SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL',' NO 7, 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 30, 1966
• Content Type: TRANS

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Iii many casas ou such huadingA I t Mill be advatitugeuus to usr.
tucticu2 uirbornc~ lu-~dings. Sometimes, depending upon thr. situutiu-i,
it will. bc! nr.cc~seary to temporarily brook off combat apr.rutionH cum-
plntc~ly in one nr ~~nather corridor and shift the effort to ii mare
udvuntaguaus nr~o which is less rxpused to radioactive contamination.
Thou, through skillful operations, troops on thy! nffen.sivu ore
ublr, evan in coziditiit~ns of rudinuctivu contamination of terrain, to
sucrc!~efully curry out Choir mission.
Defensive operations can also very oftan be set up and con-
ducted on contaminated terrain. Jan especially complex situation for
troops may come about ~-hon shifting to the defensive in the course
of an offensive operation. Troops will be forced to ocr?upy u do-
fense under onAn~y action on unfortified terrain, and with the pros-
onco of regions contaminated by radioacti~'e substances. For the
purpose of protection from nuclear attack, and for the succ~?8sfu1
axecution of Choir assigned mission, the troops on the defe;~aive~
will try oven harder to heighten their maneuvorab?lity and perform-
ance, concentrating their efforts on those axes where the aggressor
is most successful. In vi ex of the fact that the advancing troops,
as has already been mentioned, will take measures for crosaing?atm~-
taminated zones on the more or xilY go around trem, the defending
forces will have to concentrate their efforts mainly in these corri-
dors.
The organization of Cho dyfense will haws to be altered to a
certain extent, depending upon the execution of missions by troops,
the drop in the radiation level, and the cr~atiozr. of new contami-
nated zones. In our opinion, it gill be more? necessary on the
defensive th4n on the offensive to replace f'orc.ea ~e~hich have re-
ceived the maximum posei,ble dose of radiation, and also to with-
draw them from regi.ona with high l t~~rel~i of radiation to nc1a~ defen-
sive lines or cox-rido.a o~ operation.
In conditions of radioactive contaminatio~a of terrain, the
mcvement of tk~oops forward becomes considerabl;~ more complicated,
especially when the second echplona (reserWFB~ are being committed;'
to battle. When moving troops from the rear in compliance with the
situation, including a radiative situation, it will be necessary to
consider a grea:.er number of alter~nat~ methods of introduc~?ion than
was done in the yc~ara of the Great Patriotic War (World War YI~,
and to refine or even change the routes and dir~etions of operations
of divisions and regiments. Often there may be a need to organize a
detour around contaminated ar~~aa through an adjacent corridor, or to
move troops to other :outer for crossing those areaa~.:of the move at
accelerated speed, using protective means. In cau.nection with this,
Cho necessity arises, in addition, to coordinate? mattexc of morrement
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anti opercLtions of forces of ud~ucout diviaiune and even larger units.
As u consequence of torrui,rr contcLminution, therh is incvirtably
created the throat of dofecLt of thoac+ forces and fire-poorer which,
at a given time, doplay themselves over u giver- Locution. To avoid
the defeat of these forer,s, including rout urea units, and the con-
tuminution of mutariel by radioactive substunc,rs, the most diverse
macLSUrer~ may be token. One of tt~e ~aost acceptable measures is the
withdruv-ul of troops and the transfer of rear area units from con-
tuminuted tt~rritory into uncontaminated areue. But this i,a not al-
wuya us Busily uccomplitabed us may seem ut first glance. 1ldditional
irradiation of personnel may occur in new regions due to the absence
of cover, since in the course of tran~aferring troops and materiel,
raucleur strikes and enemy fire are not precluded. Therefore, the
probleme of preserving the combat efficiency of troops located in
fortified areas and in the rear muc~t also be resolved, proceeding
from the specific radiative situation and di.spoaitian and designation
of divisional and regimental units. It will be necessary, for exam-
ple, to .calculate trhat doe,e of irradiation they will have, thking
into account that already received, if they continue to occupy re-
gions in cont~xminated territory, or if they transfer to new areas,
what supplieA must be preserved above others for the security of
troops already in operation, and so on.
Of course, first and foremost, it will be~ ne~reksary to withdraw
into new areas those troops and rear area units who have received
high levels of radiation; their defeat is no.t precluded even when
th~.y have taken all kclown measures and methods of protection. And
some~timss it gill prove advantageous to bring troops closer to the
frornt ahead of the deadline, especially if their immediate commit-
ment to battle is bring contemplated. The transfer of troops must
be ac~ompliahed embothly, and swiftly, observing all measures of
camouflage and protection,
A radiative situation has a profound effect upon the control
of troopr~y it complicates it and increases the volume of work for
commanders and HQ's. A great deal trill depend upon the ability to
foresee the radiative situation, to evaluate 'it quickly and correc?.-
ly, and,:. in connection with this, to determine the most advantageous
direction and ncethods of troop operations, adopting corresponding
decisions and delivering them to those who will carry them cut. A
constantly changing radiative situation brill require alternate, often
personal directives to the troops.
Along with equipping fOrCES with individual protective means Ind
with means of special to?eatment, the continuous observation of radi-
ation and the timely information. of forces and rear arez unite con=
cerning impending radioactive contamination of terrain based on the
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observation of the direction and epoed of the radioactive cloud
talces on important significance in the course of combat operations.
Special preventative measures, aimed at increasing the resist-
ance of the human organism to they affect of radioactiv;~ suibstances
t~s well as corresponding prspa,rution of combat and transport mate-
+?a~I are also necessary. Under any circumstances, IiQ's need to
establish continuous control over the irradiation of personnel, to
organize and swiftly crsrr,~ out the liquidation of the alE~ter-effects
and the swift restoration of the combat efficiency of v,nits.
The content, extent, and order of condur.ting these measures
mttiy vary. They depend upon the type of combat operation and also
upon the .expected and established overall operational situation,
including the radiative situation.
The data on ?the radiative situation must be obtained both by
intelligence forces and facilities, and by all operating ground
forces and aviatiaa, so that the commanders and HQ's are ab1E to
notify in time those groupings which are in the most danger, and to
specify if needed, earlier adopted decisions and designate new
methods of ~ror~p operations which insure precise: and swift execu-
tion of combat missions. When envisioning operations in contami-
naE,ed territory, it will be necessary to hermetically seal combat
and transport vehicles, and to make the nece~s,9ary adaptations on
them. The protert,ion of stationary and portable rations and medical
supplies must be ,specially reliable, and for this it is necessary
to use standard o"nd improvised means which protect against contami-
nation by radioactive dust.
Most cotaplex is the elimination of the irradiation after~?-effects
to personnel and the contamination of combat materiel by radioactive
substances for the swift restoration of" L~n~ combat e"fficie^ncy of
troops. This will oftJ~n be bound together ~eitlt the necE?ssity of re~-
placing and t,emZ~orarily withdrawing units from romliat for tlae purpose
of giving special and medical treatment to personnel and tine decon-
tamiuation of combat materiel.
Sometimes it trill be necessary to resort to an e-racuation of
those troops erho receive significant doss. of irradiation nut just
beyond the rontaminatsd territory into safe areas, but also into the
interior.
For the tomstant knowledge of tme radia?t3~e~ situation and an
account of its changes, in our opinion it is, nea~essary t,o set up in
operations IIQ's a special map frith representations of th.: ce~anters
of the nto.clear strikes of bath sides, the times and altitudes of the
strikes, the boundaries of the zones of contamination t,Inus formed,
pprove or a ease
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and the rudiation levels, also the probuble ehangos in radiation
ac~c.ording to time, direction, the speed of movement of the rudfo-
clctivr. cloud, etc. In a tactical unit it is possible to confine one-
self' to plotting the data of the radiative situation on a general
aitua tion map.
They problems of a radiative situation, most likely, will bo
ref'l~acted in orul information as well as in written combat reports.
It is advisable to keep a record of radioactivo irradiation of por-
sonnel in separate journals based on the general and special reports
periodically presented at headqua,rt~ars.
All of this data will be the basis for an evaluation of the
radiati?~re situation when planning combat operations and when adopt-
ing or elaborating decisions, wheffi making calculations, connected
'with the determination of the 4ummary doses which can be taken in
ty trroops operating on contaminated terrain, and also when deciding
other matters concerning the control of tKOOps and security of their
operata.o~aa.
The protection of personnel of command elements from radio-
active substances is organized by HQ jointly with heads of service
braz~chea. In doing this, the skillful selection of primary and
alternate areas for the disposition of control points, determina-
tion of the order and speed of their transfer out of contaminated
t~sritory has great significance. As far as possible, movement
thu~orr.gh contaminated zones is to be avoided, as xell as disposi-
tions within them, especially if there is no special man??made cover.
For the swift transfer of control points, it is advisable to use air
transport.
Wren conducting combat operations under conditions of a radi-
ative situation, the volume of problems which are handled by the
rear area in connection with the need to preserve materiel from the
contamination of radioactive substances multiplies significantly,
and the wrork in connection xith these materials and the evacuation
of the sir.;c and wounded is complicated.
Supplying troops with. materiel brought by the '.,?-ansport men-
tioned above must be attec:pted in uncon:,amirated areas or at least
with short halts in areas xith low levels of radiation, using motor
convoy routes moat favourable in respect to radiation and also mech-
anized means of loading and unloading. It is evident tTiat ~t xill
be necessary to increase the stores of materiel close to the troops,
to systematically prepare and maintain roads i'n rear areas, to in-
crease the maneuverability oi' reA.r area units, and to employ air
transport for the shipping of materiel.
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to conclusion it should be emphasizod that the Icnown difficul-
tios which arc croatod whon planning and conducting combat o peratione
under conditions .of radioactivo contamination of ter~rafn are entirely
surmou~r,table if commanders, headquarters, and forces are preparQd for
them beforehand.
Future theoretical alaborution of matters concerrning the oper-
ations of troops under conditions of radioactive contamination of
terrain will contribute to the raising of the level of their oper-
ational and combat training.
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CPYRGHT
NAVAL SUPPORT OF' GRUUND I~`ORCES
By Capta i n l s t Runk N. V' yunenlco
Equipping ,ships and navA1 aircraft with nuclear rocltet weapons
hwa further increased the Navy's striking power. Due to roc1cet-
carr~-ing surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, the Nuvy has not
only become capable of destroying large groupings of the enemy's
navy at sea as well ua destroying targets deep in the rear and anni-
hilating concentrations of troops on land. Because of this, the mis-
sio~ns of the Navy and the methods of carrying them out have been re-
~avaluat~id. We will ezamine what new aspects have appeared in the
~"ie~ld of naval support of ground troop "soyedineniya" and"Ob'yedinen-
iya"# att+xcking in littoral sectors.
Naval support of ground troops was widespread in past wars.
Thi~r concept sometimes included all naval operations, even those con-
ducted by its forces independently, outside the realm of ground troop
operations and having only an indirect relation to them. But inas-
much as naval s~ucceases had a definite effect on the situation on
the Ian~l front, where the main goals of the war were usually attained,
it xas thought that the decic-ions a#'fect,ing all naval missions was
subordinate to direct support of ground troop operations on the
coastal front. In our opinion, only those naval operations which
area dependent on the purposes and aims of the operations being con-
ducted by coastal fronts should be regarded as sulaport of land forcE~s
operations in litttorul azes.
During the Great Patriotic War (World War II~ our Na~-y concen-
trated a large share of its efforts for direct support of ground
tr:rops, both in offensive and defensive operations. The theory of
naval art eren included an operation for supporting ground troops
on the shore. All naval operations ~rere determined by a purpose --
either to facilitate the advance of group troop "chasti"*~ and "soyed.-
ineniya" along the shore or to provide shore defense for them from
gtriIces of ensmy surface ships and ~mphihious landings, or coastal
groupings of hostile troops. The most important individual,misaions
vvJCUluCill~ts l9 tL uII1L or alvlsionul size Or over.
"Ob'yedineniya" is an "Army" or "Front" (a unification of Armies.
(Translator's note
A "chasti" is a unit of regimental size. (Translator's note.
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of this operation, as i~c known, were artillery support of ground
troops from the sea, the landing of tactical amphibious forces, the
destruction of enemy naval forces supporting their own troops, de-
struction of enemy naval lines of communication by which coastal
groupings received supplies, and protection for friendly lines of
communication which directly connected the troops with rear lines
on the shore.
To a considerable degree our former ideas concerning ground
troop support have retained their significance. But today the Navy
has new missions; for example, the destruction of surface ships and
submarines carrying noel+ear rocket weapons at sea. Ilt the same
time, a number of those missions have been retained whose fulfill-
ment by naval forces creates favorable conditions for the operations
of ground troops.
Modern ground forces, being highly mobile, can conduct combat
operations at very high tempo. They are able to destroy with their
weapons important targets even in the operational depth cf the enemy
and can destroy amphibious landing forces thereby ensuring the rapid
advance of friendly "chasti" and "soyedineniya" in the utnth of the
enemy defense. However, it would be incorrect to think that in a
nuclear war the need of naval support for their operations ~YOUld be
lessened.
The h'a~?y possesses great potential for successfully combattin~~
hostile naval forces that will certainly give opposition to troops
operation in coastal areas as well as areas adjac~:nt to them. It is
true that the forces and means at the disposal of ground troops, as
pointed out, could be used to combat a naval enemy which is attempt-
ing to hinder them from accomplishing a combat mission on shore. But
they are less effective than those at the disposal of the Navy, a,nd,
consequently, to divert them to fight against naval targets is less
desirable. Moreover, transferring even a small portion of the troops'
nuclear rocket weaponry for the destruction of naval targets has an
adverse~e~ffect on the combat efficiency of groups carrying out the
main missions of routing enemy forces on land.
successful des~,ruction by the Navy of enemy naval units not only
leads to a radical improvement of the situation in littoral areas,
which i.n itself faciiita+,,es accomplishment of combat Missions by
ground troops, but also makes it possible for them to keep a signi-
ficant part of their striking power for operations in the whole depth
of littoral areas,. Therefore, even in modern conditions, ground
troops advancing in littoral areas will constantly feel the need for
naval support.
In what forms are naval operations in support of ground troops
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expressed and what changes should be oxpected in ;this field? A na-
val operation in support of ground troops as a form of activity fur
achieving the operational goal of troop support has long been out
of date. The majority of missions, which have determined its scope
and content, have now become morn enlarged, but not to the extent
that accompli;ahing each of them would constitute a spocial oper-
ation, even though it might yield enormous operational results (for
example, amphibious landings in the depth of the operational forma-
tion. of opposing hostile forces, destruction of enemy naval forces
supporting their own troops . Today the operational goals can be
achieved in a short period of time by the infliction of powerful
strikes by- ground and Navy forceA directly on tho main targets of
the basic concentrations of enemy forces at sea and on shore.
Ir: our opinion, an operation in support of ground forces rani
be converted into the accomplishment of combat activity by various
types of naval Forces in which practically every naval mission is
fulfilled (combatting the strik.in~~ forc!~s of the enemy's navy, his
amphibious landings, destruction of naval communications, protection
of our own spa Ianes, strikes on land targets, landing amphibious
forces. This circumstance, which gives all naval operations in
support of troops enormous scope, at the same time precludes using
them in a single operational formation. Indeed, how is it possible
to think that in NATO naval exercises, aircraftt carrier task forces
maneuvering in the Bay of Biscay or the 1~iediterranean Sea and
supporting troops in the European theater, and submarines with
Polaris missiles taking positions in the Norwegian Sea and inflict-
ing strikes on land targets in the interests o.f these same troops,
comprise elementA of one and the same .opsrationc~l formation of naval
forces supporting ground troops?
We suggest that strike, antisubmarine, and amphibious task
forces of ships, submarines, and aircraft by their very nature and
sphere of application are so different from each other as to pre-
clude any single formation of them for executing missions in sup-
port of ground troops.
The nature of naval suppo.~rt of ground troops in offensive oper-
ations in littoral areas will be different than it used to be. Today
it is no,longer required that naval forces and all their operations
be attached directly to the flank of ground troops moving toward the
sea. The Navy can effectively support those groups which are carry-
ing out their missions in the heart of the mainland and the Navy it-
self can be located a great distance from the shore. Formerly, these
naval operations only indirectly affected the situation in which
troop operations were being developed, but today this influence will
be direr+.,. ~imong these types are naval operations against aircraft
carrier groups whose aircraft are supporting troops in one of the
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operational areas of a theater of military operations.
~~~~~ ~~
Combatting the enemy's navy has acquired a primary significance
in the mutter of supporting ground troops. Naval aircraft from
carriers and land bases will be a constant threat to the troops.
They will begin to show the greatest activity in suppoft of their
own troops in the development of combat o perations on land following
delivery by the belligerents of powerful nuclear strikes using stra-
tegi.e weapons. Naval aviation, having pr eserv9d its arms, gill
attempt to fill the gap in the ground support role which may pe
caused by the destruction of a significant portion of land-based
ui rcraft.
Let us examine the cr~?tical importance of combatting naval air-
craft,, which area threat to many branches and arms of the armed
forces. The battle against naval aircraft will not be directly
linked with providing support for any one? grouping of ground troops.
Nonetheless, the destruction of carrier sti?ilco task groups of air-
craft carriers, fnr example, will significantly weaken the enemy air
forces. This is very important for the troops conducting operations
in littoral sectors and sectors aujacent to them.
Considerable attention is being given to development of methods
for the employment of naval aircraf t. For example, daring US and
NATO naval operational training, carrier- based aircraft, in addi-
tion to improving methods of delivering nuclear strikes on targets
i.n the enemy rear, systematically develop methods for air support
of ground troops. The NATO Command believes that aircraft carriers
will be shifted into joint operations with ground troops after carri-
er-based aircraft have accomp?ished their mission in a so-called
general nuclear offensive Therefore, the destruction of even a
portion of naval aircraft significantly 1 e ssene theenemy nuclear
strike. force from the sera to land targets and will narrow the scope
of air support for hostile troop operations in littoral sectors.
Rocket-carrying submarines may also threaten ground troops from
the sea during an nuclear war. They are able to deliver surprise
nuclear strikes from any direction of the sea and from distances of
1,000 km. or more. It is true that this i s a strategic weapon sys-
tem and that its basic purpose is to deliver goweiCful nuclear mis-
sile strike; on Iarge, stationary area targets, which could be mili-
tary-industrial and administrative-political centers or important
military targets in the heart of tha country. The use of submarine-
launched Polaris missiles directly against ground troops, as the US
press writes, is unlikely Nevertheless, the possibility that this
weapon might be employed on large coucentra tions of ground troops in
certain cases has not been excluded.
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Destroying submarines and preventing them from using their
armament is one of th.e navy's primary missions. It will be accom-
plished by naval forces independently from the very beginning of
the war. I~p successful execution (similar to the successful
struggle against naval aircraf t~ will mean immediate elimination
of the throat of nuclear-?missile strikes 'from the seas not only on
rear Large ta, but also on concentrations of gr~~und troops, which
will certainly create favorable conditions for coos tal operations.
The navy's basic metht+d of combatting missile-carrying air-
craft is systematic search and immediate destruction of them by sub-
mari~aes, ships, arid, aircraft. .Against missile-carz-ying~ surface and
other ships the meEhod is joint or separate strikes, chiefly by sub-
marines and missile-carrying aircraft. In the past, the decisive
factor making i?, possible to conduct a successful struggle against
submarines was the creation of ship hunter-killer gx?oups. They
literally hunted sub>marines. Combat situation now includes air-
craft as Drell. Today, in a number of navies, hunter-Iciller groups
of submarines, aircraft, and surface ships have been created to com-
bat misa~ile-carrying submarines. They a;^~e assigned to continuously
:'heck areas of the sea, from wl~?ich it is possible to launch rockets
from underwater, and to destroy all ftete~cte:d underwc~.ter targets.
If necessary, mine barriers hampering the movement, into launching
position by hostile, missile-carrying submarines may be erected in
certain areas of the sea. Erecting ?chem can decrease the front of
the active struggle s.gainst ~;nemg* submarinos.
Another important enemy strategic weapon which can also be used
under certain conditian.s against groupings of ground troops and tar-
g~~^ts in the depth of their operational area is surface and transport
ships ~quiplaed with the very same Polaris missiles. l'rt the present
Limo a great deal of attention is bring given to the development of
these forces, called chameleon ships in the U.S. press. Although
not al.l of their capabilities are discussed in the foreign press,
it can be assumed that in a certain situation the enemy will attempt
to use this weapon t?o supl;art the operations of? their troops. That
is why "ob'yedineniya" (units above division level of ground troor~,3
will be no less interested than the navy itself in a .favorable out-??
come of the struggle against enemy naval strike forces.
Certain peculiarities are inherent in the operations of naval
strike forces under the conditions of anuclear-missile war. This
is bPCause the struggle against enemy carriers with rocket weapons
does not need to be linked !rth the salutinn of specific missions
on land. It should be a continuous, systematic :struggle. The de-
struction at sea of an enemy ship with rocket capt~.bility is impor-
tant to the same degree as the successful destruction of racket
installations in the line of advance of ground troops. Tha?;~, is why
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combating thc~ ~~nomy's navy (~noro precisoly, combating that purtioti
of his forcos which aro doployad oix ttio open sea, oven if fur from
the shor+~, when such fUX'Ces are porhups dirt~ctod aguittst ground
troops should be~ rogurdod uh ciaval s+tpport for friondly attuckin~,
troops.
In the not too distant past naval forces carr~iad out missions
In the interests of ground troops in tactical and, less f roquantly,
in operational cooperation wi*~h thorn. Moreovor, the navy muinl;y
oporrsto~~l in coastal waters or at a relatively small distunco from
its shores. Today naval operations have talcen on cortsiderablN
independence. Its "eoyedineniya" (task groups , in destroying
enemy rocket-carrying aviation forces in remote areas of tl~e ocoan,
will perform this mission xithout coordination xith the ground
troops. But in destroying or weakening grouping~~, of enemy naval
force, the navy will be supporting the operations of ground troops
in the moat direct method and, by doing su, will contribute :;~ the
overall goal of routing the enemy. At the same time, however, using
naval force in a~:srational and even in tactical coopern+.i on with tpre
troops has not ~+een excluded. But this is charact~ristir: for per-
fon'ning other missions.
The problem of combating surface ships of the enemy operating
in the immediate ~aicinity of the coast is clo.~ely related to the
problem of combating +~ircraft and rocket-carrying submarines.
Essentially, the execution of this task formerly consisted of pro-
viding cover for a grouping of ground troops against enemy attacks
from the sea. It included the destruction of "artillery" ships
which were trying to fire :;a important targets in the coastal zonN.
A similar problem still exists under present conditions. Ilowever,
it has acquired a completely different meaning as a result of the
above-mentioned changes in armament and, consequently, the increased
combat capabilities of naval forces.
During 'World War II, large +xarst~ipa, maialy battleships and
cruisers, inflicted heavy losses on troops operating along the
coast by heavy fire with their lung range gLq,nr~, and forced such
troops to halt their advance. Ylith the acq+aisition of rocket wea-
pons, it is unlikely that even ships 4rith long range guns would be
used for this purpose. Hoxeve~^, there non exists a threat of shell-
ing important targets not onto from ships but also from missile
ships. ?~.t present, attack,a f~ro~a ships and particularly frcm mis-
sile boats, which come close to the shore at the time of firing,
may result in heavy destruction. If decisive and prompt counter-
action is not taken against these ships, they would be able, ~!ith
their effective firing range, to inflict heavy losses on individual
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Kruupinpa of troops, demolish rend ,lunetic~na, bridges, ferries, and
coastal airfields, and thereby hinder the, eucr.esaful completion of
operations.
Afilitnry sppcialista in different cuuntric?s have noted the
~rrent supc?riarity of ships carrying abort-rangr_ miseries over ground
troop rockr.t launchers. Theca china ere mere mobile than ground
rorknt units; that' nrc+ Highly maneuverable bath before and after
using the w~+npon, nncl that' can fire on coastal turgata practically
Pram arty ut'fshora seen. l;van Frith nn eronamicnl axpanditura of
forces, the coastal defender could ba forced to have n grant Wombat
a: diffarer-t. forces and equipment itt order to retain the coast line
nnc; ~,~- provide affRCtiye counteraction ngninst the enemy fleet.
According to occasional stntrroarate in the prase, the aparntions
of lnrga surfnca ships nq~~inst cac-stal targets era cansidorad im-
prncticnl nt the peasant Lima. IU nppranching the coast, it is
difficult for them to remain undetected and they can be quickly
destroyed even by coastal defectsa weapons. For this reason it is
believed that it would ba mart effective to oparnte missile boats
n~nr the coast. Owing to the fact that that' peeaant smeller targets
far radar, that' c:nn stealthily enter offshore launching Wrens and
the*ir rockets can hit impaYtnnt retests an the coast.
Ona might agree with this paint of view if ell rackets installed
on ships and missile boats weer to have the sump, and in this cnsa,
short ?nnge. 13ut actually, the longer the range of rockets, the
greater is their size; consequently, larger ships must be used for
currying the rockets. In atltar wards, the lnrg~r the missile ship,
the longer the dietnr,ce Pram which it is able to hit conete-1 targets
c-nd the leas need there will be for the ship to come close to the
shore. AL present ttptstinl missile-carrying ships are under cons~ruc-
tic,n in foreign couri.ries !'ar firing on coc-stal Uirgrts. For eznm-
plc, carcase rocket carriers are being built far the West German
armed farces, in addition to ships equipped yith conventional troapors.
Therefore, oar should trot abandon the inveatigution of effective meth-
ods of con;bnting eurfncc~ ships, including large ones.
The opinion hue boon stc-ted n t Limes that surface ships of the
enemy should bo combatted by the Hurry together with ground troops,
pnrticulnrly with their rockat weapons, c~nd also by fighter-bombers.
Of courAe, in meet' instances this will be the case. however, ono
should not forget that the rocket weapons of ground troops (of the
"lioneet John" and "Corporal" type ere supposed to be used for the
destruction of semi-mobile and predominantly area targets. Their
use ngninst. highly mobile, floating targets is not very effective
and not even profi?..c~ble. However, the use of fighter-bomber carry-
ing rockets would have n greeter effect. Unfortunately, they will
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ulwaye~ be put into aporutiou complataly ovor land zones. Moreover,
Ll~a wa,ipoees used on aircruCt are more cupablr of Fitting land tur-
grts than nautical targets. One whauld also ~'ulce rota account that
it would bo undesirable to usu aircraft opera,. -tg jointly with troops
far combating a naval onemy, since this would r. .+con LIa~ direct auP-
part of ground troops vngagc~d in nontinuing comkr~.t or~rutions un land.
Surfacu ships of tha unclmy, which supfiort their troops on land,
cuu b~- d~~stroye:d by sul~murines, aircraft, and r.ven by coc-stul rocket
ue~its. This will b4 of green help to tho troops, attics they will
be rEaliHVed of the necossity to detail u considerable part of their
forces to c:austul dofottso against an utt,uck by oneroey surface ships.
In add'~tiun t,o tho task of destroying enemy ships, one? of the
tasks of t,;te navy is Lo provide fire support for amphibious forces
and fo, rho advancing units of ground troops. Ground troops equipped
with lung range rockets and nuclear weapons would now, of course, b~~
c,ipuble of hitting var,lous targets in the depth of the enemy defens7~.
without resorting to the help of naval ships. however, under cer-
tain conditions, such us naval support of troops opc+ruti:ng in moun-
tuinaue regions or in the Arctic, missile boats and rocket-?currying
ships may be more successful in using their weapons far the benefit
of the troops than the troops themselves would be able to do. This
xould bA the3 case especially in hitting targets located very close
to the water. Naturally, in such cases it will be necessary to seek
the support of surface ships for troops on the coast.
New methods have oleo been planned for tine t~se of amphibious
landing forces. :n a numl,er of coastal toners, troops cannot arrays
advance independently ut high speeds, without the help of the navy.
A rapid advance of combined-arms "soyedineniyu" is hindered by river
estuaries, straits, and channels, which are very difficult to cross
on the march. The enemy will attempt to use these features to create
defensive lines. The river-crossing equipment of the ground troops
alone will, of course, be insufficien~.t to overcome these grater barri-
ers at high speed. It will be necessary to use naval ships both for
landing amphibious troops in the depth behind the enemy defense and
for organizing rapid river crossings by troops. This is one of the
moat reliable methods of guaranteeing a high speed of advance of
troops along the coast. This method has justified itself in the past
and it xill be retained in the future. It is true that special ships
and landing equipment are necessary for ti~is purpose. The navies of
many countries have various types oi' landing craf t.
The purpose of amphibious landing operations in support of troop
advances was usually the penetration of shore defenses and the capture
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of important fortified points on the coast. As an exrxmplo, wo might
mention the Novorosaiyslc landing operrtion of tho Blaelc Sea Ploet,
which took ~1ace in September 1943.
Under present conditii~ns, a landing operation would hardly have
the same purpose. Now ite main purpose would be a joint opo~ration
with troops udvancing?from the front to complete ?the routing of an
enemy grouping.
Amphibious landing operations may also talce place in the roar
of the enemy for the purpose of occupying a portion of the coastal
area and rapidly developing an offensive from there in the depth of
defe-nsR, to prevent the enemy from forming any strike forces against
the troops advancing along the coast.
Tree U.S. Navy has assault helicopter carriers, dock landing
ships, troop and freight transport ships, supply ships, and others,
for the landing of troops. It has a total of more than 250 landing
ships and 350 smaller landing craft. According to the foreign press,
almost all of these craft have an "age limit." Most of them, i.e.,
80 percent, ~rere built during the war and are able to serve not more
than three to five additional years.
U.S. military theoreticians believe that the landing of large
amphibious forces may form the basis of an "amphibious warn" In
o they r-orda, amphibious operations at sea may be considered as
of'fe~naive operation~e, xhich have the purpose of taking possession
of large islands, straits, naval bases, or important coastal areas.
These operations will be conducted by the joint efforts of front-
line formations of ground troops and naval Forces, with adequate air
support. The composition of landing forces and the methods of com-
bat opt~rations arc subordinated to the idea of providing a fast
tempo of troop movements within the area to be liberated from the
enemy. Amphibious operations may also represent the first step in
deploying gro~~nnd troops for combat in new operational directions,
and possibly in theaters of operations where no groupings of ground
troops had previously existed.
In the past, amphibious forces were often landed within the
tactical depth of enemy defense. Therefore, in order to be success-
ful they had to connect rapidly with the advancing troops. Now,
however, an amphibious force should also be landed in the rear area
so that it may affect the whole depth of. deployment of enemy forces.
The landing of amphibious forces (with the exception of reconnais-
aance groups slightly ahead of advancing troops may lose the signi-
ficance which was formerly attached to it. An amphibious force,
~-hich has been landed at a short distance from the troops launching
an attack along the shore line, may not even have time to carry out
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its assignments before the uppr~oar?h of the rapidly moving divisions
operating from the front. In this connection, the depth of landing
of an amphibious force must bc~ culculate?d fn swch a way that the
lundirig force, after seizing un area, may have time to regroup quick-
ly on the move and act decisively to forestall the enemy in capturing
important positions fn the depth of defense and preventing the enemy
from hixidering the advance of troops moving along thc~ shore.
The L'.S? Navy has conducted a large number of exer~cisc~s in
landing amphibious forces, I'or example, in 1959 U?S. amphibious
forces in Korea conducted an, exercise involving th.e~~ Landing ~f a
force in the rear of the "enemy," whose advance was checlcti~d by the
defending side. Immediately after the landing, the amphibious force
had to occupy important sectors in the? rear of the "at?tacking" +~orce
and, by its actions, to create suitable conditions for the troops to
pass from the defensive to the of!?ensive and to capture, during
movement, important objectives in the depth of "e:nemy" territory.
A Marine brigade, a helicopter squadron, 38 ships of the U~,S. ?th
Fleet, including one attack aircraft carr.~ier, 8 destroyers, 2 sub-
marines, 23 transport ships and LSTs, and units oi' land-based avia-
tion took part in this exercise. Similar exercises wore conducted
in the fall of 1960 in the North Seu and the Norwegian Sea during
Operation "Cool Time."
The order of landing amphibious forces has also changed from
that which was in effect at the end of World War II and during the
first postwar exercises. To speed up the time of preparation and
landing, the landing force must be of a combination type, i . e. , it
should consist of airborne, helicopter, and amphibious units. Air-
borne and helicopter landing forces, equipped with small arms, can
quickly occupy key positions. in the enemy defense. The task of ar-
amphibious force, which has heavy equipment, i.a~o, mainly tanks,
heavy rocket launchers, and antiaircraft equipment to provide cover
for all lc,nding troops and ships during the landing and the subse-
quent combat operations, will consist in quickly occ:w~py%ng part of
the territory held by the Enemy and starting operations in support
of the troops advancing from the front.
The speed of landing must be as high as possible. This neces-
sitates the use of near landing equipment with greater speed of oper-
ation, capacity, and mobility. This requir~eme~nt is mat most com~
pletely by the equipmei.c a~railable in the navies of soma countries,
such as fast moving dock landing ships, which are able to land amphi-
bious forces with their oHrn floating equipment on the move. A trans-
port dock ship with a displacement of about [illegible] can simul-
taneously carry on board up to 1,000 marines, 10 amphibious craft,
6 to 12 helicopters, and 2,500 tons of freight. ThE operational
speed is 20 knots (up to 9!0 kilometers per hourj. Work is in progress
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in a number of Gauntries for dcysignin;y a ship which would combine
t,txo c;ualitic~s of u helicopter currf~~r and a duck transport ship.
'Plic:~ possfbilitius of building submarine uruiorwuter landing croft
11+LVCr also boon studied extensively.
Thr~o ways huvo boon suggested for improving the tactical
capabilities of so-culled light +imphibiuus forces, i.o., thc!ir
landing equipment. Such improvements would include the introduc-
tion of hydrofoil croft, the dovolopr~ont of air-cushioned motor
vehicles and ships, and the use of gas turbines +ls the principal
power on landing shape. Tho course of ciovolol aunt of now boats,
amphibious croft, and amphibious wh+.~oled motor vehicles has boon
px+:cisaly laid down. Tho hull outline& huvo boon improved, rA~
tractable whe~o:s hove boon installed, and the engine power has
br:d~n increased. The use of aluminum as basic material will enable
whe~~lad'motor vehicles to develop higher speeds. The installation
of retractable hydrofoils will in~.reuse the speed of movement 8 to
fr times. All these types of equipment ran be used for the landing
of troops, and some of them for transport of heavy equipment, in
ani ch case i t wi 11 not be necessurp f'or amphibious detachments to
.spend many days being shipped by sea.
In addition to amphibious landing equi~nent in the U.S. and
British navies, they plan to make e~xte~nsive use of helicopters,
Fu:rticularly far landing advance units. Ono of the British Navy
~rhip~ specially adapted for this purpose is the aircraft carrier
B~~l?rrd by many bourgc>ois idttuluginL,s tip n mennrt of presrrving
thc~ remnants of tbr. culurrlal syntrm and st,rc~nJrtht~nir~Jt the capitrtl-
i~~t,ir. catt-ucturt~. IL would br. props-r to rxpuae thr dart[3er of local
~t~rta fur thr cauNCr of peace. Lht* pussibiliLy of their dttvr.lupittg
into a ~?urld nucl~~ur tar. IL is all thr more nrrrbeury Lu ;}a this,
s;rcr.e_ certain pulitir~ul fi~;ur~+a of t,hc~ West uJ-rrr,l,y t1~*clurr. t,hut
they will nc-t heal Lett to ust> nuclrat rrc>apurrs in 2or.u1 wttrr~. '1'hue,
}oral wars, unleas}rrd by the imp~~riulistp, art: a direct path to a
Murld nur,lt.?ar catat+trul-hy. In our uJtiniun iL would be. advisable to
elevate a st-paratt~ paragraph to th~> cii-bcuesict-t of the p-?ublrm rorr-
ceruinq world and local tors.
In rxumining the rrlutiunship be>t,wr~en war Lind th~~ socialist
ravulutiun, the authors show ronclusivcly tht.~ currectrress of the
liurxist~Loniniat trnt_>t that the d~termiring cuust* of revolution is
nut war, but drop social antagonisms urtd thr rise of a class struggle
within thc+ country. "War only shurpoas these antugotrisms, c^nhunces
the political uctivit of the musso,~, and incitos them to revolution-
ary actionL." (p. 124 Anutr.er c~quully important conclusion is cor-
rectly eubstuntiutedt "~l net world war, which will ttrke on un unpre-
cedented destructive nature and xhich will lead to thn d~atruction
of hundreds of millions of pQOple, r..ot only would not accelerate,
but ?ould delay the transition of humanity to socialism; without +rar,
man will make the trunsiLicn to socialism more rapidly and easily."
(p. 12~) It can only be hoped that th