations
35
Troop Combat Operations Under Condition of Radioactive
Contamination of Terrain
~8
Naval Support of Ground Farces
62
The Third hldition of "Marxism-Lenninism on War and the
Army"
76
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AN EVALUATION OI' TIIE RESULTS OF THE JUNE PLENUM OI' T11E
CENT1tAL COMMITTEE OP TIIE COMMUNIST PARTY USSR
CPYRGHT
By Maj-Gen IC. Bochlcurev
Our Party holds high the victorious banrner of creative Marxism-
Lenini~s~~, staunchly and confidently leads the 5ovie~t people toward
the victory ok' Cortununism, and honorably ~ustif'ies its role as the
advance guard of 1,hL Wox?ld CuKnmunist Movement. Thfs was again force-
fully dcamor~sf,ru-uc?cl by the Julle plenum of thy; Centrn,l Committee, which
took up the immedfc-te~ ta~rks of the Party?s idieologicril worIt. Guided
by the dec:isiun3 ox" the ~2nri Cong~re~ss, and shaping the Congress's
requirementxwn ?~?alues are estab-
lished for those parameters of tlae op~~r~ation whose size can be af-
fected.
In effectiveness evaluation a complete mathematical picture of
t)'.1e oper+atiore is not reproduced. In this instance a certain indirect
exponent is selected -- the so-called criterion of effectiveness;
its mathematical dependence on bar~ic gtnantitatiire factors (para-
meters of the operation is established; ?then the values of the para-
me~ter,~ are found which ensure the highest numerical value of crfter~-
ion of effectiveness.
Both of these trends are based on the idea of mathematical prog-
nostication, but the approach to the solution of the prediction prob-
lem and the finding of the optimum solution is different in princi-
ple Mathematical simulation is a direct method of pr~ognosticatione
Here the .nature of the course of the operation is judged by the model
obtained as a result of the mathematical description of the basic
laws ,governing the given operation The method of effectiveness
evaluation is an indirect method of prognostics tiono The whole math-
e:matical picture of the operation is not regrodniced. The successful-
ness of the operation is judged only by soma indirect index -- the
criterion of effectiveness.
From the practical standpoint these varieties of the method of
prognostication differ in the degree of complexity of the mathemati-
cal system and the possibility of their solution on electronic com-
puters, Mathematical simulation is very compl~*x and as a rule can
be computed only on large stationary computers. The method of
effectiveness evaluation is rather simple and can be successfully
computed on small computers, including field types, and if the work
is organized properly an optimum solution may be found in a very
short time.
Hence, the application of mathematical simu 1 ation is recommended
for use in large headquarters and scientific institutions in solving
various theoretical and practical problems such a s the selection of
~ In actual problems there are usually several criteria, or they
find generalized criteria of effectiveness.
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I
 CPYRGHT
an optimum system of armament for troops or~ of individual models of
arms, the determination of expedient tactical stituations, oper~~
ational skill, strategy, and diffferent standards, etc. The creation
of a mathematical model allows a more valid approach to the solution
of problems by the method of ex"fectiven~ss e?~aluation -- to correct-
ly choo~ae~ the most important .critcaria of eff'?ctiveness and to estab-
lish t~ka~~ix~ connaaction with the parameters of the operationo
wc~ will. al.~ply the m~athod of ei~'fectiveness evaluation mainly in
sol?vinp~ ~~~nrious problems in the fi~e~ld of control of troops, which
arise in th,~, planning as well as in thc~ course of combat operations
during decision?-?malting. The proximal nature of the methucl here is
more than compensat~ad by the speed in obtaining optimum solutions,
which underlie the commander's decision. In isolated instances this
method may be used in solving another type of practicaY problem not
related to the sphere of control --- for example, in determining
rational operational and tactical standard~a, or characteristics, of
arms. However a more exact solution of these problems is achieved
by examining a mathematical mock-up of a battle or operation, or
some of their elearents.
Mathematical simulation apt the present time is developing along
two basic lines -- the creation of analytical models and stochastic
(random models.
In an analytical model all basic quantitative f?actors of an
operation (operational par?ametersj are expressed, and are inter-
related in the form of analytical depeandences expressed as different
kinds of equations. The analytical model is a system of these equa-
tions which is further explored with the goal of arrriving at a
recommendation concerning the selection of this om that parameter
of operation.
A typical example of an analytical model is the dill"fer~ential
equation of combat operations (Lanchester''s equai,i~~s~ sand their
numE~rous varieties. Even in simplest form Lanclxester?s equations
prove to be very beneficial in obtaining recommendations for the
solution, of a number of the most important operational and tactical
matters -- for example, the impact of the initial rcelative strengt'n
on the course of combat, given various tempos of troop replacement
by both sides, and the impact of anticipation of the enemy?s first
blow oza the future a~our,?s~e+ of combat o~,erations, for various balances
oi' forces and given various lead-times of warning.
Random model simulation, the so-called Monte Carlo method under-
lies the mathematical method of statistical experimentation. Its
distinctive feature is its experimental nature. The en tine oper-
ation is representated as the sum total of interdependent random
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 CPYRGHT
occurrences -- the elements of the modal, r'o r ouch phs~nomenon ran-
dom churacteiistice are established (the law of distribution of
probabilities, its parameters etc.,,, ThN.se phenomena are reproduced
by a separate block, which is interco.nnectc:d with other blocks.5
Such a model is played a sufficient numba~r of timoa to obtain the
necessary results -- the expectad values of the parameters of the
operation. The optimum variant is selected by moans of a series of
alterations cf the model and comparison of the results. With a
large quantity of component elements, operations of the hypothesis
concerning the law of the distribution of each element is based on
common sense and usually does not cause doubt.
Random simulation is presently used to reproduce battles in-
volving separate means of combat (for example, anti-aircraft or
tanks, or of small .sub-units, that is, for the creation of micro-
models. The method will also be used for the oreation of macro-
models -?- models of military operations involving units of regi-
mental size and even divisionso The random (stochastic method,
b~~eidcs its independent xrorth, is also helpful in preparing analyti-?
cal models and in checking the hypotheses broazght forward in them.
In realizing the principal schools of ma thematicaA simulation ?--~
analytical and random (stochastic -?- the most varied mathematical
equipment is useda the theory of probability, mathematical static-~
tics, mathematical and functional analysis, the theory of mass han-
dling, the game theory and others.
~1s has already been pointed out, with the method of effective-
ness evaluation concerning the successfulness of an operation,
~ixdgement is not made according to the whole mathematical picture
of the operation, which is nut reproduced in this case, but accord-
ing to another index. For example; the succe os of an offensive
battle is considered successful if they cover 100 kilometers a day.
The relative losses of one?s own forces and the forces of the enemy
may be taken as an indirect criterion for the evaluation of the
successf'u1nE~ss of a battle, If, in the course: of a battle, this
critex~iun is leas than one unit and has the tendency to be less, one
may say that the battle is proceeding favorably.
It is completely understandable that it i s impossible to accu-
r~ate~ly evaluate the success of an operation by one or even by several
criterion One may got only a tentative evaluation but the approxi-
5 The computing of random model on machines i n the form of indi-
vidual blocks was the reason for calling th i s method of simula-
tion the block method.
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pro~-~,~s~?fR~,~a~~n~t,R~4q~?9~,4~~~ Cd~~t~im$u~TeoIu#io0 0030009h001oaso is more
than compensated for by simplicity, and hence, the posaibilit~+? of
getting the necessary information r~~aiclcly. AYong this same lino one
must not forget that than methods of op~mations re,s~~arch, as a rule,
do not provide a solution, but rather a quantitati~~e basis upon
which to make a decision. In obtaining this basis, a high degree
of accuracy is not often roquir~ad.
In the pa^actir~al use of ,thti~ m~;thod ofi' ~~f'fe~tiv~e,ness evaluatfou
therE~ are two stages of rese+ar~cha thF~ fir,?st is the, mathematical
formulation of thc~ practical (opera+bionaL-~tactical~ problem, and
't:t~e ec~cond is the solution of thci mathemati+c:al problem anc finding
tn,e r.ptiruum solution.
Mathematical formulation includes~a
-?- The selection of the criteria of ~~f fective+ness or a system
of. criteria.
-- The definition of the basic quantitative gacto~rs, the para-
meters of the operation upon which the se1F ~ted criteria of effec-~
tiveness depend.
-- The elicitation of the quantitative+ de~pend~nce (the func-~
tional connection of the criteria of effectiveness on the para-
meters of the operation, the result of ~~ai ~h is an analytical
expres?pion of the fun-ctioxx of ~~ffoctivon~~,ss, which defines the
quality of the solutiono
-- The establishment of the range of ve,mie,tion of the furuction
of effecti~rene as and of the operational pa.wamete~rs of the explored
operation or pr~ableffi, as res~xlt ot? wF-.r~ch the analytical exprey,ion
for the domain oil definition i e Pound
After the first stage the formulation of the practical problem
i s purely mathemat:i ~ al, as i ~ the problem of i"inding the minimax
(maximcun or mirnimum) of the f'unnction of e#?f~~cti~v-enes,~ with th+a
varj,ables limited to their domain of dc~f'i.nitiorno
The first stage is the most crucial and important, The success
of the solution, ho~tever aQ:c~nrately the pecullar'ltles of the problem
have been studied, depends upon it, Here specialized mathematical
kno~rledge is insufficir~rnt~ erne ~ra~st kno~r intimately that area from
which the problem must. be aol,~?ed. It is hw~r~a~ that mathematical and
military sciences are united. Allow the ,smallest mistake to be made
in the presents+,ion of the problem, axed no maxtF~r hoer accurately it
is solved from then on, the result will be i.ncorre:e:t. The whole of
the vast arsenal of mathematics is used in the presentation of the
58000300090012-3
 CPY
pro-blera, the most important being mathematical aual,ysis, mathe~mati~-
cal statistics
a
d th
th
,
n
e
eory of probabilityo
In the second stage the problem of searchi
f
ng
or optimum solu-
tions arises -- find ins the m1:ltAimn~r of n f".onn*~.... ...~ 1L ___ . _
----- -?_-~;-w~;~A?p ~n ~~ucn vi tinem~ ~imalar rublemr~ ?~re~r~e
fully .fanlvwr~ ~..,,.. .,..,, ~._. 1L_ _~ _ - p '~ucCess?
.~~i~1AAL( ~,~-vr~l~ms or open-?
ations research, however, proved to be quite impossible or involved
t.T?~mtarnrlln.vn ~.,A,,,.aa __, ss n.o.
latter were caused by the great number~AAof~va
f
bl
~?
,de
~
r
a
es
and
most
of
a.ll, by the many limitations ymnnAar~ ..,,,,~ ~r,~,,.., r_ _-_-_ _ .. ....
=..A idAlulu~ ~rl~' a:inlmax,
as a rule, computative, worked out ~'n,~~ +,r,~; ~ ~n~~,~~,,._ .._ s . __.. ,
LinN:ar, non-~"linear, and dynamic programming, which are at the
present time known by the general term "me:'thods of mathematical pro-
gramming", were practiced on a large scale, Lately a method of
optimization worked o~nt by the academician, Lo ~, Foz;tryagin, hasp
appeared, which is based on the application of classical variance
methods for the solution of so-called "non-~cl,assical" problems, Hoer-.
ever, it is not yet practiced on a large sc.aie in operations research,
The selection of a method of finding a solution depends greatly
upon ghat type of problem was formulated in the first stage. If the
f?ux~ction of effectiveness is linear, the method of linear programming
is used, if it is non?-linear -- the method of non-linear programming
is used, if a step-by~step selection is necessary --?~ the dynamic
m~othod is used, etc,
The games theory occupies a special. place in the method of"
~ffectiveaaass evaluatiorn~ It is used i?ix?,s t. of all f'or the postula-~
tiorn of prroblems in the first stage, The peculiarity of the games
pos~~ulation lies in the fact that togethE~r~ with direct action, the
counter-action, deliher~ate or accidental, of the opposing side is
^bserved --~- the response Ma,t;nematicall~* a games problem is formu-
lated like a regular effec+,iverress evaluation problem and coincides
vrith a linearly programmed problem -~? it comes to the search for the
minimax of a linear function, In the simplest cases a games problem
may be solved with the aid of special elementary procedures without
mathematical formalization and apparatus for linear programming
It is proper to emphasize that operations research possesses
its own particular methodological principles which differ from those
of mathematics, although in operations research mathematical princi-
ples find vride application. Unfortunately, and especially if a comR?
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 CPYRGHT
u or is used, any applioo,tion of rnati-c~mutica in tl-cs ~oluLion of
practical problems is improperly consid~+rad un application oC optrr-
ations r~saarch,
Lot us now dwell briefly on the relatiac~l-l.p of r:ybcrnc~tl c:a
and thca theory of oparut,io,~na rMsoarcl-. In our opinion, cybornetlcs
and th~3 thcAory of op~~lratioa-e ros,aarch are independent scfi+rntific
,~rhuol F~.
Cybr~r~notlce i__~Q scf~ce of ?t-ida cci~. It c~~vtublishes tt-a
ecaeral lags of the processes of gtxidarnce, inde;;pond~-nt of. i Ls mate-
xi+~l natu.r~~, and pra~ride,~ g~anaral cn,~a.thoda of dusc;:?iptioH and rusoarch
of the procr~saes of gu.;idance with the aid of the theory of algori-
thims and the theory cf irnformation?
,~crution,~ reaaarch is the .theory of decision-~makina. It estab-
lishes the general laws of decision-~malcing in Humorous fields of
practices, and provides me~~,hoda for the research and discovery of
the optimum solutions of a great tango of pu~actical problems.
In our opinion, it is incorrRCt to consider the theory of oper-
ations research as an ixntrr?gral past of cyba~rne~ti ce on the grounds
that decision-making is whe most important stage of thtl closed pro-
cess of guidanceo We must not for?gett that the problems solved by
the m?thods of oper+~tions research also arise outside of the sphere
of guidance, and that these problems are in the overwhelming major-
ity. Toge-ther xith this, methods of operations research find wide
application in cybernetics for thy, disca~rery of optimum algorithims
of guidance processes and their detailing f'or the pux?pose of their
reproduction on computers. And conw~er~sely, in ope~r~ations research
cybernetic, methods are often ~ue+ed, as f'or e~cample~, thF~ theory of
algorithims iH mP,:hematical s3mulationo The~refor?e, a close inter-
action takes plae~ betrn~r:en the two r,~e~w aca~~~sxtifie brhoola, different
in thPme~, objectives, aid methods.
In our opinion, the t~heor~y of opexationa research coast be com-
bined organitcally with tactics, operational skill, and strategy.
The methods of op~rationr~ ceaeax?r:h mutt be ~ride~l,y' adopted in thr.
evaluation of the military eff~r.tivenesr~ of romprehenaive weapons
systems. The organic unif'i~:ation of t?he izxtegral parts of military
science and the theory of operations xeaear~h will require good
mathematical training of mi~ita..?y p~x~sonnol, aa~d a knox~lrrd?e of the
methods of opo~ratione reeeax?r,h,
We conside;r~ that the time has now Como whin it is~ nece~bsary to
organize the training of military cadres in the basics of operations
research, through military schools, instructional courses, and mili-
tary academies. For this, it is neG~^saar~y?~o include im the programs
 CPYR
of rniddle and higher command educational irrstitutic-ns n spnelal
npplic+d caurna in nparatlnna rasnt-rch.
Far the planning and study of eepaeially ,important prablams it
is advisnhlc to crests individut-1 groups of offiear-operators and
mt-thclmntxciarrs.
In order to inaura a widc? intrudtrs an objective fa~cto?~ writh tha~~ incrsa,s~~ in its dimen?~
alone under a single level of; ta~clr~niCaA sux,ul?~ of troonra i,a~w?; t.A.Thly
slue was usually accomplished consideraialy mor~:~ easily than an
offensive Consisting of a aeries; of ~xr~cces+si-are one~rai;;nn.a_ T? +.~,.~
a~cona rorta war, the 4aerman Command, havin? learned how t,o ao~nnt
on tine peculiarities of military and geographical ch~?ditions of the
western part of tlr.e Erax'~opean theater, Cam?r.^iod out an of$'ensi~~?e using
ak.. ..~____._ --_ .~ . .. __
tiaxen in May -June off' 1p4~0 againsP~ the Aixglo~?~renc:h f'orc~ti,~ in the
first stage did not exree~d 3~~~~q~~? kil.ometa~rs, if' ?~re consider it up
~4 .. 1 L .. 7~._ _ .I _ n _ . ... _ _ _
oazenaxve in thE~ direction of Paris, it inc?.reased on the v~rRsnl~~ 2fi
xatomcater?a, that is, the second stage was x~hort~.~x' yet.
In modern wari~are the eate~nt? of a tha:ater noair. oi~" coaxx~ ro~ w; 1 1
nog, pe able to play its form~e~r role i.xn the fate of an o~'f~~nci ,vta
inasmuch as the tE~chnical supply of troops allows him to conalunr?
space? faster azad easier Eve~xr~. uxxd~ar the mor~~t R?omplea of conditions
.
However, technical equipping will re~quir?e mo~r~~? complex and nr?~t^; ~~
of physici,,l and g~;cgraphic:al Tondit,ions c,f' th;e~ theate~r~. It is nec.es~
nary to take meaaur-:~s #'o r? the pr~e~parai,,ioar, of the thFater
troops
,
,
axed ~?ario+.ns combat eclu:ipm-~nx f?or cou~bat opE~rations in w~ast te~rri?-?
toxies underrapid.l;y changing conditions and great de~u~trrxs:tion ixn
The fa~ctor?s of space aaui ti.me~ u?'f'e~Ci, the. op~eratioxas of parties
on the offensi;~?~e and on the defensi-~e ixn diffr'>rent gays.
Approve or a ease
.l -~
 CPYRGHT
v
Usually having smalla~r forces and weapons than the attaclcer,
the defender in the ra~.arnt past had that problem of gaining the
time to inflict maximum ausualtfes ul?.on th~a enemy and preserving
its position, that is, the territory containing the vitally impor-
tant ob,~ectives.
In the course of defense, s+pac~a~ is u,~a?.~d t.o give stability to
the buildirng of its forces and na,ate.ria'Q1, but losses of space are
accompanied by the loss of vitally important x??e~gfons, by the r~ar-
st~r~uint of maneuvering troops, arxd bey the w~eakQ~ning of the moral
potential, since an unsuccessful defense: and tlha:~n retreat, as a
rule, has a depressing effe.~ct of troops. In this regard it is well
to r~emN~mber that the mi.ssionr~ of holding space and v~inning time
have arrays had a very prominent place in defRn~sive plansq the
accomplishment of these missions permitt~eld the assembly of strike
f'oxc.a~~s ~+~hose mirnsion it was to fni''lict d~e:cisive damage on the e~uemy
irn important directions.
In nuclear missile warfare, it is impoasi~nl~e to defend oneself
against enemy action r~imply by that- retention of space in strategic
dimensions, since rocket weapons enable strikes against objaYctives
f'r'om any distance. Neitherr can strategic dE~er~se: win time, since
the aggressor, en,~oying the initiative and the massive usa~ of num
clear ureapons, is able to inflict major damage on the defense ~n?ithin
u very short time. Consequa~ntly, strategic deg'ense cannot be adopted
in nuclear missile warfare.
Defense: may find use in the solution of operational and Cacti-~
cal problem's. The cola; of space and time irx tlne solution of these
problems will be determined fundamentally by tlae: role of nuclear
vreapons in the, attainment of the goals of defe~xxsee These weapons
have broadened the spatial boundaries of operationaS and tactical
defense both on land and in the air, arnd haw?e made the problem of
time more ~:ritical o The defannda;~r is compelled mmow to disperaa;~ his
forri~e~s still wida;~r in order to ~aitigate~ this of #'ect~s of nuclear
strikes on his combat sya~temso At the same time, having nuclear
missile weaponry, tanks, arnd motor transport, ?tlne defender has the
chance to laein.ch destructive strikes, to maneuvar wida~ly, and to
hit the advancing enemy far outside the boundaries of the defenderys
zone. In connection with this there is an increased need for the
.skillful use of territory. The center of defernaive resistance is
displa~;ed farther and farther to the rear, and the requirements for
the ec)helonment of forces and their maneuverability grow.
The maneuver of forces and weapons in the defensive zone from
tine rear, and along the front, takes on a:xcyptional significance,
because in the absence of continuous fronts, the enemy may appear
from any direction, and the speedy transfa:~r of forces and rocket
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*eapons Piro is naedod to destroy 9~,im.
The role of space arzd tiare! in air de~i?er~,se is charng~ing? e~ignifi-
cantly. The sphere of air d~fe,rns~: is Hour dispe~r~sed over v,he~ e~ntiro
territory of the warring states. The ex~,ansion of the sphere of air
ar~l ~?11t.~Ea and trice growth of the combat 'Ve~loc.ities off" of'fensi~e air
`~'e~t~pon.~; h~tivF, e,spF~cially e:~:ar.erbated thin problem of time. The speeds
of ~;euttl.e~ application of modern air defe?x~sN. wwapons is so high that
~ri~?'hoez?a? ~ j~~,,!. ial automated -~ystems the corntr'ol, off' r?e.~gimcLntq and divi-
saoz?s in bottle would be impossible.
xhN~ ~vpatial dicaen,sions of t,h~r~at,ers ex~*rr~s an es~aential inE"lu-
ence? on the nature and capa~bilitie~s off" strattT~;ir+ diepc~r,eion and con-
c.e~ntru.tion of forces. In plann.ing~ the tr'ansp~ort of troops +.h~e, size
of the theater most of all influences the: choice ofr the moans of
transport, in vier of the fact tkzat at distancers of lass than 1200-?
1500 kiloma~ter~s it is usually advantageous to use motor transport.
Au?c at greater distances, ;r'ailr'oad tr?anspox't. ThQ? remoteness of
some regions of the theater of operations may also ixxfluence the
battls~ composition of the troops and their de~ployme~xxt for operations
in tha~se regions, A grouping of troops tr'a:rnr~port~d there must be
strong enough and ha~~e r~e~se;r~?~~s and extra m,ater'ie~l s~yfficiexat to
carry out the missions assigmed t'tae~m indcpr':ndently of the main forces
ir3, the theater. In such a +~onfiguration they certainly will depend
~,o a lesser degree om external help. Arid this is very important,
since help, as a result of eri:emy strikes on communications. will be
Conquering space in armed co.~aiP'lict maEan~ o~xe:rr.oming the r~e,sist-
ance of the enemy in concrete:, natural condiit.ions, axad in other mili-
tary-geographical conditionq. Combat e~spe?ri~ez~ce ,~ho~rs that for the
attainment of strategic ob,~ec:tive~s in a givexA x,Trne^ata~r of ~ailitary
operations, troops thro~trn in fr.~om other compl.et~~l~* re~m,otc~~ r~~;gions
have often been ua~ed. It ie krr?wn, k?o;r ~e:~;am?pl~:, that thr ~Japan~se
forces, organized in the uTapanese~ Islands, oper~ate:d dur"ing? the SHCOnd
World War not only in Southeast Asia, bzxt also in Oc:~e~ania. German
forces, organized in Central Eanrope~, Tozxducted combat oper?ationa in
North Africa, while U~S~ f'orc?~:s were tlxro~rn into l;ur?ope, North Afri-
ca, and other regions.
Apt i"srst glance it. may' ee^em that the pTny,~ioal strrut:ture of a
theat,ex' axed in particular flee ^,limatio T'~onditiorns, ax?e not conxxected
with the spatial factox". Howe,~er, this: i~ far from ioc~ang so. In
varlOU9 ~fwgions of. our plane x., del,~~nding on the~Rx? spax.ial position,
the extent, relief, soil, climate, and duration oi? tlx,p. war season
are esx~ecially ne*culiar, This relationship .would, for all practical
pv.rposes, hardly be felt in a wax? in one the~ate?;r, but in a ,war cove:rT
ing several continen~i~s and oce=ans, it ~ri1~1 be? qui'c?~:~ perce~ptable both
Approve or a ease
_, ~ ~,
 CPYRGHT
o~ptrh?c~~-umanr ,ei~~san for combat tk;~cl~nologx.
The effect of conditions in the rnew theater on the human organ-
ism, combat and transport technology may rnot only ca11 f'or Certain
changes in the operational tactics of ttre armed f'orcess but if there
are sharp deviations in thN~s~~ conditions, f'ro;~u that which is custour-~
ary, they may require the use of a di4'fr'er?e~nt ta:chnology and new
m~eana of military action. Therefore a c:orasid~e~ration of the f'actor's
of space and time in the course of mod.~rn strategic planning for a
wrar in aever?al theaters, and at Yong distanc~e~ and in outer spac:e~
must lead to the selection of unified ar?m:u:d f'ox?ces, armed Combat
units, and their specifio traini.ng? i?or~ operations in theaters aa-
signed to tham beforehand. It is completely clear that Choir use
in a ne?w, remote theater must be ,~~u~stified by operational expediency,
and their transfer there must be managed ~?ithin an acceptable inter-~
oral of time,
It is most desirable, if the: sit nation allows, to give troops
nearly arrived in the new theater same time to "acclimate" and train-?
irng for combat operations under ne:w co;adAtinns.
Corxs~ecluexatly, along with operational ~~:~;pe:diency and the general
principles of milita;r~ science, it is alsao esroential to taIce a r?eaA?-,
istic consideration of a theater"s,+ spac~e~~time characteristics as a
inasis for the use of armed forr:es ixn theaters, beco,use they exist
independently of the plaaa,s fox' armed conflict, and negl~e,cting them
may lead to critical military failnnre~a.
The organization of troop maneuvers and troop supply is one of
the main strategic proble:ms,, and it canYxot be solved without x?egard
for the structure and use of communications in the country and in
theater's of military oper'ati.ons. The length of strategic combat
fronts in a future war axed their remoterne~ss t'rom the main supply* ce~n???
t~~rs wrill lead to a great ,stretching of communications, which will
probably extend acros~a several continents, for instance:, Europe a,nd
Asia, across oceans and gF:ar~, and i.n the air over them. A simple
rE~collection of these parts of the world ?br?ings to mind the most?
variEd geographical conditions, and the great difficulties which gill
arise to greet armed forces and transport corps in the course of mili-
tary operations. In organizing circumstances the obaective role of
space as a factor reveals itself in full force as a factor disuniting
strategic efforts because the transfer of? forces and supplies will
require much time. In addition, it must be emphasized that troops
and .supplies being transported cannot be actively used during trarr.sit9
tI-iey fall out of the balance of active forges, and cannot at ali be
guaranteed against injury on the way. Therefore, it seems to us that
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090012-3
d 4 -,
 CPYRGHT
the problem of communications in u futur~~a war Ls must of all a prob-
lom of overcoming vast distua~~ras in tha slaortc~~t possible Lime undrzk
cua~ditions of Fneuiy action Frith no~- ~roapor+.s --~ whoti thh !'rugility
of communications will inr.reabei many timc~e in com,nurison with that
of past wars.
Si.rilt,cs~;ic pl,ala~e urr~ di!r~oc:tly dc~pr:~r~da*nt, on th