SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL' ', NO 9, SEPTEMBER 1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090017-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 10, 1966
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATION
Number 960 10 May 1966
SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM " V O ' Y E N N A Y A MYSL ? "
;99 2, September 1265
~-l OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
I CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Voyennaya Mysi' (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of
the USSR Ministry of De:r?nse, printed by the ministry's Mil-
itary Publishing House, Aoscow. The articles translated be-
low are from rssue No 9, September 1965 which was signed for
the press 18 August 1965.
Engineering Support of the Combat Operations
of Rocket Troops in an Offensive, by Col K.
Lapshin
The Search for a Solution to the Problems of
Antimissile Defense in the US, by Engr-Lt
Col V. Aleksandrov (based on foreign press
materials)
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CPYRGHT IN AN OFFENSIVE
by Col. K rAPSIIIN
In modern offensive operations the combat actions of rocket troops,
because of the mass use of nuclear weapons, will., it is generally agreed,
take place in difficult circumstances. It may be assumed that the deploy-
ment of rocket units and their operations will be carried out under con-
ditions of great destruction of roads, bridges and water-crossings, the
outbreak of extensive fires in towns and forests, and wide-spread radio-
active contamination of the ground. Unless effective measures are under-
taken to reduce the unfavorable effects of these factors, the combat and
maneuver capabilities of the rocket troops will be greatly reduced.
Rocket troops are the main means of fire-power in an offensive opera-
tion. Therefore the defending side naturally will do everything possible
to inflict an attack first of all on the rocket weapons, using nuclear
and conventional weapons, various kinds of landing and even diversionary
forms of attack.
Hence we may conclude that in an offensive there will arise such
critical problems as providing for rapid maneuver, dependable anti-nuclear
I::'otecti on, constant readiness to fight against landings and diversionary-
and-intelligence groups of the enemy. These problems are met by various
measures, including engineering ones.
The increased scope and high creeds of an offensive operation make
a number of operational demands on the engineering support of the combat
operations of rocket troops. It is very important that the engineering
measures be carried out in the briefest time, and in a timely and con-
cealed manner, otherwise they will not assure the readiness of the units
for rocket launching. It is especially necessary to prepare quickly
routes of movement and areas of deployment.
In the zone of attack, as in known these is created a ramified net-
work of frontal and lateral routes of movement. For movement of the
rockets to the areas of deployment, it is desirable to allot to them the
best routes, and by order of the senior command keep them free for a cer-
tain period of time from the movement of other troops and military loads.
This measure will facilitate the unhindered and rapid movement of the
rocket troops into the designated' areas and the timely bringing up of
the rockets.
However, even with roads prepared in advance, the movement of rocket
troops will often meet with difficulties. There may be destruction and
radioactive contamination of the roads from nuclear attacks. There may-
also be. expected the use by the, side on the defensive of mine and explo-
sive obstacles, arranged on the communication routes of the attackers by
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 the ?B F1IQR'Iea$ 2 09 : AbRDP9MO8 ?OaI QQ 017o8pc .
There o e various kinds of road work may be necessary on the routes of
movement of the rocket units. The clearing away of forest obstacles, de-
contamination of the roadways, and extinguishing of Wires will be es..
pecially difficult.
In order that destruction on the roads may not disrupt the timely
moving up of the rocket troops into the areas of deployment, it is impor-
tant constantly to provide for measures to assure the direct movement of
columns on the march. In particular, it is advisable in the rocket troops
to create, from the engineering podrazdeleniya, movement support detach-
ments (OOD), like those which are organized in the ground troops. these
detachments, moving at the head of the column, will remove obstacles and
destruction which may be created even after the passage of the reconnais-
sance podrazdeleniya.
In presenting the problem of creating the OOD, we foresee possible
objections. But it is not a matter of what to call the engineer podraz-
deleniya which move ahead of the column of rocket weapons: whether OOD
or something else. After all, it is important that there be at the head
of the column on the march engineering units with the necessary equip-
ment--road mine-detectors., road layers, mechanized bridges, 'etc .
Also of great importance for increasing the speed of movement of
rocket troops is the training of personnel in simple road work in negotia-
ting difficult -to-traverse sections of the route, in rendering quick
assistance to drivers of combat and transport vehicles, and in the use
of means of increasing the roadability (prokhodi.most') of equipment--tow
ropes and other devices for pulling out stuck vehicles.
In the position areas of the rocket troops it is also necessary to
prepare roads, linking together the elements of the combat formation.
The extent of these is fairly great; therefore their preparation is be-
yond the capabilities of the rocket chasti and podrazdeleniya. It is
especially difficult to do this on terrain which has previously been oc-
cupied by the enemy, because on withdrawing, he will probably mine or
destroy the roads. Here arises the necessity of calling on the forces
and resources of the senior combined-arms commander. It is desirable to
prepare the routes quickly, in advance of the arrival of the rocket weap-
ons. When there is a comparatively small amount of road work to be done,
this is possible. In our opinion it is of great importance correctly to
select the areas to be occupied by the rocket troops during the offensive,
so as to reduce the amount of engineering work for organizing these areas.
In an offensive operation, for troops of the first echelon there is
usually provided preparation of a road network, checking of the terrain
for mines, and other engineering measures in support of their combat
operations. In the interests of speeding up the preparation of routes,
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 CPYRGI-
Ait is a y OrgjW~iJM/n"`' 9p~~1 ..0~"no ftf aces
gc- leas ArDtVf y c caret o:f where
routes have been prepared by troops operating ahead. This makes it pos-
sible to reduce the amount of road and bridge operations and speed up
the preparation of the position areas.
Correct selection of areas for rocket troop deployment is possible
if timely information is received on destruction and obstacles in the
depth of the enemy's defense. Therefore it ir very important to conduct
engineering reconnaissance through the whole depth of the operation, and
quickly report the information obtained to the rocket troops. This will
help in making well-Founded decisions as to the combat use of rockets
and engineering support of the operations of the rocket troops.
A difficult problem, requiring continuous further investigation, is
that of increasing the survivability of rocket troops in a modern offen-
sive operation. Engineering preparation of the areas .of deployment and
their concealment are prominent among various measures of antinuclear
protection. Here the amount of engineering work sharply increases inas-
much as it is necessary to erect a great number of various installations,
especially for protection of personnel and combat equipment. But the
brief periods of time; during which the engineering preparation has to be
accomplished often does not allow this to be done.
Therefore, increase of the survivability of rocket troops can be
acheived only by a complex of operational and engineering and technical
measures for their antinuclear protection. Among the basic operational
measures are the degignation of launch sites in places which have advan-
tageous protective features, the determinatjon.of the optimun distance
between elements of the combat formation, planning and carrying out
timely anti-nuclear maneuvers, selecting the places for disposition of
the rocket weapons in relation to the other elements of the operational
formation, etc. Each of these measures has its definite engineering
aspects.
It is advantageous to select the positions area for rocket troops
in terrain with good natural protection and concealment, which can re-
duce somewhat the total amount of engineering work. A dispersed combat
formation is of great importance for antinuclear protection. However,
we know that such dispersal must be confined to certain limits, in order
not to reduce the combat capabilities of the rocket troops and not to
create difficulties of command and of cooperation between elements of
the combat formation.
The degree of dispersal is usually established with consideration of
the terrain features and the completeness of the engineering organization
of the ground. The more complete the latter is, the less the dispersal
needed. However, research shows that there Is no simple direct relation-
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T Of the engineering organization of the ground and the degree of possible
dispersal of the troops.
It would be much simpler to establish such a relationship if in the
rocket troop deployment areas were conistruete.dpersonnel cover of a sin-.
gle type, for example, only shelters (ubezhishcha), or only slit
trenches. The relationship between the. protective qualities of various
kinds of cover for personnel and the dic; er.sal of elPm ntsL~ft1 co at
formation may be mathematically expressed as follows ? ? R R) I.
ija . c where T, , L2, L , and Li,. is the distance (in kilometers) between
elements of tie combat formation with cover for personnel consisting,
respectively, of shelters, dugouts, covered slit trenches, and open slit
trenches; Rl, R2, RRiand R. are the effective casualty (porazheniya)
radii of the respective types of cover; La.c is the distance between
elements of the combat formation which provides safety with the disposi-
tion of personnel without cover; and Ra.c is the effective casualty radius
with the latter dispositon of personnel.
T,et.us consider an example. Suppose that in the engineering organ
of the position area there are built personnel shelters for which
the effective casualty radius, with a 30-kiloton nuclear blast, is R1 =
0.5 km, as set forth in US military literature! According to these data,
an adequately safe distance between elements of the combat formation is
L1 n 3 km. Let us determine the necessary dispersal for the same degree
of protection if it is possible to provide, instead of shelters, only
covered slit trenches for the troops. The effecti e casualty radius for
such cover, with a nuclea blast of the same power is t~1- n as: R3 -
1 1 km. From the ratio W R3 we get L3 Ll 3xij, W 6.6 km.
Consequently, with covered slit trenches, less effective for cover
than shelters, the distance between elements of the combat formation must
be increased 2.2 times.
Let us determine what the dispersal would have to be to obtain the
same degree of protection of personnel as in -the second case, if there
were no engineering preparation of the terrain at all. According to US
data3, the effective casualty radius for personnel outside of any kind
of cover is R ,c = 2.2 km. From an analogous ratio we get Lr.c = L3
R c. = 6.6 ~; = 13.2 km.
The calculations show that with dispostt%,on of personnel out in the
open, the distance between elements of the combat formation will be 4.4
times as great as if they were in shelters, and twice as great as if
they were in covered slit trenches. Wish such dispersal, the size of the
position area of rocket chasti and podrazdeleniya greatly increases, and
fire control and direction of the podrazdeleniya deteriorates. Such
dispersal in a combat situation, obviously, is not realistic. At the
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 PYRGHT
same t. it tl ? 1,t~'~nr Ate/ ahC = ['~8` '8"F9~2( A~3~b00 b~ 8engi-
ARP
~g~~li g o On othe groun is impo r;ibl.e to provide depend-
able anti-nuclear protection of the troops. In military literature
sometimes unjustified importance is given to dispersal as a means of
antinuclear protection,.
The operational-tactical practice of planning and carrying out
anti-nuclear maneuver has, in our opinion, great practical importance.
This is accomplished by a periodic change of the areas occupied by the
rockets. The success of this to a great extent depends on the speed
and concealment of nccompllshing it, and on its engineering support,
which consists of timely preparation of routes for movement to alter-
nate areas and organization of these areas.
The choice of the place for disposition of rocket units relative
to other elements of the operational formation of the attacking forces
also greatly affects their survivability. It is by no means a matter
of indifference how far they are located from the disposition of the
reserves, the second echelons, the real installations, large bridges,
and other objectives, which might attract the attention of enemy re-
connaissance and be targets for his nuclear attacks. Location of the
rockets at some distance from troops, populated places, main roads,
and important targets facilitates their concealment and consequently
increases the ability to survive both of individual elements of a com-
bat formation and of the rocket troops as a whole.
Engineering-technical measures for antinuclear protection include,
of course, engineering preparation and concealment of the position
areas, and engineering measures for eliminating the consequences of
nuclear attack by the enemy.
Engineering preparation of rocket-, troop position areas is the, most
practical way of achieving a high degree of their protection against
nuclear attack. However, this conclusion is justifiable if the engi-
neering preparation is carried out in short periods, conformir.. to the
maneuver characteristics of the combat operations of the troops in
general, and of the rocket troops in particular. Considering that these
troops will be under constant threat of nuclear attack, it is very im-
portant to seek out various ways of rapid engineering preparation of
position areas .
Speeding up organization of the ground always has been and still is
of special concern to commanders at all levels, since it creates quickly
the necessary conditions for protection of troops from weapons of mass
destruction. The speeds of engineering preparation can be increased by
comprehensive mechanization of the operations, by correct choice of the
kind of engineering; preparations by allotting to rocket units the nec-
essary amount of equipment which can be assembled and disassembled,
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-polep'p
tions, and by timely movement of engineering units into the work areas.
Of the measures listed, the most difficult to accomplish i.; the com-
prehensive mechanization of labor.-consuming earth-digging operation,,;.
The construction by hand of even the simplest shelters requires the as-
signment to it of a great number of men. And this cannot be done, be-
cause rocket troops personnel as a rule are busy servicing the compli-
cated rocket equipment and cannot be drawn off for engineering work,
Therefore mechanization of the operations and choice of the kind of
engineering work to be done and of the means of accomplishing it in a
given situation have assumed great importance.
While the problem of mechanizing large-scale earth-moving opera-.
tions has been successfully solved in the armies of all the leading
countries, little has been done on the mechanization of such operations
on a small scale. It is very important, for example, to mechanize the
digging of pits for dugouts and the construction of slit trenches and
trenches. For this are required excavating machines capable of doing
this small-scale work, which will solve the problem of comprehensive
mechanizaion, thereby reducing the personnel requirements for engineer-
ing preparation of positions.
The possibility of speeding up engineering organization of the
ground to a great extent depends on skillful utilization of excavating
equipment. Experience shows that use of engineering machines should be
planned. It is especially important to set up a work schedule for
trench-digging and road-laying machines. It should be realized that
every hour of idle time of these machines because of pocr organization
of the work is reflected in the engineering preparation of the positions,
and consequently results in a reduction of the protection afforded the
troops. We think it necessary to reduce to a minimum unproductive move-
ment and idle time of engineering machines.
Since engineering operations are usually accomplished by limited
forces and in compressed periods of time, it is very important correctly
to determine the kind of engineering preparation for the attainment of
the greatest degree of protection. This determination is made, as we
know, during reconnaissance. If circumstances permit, the staffs and
combat engineers make a detailed estimate of the engineering preparation:
they determine the number and kind of installations and facilities to
.be 'set up, and also the manpower, equipment and time required. Such
calculations should be made during the period of preparation for the com-
bat operations, and for the most typical cases and circumstances, even
earlier.
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 YRGHT
A ppr~ive eI 8 - 8 AA8 5ROA iO@@96@rl~'e8t organi-
c on of t e operations, and for sound distribution and use of engineer-
ing manpower and equipment. However, existing; methods of calculations,
in our opinion, are laborious and do not make it possible in advance to
evaluate the probable final result of engineering preparation of the
ground.
First it should be said that the amount of engineering operations,
which will often be limited by circumstances, should be determined by the
quantity and kinds of installations or by an estimate of the possibility
of accomplishing the planned operations with the available manpower and
equipment in the assigned time. Here all the initial data are frequently
refined in the process of the estimates in order, in the end, to plan
such a volume of work as can be accomplished with the available manpower
and equipment. Sometimes it is necessary to spend a comparatively long
time in order to obtain the final result.
Here we have one of the serious shortcomings of the methods of cal-
culations. Moreover, such calculations do not give the answer to the
question, what degree of protection can be achieved in engineering pre-
paration of position areas. The protection afforded the troops is often
judged only by the protective qualities of the shelter installations
erected in a given i rea . In our opinion, with such an approach it is pos-
sible to estimate only in general outline the acceptability of the engi-
neering preparation of the terrain, i.e., to conclude that a better or a
worse degree of protection of troops will be afforded by a certain rre-
paration of the positions. To describe in quantitative (numerical) terms
the degree of protection attainable does not seem possible.
Besides the protective capabilities of shelters, many factors, i n
combination, have an effect on the degree of protection of personnel:
the dispersal of the combat formations, the force and number of nuclear
blasts, etc. Changing the nature of the engineering preparation of posi-
tions and, within certain limits, the distances between them, may achieve
the desired degree of protection.
In order fully to establish the interrelationship between all these
factors, and to make a sound choice of the kind of engineering prepara-
tion of positions to achieve the necessary protection, it seems to us
that in calculations of the engineering preparation of the terrain there
should be made a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the effective-
ness of the antinuclear protection achievable as a result of a certain
degree of engineering preparation of postions of rocket troops, and of
their dispersal
For such an evaluation, it seems, there should be introduced a cri-
terion which would" describe the degree of protection of troops in terrain
which has been prepared in an engineering sense. As such a criterion, in
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 ourA 5 P& AWIUa*@lt20(~bf08Mq~I1 ttb1~85T 0SD3SODDMl 48Lon
H f u amaged cover 'r ml, as a result of a nuclear attack on the rocket
'broops areas of deployment. Thus, if the number M is equal to 0.8, this
means tha,; with a large number of nuclear attacks, the number of undam-
aged cover, attibutablo on the average to one attack, will be 80 percent.
However, with a single attack the actual number of undamaged cover may
differ greatly from the average.
Strictly speaking, the proportion of undamaged shelters theoreti.
cally is an accidental value, depending on many causes--the kind of shel-
ters, the dispersal of elements of the combat formation, the force and
number of nuclear attacks, the deviation of the nuclear weapon from the
target, etc At the same time, this criterion makes it possible numer-
ically to determine the degree of protection of troops on prepared ter-
rain.
The essence of the proposed method of calculating the engineering
preparation of the terrain, taking into account the degree of protection
afforded, consists "n finding the relationship between the value M, the
number of shelters of a certain type, on the one hand, and the available
time, manpower and equipment for their construction, on the other. This
relationship may be expressed by the following system of linear equations :
alzl ,a2z2 71a3 z3 ~a4z4 ZpT
zl/z2A3~z4 = 100
M1z1/12z2/M3z3LM4z4 = 1.00 Mcp, rc
The first equation (1) expressed the requirement for manpower for
building the shelters. In this equation, Z. is the percent of personnel
allotted to work inbuilding shelters; T : the time of the in hours; al,
a2, a , a4 = the expenditure of time in hours per protected person with
the construction, respectively, of shelters, dugouts, covered slit
trenches, or open slit trenches; .z], z2, z , z4 = the percent of person-
nel placed, respectively, in shelters, dug~uts, covered slit trenches,
and open slit trenches in relation. to the total number in the chast' or
podrazdeleniye.
The second equation (2) shows the percentage distribution of per-
sonnel by types. of shelters.
The third equation (3) makes it possible to determine the degree
of protection of personnel (M rd , where M1, M~ , M , and 4. is the
mathematical expectation of tfg' proportion of undamaged shelters by
types (shelters, dugouts, covered slit trenches, open slit trenches).
These values are determined according to table or graphs.
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 CPYRGF
I3ra
App r? c 4Q ,/po~ qL. B o ~. ?tf fp~e87toRr~o cAaA~rAoa~17 range
of oiler.ational-engineering problems. For example, one of the most im-
portant problems is achieving the maximum possible protection of rocket
troops' positions by engineering preparation of them in act periods of
time and with limited manpower, Knowing these periods, the manpower,
and the equipment, it is necessary to determine what number of shelters
by types will cfford the greatest protection under given conditions.
Solution of the system of equations by the method of linear programming
makes it possible to do this.
In an offensive operation another problem is often of great impor-
tance: with a degree of protection of the launching positions set by
the senior commander, it is necessary to determine the kind of engi-
neering preparation of them which will require a minimum expenditure of
manpower and resources. This probi,,~m also is solved by linear program-
ming.
There may arise other problems to be solved during combat opera-
tions. Thus, with degree of protection and time periods for preparation
of rocket troop position areas assigned by the commander, there must be
determined the required nuiricer of installations and the manpower and re-
sources needed for their construction. Or, with an assigned time for
completing the work and a known allotment of manpower, it must be deter-
mined how many shelters can be built and what will be the degree of pro-
tection.
Thus all the most frequently encountered problems in the engineering
preparation of the ground for rocket troops can be mat: iematically solved
by the system of equations. However, rapid solution of practical prob-
lems by equations under field conditions is possible only with the use
of an electronic computer. Therefore, in our opinion, for making engi-
neering calculations there is very great need for graphs, nomograms, and
tables which will make it possible simply and quickly to determine the
optimum kind of?engineering preparation in a specific situation. The
equations provided by us would be of substantial help in compiling these.
In engineering preparation of position areas, besides personnel
shelters there is also prepared, of course, pit-type cover for combat
equipment, and natural cover is used also. Calculation of the number of
pits to be dug presents no difficulties. Fcr estimate of the protection
afforded combat equipment it is expendient to take as a criterion the
mathematical expectation of the proportion of undamaged equipment (M-.t ),
determined by the formula;
Mcp.t Ny / MONO
loo
where NY and N1o are the mathematical expectation of the proportion of
App oVe'd Bl ase '~ ~$/~~a: ~ 13 ~'1 ~}89 19'~ }dO~A~9~~ive
 cove,l Prbvetdi.Fiet ft16ak:B90Qt0fM00;: ~Z~,arRJDIR?5jTQ0&YlsFNQf3$>)A O$ -8
HTombat equipment lil:ewiuc having, roppactivel.y, protective cover, anc,
no protective cover.
Having determined the value of McP one may Judge an to the de-
gree of protection afforded combat equipment.
By the proposed calculations, we believe that eommanderr., otaffs,
and combat engineers will be able to rselec:t, for a Ll.von ,situation, the
most advantageous engineering organization of the ground in view of t1
degree of protection required and the manpower, rcuow.'ccs and time
available. There will be less preliminary comparison of alternatives'.
This will make possible a saving of time for more careful organization
and carrying out of the engineering operations, which in the final. azial_-
ysis will speed up the preparation of the position areas of rocket
troops. Moreover, it will give rise to the possibility of more soundly
and specifically assigning tasks of engineering preparation of positions
to podrazdeleniya. Such methods of calculations will nuke it possible
scientifically to foresee possible damage from nuclear, attac...; and to
plan for the elimination of the consequences of a nuclear attack by the
enemy.
Commanders of chasti and podrazdeleniya will be able independently,
without the help of engineering officers, to determine quickly the kind
and volume of engineering work for preparation of positions, which is
especially important for those units where there are no combat engi-
neers. Finally, such calculations will help commanders more correctly
to distribute among the troops ready assemblies of installations, engi-
neering podrazdeleniya, and earth-digging machines, and also to eval-
uate the degree of anti-nuclear defense achieved as a result of the engi-
neering operations.
Thus, in our opinion, it is exp;dient to make operational-tactical
calculations on the preparation of the terrai__ for the achievement of a
certain degree of anti-nuclear protection. It would seem that the devel-
opment of the proposed methods if calculation should be continued. The
compiling of graphs and tables on the basis of solution of the equations
is within the capabilities of the staffs of any rocket troops, in which
there are many officers with good mathematical trairi:iiig and capable, by
way of scientific-research work, of working out practical methods of cal-
culating the engineering preparation of the terrain.
One of the methods of speeding up this preparation of the position
areas, as has been mentioned, is the timely distribution of ready asseni-
blies of installations. This frees the troops from the laborious work
of procuring timber and preparing the construction of shelters and dug-
outs, which, of course, reduces the time of engineering preparation coi
the ground.
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among the clian?ti and podra,.,,leleniya to provirle the greatoai:, degree g of
protection to the rocket troops an a whole? O:f all types of cover for
personnel, the shelter, as we know, provides the greatest protection.
However., the relative effectiveness of using shelters varies with the de-
gree of nuclear pressure exerted by the enemy. With an increase in the
number of nuclear attacks launched by the enemy on the deployment area
or the launching sites, the relative effectiveness of shelters increases.
On the other hand, with a decrease in the number of such attacks, the
role of shelters in providing anti-nuclear protection is correspondingly
reduced.
Therefore it is very important to determine, on the bai.' of military-
scientific foresight and evaluation of the actual situation (terrain,
concealment, place in the combat and operational formation, etc.), those
units on which the enemy will probably launch the greatest number of nu-
clear attacks. These are the units to which should be allotted ready
shelter assemblies, calculated to accomodate all their personnel. This
decision is ;uatified even when othr units, located in better situations,
are not afforded the construction of shelters. With rocket troops usu-
ally not being in identical situations, an equal distribution of shelter
assemblies is undesirable, as this might result in reducting the protec-
tion of the troops as a whole.
Construction of cover for personnel and combat equipment in itself
may not provide protection unless there is established a certain regime
of activity in the positions. A high degree of protection is attained
when you have such a regime of combat activity as will reduce to a mini-
mum the danger of destruction of personnel and combat equipment, outside
of cover. Therefore it is important to construct the various kinds of
cover in the shortest possible time. But this depends not only on the
availability of ready shelter assemblies and earth-digging machines, but
also on the level of engineering training of the personnel. Thus the
time required for preparing positions will also depend on how well-trained
the rocket troopes are in fortification and concealment operations and
how they are mobilized for rapid accomplishement of these operations.
Purposeful party-political support of engineering measures is also
of great importance. There is no doubt that well-organized party politi-
cal work is an important factor in increasing the speed of preparation of
positions.
In considering the problem of increasing the anti-nuclear protec-
tion of troops, one cannot ignore the importance of their concealment
(maskirovka). Concealment, we know, contributes to such protection, and
it must be given due attention. Operational concealment is especially
increasing in importance. The uncertainty of the situation and the highly
maneuverable nature of the combat operations of rocket troops create fa-
1'd
viR5%er48rt&
1 * fe96 01M?'yIf$ST'74Rt03007-8
ru:
 PYRC
'nKirc~o i ' '3o r08cfi..,,ed C t b in a rapidly changing
nituation.
H Time for disseminating the information received for making decisions ac3
to engineering preparation, and for carrying out the engineering work,
will be limited. However, despite the difficult conditionu, there must
be clear-cut organizations of the engineering preparation and :firm con-
trol of the engineering podrazdeleniya.
How can this be achieved in a compressed period of time? It seems
necessary, in the first place, to increase the Independence of rocket
troops in accomplishing engineering tanks; secondly, to :facilitate and
simplify planning of engineering preparation; third, wherever posr,ible,
to plan in advance. In headquarters; it would be expedient to mechanize
and automate the most laborious processes of command- -the collection,
processing and transmittal of available information, and also the making
of calculations for organization of the engineering preparation. Combat
engineers need still more duplicating and calculating machines and sets
of conventional signs for making charts, graphs and tables. Moreover,
for direction of engineering podrazdeleniya, it is desirable to organize
independent engineer-support radio nets, and to allocate the necessary
signal equipment for this.
The success of engineering support of the combat activities of
rocket troops will depend to a great extent on the quantity of engineer-
ing personnel and equipment. Therefore, no matter in how difficult a
situation rocket troops may be operating, all steps should be taken for
them to be strengthened by prompt receipt of engineering units and equip-
ment. Along with this it is important that the most difficult and large
scale engineer work be done for the rocket troops by forces and equip-.
meiAt of the senior combined ails commander.
Further theoretical and practical working out of problems of engi-
neering support will contribute to successful combat use of rockets in
a large offensive operation.
Notes:
1. Deystviye yadernogo oruzhiya (The Effects of Nuclear Weapons),
Translated from the English, Voyenizdat, 1963; pp 130, 165.
2. Deystviye yadernogo oruzhiya (The Effects of Nuclear Weapons)..
Translated from the English, Voyenizdat, 1960; pp 1114, 244-
3. Deystviye yadernogo oruzhiya (The Effects of Nuclear weapons),
Translated from the English, Voyenizdat, 1963; Pp 130,62)+.
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 Ap OCINW1fi I~eiieas8cgA4? 8'fQ9 TI ~t IL~T( ~ 1~' ~1 ~~~ 1~ IN
THE US
CPYRGHT
Scientific research and experimental design work in the field of anti-
missile defence has been conducted in the US for more than 1.0 years.
Nevertheless the entire complex of difficult problems connected with
creating an effective system of antimissile defense seems further from
solution than it did four or :five years ago when on the pages of the for-
eign press a fierce controversy raged over the Nike-Zeus antimissile sys-
tem..' This is not because the US command and government has not given
this question sufficient attention, but because or a number of other rea-
son. To understand this it is necessary to examine the work which has
already been done in the US, and also to evalutate the expenditures of
forces and means connected with this work.
.Already in 1957 definite directions were noted in the work being con-
ducted in the US to create means of long-range and extra long-range de-
tection of missiles and means for intercepting and destroying them. Par-
ticular attention had already been given to special radar stations with
ranges of 1+,000-5,000 kilometers for detection of small targets such as
the nose sections of iitercont inental ballistic missiles. Active anti-
missile systems included the Nike-Zeus, Plato, and Wizard systems, which
in principle embraced three basic directions: defense of objectives
(Nike-Zeus system), troops-(the Plato system), and the country (the Wiz-
ard system).
Work connected with the creation of radar stations for the long-range
detection of missiles in flight was successfully completed: the US
created the AIt'/FFS-17, AN/FPS-1+9 and AN/FPS-50 stations with ranges of
1,600, 4,000, and 5)400 kilometers, respectively. Stations of the last
two types were used in the MEWS long-range detection system, which was
completed in 1963. This system provides, at least theoretically, a 15 to
17-minute warning of the approach of missiles from the north to objec-
tives located on the territory of the US.
The original plans of active systems of antimissile defense failed.
The troop system Plato proved to be too complex and cumbersome, and its
development was discontinued in 1959. The Wizard system, which was in-
tended to be used for intercepting missiles at ranges up to 1600 kilo-
meters, met with the same fate. The remaining system, Nike-Zeus, was
brought up to the stage of flight tests, which began in September 1959.
In 1962-1961+ extensive testing of this system was conducted with firings
against the nose sections of actual Atlas D and Titan 1 missiles.
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 A fl-di~'~I'~~lia W016 091b$109 Y(G114 Dt 5WV?'8-7'&RG0t330A019W 18
fudge.from certain figures on the expenditures for, thin purpose and from
fthe number of tent firings. From the beginning of development to 1, July
1963, 1,372,000,000 dollars were spent on the Nike-Zeus system, in the
1963/61s. 'fiscal year -- 89 million dollars; and ih the 19611?/65 :fiscal
year 40 million dollars were allocated for completing the testing of the
system. Thus, the total expenditures on the development and testing of
this system were nearly 1.5 billion dollars. By 211. October 1962) 43
firings of the Nike-Zeus missiles had been conducted, and in the first
phase of systems testing -- from 24 October. 1962 to 5 July 1963 -- there
were 17 'firings2, of which 15 were successful. By March 1964 Nike-Zeus
missiles had made ten intercepts of the nose sections of the US Atlas D
and Titan l intercontinental ballistic missiles.3 The Nike-Zeus missiles
were launched from Kwajalein Island in the Pacific Ocean, and the Atlas
and Titan missiles wfcre launched from Vandenburg Air Base (California)
on the Pacific coast of the USA. Despite the relatively good test re-
sults,'the US had to decide against adopting this system. Actually, the
fate of the system was decided before completion of the tests, since it
was pronounced insufficiently effective, and since the deployment of
this system would cost billions of dollars. The entire complex of this
system -- including the Nike-Zeus missiles, five cumbersome and complex
'radar stations, and complex electronic computers -- could conduct fire
against only one rocket since the system was constructed on a single-
channel principle. Moreover -- and this is most important -- with this
missile the US could not solve one of the most difficult problems of
antimissile defense -- discerning the actual target when the enemy uses
interference and dumty targets. The method of compaing the reflected
signals with characteristic signals from actual targets which have been
studied and fed into the memory of computers in advance was pronounced
unsatisfactory.
The fate of the 'Nike-Zeus system was shared by many systems intended
for both the passive mission of antimissile defense (the detection and
recognition of targets) and the active mission (the destruction of the
nose sections of missiles in flight).
Already in 199 and 1960, when the effectiveness of the Nike-Zeus
system was in doubt, a number of other systems were proposed, including
the active system Arpat for intercepting missiles in mid-course with one
rocket of several small intercepter missiles, the Bambi system intended
for the destruction of missiles in the powered phase of their flight with
missiles launched from artificial satellites, and a system of detecting
missile launchings by means of the artificial satellite Midas.
The Arpat system, :although it provided for a considerable increase
in the number of destructive elements in comparison with Nike-Zeus mis-
siles, was not without a basic deficiency: it could not reliably distin-
guish between actual and dummy targets. The Was system was intended
Approvea or a ease
111
 CPYRGHT
Apa~'f2i(/d$'5Y091Q0~3b0t~97~8~o a al-
tucle o:r to lc...ometer. s by 1,e infrared radiation or the flame jet
or rocket engines. The US spent 225 million dollars on the development
or the system and the launching of experimental. c. satel.lites.~~ They were
able to achieve certain successes in the creation o:C extremely sensitive
and miniature detectors of infrared radiation and in a number of cases
registered from space the launchings of their missiles from Aitantic and
Pacific missile ranges. Nevertheless this system had to be abandoned.
The apparatus aboard satellites proved to be extremely complex and
could operate only several hours in orbit since the detectors of infra-
red radiation had to be cooled to ver-r low temperatutes by means of
liquefied gases. Moreover, the stumbing block in this system proved to
be the difficulty in solving the problems of reliably distinguishing a
signal from a missile in flight from the background noise of signals from
various other sources, both earthly (forest fires slag heaps, etc) and
atmospheric (the reflection of sun rays by clouds). Finally, the Midas
system proved to be too cumbersome and expensive. For the prompt detec-
tion of each missile launched the system would have had to consist of
dozens of satellites with relatively short periods of active operation.
For each satellite which ceased to function a new one would have to have
been launched. The Midas system would have been effective only if each
signal detecting a missile launch received by it were immediately trans:.
mitted to a center for evaluation and comparison with other incoming
data. Therefore it would have been necessary to include in the system
many ground control' and communications stations spread over entire con-
tinents or to have used communications satellites for transmitting sig-
nals. In the latter case a system of satellites with transmission links
of the type "space-to-space-to-ground" would have been required. Even
simpler space communication systems of the type "earth-to-space-to-earth"
has still not been brought up to operational use, and a system for the
Midas satellite would probably require at least 1.-5 years.
In analyzing the scientific research and experimental design work
on the Midas system, the US concluded that this system could not be put
into operation earlier than 1969. This system would cost 2-3 million
collars and the year~y maintenance cost of the system would be at least
100 million dollars.
It should be noted that the abandonment of the Midas system does
not represent a complete cessation of the development of systems for'de-
tecting missile launchings by artificial earth satellites. This work is
continuing, but with considerably less intensity than before 1963, and
only in the research phase.
The curtailment of work on space means of detection is explained
not only by their high cost and complexity, but by still another factor
mentioned by President Johnson during pre-election polemics with the
15
 Rep blican c ft" 0 $
Al3
o a e c e o c e q 8c -re 'urn pro ng
H nd capable of detecting objects located at the limits of the radio hori-
zon. According to the President of the US1 these radar stations will
"literally peer around the curvature of the earth, informing us of air- 6
craft and especially of missiles several seconds after their launchings."
Stations using deflected-return probing have been under develop-
ment in the US since 1958 in projects Tepee and Nbdre. A beam from this
kind of station is directed at the ionized upper layers of the atmosphere
and can be reflected from these layers and from the surfaces of the earth
or sea, in this manner traveling around the earth. It has been demon-
strated, for example, that a beam from a station located on the North
American continent, after being twice reflected from layer F (altitude
approximately 160 kilometers) can look over the territory of the USSR.
A signal reflected from the cloud of ionized gases formed during the
launching of a large rocket can be received by a station and used for de-
termining the' approximate azimuth and distance to that cloud. It is al-
so bossible to receive a direct signal distoxted,".as a result of the ab-
sorption of eziergy by an ionized mass of gases. After triple reflection
from layer F this signal can be received in 'the Indian Ocean by stations
located, on islands or on ships of a radar patrol.
In the long competition between the M1das system and the stations
of deflected-return probing, the latter is winning at present.
Thus, in 1963 the US rejected two possible concepts of antimssile
defense with the intercept of missiles during the initial powered-flight
phase of their trajectory (the Bambi system) and during the middle part
of the trajectory, which lasts from the moment of separation of the nose
section of the missile until its rentry into the dense layers of atmo-
sphere at an altitude of approximately 100 kilometer, when it is already
near the target (the'Nike-Zeus system). At present the main efforts of
the US Are being concentrated on the development of a system of inter-
cepting the nose sections of intercontinental ballistic missiles during
the' final. phase of their trajectory, after their entry into the dense
layers of the atmospehere. This is the only concept which is seriously
being studied.by US specialists, even though its realization is connected,
i their own opinion, with very great difficulties.
The results of the work conducted in the area of antimissile de-
fense was presented in a report of the deputy chief of the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency of the US Department of DDfense, Dr. Herzfeld,
published in the press at the beginning of 1965. According to the re-
port, the total expenditures on the development of antimissile defense
means up to that time amounted to 2-2.5 billion dollars.
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 CPYRGH
A roY FX F 'pteq ' ftd~ 80 c 80l9Q$ions of
s a: a ter ey avr re-enterec a ens a ayars of the atmosphere i s
the Possibility of reliably distinguishing the target by means of atmo-
spheric filtration, i.e. tho natural separation of the actual target from
possible dummy targets as a result of 'their different deceleration by the
atmosphere. The main difficulties in creating such a system are the tame
limitations (an intercept at low altitudes must be made within 30 seconds)
and the necessity of providing high reliability, approaching 100 per cent.
In principle, it is condidered possible to use antimissile missiles
with either nuclear charges or charges of conventional explosives. In
the first instance it would be possible to get a high reliability of de-
struction, but the nuclear blast would create interference for the fur-
ther operation of the radar station systems and the intercept of other
nose cones. It is estimated that the explosion of a nuclear charge of an
antimissile missile of relatively small power would not create a serious
danger i'6r one's own troops and population; however, in the event of an
explosion of the charge of the nose section of the target rocket at a
relatively low altitude, there will be a very real danger and, con.se4-1
quently, special measures in regard to the construction of sturdy in-
stallations for the protection of military objectives and shelters for
the civilian population would be required. In the second instance, the
destruction of a target as solid and small as the nose section of an
intercontinental ballistic missile will be relaatively low and the danger
of a possible explosion of the charge of the target rocket will be the
same as in the first instance. Therefore, in this intercept system it is
considered advisable to use antimissile missiles with nuclear charges.
A new concept of antimissile defense emermpd with the development
of the Nike-X system, in which improved Nike-Zeus missiles would 'be used
along with new equipment. The basic elements of this system are missiles
of the Nike-Zeus type, new Sprint missiles, MAR and MR radar stations,
and improved ground equipment for intercept control.
In recent years the Nike-Zeus missile has been considerably improved
and extensively tested in firings against missiles and space targets.
Testing conducted in 1963 and 1964, after the decision not to deploy a
Nike-Zeus antimissile defense system,. had the purpose of determining the
possibility of using this missile in the Nike -X antimissile defense sys-
tem and in a system of intercepting space targets which was being devel-
oped at that time.
The missile is a three-stage rocket with solid-fuel engines in all
three stages and a nuclear warhead. The overall length of the missile is
14.6 meters, its maximum speed is approximately 3600 meters per second,
and its range is over 240 kilometers. The missile is directed to a tar-
get by a command system using special radar stations.8 It has been re-
ported that this missile successfully intercepted a satellite passing
 1(~G r ~o~g` h s ffi c3 A~/~ c~ve ceated"n q, P0~i'h - wo
complex of thin system has been set up on the island of Kwajalein. The
second system uses interceptors carried into space by the rocket carrier
Thorad, and can supposedly make intercepts at altitudes up to 640 kilo-
meters. It has also bsen tested in firings against US satellites, using
a device for registering the degree oJ.' miss instead of a warhead. This
system was used to intercept the Transit, a US satellite which had
ceased to function.
In the Nike-X syst of antimissile defense the Nike-Zeus missiles
.ave to be used in the first line of defense to intercept the nose sec-
t-'Ions of missiles at great altitudes prior to their entry into the dense
layers of the .atmosphere.. The US is not counting on these missiles to
be highly effective, especially in event'-,of a "serious threat," and con-
siders that they will be able to destroy only certain targets.
The Sprint missile, in the second line of defense, is intended for
the intercept of the nose sections of missiles after the atmospheric
filtration of dummy targets. It is a conical-shaped, two-stage missile
8.2 meters in length with a maximum diameter of 1.37 meters, a radio
command guidance system, and solid-fuel engines in both stages. The
first stage of the rocket does not have a fin assembly, and 18parently
the missile is not guided during the operation of this stage.
Sprint missiles must be launched from underground silos by means of
a special system using hot or cold gases. The engine of the first stage
is turned on after the ejection of the missile from the launching silo
and in a short operating time of several seconds it imparts hypersonic
speed (greater than Mach 5) to the missile. It is believed that in that
phase of flight the missile can execute only limited maneuvers according
to a ,predetermined program.
For the development of the Sprint missile the experimental two-stage
missile'Squirt was built. Its first stage is a cluster. of seven Recruit
solid-fuel engines of the Thiokol firm, and the second stage is a clus-
ter of seven Cherokee polid-fuel engines made by the same firm. The
nose cone of the missile is intended for testing various materials under
the intense heat generated during movement through the dense layers of
the atmosphere.
Another experimental missile has been created by the Boeing firm
especially for the study of problems of stability and flight control
during the very high rates of acceleration (approximately 100 G's) which
the Sprint missile will develop during acceleration and maneuver while
still in relatively dense layers of the atmosphere. This'single-stage
missile is approximately six meters long; its body consists of three
sections -- the tail section (with the engine nozzle), the center section
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18
 PYRGHT
(with a solid-fue1 engine built the Hercules Power firm) and a nose
Ape Ran-ftimwQQ0( l t : bAPN?T99AM99PO1DA@Y9&17cr0 experi-
ments with thecc, niicsilen, was begun on the White Sands Test Range.ll
The MAR radar station takes the place of three stations of. the Nike-
Zeus system and can simultaneously detect, recognize, and track a large
number of targets. Using this station, the complexes of the Nike-X sys-
tem can simultaneously conduct fire against many targets. This station
has a phased antenna array and an electron-beam scanning system one of
its advantages is that it has no moving parts. The maximum range of an
MAR station is estimated at 3200 kilometers, its average radiation power
is 1-10 milliwatts, and its peak power is 100-1,000 milliwatts. Sup-
posedly, one such station can ser ice several aL.cimissile defense com-
plexes located in three or four different states. A prototype of the
MAR station was constructed by the Bell Telephone laboratories and 3.n the
summer of 1961E it was set up on the White Sands range for testing.
The MR radar station is intended for directing antimissile missiles
to selected targets. t.ke the MAR station, it has phased antenna array
and an electron-beam scanning system. Each antimissile defense complex
must have one MR station connected with the MAR stations and a central
control post.
In addition to a MR station an antimissile defense complex may also
have infrared and ultraviolent installations for tracking approaching
nose sections of missiles.
For the development(of the Nike-X system the US Government allocated
211.6 million jp1lars in 1963/64 and 334 million dollars in the 19611.165
fiscal year. ' This is a relatively small amount and it is designated
for experimental design work and the testing of separate elements of the
system. The cost of deploying this system is estimated at between 12 and
20 million dollars.13
Why hasn't the US, despite rather extensive scientific research and
experimental design work in the field of antimissile de.:'ense, settled on
some kind of definite plan for a system and begun actual construction of
it?
There are many reasons: the imperfection and insufficient effective-
ness of the systems which have been studied (technical reasons), the ex-
tremely high cost of deployment and the relatively small political ad-
vantages over the enemy which wc',ld be achieved by"the very costly wide
or even partial deployment of a system of limited effectiveness. But
these are not the only reasons.
The Dr. Herzfeld mentioned above evaluated the work which has been
conducted in this area. At first glance this evaluation seems paradox-
ical. This scientist and important military leader of the US Defense
19
 Department considered the most important result of all the v Q r c
an14rp~?Y~~ ff'd~~~i.4Q~~/4~nPta`bTQBJ~~~8a ~$~
HThe compilation of data for impr. ovirig offensive weapons and for develop-
ing means to facilitate the penetration of an enemy defense with US in-
tercontinental ballistic missles.
it should be noted that work on an antimissile defense and on ways
of overcoming such a defense is being conducted simultaneously in one
huge project known ac the Defender Project, for which yearly allocations
have for many years exceeded. 100 million dollars. Thus, antimissile de-,
fense and anti-antimissile defense is being examined by the US as two
sides of the broad problem of effectiveness of modern means of offense
and defense. in every phase of this work it has been shown that the d.e-,
velopment and perfection of offen>.4've' means are more promising, cheaper,
and simpler.
In the opinion of Herzfeld there theoretically is no antimissile de-
fense which cannot be overcome by an enemy. The more effective an anti-
missile defense system, the greater the expenditures vhich will be re-
quired to overcome it. H( wever, these expenditures do not compare with
the cost of deploying the defensive system. And this is the most impor-
tant advantage of means of penetrating antimissile defense: They can b'_
extremely effective with relatively small expenditures.
Means of overcoming antimissile defenses are intended to hake it
difficult or impossible to detect a nose cone in flight, and also to make
it difficult to destroy after detection.
In the initial, powered-flight phase of its trajectory, a missile is
difficult to detect but easy to hit, even with a convezitiona]_ infantry
weapon. In the middle phase the separate nose cone is difficult to hit,
but wide use may be made of interference and dummy targets to deceive
the enemy and neutralize his means of tracking and recognizing targets,
thereby reducing rG much as possible the time for their intercept and
destruction. In this phase measures can be taken to decrease the effec-
tive reflecting surface of a missile's nose cone. During re-entry into
the atmosphere., when atmospheric filtration simplifies recognitition of
the target and screens out dummy targets, it is possible to use certaili
methods such as additional acceleration of the nose cone, its movement
at a great angle to the horizon to reduce the time during which it can
be intercepted, and finally the use of a maneuvering nose cone, capable
of sharply changing its trajectory and switching to a new target, there-
by-mullifying the results of the tracking and the calculations for deter-
mining the point at which the intercept of the nose cane should occur.
After work on the Bambi project had been haltered and the work on the
Midas project had been suspended, the main interest in th,!_~ US was concen-
trated on the development of means of overcoming a typical ant missile
defense for the second and third phases of a mi].lile's flight. F
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 YRGHT
ApprovO :FenRaedetlss 20 O ifd9eoe EiL?$fiT@0875RQ08XWQf 9004 7r- rct
methodrs of overcoming an antimissile de:Cen,e. Whereas in 1950-1952 the
effective reflecting surface of a nose cone was considered to be approxi-
mately 0.2 square meters, it is no:' estimated bh+ut with the use of pointed
and oriented none cones and of ablatious coatings this surface can be re-
duced by a factor of 1,000.
Dummy targets are considered one or the simplest means of deceiving
an enemy. Light-weight dumnr targe~o -- inflatable balloons of thin
aluminized material, corner reflectors, and metal chaff -- are consid-
ered effective means only in the middle phase of the flight trajectory
of a nose cone, since upon entry into the atmosphere they are separated
from the actual target. For the imitation of infrared radiation the nose
cone, upon entry into the atmosphere, must use special heat decoys (these
are being developed for infrared and visible ranges by the Hughes firm
in the program Opadek). Finally, heavy dummy targets, which can them-
selves carry chaff or inflatable balloons and which have heat-resistent
coatings, can be used to imitate he nose cone in the middle phase of the
trajectory and during entry into the atmosphere.
Reportedly, dummy targets made by the Aeroneutronics firm have been
used by the US with the Atlas and Titan missiles and are to be used with
Minuteman missiles.
Active radio interference can be created by transmitters installed
in r>.ose cones and in small dummy targets. In the opinion of the US, the
se~und way is preferable, since a nose cone escapes destruction while a
defensive missile is being directed to the interference. The dummy tar-
gets must be equipped with receivers, devices for analyzing the signals
of radar stations of the antimissile defense, and interference transmit-
ters for reproducting the signals reflected from the nose cone. The
development and testing of means for creating active interference is be-
ing conducted in the US by the Sperry Rand, Avco, Aeroneutronics, Ray-
theon, and Lockheed firms. The Raytheon firm developed the PX-3 and
PX-4 jammers for the Polaris A-2 missile.
Maneuvering nose cones have been developed by the McDonnell and
General Electric firms. These nose cones can change their trajectories
by means of small engines prior to re-entry into the atmosphere or maneu-
ver in the dense layers of the atmosphere by using aero dynamic forces.
One of the variants is a nose cone with several warheads having separate
trajectories and intended for the destruction of various targets. At
present the Americans are studying the possibility of building a Mks 17
nose section for the Minuteman 2 and Posidon missiles.15
Still another means of overcoming an antimissile defense with special
missiles intended for the destruction of radar stations of a defense
system has been observed. Work in this direction is being conducted by
21
 the P W3 1 d R I~ aWe 2 1OB1O9 d#A~RDP &TO?'~?6ROOi 231 O9OOi17b8
launched when dcuir?cd or uepar?nted Calm the no t. i,rct ion or f.he main mis-
YKdH `' upon c"t?r?y into the atmortplicr-2.
The data prcucnted abcve r;how.; that a wide ur:,crrrrJ. or -.achrr:ical.
meal... may be sued to overcome on tint inLLt;:sil.c clefenr,r_, Work r, r. :r rating
such means hat; been conducted in ftc U.S' :f'cr? u 1.o1n(', time. but it has ac..
quirecl special scope in recent ycar?a. imercc:; in the 1.961/62 fiscn.l
year the allocations for this, purpot e totaled 35.5 million doll. r.,.;, in
1962/63 and 1.963/6li they reached 1.1E inil.lion clyd 1.511 tnl,l.li dollar. cs,
respectively. To date the US has spent nearly c?r,,o billion, clollaZp on
the development of means for penetr?u1 Lnf; ,oi ti~;,.r t mi r.1.1c defr_nue. '
Whereas prior to .1965 the money was r;pcnt nw;wcily on t c.I.erat i f is research
and experimental. design work, since 125 it bias basil cpent, primarily on
the production of previously developed and tested rncar.s of. overcoming an
antimissile defence.
Thus, the development of means of . vercoming an arty:Y.mi:~ ;f l.e defence
has, in the view of the US, outstripped the d,.vel.opmerrt of ar'f irnissile
defense systems. This does not mean that the US is not making, an effort
to develop an antim;.ssile defenco cy t em of at least partial. effcctive-
ness. On the contrary. Although the US has not reached the point where
it can make a decision on the deployment of an antiml.nsilo defense Sys-
tem, scientific research and experimental design work in this area is
continut.ng on an ever increasing scale. New program and projects are
constantly appearing in the press.
It is expe it`d that allocations for the development of the Nikc-X
system will reach approximately 1400 million dollars in -the 1965/66 fis-
cal year, and that more than 100 million dollars will. be allocated for
the Defender Project. Among research projects mentioned in the press,
for example, are the US Air Force project for de-?cloping the IiiB] ( anti-
missile missile, which is suppose to develop even greater acceleration
than the Sprint, and the A1bis missile project being developed at Johns
Hopkins University. It was recently reported in the press that work on
the Arpat Project is continuing and that a radar sit .tion called Armand
is being developed for that system. The US Arnry has reportedly ~lready
made several successful missile intercepts with Arpat missile-c.- There
are indications that this missile is to be used in ar.,. antimissile de-
fense of fortified positions for the intercept of missiles at still
lower altitudes than the Sprint missile. The Starf' .rcl Research Insti-
tute of the USA is conducting work in the field of antimissile defense
according to several. contracts vIth the US Army, including the devel-
opment of the Lars radar station, intended for tracking and identifying
missiles flying at relatively low altitudes. Finally, the successful
beginning of the flight testing of the ;print missile should be noted.
The first launching of this missile was made at the j;.;ite Sands range
on 26 March 1965. According to the press, the results of the launching
exceeded the expectations of US specialists.
 CPYRG
Approv.Q.,6 ar{2~~~g~ q?.~Tn(~Q75000a3000 0(~0~x8rimnta
and tents which the US intends to conduct in 1965 and 196 in the Nike-X
program and the related Project Abres (the study of :flight dynamics of
T missile nose cones and means of facilitating their penetration of anti-
missile defense systems). A considerable part of the Atlas and Titan 1
missiles are to be used for this purpose. By April of this year 27 Atlas
D and Atlas F intercontinental ballistic missiles had been earmarked for
this purpose, and a total of 160 rockets of the Atlas type are to be used
in the Niko-X and Abroc rograms? In some experiments the rockets will
be launched from silos.l?
From the information presented in this article, it is obvious that
the search for a solution to the problems of antimissile defense is con-
tinuing in the US. This work in taking into account the Problems of
overcoming an antimissile defense, the creation of civilian defense under
conditions of nuclear-rocket war, the status and development of means of
attack, economic considerations, the political situation, and other fac-
tors. The first real antimissile defence system is the US may be the
Nike-X system, which, if its test are successful, could not be deployed
before 1966-1967.
1. Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 22, 1963.
2. Flight, August 1, 19-3.
3? Kcsiles and Rockets March 9, 1964.
4? blissil and Rockets, February 3, 1964.
5. Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 3, 1964.
6. Time, September 25, 19617.-
7. Idssiles and Rockets, January 18, 1965
8. Air Force Space Digest, My 19614.
9. Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 28, 1964.
10. Missiles and Rockets, November-27
19611..
11. Flying: Review, January, 1965.
12. Missi a Space Daily, January 28, 1964.
13. Missiles and Rockets, March 9, 1964.
14. Space Aerona utics, February 1964.
15. Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 1, 1965-
16. Electronics., January 11, 19b5.
17. Electron:.'.cs News, March 8, 1965-
18. Interavia Air Letter, March 22, 1965.
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