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,IA 1?))1) TRANS NO ,962 , , j,,NN.Ay:A y 2000,08,09 CIA-RDP85:1,0875.0.030009,019-6 'VOY MAY 1966 NO 9 0 Approved For Releas COIDR 000300090019-6 FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION TRANSLATI ON Numb e r 962 25 May 1966 SELECTED TRANSLATIONS INOM VOYENNAYA mrsw", NO 7, Ju) 1965 OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE CENTRAL INTELLIQENCE_ AGENCY Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : GIA-RDPidbl uw575R000300090019-6 Approved For Release. uELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM VOYENNAYA No 7, July 1965 Voyfennaya Mysl'(Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's Military Publishing House, Moscow. The articles translated below are from Issue No 7, July 1965, which was signed for the press 22 June 1965. TABLE OF CONTENTS Economics and War, by Col A. Gurov Concerning the Nature and Classification of Certain Phenomena in Armed Struggle The Critical Time and Operativeness of Troop Control, by Engr-Col A. Tatarchenko Air Support of Ground Troops, by Maj Gen Avn S. Sokolov 14 30 38 The Optimum Physical aid Psychological Load for Soldiers and Modern Methods of Training in the Process of Troop Field Training by Maj Gen Z. Veys 46 Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War, by Col Gen Arty (Ret) F. Samsonov 55 Book on Laws of Armed Conflicts by Col V. Morozov 75 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 Approved For Release 2000/Wgi)(561,ARQPIKT00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT by Col. A. GUROV Marxism-Leninism, in considering the role of economics in war, demands strict consideration of the objective socio-political and military-techni- cal factors which determine the character of a given era as well as new criteria which arise in connection with the qualitative change in weapsas and, consequently, in the form and methods of conducting military opera- tions. Among the objective historical factors of our era, the formation of the world socialist system stands out in the foreground. The emergence and the development of the world socialist system and the swift growth of 'its economic might and political authority led to a sudden change in the state of the post-war world. The world socialist system is transformed into the decisive factor in the development of human society. Creating the material-technical base for socialism and communism, the socialist countries successively inflict blow after blow on capitalism in the decisive sphere of material production. It is known that the share of the socialist economic system in world industrial production was about 3 percent in 1917, in 1937 -- 10 percent, and now has reached 38 percent. The following indicator also is proof of the superiority of a socialist economy during the years of Soviet power, the average annual increase in industrial production was 10 percent and, in the citadel of capitalism -- the United States -- for this period it equaled only 3.4 percent. The strengthening of the economic ties between the countries of social- ism answers the fundamental interests of each of them and creates conditions for their successful economic development. The possibility to make wide use f experience and to rely on friendly and unselfish support is one of the main advantages inherent in the world socialist system. The perfection .of economic coordination in the socialist camp is a natural process. The suc- cessful building of socialism and communism is having a beneficial effect on the scope of the international-workers? and national-liberation movement ate/ It assists the progressive forces to uphold more decisively the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and to persistently defend peace throughout the world. At the same time, imperialism has begun the period of the decline and downfall. As a result of the struggle of revolutionary forces, the area of its influence is continuously narrowing and its position is irrevocably being demolished. However, in estimating the relationship of world forces, a strictly realistic approach is necessary. It is no secret that imperial- ism still possesses a tremendous production and military apparatus. Relying on it, the reactionary forces in the struggle against socialist and other Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : Cl1i-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 peice .216Yvolr.1444L OL ilii4iStlecjitilYokMrchttlitickePV0087:8R0030009001S.6 Gr u aka. ogica. dive X ION. Proof )1 Lii 1 io plundering of LB Imperiulism in Viet .Nam, Laos, ten.: x.'.0, C3 provo agaill,st the Cuban ilcpublic? and direct military irAtnsecerenec,: in the affq j,:r of the Dominican r:!cple. An. th U I/91 if ie S that a a tb.ov.ght,h p:' for the inf anenk.le of Imperial/ GM on the course of enents Lave become in- comparably fewer, its explcitative, eggressivii, essenee did not chenEe, end the danger for the initiation of 'wars has not been eliminnted. And if e new world War to Wb. tell the aggressive imperialist c ix' c drmil,x*2; kind is not successfully prevented, then it and its np:)..ntr,,..?wit. decisive urAc unpromising clash of two socially opposite,:10 it j,,?,)7:..jr?ix whic):?1, the warring sides will pursue the ymost decisive class goals. The most importent factor of our era, determiniie. the bete:re of o probable liar, is the rapid development of productive forces. In YO 6 T.!" colossal successes in the development of industry and natural scines ar their aggregate and their interconnections which predetermined the gun:I:at:1- tive leap in the sphere of material .production connected che diecov.ry of nuclear energy, the conquest of ontex space, and the develepment ef ehemistry? electronics, and cybernetics. A genuine seientifi( .teehnicai revolution is occurring which is expressed not only in: the re-en(pment of che so -celled traditional branches of production with new teeLnelegy. phenomena also occurred formerly. TJ "iren; fent 410,y se ientifie -technieeJ . volution manifests itself in the creat!on onei rapid de v- opmect of oempl% te'Cy new branches of industry which lead to a fundamental cnangs in ',be nt meture of social production. First of all a break occurred in the structure of the power balance which was connected with the movement of petroleum and gas to the fore- gronnd. The raw material haze is undergoing an important change in cono, nect ion with the gradual replacement of steel by light metals and alloys; and with the predetermined production of new artificial materials with predetermined properties. The leading place among progressive brarnhes Is occupied by the chemical industry, which has become an important in- dicator of the level of the industrial power of the conntry. Strong positions are retained by the electrical engineering industry, and electronics are developing especially rapidly. Computers and cybernetic machines, which are a powerful weapon for the automation of production and control, are being widely distributed. Along with this, the produetion apparatus -- machine tools and industrial equipment; which are, according to Marx's expression, the "bone and muscle" system of 3?r Auction -- con- tinues to change. Agricultnre is changing more and more to industrial methods of production. Shifts which ere occurring in the txaneportation industry are leading to a relative reduction in railroad shipments. More and more significance is being acquired by the development of pipeline, motor vehicle and aerial transport. Military production now is charaeterized first of all by the development of the latest branches of industry (atomic, missile construction, instrument building, electronic equipment? chemical), Approvecl_For Release 2000/08/09 : CIACIIM9t60875R0003;be90(N9-6 CPYRGI-TT APprovedxforaelease1200068ga Al4AP.8??.70414R9PORDERNAft ic -re - sear.:1.1 and design operation:, and by the growth in the requirement for specialized and standardized equipment. All. these new phenomena in economics and the great achievements in scientific-technical progress created the conditions for the military- technical, revolution. Of course, this revolution is not a one-time act; it unfolds and grows in aceordanee with the practical use of theoretical, achievements, especially in, the fields of mathematics, physics, ehemistry, and in, the successful development, of machine building and instru- ment building. In the aggragate, they determine the most important directions of the militaxy-technical revolution the use of intranuclear energy and the development of missile and aviation. technology, radio- electronics and automation, on the strength of which cardinal changes oc- cnxred in the field of the development of means of destruction and means for delivering them to the target. Nuclear missile weapons differ primarily from weapons of the recent past by their unprecedented destructive force, unlimited range, and the lethality of initial radiation, thermal raiaation, and radioactive contamination of the terrain, The fundamental changes in the material base of war entailed changes In the methods for accomplishing combat missions. A modern world war, if one should be unleashed, will be a nnclear war and it cannot be approached with former yardsticks. The transfer of the center of gravity of military operations to the depths of the territories of the warring countries, strikes against large indnstnial, strategic, and admitistrative-political centers, means of nuclear attack, power centers, transportation networks, communication networks, the possibility of inflicting irreplaceable losses to the economy and human resource of the warring states, the decisive de- pendence cif' military operations on massed nuclear strikes and, finally, what is most important, the growth in the role of the initial period of the war and a reduction in its duration -- all this furthers the signigicant change in the role of the economic factor in war. The creation of new means of armed combat which are new in principle, the fundamental change in the very nature of modern war, and the serious structural shifts in the economy of the developed states greatly intensified the dependence of the armed forces on the technical-economic base both in the quantitative and qualitative nature of material requirements and in the methods for their satisfaction. In modern war, the economical steps forth not only as the arsenal but also as the direct objective of armed action. This is why, along with the problem of economic supPort of nuclear war, the problem of assuring the survivability of the very economy stands out with great poignancy. Nuclear war demands colossal material expenditures; therefore, the Im- portance of the economic preparation for it grew tremendously. It is suf- ficient to not the "obsolescence" of modern equipment Which is occuring much Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-IpP85T00875R000300090019-ec0nt'd) PYRG P8F108T5R000300090019-6 morAprip(Wed .fieraRe140,?gr2OGNPEQPio. gli`"RAcur, ? :'or..(14J1 to solve the problem of teu.,,.ilmg miDtury equipm,ut at eAneptionsaly rapid rat,es scf, that the troop hP,91:1 everythipg necessNry avd at ;Any rikomeut, :ixakried1ate:1;y. change to milit.oivoy opes,ati-)Ls and aGhie-ve dezif,tve svc,:ese6 ewn in,The initial period of th.i.) war. A c;:omparison. of eApendit'IrE's on. ware of the "pre -nia,:.1:ar pvrlod" wIth, expeditures for the proTarat4cin for modexx. war graphiaally confm corAeluslo.o.. S .1?31'4117i.,?:!lety.t t o s;ity thri,t; -tAle E pecJ. of two world wars ?est,;imat,edt.Uwe appro:cLno.te:4 j2000 'tf..:1 Dae. Kra:Allocene;ss of this ,S")111 bi!!%';00.t,'; .3o& v io.;:w if we taiat ent,ire natioro1 wealth oftht-?:: f;.3....,et,ep .9.i ..0,e, end Csr the Sec ox:d. Iflorld War was estimat ed at 600 1,13:11.or. Mudc!ni, preparat eVE!ry'1.4t. e re vert. tag ,..2r1%,:.'..rEy trom,..i:ndavA3 xo;,),5dses of people from pea,:eft,l, and leading to the non-proThzItive ear.ip.7.1d.ituref a large amount of xnaterIal resourcen? wial be even snore: e:pei:v. The famous Eng:113h m?.11.tal.y ob,rver R. Flet .\:her? it LS for e:Jomplei, that, elpenditures on a Alucjar "deterrent" in England '17: =prise S Ift. k.4 :1.5.?20% of the military budget. 1136 overall cots of all oc,,uiotries i postman. years whiet :a.r.Y? co:vne,,nted. with the arms race approxitiate a thousand dollars. be war ina,z!htue which now exists in .the wid is estimated at 350 dO:aarS this is more than the r.".ost,', of the F'irst Word War. About. one hundred mi.l:Lion. men are perfecting and waitZain:ing .W3.e modern war machine in readiness for action. The prob:Ram of the economic support of a future war is not limited to a determination of material expenditure. It is no lees important to de- termine whether these eApenditures will te covered by the reserve acolmillEited prior to the war or by current production, as was the case in the .rse of past wars. This is a very diffi=lt dilemma and its solation? for tbe, present, does not go beyond the framework of assumrtions ad s,Aentifie ioresight. The assumptions ploceed primarily from two possibl variations of wars, because one camot wlth complete confidence negate the p7obability of a protracted war as well as a short war. In a future war between two coalitions, eadl of whikt possesses great human and material resources and extremel,y vast territories, it will be difficult to be limited to the mutual exchange of rear missile strikes and avoid the nec.essity to smash the surviving enemy for2es. In addition, effective means of combating weapons and protection against them are being developed. In foreign countries, even not.,T they are search lug for other means of combat, such as, for e.samp:Ae, ray ,veapons. The appearance of rel iAble attimissile means will. redwe ,:acs Iderably tte pro- bability of the complete destrartion of industrial objE cT,tves and will onf:e again pose the problem of claxxvnt production in the course of war. Oz. the other hand, the perfection of technical means of lor,.g-range detection re- duces to a certain degree .K!..le possibility of surprise atf',acli. All this Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ziCIA-RDP85T00875R00030q0ppVy6 App door ReiitatiesPOOMini,citAIRPF,r8, ?FRIF.0).99MIPPRAt6n in the initial period of a nue:1ea:17' Yorqr., f' he. pC") E4 431bility for the use and restoration of produotive forces in. the course Jf war cannot. be completely exlluded and, therefore, the necessity for the compreherAsive preparation of the economy for the conduct of ,3uch a war remains? CPYRGHT Of course:, it is difficult now to assume the proportions which will be established between military E#,:raci civiliei requirements., between the pro- duction of nuelear and conventional I.Tcapons. But nevertheless? it is im- portant to stand on. realistic ground. With a eurprise attack, modern des- tructive means of war make it possible to put out; of operation large economic areas and centers and. power and railroad centers, to cut off theaters of military operations form the rear of the country, etc, Con- sequently., in anticipatins the possibUity of a sh.ortnsterm war, it is extremely risky to assume that the production apparatus and the current production will play the same role as in past world wars. The outcome of a nuclear missile war will be determined first of all by the reserve of nuclear weapons anl means for its delivery to the targets as well as of other weapons :and other materia.1 means which are produced and accumulated during peacetimes, before the start of the war. In the opinion of a number of bourgenols economists suck as 0. Morgenstern and R. Clemens, Hitch, Makkin, Knorr., and Schlesinger? former methods of mobilization are not applicable in the third world war. They oar.xsider the condition for success in war to be the capability for potential motilization? as early as the pre-war peftod, of 30% of the gross r.tational product for the needs of the national economy tend some increase this figure to 50% and even 70%). They are based on the fact that the initial thing in economic mobilization remains., the quantity of material means ,..t the disposal of the warring sides. This finds its coaf tmation in the practical preparation of the armed forces of the United States and the other imperialist countries, in their education of a tremendous amount of reserves of military production, and in the striving to in'srease the viability and mobility of the economy of the conintries in the course of the war. ? Economic support for a nuclear war requires eytremely careful pre- paration for the even of any of its variatts.s(short as well as prolonged). The economy should assure victory over an enemy who is strong in all respects by the prepa.ration of an allodestructive countersstrik.e by nuclear weapons against his most important objeetives for the purposes of achieving strategic rests from the very beginning. As has already been said, the war cannot be limited to an excha.nge of non:Lear strikes. Combat operations will con- tinue for the purpose of the final defeat of theeaemy on his own territory. And this means that the vitality of the economie organism of a country and the provision of elementary but necessary conditions for the productive and public activity of the population will be of no small significance. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RpP85T00875R000300090019-6 pagil'Ol4C40)F8Tit6Wai6060/01809-1?-dtAARtADO.ItIlY 75R0003000a0049,6.1...h,...t.:y ;114 , or t U,y prozur....? : , ;?,0,. 1:01i. weapoD3,., means of transpart and types of fd? tl7e stability. oft.IDMCIOX,1'..".A1A',..ip wad 4..ho ati'11y industrial proditxt:Ion after e?ix-Imy pr:.blems of t...;,1:0:ilfAIRIC.! ty,pp,?:..xt of' th.P. war It is assum....:16. of the :10,3t )..oar sw,":. be o.. .b.e corivr.,Ary? vill Igstrpose.cflaly ap.d. 1,111e revolvtio mIlltary affairs iL4 of competition of tw;, opping ex)ciWAst system. tb!e: and aAbor expUits of tte pe,opae,, .;geapy's have been created. An ttey have teen ford to m,7,Nry t';2.0,1 countries, too. 7?)..a? the official report Scientific and Edto,:ation" pubj,ashed ia m 20 .Aug-ost 19647 states "In tte last eitee.n. years the of Russitims:in..the development of techno3ogy kOW:t friglates:=4:7,, Tt.ssia now has precision eaetronics. It bas rel.:faNtA..pwommed aud large compoterS. Russian i%tercontient9,:l. a new level in the development of terftrgy? vtic:L: the RX..;:" iC.;,E; b. A t red more rapiday we did, and tteir miss?.1es can carzy a ereatly payload than ours?. Thut? with t'ne movement of the Ocvdet Vnion to the.jad..?,:ng posit:lon. in world scient tf: -t e anl cal, progress., OD.E1 of the poait1t7.(..-,strtegir cal culatims on a monopoly of nuclear a matnezt b.1th vas he:1d by Mi4 ism failed. This cirmums'tance once again testifie-.3 how impolctant i is to approatt the evalNation of militaiy.-economic CTIlpibiliLies of a state in- a. new The idadetittacy of comepts of the direct de9endeme of economi and pallitl!,1,r,y potentials of a country on the over-,all lew.L of the production of pxodurAs alone already hus beei clearly discovered. The Oviet Vnion?, aathaugh it still has not overtaken the United States in this respet,, thanks to .tile planned system, of its economy and the superiority In the deve:Alopment of the most *portant brarzhes of scivace and tecauology W,tih has been ftrtneped: by socialist Iunductive relations, managed to surpass them in mode4n maxs of nuclear-missile armaxent. With the creation of Arteronti,:ze,v9a mis 5 Ukt S Which be7mme the main means of delivering nurlear weapons in the 11,oiriet Armed Forces, the relative strategi:1! iniaanerability- of the United Sates was liquidated and tbe icrcportanse of the system of .mi1itary. bases created by her was serdously It al:so became clear that a fucdamental reorg9.ization? not only of the military-industrial apparatus, but of may cccted wThL it was necessary to achiele a contemporary technicl level J.n the fiearl of weapons woduction. Itiaitary.,tehnicad, :progress depends on -the overall levlia of the countxy's e=omic development, ',),nd parti.-Aaaxay. of its CPYRGHT ..b)9 Approvea ror Release 2000/08/09E: CIA Abbfill-RDP85T00875R0003 -6 , PYRGHT rav%A-,Or ieage CI AuRitfR85T0 R00030 0100% 90tovelm aent; Aindustri.a2 Pot:071M 1 mRP-prO -TAVU :?.' ts.e most imports!int of which nrc: the laboring masses. The basic oondition for the purposets:I. buildup of C.Conoznic potential., ef fective economic mobilization? and the support of the war is now the achieve- .ment of military-technical superiority? Which :is understood to be superiority over the enemy' in the qz'Lantity a..nd quality of armaments .9 xxd in the technical 6:quipment of troops. The recognition of' the increasing significances of military technology by MarrisrosIeninism has nothing In common with viewpoints of' the bourgeois "technocrats" who ignore the ro:11,e of man and consider :30cAril progress as the drivative of technical progress alone and military technology as a means of saving the capitalistic system Which is rotted through. In this artdele, there :is no need. to dwell. in detail on the problem of military-technical superiority over the enemy. We only note that it is de- term:timed by a widely varied complex of elements, including the creation of a tremendous mass of modern raaterialatechninal means Which assure colossal firepower and mo'bility? the organization of rapid scientifiestechnleal plan- ning of operations and the control of them:, and the highest coMbat readiness and combat effectiveness of troops. It is important to keep in mind that the growing dependence of the economic capabilities of a state on ehangas in the structure of' the national economy in favor of the development of its most progressive branches poses the problem of the optimum solution of a wide circle of economic and techni- cal problems of nu.cles,r-rocket, war with all aorteness. And nit is not, by chance. Even a highly industrial rational economy does not automatically lead to the creation of military- might which answers the requiremsntsof modern war. For the achievement or the necessary results, there is still. a requirement for the. correct and :purposeful consideration of' the ties between the economy as a whole:, its individual branches, and military construction and for the determination of prospects for militatechnical progress, economic fl combat effectiveness of various types and kinds of weapons and military equipment., arid also the establishment of reasonable proportions in their pro- duction. The problem of the optimum solstion in military-economic pia:ming also had significance in the: wars of the "pre-nuclear age" when militax7-technical progress was accomplished within the limits of that material-technical base. Its significance is growing immeasurably now when the rapid development of military technology has taken on the character of' a mil.7.'ttary-technical revo- ETere we will or:1y note some of the aspects of this problem. In the first place, since victory in nuclear war is aohdeved by the combined efforts of ail types of armed forces and combat arms, it is naturally necessary to correctly select the proportion of' the main means of destruction. of nuclear-missile weapons to conventional weapons in cothat Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00030009RMO'd) 7 't,,''birAZi4DP8ST008715R0008000900StaiaieJ. r0?.' W'an "0:kt.en, ; 14:11ake nn a.,;;;d. NriokA dep!ply. xcv.i.vao, les6 tl,ne ?04:olowayl 01;',It by "a of eACtort vhi,,T. the A..,,my hzd tte vic1,011rom tLe P.MIDY 0....0.:03e of be - plied in toe fi'rot vtrike actions of bal armed fo:ixes." o!' Jr.( 11,4410a,r it.'nr.? e r-,;saryi. of new and 4.:.onventior.A1 meant; in veeidy IJUI:::141:',,M11:45i112' weapons r,.,.(1ixes greatr oolution of complex aac,rata.:1-dosiga prol,mso their (.totbot ',"..apabilitiod a conoide.x.a.Ny fiX:1 I?. 5 it 1,4.xole le Ca C> $ar,V. .forpend:1:f,.....a.T 6 p: .r1: :production of ,T.onventioai..:4 weapon. Tlis vny?, or vievi i1L'16 e:g.e....CYJIMaY ..:14WCtRrit tO detera0:a.p: tbe coy?-st between the ready Irdliturypsodiztion as 'Whole as well as the prrportian.3 the prodvtion of :o.FAir uad SeconCy? tbe e=,t p:Ite data of employing varir. ypr:!::; of weapons o": com'Aa!':, ecr,u4n)e..7.7;? fever within the framc.::work or itliperialist and comptidon in the armament; nipxRets., ansd thee.A.c!xdari:;;, the "military-ioduztrial complele in capitalict wasting of meam and foris and to the immobi'lAzation vable3 in the form of strvteei::: raw meterial?,-; tectify to the fact ftha', the UPited States P7Jnd he:t r.ew roumd in the arms race, INhipled 'op by US agE'rPsoicio. in 7ie'D. April ct this year the Sennte of the lir.lited Stl.tes 15 bi:tlion dollars for the development of .ne:v types of weapons in the :196V66 fiscal. year. West lerlfiany 1.s being armed at full speed., azid her :mil expenditures have trip1.ed0 liast milite,ry programs have bee:..;,. adopted in Frame and Ene1d. trader the;:le cor,dit,ions? the 77.3ST.3 bac 'been fo.,;,.ed eicnend ,ett,a;.r.) part of' its material, flcca2; and hymn re,so'arves for defew,e 7;ecd,:. Tkke precent:e of a mighty heavy inhistxy now perart...5 Lik not oray to more eompleely the requirements for overall economic devi7Mpm. It.e de- fence of the country Inttoto A 1111.1C..1 greater degree b.ack fo.rmer4? to supp:iy agriculture and braLches connected vitn :-, the f.,,Dpulat;i :it the mea,-,s of prodmAjon. We rec.ala tbat expedit-z?s f the An7Fd f:rck.?s in the new trAget of the Soviet d.on have ben 500 'D.C1.11a.A This means that the /Lanned c:t.arter of tal,a eentration of s,lientifIc-techu.oalthit o.. the most, pr j:h):.I.ez of military affairs permit. the Soviet; 'ion to J:t7r, superiority over imperialism even with a '.,-nvOle-r' wr.t.r,.1try Approved For Release 2000/08/09 . CIA RDP85T00875R000300090019 6 CPYRGHT ; tb.7. third place:, it; 1a impart. on N 'Le keop in mind the d eel It erdvsralenb%icolteigdwitiV. tiN4:161246 itd08755R0010300090011(90Sority? " 41103Yt91173A)nr.oRPY.40 37%.q.uirTonutap bc n .1' technolocy and man? of people in the arme.:d. forces?in ?thei... wo.rds? the most judiciouc? optimum measure of' saturation of the armed forces with technological equipment. The rapid introduction of the lateot weapons and equipment among the troops should be accompanied with the ASCUrnnce of th e tr max.imum combat capability in which, on the one hand!, there would be no chortcomings in thi equipment and? on the other hand, the equipment itself would not 'burden down the personnel in its servicing and combat employm.ont. The correctly a.lbated, scientifically 'based optimum measure of technical saturation of the troops should serve as the initial indieator for determining the requiremmts of' the armed forces for material-technical supplies and the purposeful loading of military industry. It is eompletely understandable that all. this requires a transition to optimum planning and control, in the field of economics which is based on the systematic processing of economic information tj electronic computers, on the widespread use of mathematical methods which permit determining variants of the most effective use of means., and on the defense of the country. Of course, the achievement of military-technical superiority over the enemy does not reduce the importance of other elements of the economic potential but on the contrary, assumes purposeful) clearly thought-out ad- vance work on perfecting the forms and method of the hiobilizational re- organization and adaptation of industry, transportation, agriculture and trade, planning and control to the needs of the troops, determination of the required proportions between all branches of production, organization of material-technical and ration supply, preparation of human resources for war, etc, In economic planning, a spec:tel. place should be 0,::cupled by the scientific potential which, along with the traditional potentials -- mili- tary, economic, end morale --- is now one of the components of the military might of a country. Rapid scientifie-teehnical progress has far-reaching consequences for the developmerAt of the economy. If one speaks of the economy of modern capitalism, then one shoull consider first of all the increasing '..ntere ference of bourgeois governments in it. Private business does not izesst to assume the risk of tremendous capital investments in new branches which would not bring profits in a short time. The bourgeois government takes this risk in the interest of the entire capitalist class. In this con- nection., the government market, that is, work for the government? acquired a tremendous role for the monopolists. As is known., V. I. Ienin called working for the state "a special type of''astional economy." Prior to the Second World Warp this "special type of econore was observed primarily in fascist countries where, in accordance with the policy of autarchy, state control was im..21,xmeAed over the economy in the CAORCT410 For Release 2000/08/09 : CWRDP85T00875R000300691}1 laterenta of rni1itr monok.Vutayou0411114.QuIl.1 KLikk' Obret6R06.03000196616 tenutqW3VREWEPAIRR,41-rdY6fin 111 .u.e process or 1,foaoA1on ole! pOSO of militarizing the economy tilso became a cnaracteriOje feeler? ln main cnpitaliat countriea in peacetime. New branche or leeleeloa arc engendered by aclentific-technical progresa firgt or ,12, er:,),-ve 4 taristic orientation (nuclear phyalegl miscue eontitrete.,1, aircraft conatzuction radio-electronics, etc.) In the United Oste? Vei examplv militariom controls about 70 percent of all efforts in thy rp:ld of delaAek. merit, of science, and three-fourthe of the increase of mere:a e.-xpeAlle.tre on reocarch is for military-space purposes. The arms race is engendering a function/I-ize-li d arm', Miar wa-irh monopolies sell military goods to the government: with 4 hcJaranteed Man profit. Military-economic: business thus acquires the feateyes of e. m9.;le and legalized enrichment at the expense of the natimoa te,rit ,Ard $11 -tee expense of the tax-payers. The mutual dependence of economics and militarism will beeemc mee,, more intimate, and several bourgeois authors have been for:ed to adm...,t "There exist two Americas, and there exist two economies militar7 ard civilian. Of course, they interact ... but we must reeognize the i:aet the military economy plunders the civilian economy. 1a the ftrst Federal Government generously releases funds for scientilicereseure work In military industry to the detriment of the peaceful branes...Of 16 lion dollars disbursed annually for scientific-research pirposes, only fo-Jr millior are expended in civilian industry. In the second place mElitary corporations rob civilian industry, enticing the best specialista for themselves, and there are not enough at them in the country." State-monopolistic capitalism is converting a military economy into a :ermanent attribute of capitalism, not only in war years:, but also in pc,!eco time. The military economy, as a product of state monopolistic :a.pita1isn4 is growing on the soil of a national capitalist economy. It is also spreading to the sphere of super national monopolistic amaigemations have emerged in the form of so-called "intergraions." The creation of international economic organizations of imperialism is conn,...t,z.ld with the ati,empt to mobilize the resources of the capitalist world and to "re,ple.te" the world capitalist economy in the interests of monopolies. it is in- separably connected with capitalist programming, with the so-called planifi. cation in the interests of the "military-industrial complex." However, in analyzing the process of integration, it is impcitant to stress not on:1Y the economic, but first of all the military-political aspect, connected wit.L the activity of aggressive military blocs. European integration introduced new features into the military ,.coemy of the imperialist states. Now, the correlation of forces in the louperiist camp cannot be determined only on the basis of data on the economic potential. of individual capitalist countries. it is important to consider the AiNgs:mlifior Release 2000/08/Op0: CIA-RDP85T00875R0003000W.194 CPYRG RIZIPMQ, E.WP groepe? the members of which are not enly connected by treety rcelationehipe belt are also militnry-technically and finaciaIly dependent on eech otee Thue? in a world d ivided into two opposing uocial-economic aysteme? the problem of the stud'e of the economy of coalitions arises. Militery-technieal progress presents greater and greater difficulties for the capitalist military production.. Each scientific-technicel achieve- ment :i.mreasee the volnme of means diverted to the ereparetion of war. New T miccitc, bombs? seletarines, and spy-satellites become more and more expensive, and inventions follow each other with such speed that by the time a weapon comes out of production it often is obsolete, and many military orders are cancelled even before they are filled. Of the main capitalist states, only the United States is able to develop all the latest types of armaments and military equipment. True, some other im-, perialist states have not refrained from the area race and, without reckoning with the expanse, strive to have their own nuclear weapons. After England created "iridependent" nuclear forces, Prance began to create "nuclear strike forces". The West German revanchiste are more and more actively being drawn to nuclear weapons,. too. Meanwhile, the imperialists of the United States in recent times are steadily obtaining a more uni- form distribution of the burden of armaments among the NATO members., mien - standing that a lengthy militarization tithe economy will lead to a drop in its rate of growth and to a Ireduction of its ability to compete. This once again is evidence of the. :Limited possibilities of imperialism for maneuver in the field of military-economic mobilization. State "regulation" of the economy in the interest of a financial oligarchy not only does not eliminate:, but. intenSifies even more the inter- imperialist contradictions within the framework of "integration" and in- tensifies the internal instability of imperialism. And this also aifects the military-technical development of capitalism and, in particular, of its citadel -- the United States. This is why United States diplomacy is presently becoming refined in, attempts to foist. the NATO "multilateral nuclear forces" on her partners and thereby open accese to nuclear weapons for the West German revanchists. As was stressed in the Warsaw communique:, plans for the creation of multi- lateral forces "are aimed at strengthening a special DS-West German bloc within the North Atlentic Alliance." A comprehensive realization of the fruits of the scientific-technical revolution requires a high level of co:Llectivization of the means of pro- duction, clear-cut plaming coordination of science and technology, and the lifting of the culteraletechnicaa level of the population. Only socialism possesses these conditions in full measure. All this opens tremendous pos- sibilities for assuring a higher productivity of labor than in the developed capitalist countries -- the most important condition for the raising of the economic might of the eaentries of socialleta Approved For Release 2000/08109 : GIPAIWP55T008t5R000300090019-6 fibpl-MeiglzdkRtteaves201301131169; : alAltia0Rigalg5BP.PfAg:99icatition., there is a requirement for constantly improving the forms of organization. ot p37oduction? mastering the main directions in the development of technlea:,l, progress, and working out the correct military-technical po../.1.:.T, 'dkale:b. cox- responds to the new criteria Of economic support of military might and 1.s capable of assuring the frustrations of the criminal intentions of milita,rism and, if war becomes unavoidable -- the rapid and utter defeat of any enemy. The general plan of the economic policy of the Soviet; stote :is the building of communism and the continuous raising of' the material and cult;..,s;a:a;) level of the people. The means alloted to the solution of this problem a:ve growing unswervingly as the economic might of our country is strengf)11.enedn The production of agricultural products and consumer goods is 'broadeEing axy; the growth rates of production of the means of prod+action and COrlft'Ut11V are converging. In the Soviet Union, in the process of creating the materia.teChnical base for communism, there have been created a special metallurgica),;, atomic, electronic, and missile industry, precision instrument-bui3.da2g.?jet aviation, modern shipbuilding, and production of the means of Fratomat,Loa. A graphic expression of progress in the most important branches of sci.N.i! ecv.3 technology and an indicator of the level and' potential of Soviet induatriaa production is the creation of satellites and space ships. Of tremendous significance for the further growth of the economic might of the world socialist system is the accomplishment of all tasks for the building of communism which have been developed and which were determined by the 22nd Congress and subsequent plenums of the Central Committee..., CPSV. In the:period that has passed since the 22nd Congress, the Central Committe CPSU profoundly and comprehensively considered the urgent problems of tha most expedient ways and meana for creating the material-technical haze for communism, of a common technical policy for the Party, of qualitative trails.- formations in the leading branches of material production, of raising the economic effectiveness of the most progressive directions of technical pro- gress, ani of the systematic study and introduction of the newest achieve- ments ? Toad science and practice. Al]. this is the most important con- '7he preservation by Socialism of the vanguard positions in world scier 'o-?,echnical progress. 'em war requires continuous, ever-growing, and harmonious develop- ment, oi varied technical means and, first of all, of nuclear-missile weapor.a. It leans on a highly-developed coordinated material-productive organism economically capable of supplying the armed forces with all necessities. Al:!. this obliges us urgentl,y to follow the course of the military-technical re- volution, comprehensively consider the demands which it makes on the economy., closely link them with the experience of economic mobilization in the last war, and strengthen the economic, political, and military collaboration of the socialist countries. ApprovedWaValase 2000/08/091XIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRG thc ml lit ry suxerl .9Ripitiiir169?p, 6100 f2 o' ApiprifireQ01.94i ligtflia,%ttgn. _A?, irtb5"tri.LT,Ittyit'egi.' 193-64260,, mot d.or theni. .I.mperi:sliam As st,i1.1 strong ond c pcl f 1.1.nleashing any adventure .0thich is dangerous f or humanity . Under t.t?.ese z'onditions., it is necessary constantly to be concerned that our Armed Forces have the most modern means for defending the Mother- land and moil:tath all typos of military equipment in the required condition.. The r.4trenathening of the defense of the USSR and the might of the Soviet Armed Forces Is the 1.xrgent task of the Soviet people.0 lic)teiz tt.!izhdtoarod32,:spe, Ehizau,D j 3. JLD25 octorti.m. 1952. D VP 7,1,D 7.9 ig knownthe; the Itaraufac.',6aaue ofichni.e) rocket with a peatex coatat erreo.% than 4,,cyx 1.,?,00,kg; rx,.;;;)0(,...4,,ti:11.esu hck the) lar,,t wec requires lees matezoistal, ecepe.riditvoes. 5. 123 tyri.1 1965. 6, 0 inlann Tv,xclzhe)teMSRrta 21c,e2).,5 gcyl (The Ecomo- ellot uric Tian a'124, the USER BuAlfe,es leaf 1,9b5 lzdat(iliviet'm, 19e4s 65 leges. 7. Wztl:,.....avls.:42,9 Nr-,p la :11,96h., Peel) Ie. 8. iv.ijamaETI? qtrz.luzta:r.:2.Afizzv _otnwhaszl, N? 1Cip 21.96;3. Pav 58. 9. Na:72 V.; ,i74;nr.,51.17 191Z):11.0 10. 711( &7-Ipae;a00 (-.1e facs?-vg r? ieganisyEltImis&iIccruf thls. NATO blf:w_.,) was myeatedo and the) Ilmvaan C*)al 31 Cmaau..11V wAsa Pint an att(4474)1; to forma a Rrtvean at,fewe C'comunl'ISiey WiE,6 v:7?d,aviWcians, and than th(m)a appeavai the C:Ammon Moket ecoal, ra,11,ta7,3.,:y-oc=fallrri ? iMh as Itoatomp amid ethers. 11. Ir.r6saya jranwy .11.961.!50 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-.ff)P85T00875R000300090019-6 Approved For We1 0400700/019:RUMARDPB63100UNROA030009001 9-6 OF CERTAIN PHENOMENA IN ARMED STRUGGLE CPYRGHT Comment by Cot A. Yekimovskiy Of late, our military press hez published sevexal articles, responses, and theoretical works which analy4e the nature ami classi- fication of the individual phenomena of armed struggle. Entirely opposite points of view have been expressed on some basic rAtuations. The sharpest of all polemics developed on the subject of what should be classified as military action and as strategic action. For example, the article by Viarsbal of the Sa,ri et Union V. Soka- lovskiy and Major General M. Cherednichenko classifies as military operations strikes by the strategic nuclear missile forces against military, economic and political enemy targets; the operations of anti- missile and PVC, Strany troops of the country, protecting the country and its armed forces against enemy nuclear strikes; the advance and, sometimes, defense, on land theaters of operation, and navy operations at sea. In their work "Military Strategy," the co-authors, who are also the authors of the above-mentioned article, essentia2Iy consider such operations as types of strategic operations (page 373. The authors describe the types of military and strategic activities as identical concepts (pages 344, 367, 380). In his article, Major General Zaviyalov includes as military operations "operations of the Armed forces as a whole, which are at the basis of any war." (Article 15), The author includes here attack, defense and fight in the air. Unfortunately, we cannot fully agree with any of these points of view. Above all, we consider wrong to identify the concepts of "types of military operations" and "types of strategic operations." The first, undoubtedly, is broader than the second for military operations may include the use of one or several types of armed forces as a whole, as well as their operative task forces and formations. In other words, these activities will be displayed on various scales, not only strategic. Strategic operations presume the use of major formations of armed forces and express only their inherent method of fighting in carrying out assignments of absolutely strategic signi- ficance. The identification of such concepts would mean restricting the possibility to find more accurate expression for the nature of such different phenomena. Approved For Release 2000/08/094CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT ApprovelliFtrRedivalsei2009/08109.lii01A-ROMPAWFMNOROMMET?y operations and what are their scales? First of all, we consider as such the strikes dealt by nuclear missile forces. It is known, in fact, that the basic role in a future war will be played by nuclear weapons used through strategic purpose facilities. These facilities, in our opinion, as was properly claimed by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Sokolovskiy and Major General M. Cherednichenko, are not inherent to offensive or defensive operations. Regardless of the nature of operations on land theaters, they may strike at important targets in the deep enemy rear in the interest of the war as a whole and carry out their assignments independently. Nuclear strikes delivered by operational and factical means also help resolve very important problems in operations and combat. In such a case they are a component part of the other types of military opera- tions, for example, offensive or defensive on land theaters. This is no reason at all for. not considering nuclear strikes as a type of combat operations just as we consider it entirely acceptable to consider, for example, a short defense in some directions as a component part of an overall major offensive operation. Naturally, advance and defense continue to remain types of military operations. However, they should not be spread over to include the operations of all armed forces as a whole, as is being done, for example, by General Zaviyalov. He writes that an offensive is the type of military operation of armed forces as a whole, the basis of which "consists of powerful nuclear strikes with strategic nuclear facilities -- rocket troops, atomic submarines, armed with missiles and long-range aircraft" (page 18). "Defense (meaning against enemy nuclear attacks, carried out by the anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense troops -- the author) will be one of the basic types of military operations and will acquire an exceptionally great national importance" (page 20). On this basis, he classifies it as strategic defense on the part of the armed forces. If we agree with the author that the operations of strategic nuclear facilities should be considered as a basis for strategic of- fensive of armed forces, logically they should be considered also as a basis for strategic defense. It is entirely obvious that by striking at the straisic nuclear attack facilities of the enemy, they carry out an exceptionally important assignment of a defensive nature, decisively weakening the power of the nuclear enemy strike and creating conditions for successful operations for the antiair and antimissile defense troops. In this connection, the question naturally arises as to how proper is it to consider the same type operation as a structural part and also as the basis of two simultaneously developing but entirely distinct types of military operations? Obviously, it is hardly logical to pursue this line of thought and this leads us to Approvea ror Release 2u0u/Ots/u9 CIA T.A--8oi u0d7oRu00300090019 6 thetpmaafiedifer Release2100/0109 44gdA-RJAMP.0?ZW/99?.609IRRRI 9-6 be classified as an independent type of military operations (in this case as strategic operations). Offensive and dcfense as types of military operation, may be mentioned only within the framework of a land theater. Offensive, as well as its variety -- pursuing -- will be applied here at all scales, including strategic?, defense could be no more than operational. Even though as regards the latter we consider that it could be done with rather major foes, for example, one or two front formations; together with other types of armed forces. The possibility of defense conducted on such scales was clearly proved by the experience of the past war, indicating that troops undertook defense with such major forces even during the period of general successful strategic offensive. The same may be said of the scales of counteroffensive which, under conditions of a short defense, are typical in the transition from defense into offensive. Retreat, as a variety of defense of our troops, can also not assume a strate- gical scale. However; as was already pointed out, we classify defense and counteroffensive on such a scale not to the strategical but to the operational category, mainly because; within the framework of operational command, they must be considered on a broader scale than in the past. During last war; for example; operations in a different direction of two and sometimes a single front formation could. be classified as strategic, since control of the operations of major operational formations of land forces constituted the basic area of activity of the strategic leadership of the armed struggle. Under current conditions, the center of strategic leadership has moved more and more in the direction of major intercontinental and global scales within which strategic forces and facilities are used in the interest of solving the tasks of the war as a whole. For this reasunp the operations of individual fronts and, sometimes; of groups of fronts may, in our opinion, be in the field of operational command. Military operations or varieties of offensive include also a meeting engagement. Its rejection on the part of General Zav'yalov, when he says that "once the fight is on, this means that one side is attacking or advancing while the other is defending itself. And, vice versa, if there is no offensive or defensive -- there is no fight!" (page 17) -- is simply unexplainable. It turns out that the author does not consirier the possibility of a ease in which both sides are advancing and neither is on the defensive. Yet, it is precisely such a situation that may be the most characteristic in a modern nuclear missile war. As we imagine it, a future war may begin after strikes by nuclear missile means with meeting engagements by army formations of border military districts. Such battles and engagements are not excluded even in subsegnent offensive operations against enemy reserves moving up from the deep rear. True; only the meeting engagements (the A roved For Rele,qse,2000/08/091.6CIA-RDP85T00875ROMM14019-6 ADDrtireebrwir*Ma 26aPevotiu.1)31A0RDPgt5T008754R000300001119N60 other p of m tary operations. If ono of the sides begins a defense or a retreat, the other one will undertake an offensive or pursuit. However this is no reason to deny them in general. As regards the scales of battles, taking into account their individual nature in different directions, they could hardly outgrow the framework of an army. CPYRGHT In our view, defense against the enemy nuclear attack should also be considered as a separate type of military operation (anti-air and anti-missile, carried out through the means of the PVC) Strany Troops and other types of armed forces). True, the tasks of such a defense would be conducted to a considerable extent, in the course of other types of military operations, particularly when dealing nuclear strikes and engaging in an offensive. However, at a given stage, the forces and facilities of the anti-missile and anti-aircraft defense will enter into action. Even though the method of action of these forces will be of an active and offensive nature, the assignment as a whole remains defensive and, therefore, the type of military operation of PVO means and forces should be considered as defense against enemy nuclear strikes. However, It would be wrong to classify as strategic operation such a defense. As was already pointed out, strategic operations include operations of a strategic scale not only by virtue of their purpose and composition of the forces taking part In them, and which usually consist of major formations of troops of one or several branches of armed forces but which, furthermore, are characterized by corresponding time and space indices. Such concrete indices greatly determine the scale of the very purpose of the operation, the amount of forces and facilities used as well as the possibility to carry out joint operations on the basis of their co- ordinated activities. Approaching this question from such a standpoint, it should be said that defense against enemy nuclear strikes is, undoubtedly, of major strategic significance. On this basis again, it would seem that it should be classified as strategic action. As regards the other factors, from this point of view It does not fall under the classifica- tion of strategic action. The operations of the PV0 Strany ob'yedineniya divided on a territorial basis, may take place at different times and In different areas, depending mainly on the composition of the forces and the nature of enemy attacks. As a result, in the course of their combat operations, the PVO troops main effort cannot be directed against the main enemy groupings. This is 'what is precisely most characteristic of a strategic scale of operations. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-.firDP85T00875R000300090019-6 The same forms ofaillWINJ;99444grug614g4kowiAgAM-M. rnolli71041 Al* Med cEetEiiieteneAughdku.WMA.3. MAY 11Nortnr IVrmati one and task forces, and primarily the nuclear strikes of a strategic or operational scale delivered jointly with nuclear missle or air nuclear means of other branches of the armed forces or independently. Navy task forces or formations may also engage in offensive or defensive operations together with the laud troops in maritime areas if they are a stractural part of one or another type of aTilitary operation on the part of land forces. In some cases, for example, in opera- tions for the capturing of maritime straits or groups of islands the navy which includes submarines, ships, aviation and marines may undertake offensive operations separately or constitute the basis of an offensive formation of trocps belonging to several types of armed forces. Such a type of military operations could be considered (3Ffras no other but offensive. In this respect, we agree with the author of the book Voyennomorskoy flat (The Navy) 4 and do not share the opin- ion of the authors of the above-mentioned article in Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star) who classify navy operations as military operations. The various types of military operations such as nuclear strikes, offensive and defensive, are characteristic to the air force as well. Thus, long-range aviation is used to deal nuclear strikes independently or in combination with the other types of armed forces, for example, with the submarine navy forces on aircraft carrier strike formations, the navy or convoys of the enemy in the open sea. Tactical aviation may deal nuclear strikes and, also, take part in the type of military operations carried out by land troop formations and fighter aviation may participate in the defense against enemy nuclear attacks. As regards fighting in the air, classifying it as military operations as is recommended by General Zavgyalav in his article is, as we see it, quite doubtful. It is sufficient to say that military operations, as we habitually understand them, involve a stru6gle with arms and its results are the destruction of the personnel, the arms and the military equipment of the enemy. lowever, in this case there is nothing of the kind. This struggle is a structural part of the other types of military operations. Thus, under current conditions, the types of military operations should be the following: nuclear strikes; defense from the nuclear weans of the enemy; offensive and defensive on land theaters of opera- tions and adjacent maritime areas with their varieties -- pursuit, meeting encounter (battle), counteroffensive and withdrawal (retreat). Strategic operations should include: nuclear strikes by strategic nuclear forces at the deep enemy rear (with the participation of strategic rocket troops, navy submarines and long?range aircraft); nuclear strikes at the enemy in the open sea (with navy submarines, r ve _Eor Release 2000/08/09 :1eIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGH A glleorniyfelaiegOliteitocwa. dozwip8STetOlifti FT630300090049 ge'f ensive --PPAyu, / u Auuu ,ary operation 'theaters (with the participation of most or all types of armed forces). Concerning the forms of military operations and forms of armed struggle. Let us point out, above all, that military operations and armed struggle are almost identical, concepts. The difference lies only in the fact that the armed struggle, strictly speaking, may take place not only in times of war but in peacetime as well and is carried out both by troops as well as by the civilian population with the help of any weapons whatsoever. Military operations are inherent to war only. For this reason, Wten it is a question of the forms; it would be more accurate to use the term of form of military operations and not armed struggle. However, this does not mean that one should entirely abandon the term of "armed struggle." It is extremely neces- sary in cases when one would like to emphasize armed atruggie among the other forms of struggle used in war (ideological, diplomatic; etc.). However, since in the given case the above terms are considered by all as being identical and, most frequently; in this sense the term used is "forms of armed struggle," we will also use it in the future. Until recently; the main forms of armed struggle, as is known, were considered to be the operation and battle. No one objects to this. Yet, the belief arose that perhaps the forms of armed struggle also include nuclear (nuclear missiles and nuclear aviation) strikes with which, in our view, one cannot agree. Nuclear strikes which are a type of military operation, cannot be at the same time a form of precisely this type. One or another type of military operation shows up in concrete forms in various scales and within the given framework of the goal of operations, time, space, as well as the method of operations of troops used for the purpose. In one or another form of armed struggle there is a given procedure of opera- tions and interaction among all participating forces and facilities. This means that nuclear or nuclear missile strikes may be used in combat restricted by certain goals, place and time, on the basis of close cooperation among the various arms and types of armed forces taking part in the operation. True, these operations do not fit in within the old concepts and it is difficult to accept them with the help of established points of view. Obviously, however, nothing else remains but to accept this new phenomenon as objective reality and, on this basis, resolve problems facing the theory and practice of military affairs. In the light of this fact, nuclear strikes with strategic facilities at other continents or in the open sea acquire the form of a single strategic operation of nuclear forces (rocket troops, missile carrying submarines forces and aviation). Rgleas .2000imp9 : CIAADP85T00875R000300090019-6 The scale of operg&,?64\01.{apciitiii,isipittr#T6687:5R066300090019.6 INDSVOlVieCLEPEROWte4Weefcngilln.70FameworIE of this field of military art which usually encompassed the concept ef "operational art." True, during last war already, operations of strategic signifi- cance were carried out (operations of groups of fronts). Yet, at the same time, a general strategical offensive along the entire Soviet' German front was not considered as a single strategic operation but was the sum total of operations of groups of fronts interrelated. only to a certain extent in time and space (strategic scale) and of individual front and army formations (operational scale). Nor, the forces at one or several land theaters which will include the partici- pation of all the types of armed forces, including nuclear strategic forces, striking along the entire depth of the strategic offensive operation, require accurate coordination as 'regards target, space and time. This phenome,lon is not only a type strategic operation (strategic offensive), but it also acquires the form of a strategic offensive operation. The action of operational formations of ground forces, of air forces and PVO troops of land theaters also turn into joint operations but on a smaller operational scale. Such operations should include those of one or, sometimes, two fronts and as well as army operations. The biggest of them will take place in combination with rocket troops and long-range aviation. Operation in maritime areas would be, essen- tially, also joint operations involving rocket, land, navy and air forces, as well as the PVO Strany troops. Such combined operations may include others which acquire the form cf separate operations carried out with the forces of one or several operational formations of aviation trooLa, particularly long-range aviation and navy (sea operations), as weil as air and sea landing operations in which may take place the personnel of other types of armed forces. Battles, as a form of armed struggle, show UP in the operations of ground troop formations. In some cases, they may involve task pyRGHTforces (units of the navy, air force and airborne troops). Sea engagements take place in the seas, and air engagements in the air. We should deal particularly with an opinion which, in our view, is not entirely true, to the effect that the activity of the PVO Strany troops will acquire the form of operations (antiair and antimissile). The point is that one of the main elements which determine the operation of the form of armed struggle is the participation of formations of strategic or operational troops. Yet, the activity of the PVO Strany troops are usually separate, carried out by individual formations and, less frequently, cask forces, and are of local importance. For this reason, the PVO Strany troops engage not in operations but in combat action which takes the form of an operation only when an operational TCr08 030009 -6 ppi coved yr elease 2000108109 20 PYRGHT task force is compactly deployed, cover1/1z a a4U-45VAATiisites Appihtdost RoeRehelase 2.1/08/11WaigA713PAW00?118ilaiv tit Mt Iritry be only of an operative and not stIgIc scale. Anti-missile defense may also turn into a form of operation only if it is carried out by entire operational task forces pursuing the same aim and under single operational command. As a whole, discussing the forms of armed struggle, we should point out that it should be considered not isolated from the types of military activities but in close coordination. At the same time, these concepts cannot be identified. The type is the essence, the content of a phenomenon, while the form is the way this content shows up. The form of military operations shoAd not te applied to the external display of the content (i.e., the type of military operation), as is sometimes done in our military literature, but should be con- sidered as a concrete display of the essence of type itself of military operation on one or another scale (operation or battle). Only the form helps reveal the nature ofa phenomenon fror all sides, only through it could one understand the essence itself of the various types of military operations we have discussed. It is entirely natural that, analyzing these types of military operations in connection with phenomena of another sort, they in turn may become forms. However, in this case we have taken them as the essence, i.e., as the content and are indicating the forms in which this content shows up. Operations and battles; in turn, have also their own nature which shows up in various forms. The forms of offensive operations, for example, would include: encirclement, fragmenting of enemy formations, etc. From the point of view of scale, no sharp delineation is possible among the forms of armed struggle. In some cases, a factor such as the forces and facilities used became the criterion for the scale of an operation and in another -- the goal of the action. Under certain c?/.'=stances, those same indices may make the operations strategic or operational. The question of methods for waging war is closely linked to the aspects analyzed above. The book Voyennaya strategiya (Military Strategy) states that: "Methods of waging war should include the sum total of forms and methods for the conduct of military operations, the forms and methods of using the means of armed struggle, task forces; formations and units of the diffecent types of armed forces and arms, as well as armed forces as a whole, for the fulfillment of political, military-strategic, operational and tactical tasks" (page 318). It is further stated that "the type of strategic action (or military action) and the concrete forms in which they show up in the course of the war (operations, strikes; battles), the combination Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CDURDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYR 0 one W r interaction conutiLute the nau,ure or the methoOas of waging wnr" (page 367). Thus, the authoro claunify an the methodu for waging war military operationu of all ncales, together. Yet, their analysis of these methods leads to a revelation of the nature of nuclear war and the types of action of the various arms, of their task forces and formationu. Such an approach to the analysis of the m of waging war could hardly be considered successful. Eauentially, the concept of "methods of waging war" should include the main aspects in the nature of the use of the armed forces of the country or a coalition of countries to achieve victory in the war as a whole. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall that F. Engels, speaking of the :Jeans (methods) of waging war and of the system of waging war meant a single and not severel methods for waging a single war or a series of wars. The essence of the method of war, for example, during the times of Napoleon was considered by*/!Ingels as being the skillful leadership of big mauneu of troops, maneuvering them and concentrating them on the decisive sectors. Engels compared this method of waging war, progressive for its time and criticized some subsequent less efficient methods, which did not Answer concrete historical conditions, such as the slow trench warfare of the American civil war (1861-1865) and the French system of waging war (the 1953- 1656 Crimean War) which he considered as a backstreet Russian war and a waste of forces (F. Engels. Selected Military Works, Voyenizdat, 1957, pp 626, 630, 425, 76-79). What was the most characteristic aspect in the Great Fatherland War from the point of view of the method of operation of all armed forces aimed at reaching the final goal? It was the essentially eystematic, in time and space, defeat of enemy formations with sub- sequent occupation of enemy territory. Currently, the armed forces have such means of struggle the use of which would help reach the defeat of the enemy within a short period of time wherever on earth he may be. Consequently, the most suitable method for waging war under current conditions is the simul- taneous defeat of troop groupings and the destruction of the material- technical foundations for waging war on enemy territory along its entire depth, and achieving the purpose of the war within a short period of time. In our opinion, the question of the method of waging modern warfare should be considered only within that context. The sum total of different ways and means for carrying out one or another assignment by the troops should be better named, as was done in the book 0 sovetskoy voyennoy nauke (On Soviet Military Science), as methods and forms of armed struggle. In this case, not war as a whole is considered but armed struggle (Military operations) which show up with methods and forms of its scaApproved organizFor Keiease zuu0 cW2kbiseStinef5Ftbectamiegoo19-6 ation Ansi CPYRGHT Such is our point of view on those matters. Comment by Capt 1st Rank N. Inyuneo In his article, Major General I. Zav'yalov properly underscores the idea to the effect that now, when there is a radical departure in the views concerning the methods and nature of armed struggle "it would be erroneous to drop all concepts developed in the course of past wars and military development -- to invent and implant allegedly new aspects of principles in places where conventional concepts retain their vitality even under conditions of a nuclear war as well" (page 15). It seems to us, even more so, that there is no need whatsoever to retain and adamantly defend that which has already outlived its own usefulness, which has become part of history, as well as there is no need to try to squeeze a new content into an old form. It is precisely thus that one could consider the desire of General Zaviyalov to prove that now, as well as many centuries ago, there exist only two interrelated types of armed struggle -- offensive and defensive. In our view, the author ignores the important fact that concepts and principles true for one time become wrong for another. The quite well known General Dragomirov, in his article "On the Relation of Drill Regulations to Tactics" this idea as follows: "There are things, ideas about which have apparently become so strong that they are not even mentioned; in fact, the opposite is true: frequently It is not so much the concepts which are established but the phrases which express them. These sentences pass from mouth to mouth and slowly their meaning disappears and only thing that remains is their sound; the only thing that is left Is the outside cover of the con- cept like an empty bottle: It is a proof of its content but, mean- while, the content has long disappeared." Something similar has taken place with the concept of "offensive" and "defense"; in the course of many years of their historical development, the most diverse contents have been included. It has become a habit to call all active opera- tions by no other name but offensive even though frequently they have nothing offensive in them. The same has taken place with the con- cepts of "defense." Despite the fact that as weapons have developed and that the types, forms and methos of armed struggle have been constantly changing, we frequently come across the desire to encompass these changes within the already existing and habitual concept of "offense" and "defense." No third possibility, as Comrade Zaviyalov believes, exists. Yet, let it be said immediately, a third possi- bility has arisen and, despite the opinion of the author, really exists and is developing -- it is the nuclear missile strike, i.e., precisely that new type of armed struggle the "illegality" of which was being prover' in the discussed article. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CU-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 Appr144/0147-orgetess00106a081WS I ogrtfiPRNMEP 1390R9q9M 9-6 has been known even before the nuclear time. Its appearance should not be :Juiced only to the use of nuclear missile weapons which only increased its significance and bcceeted its development. It has been applied in past wars, mainly throngh highly mobile types of armed forces -- navies and air force, together with the other types of armed struggle, to reach the goals of the war, of the campaign, the operation or the battle. In many cases it had a separate significance and was not necessarily a structural element of defense or e,tacl. The use of navies in past wars was almays.a clear expression. of the desire of the warring sides to destroy, in one or severel blows the main forces of the enemy fleet, regardlees of whether it was being done for defensive or offensive purposes. The history of armed struggle at sea is rich with examples showing the attacking side achieving major strategic results with one powerful blew. Such was the defeat of the American fleet in Pearl Harbor en 1941 by the Japanese navy. This attack had the form of a clearly expressed single operation and was nothing else but a strike as understood today. These operations on the part of the Japanese navy bad nothing which could be called an offensive -- no given distance had to be covered, against enemy opposition, nor did it have any other charaeteristics for this type of combat operations. It was a brief and powerful strike against the enemy. A st rike, as a type of combat operation, has been extensively applied at sea in operatione awed at the achieve- ment of so-called defensive goals. Under current conditions, when the armed forces have such a powerful means for annihilating the enemy such as strategic missiles, a new type of combat operation -- strikes -- will play an even greater part than in the past. Nuelear missiles strikes will be applied by all the types of armed forces coordinated with other types of military operations in the interests of achieving the common goal -- the defeat of the enemy. Accepting this new type of armed struggle does not reduce by any means the importance of other types such as offensive and defense. The fact that such strikes cannot be "classified as offensive or defensive" would not influence their results, particularly if they are successful. Comrade Zaviyalov considers that nuclear missiles strikes, as a type of military operation, are improper also because they are charac- teristic not for the war as a whole but for the operations of each type of force individually. However, it is hardly necessary to prove the simple truth that armed struggle, under current conditions, is a combination of the operations of all types of forces and it is pre- cisely here that is found the most Important prereqnisite for victory. ApproveRigNtgase 2000/08/092:4CIA-RDP85T00875R00030009001 9-6 CPYRGH Approved F1X1nie1egseb20000.8/Q9 :1.,GIAAPPDPPTAPERANWP9E1.1211Terent types of our armed forces wouli apply only one type of struggle, namely defense, since the purpose a,: the Soviet armed forces con- slots in defending the country an attack on the part of the aggressor. Obviously feeling the weakness of his position on this queation, the author, contradicting himself, nevertheless must admit that an "answering nuclear strike is an act of self defense, an act of defense against enemy aggression, but that it should be classified as an offensive method of military action" (page 17). The author is entirely wrong also in stating that the strike is a "more limited concept than operation and battle in the course of which many different strikes may be made" (page 17). As regards nuclear weapons, this is an entirely unacceptable idea. It is well known that the consequences of a nuclear missile strike -- "a simul- taneous action of striking at the enemy" -- would be incomparably greater than the result of the biggest possible operations, campaigns and even wars of the past. Such strikes would be made not "in the interests of offensive" or "the interests of defense," but would pursue entirely real goals -- the breakdown of the nuclear enemy attack at the very beginning of the war and the decisive defeat of its armed forces. In order to achieve such purposes, the rocket troops need no offensive whatsoever. They have been deployed on time, and their "offensive," as well as "defense," would consist in the same thing -- launching the missiles at the time determined by the military command. Similar actions will be inherent to navy missile carrying sub- marines. They may use their weapons from previously taken positions without having to undertake an offensive for the sake of accurately striking against the enemy. They will strike at the enemy with nuclear missiles from the areas wherever they will turn out to be at the beginning of the war. The same type nuclear missile strikes at the enemy will be made by long-range aviation as well, without engaging in any whatsoever offensive in the former meaning of the word. The fact that the concept of nuclear missile strike has found a broad application on the tactical, operational and strategic scale does not prove at all a "loose attitude concerning terminology," or the "unfoundedness and flexibility" of the positions of Comrade Zav'- yalov's oppcnents. This is one more serious proof of the fact that the new type of armed struggle, i.e., nuclear missile strikes, is real and has acquired the same rights to exist as offensive and defense in all areas of military art -- strategy, the theory of the conduct of operations, and in tactics. It has been diseeminated among all the types of armed forces and various types arms. The bigger the role played by nuclear missiles in the arms used by one or another, type of armed forces, the greater the importance in its use of nuclear A plHARAM FoAtiirAWAce*mainginart. etwanuefeerataRzspnnnannnqnni A-A 25 Approbked EtortRedea4e200QA06/0i9ez gri*RIPP?P9,87,:?ECTERN.V20?-6 leadership of the USA and NATO is training its a=d foces2 particularly the navy, to make, above all., ratcl.tar missiie strikes. The USA is building a nuclear MICGiie submarine fleet which includes about a third of the nuclear missile strategic facilities at the disposal of the armed forces of the USA. A certain trend in the redistribution of strikiAg power oE the armed forces, with emphasis on the navy, has been noticed in Englaad as wellvhich has also, engaged in the building of atomic missile carrying s,,ibmarinez. The same thing is noticed in France whose live-year military plan calls for placing most nuclear strategic missiles on the stoyrdc submarin,,,s it is building. All the new, and now ezisting strategc facilAtca will be used not for offensive or deenoe but fee' otrY.king, euddenp brief and extremely powerful nuclear miseite strikes at prede;ermir?ed targets and from predetermined positions. The essence of the armed struggle at sea will al) consist; in nuclear missiles strikes aimed at destroying, above all, the carriers of nuclear missile weapons -- ships and submarines -- the destruction of convoys, of bases, etc. It looks as though fighting formations of ships carrying air- planes and missiles, as well as convoys at sea, will consist in special operations which would include a combination of systems of nuclear missile strikes made by the various types of navy khips in different sequences. Similar activities will be carriml ?IA for the destruction of ground targets with missiles launched from submarines. The characteristic aspect which distinguishes s uuelear missile strike from previous battles or operations at sea is the fact that the carriers of such weapons, carrying out combat assignments, do not engage in fighting the forces against which they will be using their missiles. For example, if the air force is using missiles; the air- craft carrying such missiles will not meet with counteraction on the part of the targec which it is striking. The same aspect prevails in the operations of missile submarines and surface missile carrying ships. The enemy must defend itself from the rockets themselves. The struggle against the weapons carriers must be conducted by other groupsspecially designated for this. 7'or this reason, now in armed combat at sea the main aspect becomes the one-sided action of the weapon carriers, i.e., the one- sided strike in the full sense of this word. He who succeeds, with his strike, to forestall enemy action and cause the enemy a decisive defeat before he has been able to make use of his entire striking power will have greater chances to win in modern naval combat or operation. ApproveaFRReclibase 2000/08/026 CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT ApProved FAIDACtiffiasAgg9CVMP. .ecti&ERDATA.PIPM/93221?M ;C! 9--med struggle; hating radically changed its nature, have led to the appearance of new ways and forms ef waging this struggle. The task of military science consists not in trying, at any cost, to squeeze the new content into the old form but in bringing to light this new content and properly determine the ways for its use in armed struggle for the sake of victory over the enemy. Comment by Col P. Shkarubskiy The appearance of a new weapon always leads to the appearance of new methods for waging war. True) this does not take place immediately. At first) the new weapon is applied on the basis of the already developed principles of the military art. Those who apply the weapon as though adapt themselves to the existing methods of action. However, as F. Engels said, the moment comes when "technological successes, almost as soon as they have become applicable and have been in fact applied in military affairs immediately -- almost mandatorily and frequently against the will of the military command -- create changes and even sharp turns in the way of waging combat..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol XX, p 176) Currently, such a time has come as regards nuclear weapons which have become already established and are holding a dominating position among all ot-ter modern weapons. Now, the world has such a stock of nuclear ammunition and means for their delivery which, according to the bougeois military specialists, could put out of action) with a single strike; entire countries. The imperialist countries continue their arms race, concentrating on the production of ballistic long- range missiles and atomic missile submarines for a "nuclear attack" with a view to striking at cities, the economy, the nuclear missile facilities. and formations of the armed forces of the socialist countries. Obviously, if the imperialists try to unleash a nuclear missle war, they could be defeated only by the decisive destruction of the means for nuclear attack. Primar enemy targets are the launching pads of rockets, aircraft on the ground, submarines in their bases and at sea, dumps and bases for nuclear weapons as well as the industrial enterprises engaged in their production. What is left will become the target of the antiair, antimissile and antispace defense. In this light; General I. Zav'yalov's claim to the effect that defense is the main type of military operation could hardly be considered as justified. Defense, as never before, takes second place to offense. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA2FDP85T00875R000300090019-6 Approkseed4Zor ROI astea2000/08i109 tEelAdRDR8510047513999409,991M 9-6 effect that the rocket troops engage in a nuclear offensive which constitutes the basis for the strategic offensive of armed forces. Historically, the offensive has developed as a concept of continuous action and movement ahead for a certain period of time. For this reason, it is applicable to land trOope. In the Great Fatherland War and the term "offensive" was properly considered also as regards the artillery which, ix the course of all the operatiorm; eystematically struck at the manpower, firepower and combat equipment of the enemy; moving together with the advancing infantry and tanks. However, the rocket troops cannot; like the artIllery0 constantly carry out nuclear strikes. They cannot engage in the oystematic destruction of the enemy opposing the offensive, fo/lowing the advancing troops. The nuclear weapon will be used for destroying the main targets and main formations of troops on the theaters of military operations by massed, group and sing'e strikes. At the beginning of the war; the massed etrikes of the nuclear troops will constitute the first blow against the aggressor. In the course of the operations; blows will be dealt at the main forma- tions at the military operation theaters. As a rule, in order to strike at individual targets, the rocket troops will use group and single strikes. All this will be done within a short period of time. Thus, the term "nuclear offensive" may extol the rocket troops but does not fully reflect the nature of their operations. A "nuclear strike" while properly understanding its nature, may be classified both as offensive and defensive. Unlike for the rocket troops, for the air force the author con- siders as inherent both offensive and defensive operations with all types of aircraft participating. However, be does not answer the question of where would the air force use be most effective. We find this answer in the experience of the Great Fatherland War. It is precisely in offensive, in striking at the enemy troops, grounded aircraft and other targets that our aviation achieved its greatest successes. Defensive operations aimed at deflecting the enemy strikes were nothing else but finishing up the destructien of its aircraft after striking at the air fields where it was grounded. The article deals also with such an important problem as the struggle in the air. The author considers it as a new type of military operation, claiming that it would be "carried out simul- taneously both for the interest of offensive and the interest of defense (page 22). It seems to us that this is not the main reason for classifying air combat as a separate type of milltaxy operations. C PYRG11143 proved For Release 2000/08/09 :2SIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 App rod Role atie maul nrigCapRaRgiT1007?Pg9RPPARAP-?f a given fight, its scale and means and methods of action used. This struggle is,, in the full sense of Le word, an "electronic war," as it is frequently called. It will make use of a tremendous amount of radio electronic equipment available to the troops and at the disposal of supreme command. All available forces and means will be used to destroy the radioelectronic equipment and to interfere with their operation. This is our opinion on certain aspects as to the types and forms of military operations discussed in the article by Major General Zav'yalov. Undoubtedly, these questions should be extensively discussed in the military press. The proper determination and understanding of the nature of the types and forms of military operations, their interrelationship, place and role in the future war, will greatly influence the answer to the questions of the development of means for armed struggle, the building of armed forces and their training to repulse aggression. 1. Commentary on an article by Maj Gen I. ZAV'YALOV. Voyennaya Mysl'I No 1, 3965. 2. Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 August 1964 3. Voyennaya Strategiya (Nilitary Strategy). Edited by Mar SU SOKOLOVSKIY; Second Edition, Voyenizdat, 1963. 4. Voyenno-Morskoy flot (The Navy). Voyenizdat, 1959, pp 289-291. 5. Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 August 1964; Voyennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy), p 375 6. Voyennaya Mysl', No 1, 1965, p 23; Voyennaya Strategiya (Niliteury Strategy), pp 376, 394 7. S. N. KOZLOV, M V. SNMRNOV, I.S. BAB', P. A. SIDOROV. 0 sovetskoy voyennoy nauke (On Soviet Military Science), Voyenizdat? 1964. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIADP85T00875R000300090019-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 THE CRITICAL TIME AND OPTIATIVMSSS OF TROOP CONTROL by Engr - Col A. TATA.RC CPYRGHT The time factor has always played an extremely important role in com- bat operations. Now, in connection with the spread of nuclear missile weapons and the revolutionary transformations which have occurred in the structure of armed forces, in the methods for conducting armed conflict, and in military theory, this factor has begun to play, not simply an important role, but the decisive role in the development and outcome of combat opera- tions. Therefore, understandble is the general. striving to introduce into troop control the achievements of cybernetics -- the science which studies the most common rules of control in nature, society, and technology. It has turned out that because of the material unity of the world, var- ious systems of control have been constructed according to approximately one principle. The line diagram of the control system consists of an operating device, channel for the transmission of controlling commands, and a feedback channel. The operating device interacts with the external atmosphere, as a result of which its state and position change. Thanks to the presence of a feedback channel, the controlling device, during time T1, receives informa- tive information concerning these changes. On the basis of the information obtained and conforming with the established goal, the controlling device, during the time T2, works out controlling information which is transmitted to the operating device during time T,z in the form of commands. With this, the elementary cycle ends. Rcpended on it are time segments T1, T2, and T3, the sum of which can be considered as the time of control Tcontrol = Ti + T2 + T. Following subsequently is the execution of the re- ceived command by the operating device which expends time Toperating in this time. As a result of the execution of the command, the operating device changes its state and position, which entr_ils a new control cycle. In several actual systems, for example, biological, these cycles follow each other con- tinuously and in others, in particular social systems, they are repeated periodically. roved For Release 2000/08/09 : b1A-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT a ? n ng he is om of roan 03A r?% we can . cover n it not only dlements which aro similar in their fundamental purpose, but also similar pro. CeSSOS. As a Ttter of fact, any system of troop control has a controlling de.. vice (headquarters, command post (KP), control post, etc), an operating de. vice (troops with their armament and equipment), and also channels of commu- nication between them over which reports from sources of information arrive in one direction and, in the other direction -- signals and orders for the troops. The same processes for the transfer of information over channels of communication and its processing in the control device proceed in each troop control system. The troop control cycle can also be characterized by ex- penditures of time T1, T2, T3 and the duration of operations of the troops -- time T opr However, along with the analogy in the elements and processes, the troop control systems have their own clearly expressed specific features which place these systems in a special position. In military operations, highly-organized masses participate which are controlled from single centers by means of a branching structure of control organs. Nowhere is thersuch a saturation of equipment as in the armed forces. The volume of information which circulates in military systems is very vast -- concerning the enemy, concerning friendly troops, tactical and technical data on armaments, the ter- rain, condition of routes of communication, hydrometeorological conditions, the radiation and chemical situation, etc. In transmitting military infor- mation, it is necessary to consider jamming which the enemy, as a rule, ere. ates for all communications means and means of control and his striving to intercept information which is being transmitted. Interruptions and breakdowns in systems of military control are unallowable and, therefore, special demands are made on the dependability of their elements. Troop con- . trol organs are objectives for enemy strikes, and this requires assuring their survivability and mobility. Even with this brief enumeration of the specifics of military systems, one can explain the intensive development relative to the independent branches of cybernetics and, namely, military cybernetics whichcan be defined as the science which studies the most common laws of control in military affairs, that is, the laws of troop and weapcns control. However, we have not yet touched upon two more most important features on which we should also dwell. The first of them consists of the fleeting nature of those processes with which military systems are called upon to control.. In this connection, the struggle to gain time acquires an exceptionally acute nature. For this very reason, in the process of training military cadres the conviction is cultivated that Success accompanies the one who is able to collect informa- tion and, make a decision in the shortest time, assign missions and organize the troop operations, prepare and launch strikes against targets in the. shortest time, and bring up and commit the reserves to combat in time. 1 API:kr etitroPMA? 641142M01000910344cROP86TOB875R00053400%tegicht times", "timay , as well as "immediately", ?"as rapidly as possible", and others which characterize the qualitative side of the time factor do not reveal its quantitative side and do not provide the numerical value which would permit judging how oserational the control by a different process may be. If it is said that in combat operations delay is similar to death, it remains unclear exactly which delay is fraught with such serious, consequences. Any delay, or a completely specific delay which disturbs the measure of the phenomenon? For it is impossible to reduce expenditures of time infinitely and, if such attempts are made without knowing the measure, one can fall into the other. extreme -- commit super-haste and be in too much of a hurry to the detriment of well-founded decisions and actions, to the detriment of all-round support, and to other important principles of military art. 1'4:ore:over, chan- nels with increased traffic capacity for transmitting information and high- speed computer equipment are very expensive and it is inexpedient to use then always and everywhere. So that it would be possible to make well-based quantitative demands on the operativeness of control in each specific case, a careful analysis is necessary which the concept of critical time can further. The critical time (T0 ?t)can be defined as the time at the end of which the operations of the troops do not lead to the assigned mission in general or with the effectiveness which was expected and planned l'or. The value of critical time, just as of the 'time for the troop opera- tion, is closely connected with the nature of the combat operations and with the purpose of the control and, in specific conditions, may have the most varied values. What does it mean to control operationally? This means to see to it PYRGHThat the sum of the time expended on the control cycle (Tm+) and the time necessary for the troops to execute a received command rTopr) is less ? than the critical time, that is, so that the inequality Tcont Topr Tcrit? Consequently, the condition of operativeness of control can be writ- ten as follows: Toont < Torit - Topr. In this, we recall that the time of the control cycle in turn is the sum of the time for receiving, processing, and trInsmitting information. Let us use an example. Let us assume that enemy aircraft (or cruise missiles) were detected by the radar system 10 minutes before they reached the line for the objective, the approaches to which are defended by by fighter aircraft. Let us assume that the fighters, after receiving the signal, are capable of intercepting tne gnemy in 6 minutes (in the case of alert on the airfield) or in 3 minutes (in case of alert in the air). In this, we have the basis to consider that, in the process of warning the KP (Ti) making 4. 4lect.pAion 671 stipktv.-....Vt4Ld (or 431? KOMAR MisMP v. b 32 CRYRG HT can zno operativeness of control bo evaluated undor these conditions? Approvecupgcgopm ?A9gifilI9lci1Qimr8RT01R000300090019-6 Location of, Critical Time o Required timrtor con- Timeoniarr?ia on alert fight: TI`cimet, T , opera trol min ri cent available . ers tion, Ti T2 T3 Terit min. IniEr. I T1,, oPr 1. At the 10 6 1 1. 1 3 4 Control airfield uperational (reserve of time 1 min.) 2. At the 10 6 2 2 2 6 4 Control not airfield operational (short 2 min. of time) 3. In the air 10 3 1 1 1 3 7 Control operational (reserve of time 4 min) 4. In the air 10 3 2 2 2 6 7 Control operational (reserve of time 1 min.) It can be seen from the table that variants 1, 3, and 4 assure opera- tiveness and variant 2, because of large expenditures of time for control (6 minutos) does not assure timely intercept of the enemy since a shortage of two minutes occurs. In order to maintain operativeness in this variants it is necessary that Tcont be no more than 4 minutes. The requirement to duce the time for control to one or two minutes or "to the shortest timos" general would be groundless. The reductizm in the time for control depends on a number of specific conditions. T.n some cases, it can be assured by accelerating the receipt and transmission of information (this will reduce T1 and T3), in other cases -- by accelerating the process for making a decision (this will reduce T2), and most often, even if a small saviug, in each of these processes. The most accessible methods for reducing the expenditure of time in re- ceiving and transmitting :?,nf.-_,.rmation are increasing the skill of the. communi- cations personnel and reduci..K excess multiple stages in the passage of re- ports; reducing the number of words (symbols 1 in each report b.m.rilienal coding; Approvcd For Rcicasc 2000/08/09 : CIA RDP88T00878R0003000.700 33 briAPPRoVIN EarmliVieMPAAOKI, Wj 1JianIADEIPATAMORQQ039Q9PQM9A0p1. with authority; using moms of mechanization as well an a whole series of methods which can be found in each specific case. A largo reserve of time is laid in observation of the principle of transmitting only necessary in- formation but in sufficient quantity. 'ihthout doubt, automated communica- tions are extremely proMising, but their introduction does not exclude the use of all 'internal." reserves for reducing the time to transmit information and orders. The concept of critical. time will help select various methods for reducing times Ti and T3 and evaluate its effectiveness. The most probable methods for reducing expenditures of time to pro- cess information (to make a decision) can bet strengthening discipline, raising qualifications, clear-cut delineation of functional duties and assur- ing interchangeability of persons in authority in case of necessity, knitting together staffs and sections of command posts, and others. An important and promising direction is the introduction of means for tho mechanization and automation of the mostlabor-consuming processes which are connected with processing information and making a decision. In this connection, it is necessary to dwell on the second most im- portant feature of military control systems. As is known, combat operations belong to the number of processes which contain elements of uncertainty which are caused by the presence of a number of random factors and previously un- known conditions. Therefore tho staff, in preparing a decision, is required to consider not one variant (and, consequently, result) of combat operations as a whole or each of their separate stages, but a great number of possible variants which differ from each other (results). In this, each of them has only some probability of coinciding with what is planned. No military com- mander is able to predict accurately how combat operations will develop in time and space; he can only assume that under certain conditions such and such a result will be attained in such and such a place at such and such a time. In order to form these assumptions on a quantitative basis, that is, more objectively, it is necessary to perform a whole complex of calculations using mathematical methods of investigation and leaning on the concept of ' probability. In this, one can assume with a sufficient degree of practical confidence that, in the course of of combat operations, those events will occur whose probability is sufficiently great. And conversely, those events the probability of which is very small, can be considered as practically im- possible. However, in view of the presence of elements of uncertainty inherent in combat, operations, it is necessary to perform not one calculation each time but many variants of calculations, to solve the problem of optimum planning, target distribution, and a number of others. This requires tremendous ex- penditures of time if no use is made of high-speed computer eouipment for which the corresponding algorithm has been worked out ahead of time and a computer program has been prepared. Great help can be rendered by slide rules, tables, graphs, and nomograms worked out ahead of time, including from results of machine computations. In any case, both methods, based on mathe- matical methods of investigation, permit reducing the time for the performance Approved For; Release 2000/08/09-9,CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 PYROHT Aimvpmftdc;RNINfriawtaMignp 9-RpPg5T008R00030209001 9-6 o na y or mincing a doe nion and further reducing tho expenditure of tim? T2. The practical nolution to the problem -- in just what control organs and for what typos of combat operations is high-speed computer equipment necessary and/whore can one got by with other means -- again is connected with the concept of critical time. The question may arise: whore to take thono values Tip T2, 711, and Topr which go into the simple relationships previously presented? First of au, from practical time measurements of the time spent on various processes. Therefore, in daily activity, on troop and staff eocorcisos, it is absolutely necessary to manure the time expended on control as well as on the actions of the troops. However, in far from all cases can dependable characteristics of time expenditures be obtained by timing, especially when timing one time. As a matter of fact, the expenditure of time on various processes depends on many circumstances which its is difficult to consider ahead of time; in other words, it is a random value which can take a different amount in each specific case. So that the calculations which are made can be more dependable, they should be based on averaged characteristics and, in individual cases, consider the amount of possible deviation from them. To estimate times T1 and T, it is expedient to use a value of mathe- matical expectancy (average value) of these times which, in contrast to the average arithmetic value, considers the frequency of appearance of various values obtained during timing. For example, if as a result of ten measure- ments of the time Ti we obtained 1 minute in four cases, 2 minutes in one case, and 3 minutes in five cases then, accepting that the probability of ap- pearance of these values is proportional to the obtained frequency, we come ? to the following law for the distribution of time Ti: Value T1 (min.) 1 2 3 Probability of these values 0.4 0.1 0.5 The mathematical expectancy of the time Ti, equal to the sura of the products of each of the values times its probability, in this case will equal = 1.0.4 + 2.0.1 + 3.0.5 = 2.1 minutes (while the average arithmetic ex- pectancy equals 2 minutes). The mean square deviation of the time Ti from its =earl value equals r. )1(1 ?2.1e -0.4 (2 ?2.1)11-0.1 ?2.113-0,1-0.943 minutes. Just what time Ti should enter the calculation? To solve this problem, it should be kept in mind that time T1 can be greater than its mathematical. expectancy: by the amount GT, (i.e., Be equal to 2.1 + 0.943 A...? 3 minutes) ap- proximately one case out of each six; by the amount 2eri (i.e., be equal to 2.1 + 4 minutes) approximately in 2-3 cases out of 100; by the value 3 *pawed Fter EtoieladeD 0341010 6109 .90AIR RearaliCiaMEN 3041%0Q49 -6 f .5 Rut 0tAilsprsoirblaInFdraR6legtift2000/08/01ixciMiTilOVIPPEARPIO3m99OrtEM1 %-rP 1 es s than 2.1 minutes. In this connection, as a rule, the mathematical expectancy of tho time Ti may be used in the calculations, i the value of 2.1 minutes. And only in individual, especially imoprtant caner; can its maximum value be consir3nrod o9ual to 3, 4, or oven 5 minutes. To estimate the times T2 and Ton" it is expedient to uno a different method of calculation, in accordance with which the expected time for making the decision (or action) is determined on the basis of three estimates: minimum To, maximum Tp (these are also estimates which in practice can be' en- countered in very favorable or very unfavorable conditions, but each no more often than in one percent of the cases) and the most probable estimate Tv (often encountered in practice). Then the expected time for making the de- cision (or action) will. equal T 11- To + 4T + T v p 6 and the mean square deviation will be = Tp - 6 Thus, if under very favorable conditions the staff is capable of pre.- paring a decision on a given problem in 10 minutes, in very unfavorable con- conditions in 1 hour 40 minutes, but most often succeeds in doing in in 40 minutes, the expected time for preparing the decision is T = 10 + 4.40 + 100 = 45 minutes. In this, the mean square deviation will equal 6T = 100 - 10 = 15 minutes. 6 This means that in one case out of six, the staff requires 45 + 15 = 60 minutes; in 2-3 cases out of 100 45 + 2.15 = 1 hour 15 minutes will be required; and finally, in 1-2 cases out of 1000 45 + 3.15 = 1 hour 30 minutes will be expended. As a rule, the expected time can be used in the calcula- tions (in the example, it equals 45 minutes.) And only in individual, especial- ly important cases is it considered as equal. to 1 hour, 1 hour 15 minutes, . and even 1 hour 30 minutes. In conclusion, it should be stressed once more concerning the import- ance and necessity for a careful consideration of the time factor in troop control, remembering that poorly organized control will consume the lion's share or all the critical time and deprive the troops of the opportunity for the purposeful use of their combat power. Well organized control expends the minimum necessary portion of the time on the processes of receiviE Approved .For Release 2000r0a/u, CIA-IturEoI uW5roKuuu4u90 AppaittvadrpraliteRtMACCARICAtocAtNI3,8gPWP VP PEW c1,109strve of time for the troops. In this connoction, one should spare no efforts in chocking the ex- pendituro of time by all echelons of control, in estimating their operativeness by all ponsilile methods and, in particular, using the concept of critical time and, in the case of discovering a shortage, !looking ways to eliminate it. The time factor should enter into an estimate of the activity of each officer and soldier, each control, organ, each crew and podrazdaloniye, of any military body. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : C141RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 AIR OUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS by Maj Gen Avn S. SOKOLOV CPYRGHT The use of tactical (frontovaya) aviation and the nature of its tasks have changed considerably since the equipment of ground troops with operational-tactical rockets capable of striking at troop formations and targets deep within the enemy rear. In this connection, the question arises: would it not be better to abandon entirely air support for ground troops and entrust it completely to rocket troops? Military theory and practice have answered this question in the negative. The point is that each of these combat weapons has its ponitive qualities; for example, aircraft have high maneuverability, while rockets have great speed of flight and, consequently, the ability to reach the target within a short period of time. For this reason, In modern ground troops operations, rockets and tactical aviation operate not as rivals, but as allies, supplementing and reinforcing one another. As in "pre-rocket" times, tactical aviation is used for joint combat operations with ground troops and, in maritime areas, with the navy. One of its important tasks is the air support of ground troops. What does this support represent, what is its basic purpose, and how is it carried out? This question can best be answered by an analysis of the combat capabilities of tactical aviation and its sphere of use. It is known that modern tactical aviation can deliver, together with rocket troops, a large amount of nuclear ammunition to the targets. The use of nuclear weapons helps aviation to perform, relatively independently, major assignments in the interests of the operation as a whole, involving the destruction of a portion of the forces of an enemy formation (ground troops, aviation, or others) and the destruction of enemy rockets and nuclear weapons. However, as proved by the experience of past, non-nuclear wars, aviation is also very effective in combat with the use of conventional weapons. Let us recall the role which it played during the Great Patriotic War in defeating enengf ground troops Approved Foir Release 2000/08A : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPY-GHT ? V. ? and air force formational and also in supporting its own forces, both in a swift offensive and in a defensive operation. Air reconnaissance in support of ground troops, fighting against enemy reserves, and ' other aviatipp tasks, have not lost their significance but, on the contrary, have become even more important. Important combat qualities of aviation, such as the ability to appear quickly over the battlefield and to destroy, with a high degree of effectiveness, small and mobile targetsIthe location of which may be only approximately known at the time a mission is assigned, have improved considerably. Speed, flight altitude, and rate of climb of the aircraft, as well as the combat effiCiency of conventional weapons, have greatly improved, as compared. with World War II. The capability of tactical aviation to act independently in reconnoitering and striking at targets, judging by the experience of past wars, makes it an irreplaceable means of support for ground forces in combating small, shifting, and mobile targets, such as rocket launch installations at their positions or on the march, enemy fire weapons, individual tanks, and others. Even standard guns, not to mention rockets, make it possible for modern fighter-bombers to carry out such a mission efficiently. Another aspect should be mentioned. Modern combat operations are to a great extent mobile, involving high speeds in the shifting of forces and equipment. Consequently, mobile targets will be encountered in greater numbers than in the past, and considerably more frequently., i.e., individual groups of troops, tank podrazdeleniya, infantry on armored carriers, and others. This qualitatively new phenomenon in combat operations increases the significance of the participation in combat of mobile groupings and targets, which can be hit most effectively and with the least expenditure of forces by aviation. Thus, in the interests of the ground troops, aviation may perform a wide range of tasks. These tasks may be divided into two groups, depending on their nature and purpose. The first group includes general, front-line tasks, i.e., air reconnaissance along the entire depth of the operational deployment of enemy troops; combating enemy aviation at airfields and rockets at launch sites in the operational depth; destruction of enemy rockets and nuclear weapons; protection of troops and targets in the rear from enemy air strikes; combating deep reserves, and other tasks. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : eIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYR e 2000/D8/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 APRiPW8cfnarliSMroup or tacit's) is carried out by tactical aviation in operational or tactical coordination with ground troops, supporting them during combat when they are in immediate contact . with the enemy. This includes the destruction of rockets and nuclear weapons in tactical :and immediate operational depth; combating immediate enemy reserves; destruction\or neutralization of radiotechnical equipment and control points in the line of attack of a particular operational or tactical grouping; illumination of an area or installation of light signals to facilitate the combat operations of ground troops at night; and sometimes individual flights for the purpose of air reconnais- sance. This task is carried out, as a rule, in accordance with the plan of a combined-arms ob"yedineniye (or soyedineniye). In considering the nature of the second task, it is easy to observe that its resUlt; have a direct effect on the success of combat operations of combined-arms ob"yedineniya and soyedineniya; therefore, such combat operations of tactical aviation are known as aviation support of ground troops. Let us now try to formulate the concept of "aviation support." Essentially, it may be considered that aviation support of ground troops,under present operational conditions, constitutes combat operations of tactical aviation for the destruction (or neutralization) of enemy targets on the ground, according to the plans and by request of commanders of ground troops ob"yedineniya (or soyedineniya), within the scope of the established flight resources and nuclear ammunition for a particular combined-arms ob"yedineniye (or soyedineniye). The purpose of aviation support, in the final analysis, is to enable the rapid advance of ground troops. Let Us briefly discuss certain aspects of the methods used in providing aviation support. There is no need to prove the priority importance of the destruction of nuclear rocket weapons under conditions of a nuclear war. However, we must point out the difficulties in striking at such targets. First of all, nuclear rocket weapons will obviously be best protected by air defense (PVO) facilities. For this reason, the PVO facilities must be neutralized first, wherever such targets are located. Secondly, these targets will be well camouflaged both at their launch positions and at their temporary locations, or while being moved. In the course of air combat operations, all the facilities of air reconnaissance are used for the active spotting of nuclear Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ?-41A-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 Atip?KtchFror Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 rocket weapons along the entire line of advance of the supported troops. Not only special air reconnaissance flights are planned, but any data of incidental intelligence obtained during combat missions /of all types of aircraft are used. Various methods of air reconnaissance are used to spot nuclear weapons of the enemy, i.e., visual reconnaissance, aerial photography, and reconnaissance with the help of radiotechnical and other equipment. Air reconnaissance is conducted on a continuous basis, day and night, under favorable or difficult weather conditions, for the purpose of spotting new targets of nuclear rocket weapons, following the movement of previously spotted targets, and supervising their destruction. The targets which have been spotted are destroyed immediately or after a minimum amount of time. The most efficient way of combating nuclear rocket weapons is with the help of fighter-bombers, which conduct an independent search and destruction of the targets spotted, i.e., the method of "hunting." This Method was used fairly extensively by our aviation during the Great Patriotic War for the destruction of ground and air targets of the enemy. For this reason, the prihciples of its organization have remained essentially the same. Natura]ly, in applying this method one must consider the changes which have taken place in the aircraft armament, and even in the tactical and technical characteristics ol aircraft, as well as in air defense and in the nature of enemy targets. It should be stresEnd that the success of the "hunter" crews greatly depends on their training and initiative in carrying outtheir xnxignmunt; mission, as well as on the assignment of permanent areas of operation, or of certain directions, to them. In carrying out their mission, the "hunter" crews may locate important ground targets, which can not be destroyed by them alone. In such cases, they must immediately radio their control point and, if possible, mark the target or help in guiding to the target other groups of aircraft, which have taken off in answer to their call. However, individual spotting and destruction of targets is not the only method of combat operations applied by fighter- bombers. In some cases, they may take off for the purpose of delivering strikes, as ordered by the control point. For example, a reconnaissance aircraft may have discovered the position of a . Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : Cl/W-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 battalion, gr,e4pA or, nAMakibot ItStAtli445irtAWORDOMOOSeate.-6 TAPPRehlatigNoSSEPPART"Crev bannot destroy this target unaided. Therefore, it must immedtely transmit data concerning its nature and location to the air force headquarters. After receiving the ' report, the/air force command may assign the mission to fighter-bombers, or to bombers alone, and sometimes to fighters alone, to destroy or neutralize the target. In view of the fact that a request for tactical aviation may be received at any time, a certain number of its aircraft, on the airfields taut always be ready to take off on a mission to destroy the spotted targets. Depending upon circumstances, various methods of operation of tactical aviation will be used in certain combinations. For example, a "hunting" flight may take place for the purpose of obtaining no more than orientation data on the targets spotted by reconnaissance. Other methods may also be applied. These may include the re- assigning of air force units already in the air on a different type of mission, to the destruction of nuclear rocket targets. Such a use of aviation may help to reduce the time needed from the moment the target has been spotted to the actual striking at the target, as though the mission were carried out not from the position of "alert on the airfidld," but that of "alert in the air." These are some of the methods in combat operations of fighter- bombers) used in the spotting and destruction of nuclear rocket targets. We might say a few words about the destruction and neutralization of enemy radiotechnical facilities. The methods for the destruction of such targets depend on the purpose of air operations. In some cases, partial destruction of radiotechnical equipment would be sufficient; in others -- the total destruction of individual, important units of one or severaa radiotechnical systems maybe necessary. The most effective means for the destruction of radio- technical equipment is the use of conventional (non-nuclear) weapons by fighter-bombers. The armament of a modern fighter-bomber, its guns, and especially its srockets, can destroy any radiotechnical station. Taking into consideration the extremely large number of radio- technical facilities of enemy troops and the need to neutralize and destroy them, a certain percentage of the airforces must be permanently assigned for this purpose to the support of troops. CPYRGHT Approved Fqr Release 2000/08/09 tk.1A-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 Ap CPYRGHT Droved FoR6t6agW12600i681ff9c',1d1A-RDIP85t1008175R00030009110194 combat the nearest enemy reserves. Aviation can quiclay detect formations of enemy ee,. reserves and by systematically cleivering sLrikes against them, even without using nuclear weapons, establish fttvorable conditions for the opretions of the troops it is supporting, prevent the advance of reserves and inflict casualtie6 among them. The bringing up of reserves, as the experience of the Second World War indicates) may be prevented by various moans. These would include the blowing up of several bridges or crossings, strikes against troops in ravines, etc. This leads to a bottleneck of troops and equipment, usually in the form of ground targets drawn out in a line, which become suitable nuclear targets. The scope of the missions of eviction support is determined by the flight resources at the disposal of the command of the coMbined-arms obuyedineniye or soyedineniye. Naturally, such resources will not always be the some. They are determined by the front command according to concrete circumstances and the striking power available to the obnyedineniye or soyedineniye, and may be either incresed or decreased during operations. During the Greet Patriotic War, the predetermined resources for aviation support was also revised in the course of combat operations, frequently on a daily basis. The flight resources allocated for eviction support must be used exclusively for the destruction of targets determined by the commander or chief for whom the support is planned. In this connection the question arises of whether there remains any validity in the t position on aviation support which existed during the Great Pptriotic War, when aviation soyedineniya were completely subordinate, operationally, to the commander of a ground troop soyedineniye or obnyedineniye, or at least attached to a obnyedineniye or soyedineniye for a certain period of time. In our opinion, this method has lost its significance. The structure of ground troop and aviation soyedineniya and obllyedineniya has changed. Their capabilities changed when they were supplied with nuclear weapons and with the increased efficiency in the use of conventional weapons. For this reason, there has been a change in the conditions of conducting combat operations and the procedure for coordinating the operations of the various arms and branches of armed forces. The nature of combat operations now demands strict centralization in the use and control of aviation. New aspects have developed in the field of coordination. In modern operations both ground troops and aviation are interested in joint operations. It can not be considered that aviation alone must operate in the interests of ground troops. Ground Troops must, in turn, carry out many assignments which ensure the success of the combat operations of tactical aviation. These include combating enemy aircrDfl OU2UOU90019 and wuided neutraiZing Approvcd For Rcleacc 2000/08/09 : CIA RDP 670087BRO- 6 99_00145_ anykisipp6vediForcRekwasir2090A8L09'6cCiAtIKQPNWFWATANCIRica... equipment and aviation control systems) within the operational area of one's own air force, rendering assistance in securing basea for tactical aviation, particularly where ground troops are advancing rapidly. The organization of coordination between tactical aviation end ground troops requires, above all, the proper distribution of assignments (targets) among aviation and rocket troops. Taking into consideration the combat characteristics and capabilities of aviation, as was already pointed out, it is expedient to use it to strike small, mobile, newly discovered, and rapidly moving enemy targets. The main targets for fighter-bombers may be launchers and missiles of various types, cruise missiles at their sites, aircraft on airfields and, sometimes, in the air, coltmms of troops and trucks, radio and radar stations, control points, railroad cars and locomotives, enemy airborne and amphibious landings (both during arid after the landing), and many other targets. One of the tasks of coordination is ensuring the aviation escort of ground troops. However, the concept of "aviation escort of ground troops" should not be understood in the sense that it had in the Great Patriotic War (particular' between 1944 and 1945), when our attack planes were frequently in the air over the battlefield ccntinuously for several hours, even if it offered no suitable targets. Today "escort of advancing ground troops by tactical aviation" should be understood to mean its capability to carry out certain missions requested by the ground troops at a given time, under conditions in which the ground troops are advancing rapidly and certain soyedineniya are separated from the main forces of the front. This is a very responsible task for tactical aviation. First of all, it must be in a state of high combat readiness to carry out such assignments day or night, under simple or complex meteorological conditions. Secondly, it must rapidly move to new airfields,following the advancing troops at a pace equal to their OMR daily progress, i. e., not remaining behind the ground troops as was sometimes the case in the last war-. These conditions are essential for the escort of ground troops by aviation, especially fighter-bombers, which carry out almost all the tasks involved in aviation support. Problems of the combined employment of ground troops and tactical aviation must be worked out in advance, prior to the beginning of combat operations. This must be reflected both in the plans of the ground troops and in the plans of the tactical aviation soyedineniya. Coordination between the ground troops and tacticul aviationorganized primarily by the command of the front-line ob"yedineniye. The command of the combined-arms ob"yedineniya and representatives of the aviation are responsible for organizing the coordination for carrying out coax specific assignments. Approved For tilitirilmn00/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 b Pwrovea I-or Release 2UUU/U13/09 : U1A-KL)1'oblUU13/bKUUUJUUU9UU19-b We hove touched on only a nmoll number of quentions of aviation support. However; it seems to un that from what hon been written it io_posuible to conclude thnt under modern conditiono there still exiotithe possibility and nesennity of using tactical aviatin for missions involving both front-line snd combined-arms soyedineniya and obnyedinenlynoi.e., for the conduct of combat operations in the form of aviation ER.pport, even though: compared to the last war, it has changed substantially in form and content. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CI4-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 THT, OPTIMUM PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LOAD FOR SOLDIEIS AND MD- DIN MFITODS OF TRAINING IN THE PROCESS OF TROOP FIELD TRAINING CPYRGHT by Mai Gen Z. VMS Revolutionary changes which occured in recent years in the armament and technology of the socialist defense union are making new and increased requirements on all rgions of military affairs. This especially pertains to the main activity of the army durina peacetime the education and train- ing of servicemen, podrazdeleniyas, chasti, soyedineniyal staffs, and the personnel of military training institutions. The requiraments which are made by modern war on the individual soldier as well as on each military collective are incomparably higher than they were in the past. As is known, it now is insufficient for the serviceman to learn military affairs in general terms; under modern conditions, each officer and soldier should be a master of his trader For this, it is necessary for him to master compre- hensive knowledge, skills, and qualities which permit him to accomplish his missions under difficult combat conditions by displaying high consciousness,. creative initiative and selflessness in the interests of victory over the enemy. Put such high qualities, physical skills, and moral steadfastness are' only attained when the soldier experiences the corresponding physical, spirit- ual and moral loads from the first day of his military service. At the present time, the National Peoples Army of the GDR (German. Demo - cratic Republic) is conducting a number of investigations and experiments which should provide the answer to the question of the possibility for attain- ing this maximum physical and psychological load in the course of field train- ing. The investigations which we have conducted have been generalize 0 and analyzed in detail. We will tell about some of them in this article.' The author adheres to the opinion that the possibilities which are available in this field are far from exhausted and that even closer coopera- tion with the Soviet Army in scientific investigations on problems of. training 1The article by Major General of the National Peoples Army of the GDR, Z. Veys, is printed as an exchange in experiences. Approved Fix- Release 2000/08/04;'qCIA-RDP CPYRG Will permit making a significant step forward. The treaty of friendship, mutual aid, and cooperation which was concluded between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic places this obligation upon us. In the conduct of inspector's checks, it was frequently established that the degree of physical training of those who were obligated to military service still does not correspond to the requirements which should be made from the point of view of modern training in our National Peoples Army. And we decided to obtain accurate information on the level of physical capabilities of those who were being called up for service. Considering the requirements of modern war and the missions of the National Peoples Army of the GDR (NNA) in the socialist defensive alliance, we investigatmil the ways and possibilities which permit raising the intensity and quality of military training to the required level. For this purpose, we set about the study of sports exercises by the draftees prior to their joining the army and their physical capabilities. During the registration of the draftees in the army, a special investigation group used the following methods: SOON written questionaire; -- revealing functional capabilities using sports tests; -- a medical inspection to check physical preparedness. The investigation was conducted in various chasti of all types of armed forces which are part of the NNA. There was no special selection of people for the check. The average age of the people obligated for military service who were investigated was 22 years. Approximately 40% of them were 20 and 21 years old. All persons investigated were suitable for military service and were in good health. It turned out that 39.6% of those obligated for military service did not take up sports at all after completing their general educational schools, 14.5% took part in sports activities unsystematically and only 45.1% of the young people regularly took them up. All together, only 33,3% of all those questioned had a sports badge and 1.9% had confirmed it a second time; 17.2% of those obligated for military service did not even know how to swim. In determining the expected average indices for .sports tests, the in- vestigating group proceeded from the standards for the "Olympic Badge" which served as the basis for graduation examinations of the 10- and 12- class schools. The highest number of points obtained -- 67 (of 72 possible), the lowest -- 8 points; the average number of points collected was 28. The indices in pulling up on the hands, in propping in the prone posi- tion, and in throwing the hand grenade for distance were comparatively good and with respect to the distance of jumping and speed of running, there was The investigation ,prptAl cithAAblifbpantido8:17a5000031000;9009-8raining of APPrdNeft AleJegt-gfiClYtt ba7.13'1152- their further physical. develop- ment in the National Peoples Army. The level of endurance and speed turned out to be unsatisfactory. The chock which was conducted after four weeks of service in the army was ovidonqe of the improved physical. training of the personnel who wore obligated for military duty and the load for the majority of them turned out to be completely within their capabilities. But, at the same time it was noted That in the period of the body's adaptation among the young people who were drafted into the army, there was some drop in their physical activity. The task of the second part of the investigation consisted of testing the most effective methods for raising the physical strength of the soldiers. A special program was introduced in test podrazdeleniyas for the conduct of morning exercises and physical training, and they were also occupied with various types of sports and physical training in the course of field train- ing. So-called circular training2 was employed as an organizational-methodo- logical form which permitted improving the physical training of the service- men. Proceeding from the necessity for the maximum perfection of the train- ing process and the complete utilization of a small amount of time (18 months), as a result of the investigation data was prepared concerning the expedient use of training time and concerning the causes of the dispropor- tion between its expenditure and the results of the training. Observation of the training was conducted using investigation plans which embraced 30 lessons. In the course of the exercises, investigation was performed on the activity of the instructor and soldiers (all together 114 men) and a written questioning of the soldiers and noncomissioned officers of various chasti of ground forces (all together about 1000 service- men were questioned) was conducted. An analysis of the exercises which had been checked (tactical, firing training, physical training, exercises on the regulations, drill, and pro- tection against weapons of mass destruction) showed that the physical activity and, first of all, the active mental activity of the soldiers in the course of the training was far from satisfactory. To some measure, this is explain- ed by the fact that the instructors themselves do not know to a sufficient degree the ways and capabilities for intensifying the training process to free time for practical independent training of the soldiers and noncorrrissioned officers. First, this pertains to the selection of methods for stimulating the trainees to active independent physical and mental activity. The exercises, true, occupy 50% of the total time (68.9% for practical training and 10.7% for theoretical training), but independent work in which the physical and mental activity are ideally joined together is not employed at all in prac- tical training and, in the theoretical part of the training, occupies only 2The author has in mind combined training Approved For Release 2000/08/0*: CIA-RDP85T00875R0003000908MGHT PYRGHT 4143.(146dt1151r9k616Aet41300/08/09 :20tAIRIDP85i11410Ppir5EttilN101Q-9(Mg Ati o servicemen such methods predominate which instill among the trainees a passive attitude toward thn exercises (talks, guidance), while the methods which stimulate the soldie.,?1 to physical and mental activity (conversations, independent work) are hardly used or are used to a clearly insufficient degree. At the same time, the talk in theoretical training occupies 55.0(4 and in practical training only 3.6.5% (on the whole, 28.5%). The share of the more active method -- conversations, is respectively 24.9?,t and 9.3.% and the application of the method of demcnstration is already completely insufficient The methodological deficiencies which are present are sharply demon- strated in the analysis of the method for conducting the exercises. On theo- retical and practical exercises, the talk in combination with the demostration occupies respectively 74.5'4 and 22.0% while the more active method of conduct- ing the exercises (conversation, independent work), which activates soldiers and the noncomissioned officers occupies only 7.9% in theoretical training and only C.9% in practical training. The conclusions from the questioning which was conducted showed that requirements which are too low are made on training. This pertains especially to theory. 47.0 of the soldiers who were questioned asserted that they could better master the training material while only 5.61, of the soldiers think that they are not able to do more. This is evidence of the fact that the majority of the servicemen are not completely loaded. ' In summarizing the Investigation on the intensity of training among the troops, one can note that, first, the activity of the trainees and consequently the intensity of the training process are low. This pertains especially to the theoretical training of the soldiers. Second, the essential reasons for shortcomings in training are hidden in the methodological inexpediency of the organization of the training process -- first of all in the predominance of methods which lead to passive behavior of the soldiers and in the insufficient application of activating methods. Third, the results of the questioning revealed the necessity to employ increased demands in the training of service- men and showed that a large number of them expect such a decision. On the basis of conclusions obtained in the course of investigations of the intensity of the training DrOCOSS among the troops, at the present time a pedagogical experiment is being conduct ed in one of the training chasti. It is not yet completed. c?le can only tell about the goal which was established, methodology, and some preliminary results. The training of non-commissioned officers for our National Peoples Army represents an especially complex problem which consists, first of all, of the fact that only five months are available for training and the courses for training non-commissioned officers are made up practically without ex- ception of servicemen who have undergone only four weeks of basic training. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CPA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 Th s a we must train the students in a period somewhat less than five months, that is, first as a soldier and then as a non-comtnisioned officer. Proceeding from this, a training chart' was selected for the conduct of the experiment. For the experiment to be made more convincing, it was .distrib- uted over only one discipline -- teaching small-arms firing. A motorized rifle company served as the test podrazdeleniye. The purpose of the experiment consists of working out and testing pedagogical methods which permit raising considerably the activity of the servicemen on all exorcises and which assure the systematic assimilation of the necessary knowledge and abilities. In this, we analyze and make practical use of the latest recommenda- tions of pegagogical science which are expressed in the application of meth- ods of programmed instruction. Results of an experiment conducted earlier in one of the officers schools showed that the employment of programmed in- struction, even in a relatively short time, leac3sto higher indices in training. The experience obtained in other armies, including in tho Soviet Army, judging from published materials, as well as outside the army confirm that it is expedient to use programmed 'Instruction along with eodsting meth- ods of training. At the same time, still insufficiently deeply studied is the question as to whether the teachers with average qualifications are capable of em- ploying modern Pedagogical methods in combat training without rendering them very great assistance on the part of specialists in the field of programming, and with what success this can be achieved. ',\Te are speaking of the capabili- ties and ways for the broad introduction, into actual troop life, of modern methods of programmed training. Nor have we yet decided the materials, sub- jects, and elements for which an optimum decision is possible or what methods are required for it. In studying: the problem, we want to find the answers to such questions. What effect is rendered by the optimized planning of marksmanship training in the instruction period in courses for training non-commissioned officers as well as by the employment of elements of programming in the test podrazdeleniye on a) the results of firing, b) theoretical knowledge, c) practical skills, d) methodological capabilities of the students on exercises in the teaching of firing from small arms? -- What results can be expected from the conduct of the test with re- spect to the use of training time and varied formulation of tho method of training in the test podrazdeleniye? Approved For Release 2000/08/091(?C1A-RDP85T00875R0CUS0OCE11019-6 CPYRGHT S. el?it -- In what measure does the organizational-methodological formula- tion of the exorcises influence the more attentive attitude of the students towards marksmanship training and influence their activity? ? reps programming affect the process of training in the remaining unprogrammed disciplines of combat training? -- Are the instructors with average qualifications able to employ the methods being tested, obtaining assistance possible under troop conditions from their organizational commander? Wo are investigating all those questions using the following methods: we take the initial level of training of the students of the test podrazdeleni- ye and of several podra,zdeleniyas being compared at the s7,art of the training and, by moans of observation, analysis of personal records, written reports, and practical checks, we discover the degree of progress of the trainees. We conduct the planning of marksmanship training in the test podraz- deleniye with consideration of the Icnowledge and the Experience of organi- zation of programmed training in it. Training materials are worked out for individual lessons: for theore- tical lessons -- programmed training texts, for practical lessons -- detailed synopses which consider the degree of know1ec3ge of the instructors in meth- ods of programmed training. At first, these materials are worked by a con- trol group and subsequently, with the inclusion of the instructors and the students of the test podrazdeleniye. The lessons in he test podrazdeleniye are analyzed by the control group. The passage of ?the lessorr in the test podrazdeleniye is also observed in other disciplines as well as in compared podrazdeleniyas. In this re, spect, the progress of the students of the test podrazdeleniye is checked in the process of training in the middle and at the end of the courses. In the same manner, a check is conducted in the middle and at the end of the courses in the compared podrazdeleniyas, too. The results of the training which are achieved by the students in examinations in other disciplines are used for comparison. For this purpose, questioning of the students is conducted in written form. It is clear to us that the training of students by the method of pro- grammed instruction assures continuous, systematic acquisition of the neces- sary knowledge and abilities and that it demands from the trainees a clear, specific scientific analysis of the material being worked out and a sharp differentiation of separate and partial subjects in accordance with their im- portance. Only on the basis of such an approach is the opportunity assured to plan the necessary systematic repetition of all important elements of the knowledge which can be taught. Planning the material in this way is. freed of any ballast, that is, only those elements of the material are taught and as- similat ed which are necessary to the future no n- co mmi s sion ed officer. Un- Approved For Release z000/08/u9 . CIA-,RDP85T008tbR000300090019-6 CPYIGHTpproved ror Release 20001013109 . CIA-RDP65T00075R000300090019-G ottunataly, this is still not a firm rule with us yet since, proce(xling from the short period of rnilitany ;;ervice? the nocesnary ;3 01 (led 0 n of ma- terial up to now is determined to considerable measure by the subjective im- pressions of individual instructors and commanders. Tho worlcing out of the theoretical material on lessons in marksmanship training using programmed training texts will lead, for example, to a more intensive, independent, and creative mastery of the knowledge by the students. It was established in checks that the progress of the students of the test podrazdeloniye of the school, on the average, was higher than that among the personnel of the compared podrazdeleniyas. In theoretical tests which took place in the middle of the courses, the soldiers of the test podrazdeleniye received 42.2 points and of the podrazdeleniyas being compared, on the averar.);e, only 25.8 points. In this connection, it should be noted that it was recom- mended to company commanders of the podrazdeleniyas being compared that they submit their best platoon for check while all platoons worn subjected to the test in the test podrazdeleniye. ? ? . It should also be expected that the knowledge obtained by the students of the test companies is retained longer and more firmly than with the stu- dents of the podrazdeleniyas being compared. I\To little significance is had by the circumstance that the students have an extremely positive attitude toward the work with programmed training texts. In the questioning, almost all students of the test podrazdeleniye expressed the desire to retain this method. 'Zany of them base their opinion on the fact that such a method promotes broadening and improving independent. work and provides the opportunity for constant checking of their individual studies by the director. r:Te have already drawn the conclusion that practical instruction from synopses which consider the principles of programmed instruction assures a more confident, profound, and complete mastery of the skills and abilities which the students are required to possess. As a result of the practical test in the middle of the courses, the test podrazdeleniye, for example, received on the average 64.8 points (out of 75 possible.), and the podrazdeleniyas being compared -- on the average, only 52.8 points. In this, it still is necessary to consider that in the podra.zdeleniyas being compared individual exercises in firing, which are conducted in the course of the training, were systematically prepared (this is generally accepted coach- ing which threatens the accomplishment of tasks facing marksmanship training as a whole) while training in the test podrazdeleniye proceeded in exact conformance with the program which did not permit conducting special working out of individual exercises. Nevertheless, the results of exercises performed up to now in the test podrazdeleniye are rm.ich 'oetter. From what has been said, it follows that the experimental employment of programmed instruction permitted improving the training considerably and, first of all, activated the students to independent and creative work. The A ? proved For Release 2000/08/0L)CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT methods of programmed training are already being employed at the present time in some of the schools of the National Peoples Army. Results obtained also confirm the indicated conclusions. Consequently, the future also be- longs to programmed'instruction in military training because it is the means which helps Us to cope with growing requirements which are made on combat training by/the nature) of modern war. From the investigations conducted in the National Peoples Army of the German Democratic Republic, a number of conclusions can be drawn: 1. Each instructor should first know the mental and physical capabili- ties of his subordinates in order to determine minimum and maximum loads and adopt effective measures to increase progress. In the very first four weeks of military training, the instructor should work with himself especially purposefully in order to acquire the knowledge and abilities to use teaching and testing machines. 2. Considering that mental and physical labor of a man do not re- present values independent of each other but are a component part of any human activity, in the training process consideration should be given to both these facets and their dialectical interconnection. One should strive to overcome the one-sided physical load of the students: in accordance with his capabilities, each serviceman should receive a large mental load, but one within his capabilities. Thanks to the daily concern and wide support of the entire educational system in the GDR by the workers' and peasants' govern- ment, the mental level of our youth is rising .from year to year; therefore, this should also be considered in military training. 3. In view of the direct dependence of military knowledge, skills, and abilities on the level of general development of the servicemen, in the process of training this activity should be directed to working out optimum , knowledge and abilities. Therefore, methods should be primarily adopted which force the soldier to work independently, actively, and creatively physically as well as mentally. 4. The maxim= amount of mental and physical load of the servicemen in the process of the lessons depends to a large degree on the systematic character,, sequence, and purposefulness of the training in all instruc- tional disciplines. On the one hand, this assumes the clear coordinations of procedures studied in individual disciplines and, on the other, the specific and scientifically-based planning of each subject of instruction as well as the excellent organization of theoretical and practical lessons which assure the complete conversion of the plan into actual troop training. 5. The results of the tests which have been conducted confirm the value and usefulness of the prograrrzned method of instruction. In theoretical training, this is expressed primarily in raising the degree of independence in developing knowledge, in the compulsion toward an intensive mental pursuit of the material being studied, and also in the immediate confirmation of the correctness of the knowledge obtained. In practical training, the value of Approved For Releage 200'! r. rove41. I-or Release 2000/013/09 : U1A-KlilaBb I UOtitbKUOUJUOU9UU19-ti s method consists first of the systematic repetition of important ele? ments and in self-constraint toward proper, independent practical activity. The purpose of this article, as has already been stated, is 'the ex- change of same experience in the matter of combat training of soldiers and students of schools in combat training which will promote closer co- operation of both our armies in a practical manner as \Tell as in the field of the theory of instruction. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/0951CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT SOVIET ARTILLERY IN TEE GREAT .ATRIOTIC WAR by Col Gen Arty (Ret) F. SAMSONOV The role, of artillery, just as is the case for etch type and branch of the army, depends on a number of interacting 'footers. The most important of these arc the military qualities of the weapons, how many of them the army has the correlation between the organization of the particular branch of the army and its ordnance, and the methods and means of using them in battle - the battle capabilities of the weapons. The military quality of the weapon is determined primarily by its firing capability. Even M. V. Frunzye pointed out that "in a modern battle the decis ive factor, and the main strength, is fire. Only with the help of fire can th( domination of the enemy,be, arrived ot....14ence, every group in the army, every type of weapon, must appear before the enemy, that is, on the battlefield, so as to ensure to oneself superi)rity in fire." 1 This thesis has been complete: proven in the course of World War II, and retains its significance even now tilt the war is over. Artillery, as a branch of the army, has at its disposal the greatest means of fire poweravailable to any of the branches of the land forces. The attentic of the nation's leadership and of its armed forces have always been engrossed i artillery development and in outfitting artillery with modern, first-class weap The qualitative modernization and the quantitative growth of artillery in country in the pre-war years were of great importance. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the People's Commissariat of Defense, in setting forth a number basic conditions of the operational art and tactics, decisively confirmed the b part the artillery, as a branch of the army, plays in battle and in operations. At the same time, the development of aviation, and of the tank forces, and the immeasurably increasing importance of them in the conduct of maneuvering operat had to be taken into consideration. We did in fact have at our disposal first-class artillery weapons. This wt convincin9ly pointed out in an article by Colonel General of Artillery N. N. Zhdanov. We will only point up certain of the situations in his articic in tl interests of our own article. ??? 1. M. V. Frunzye. Collected Works, Vol. I. Gosizdat (State Publishing House), 1929. pp. 237-238. 2. Voyennaya'Mysl* (Military Thought), No. 3, 1965. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : gl4k-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 - At the beginning of the war ovvgoky#8.rfifefeidowNl000stimtguet, 45- and 7Apprcgved ForcRekapem299049Na: yugfrghtly raCiang in howitzers. This shortage was the result of the increase in the number of howitzers in the tables of organization and equipment fox- the rifle divisions just prior to the war. We had all of the large caliber guns we needed for the corps artillery .and the artil- lery in the RVGK. 3 There hdd been a sequential replacement of artillery weapons with new, even more modern artillery pieces, in the period 2 to 4 years before the war. howeyer, the process wan not completed. When the surprise attack by the Hitlerite troops began we had only 49% of the new 45-mm guns, and only 14% of the new 76-mm guns. Deliveries of the new 122- and 152-mm howitzers were low too; 19 and 28%, respect- ively. However, the earlier models of the guns had adequately high battle qual- ities. The biggest bottleneck was in providing the troops with the small caliber, 37-mm, antiaircraft gun; the total supplied was some 30% of the organizational requirements of the troops. There were very few large caliber antiaircraft machineguns. The result was that the troops suffered heavy losses in men, in supplies of horses, and in prime movers and automotive transport, the result of enemy air attacks. Batteries which lost their prime movers had to destroy the materiel portions assigned to them in order not to leave them for the enemy. Since the materiel portions of command responsibility contained quite large reserves, we had been unable to manufacture ammunition in quantities sufficient .to bring them up to the norms decided upon in the corresponding decisions which had been made on the subject. Provision for them at the beginning of the war was very inadequate. There had been no success in overcoming the difficulties involved in developing ammunition production at the beginning of the war. Having placed great importance on antitank defense, we had adequate supplies of armor- piercing projectiles for the 45-mm gun, but very few for the 76-mm. Arlor-piercing projectiles for the antiaircraft guns had not been designed, although their use had been anticipated in the struggle with talks. The high-explosive fragmentation shells were only good against light tanks, ad only good against the side armor of medium tanks, and that at short ranges, when tank fire was more active and when the time available to destroy the tanks had shortened. Finally, it should b. recalled that the idea of making subcaliber and shaped charges was known to us long before the war, 1 but their manufacture began only during the war when the enemy had already used them in the struggle with our tanks. We were also late in using in our armaments and in establishing wholesale product- ion of rocket installations, their missiles, and of self-propelleddartillery mounts as well. In the short space of the three, incomplete, pre-war Five Year Plan periods a great amount of work was actually done to raise Soviet artillery to the first class level. However, there were shortcomings which reduced the battle capabilit- -ies of our artillery. PYRGHT 3' ARpAiiesgeravfleiNgeb100708/07CIASKP1515651tOtrilkaine00#00916 of war. 1. The principles of the shaped effect had been investigated in the Artillery 2_ netni I 1,1)D T NS NO 9 , v0.,..vec, Y1',NNAYA MY SI, ' ' ' , , 5 MAY 1 9 6 6 SFL C ? .5 008,ER0.,,, , CPYRGHT a-: es: room ? ^ . Wo needed prime movern, without which Hey maneuvering wan out of the question, in order to pay off ou the battle qualition of the weaponm, but we also needed Cite technical equipment for communicetionn And reconnaismance, without which it would be impossible to control fire. Much has been written concerning the shortcomings in means for mechanically towing the ortillery pieces. hot um note here that the tractors supplied the Army lacked speed, nnd apare porta, and rApidly broke down. The national economy had no tractors or trucks cApnble of meeting the army's requirenwnts in the event of mobilization. The main bulk of the prime movers were low-powered Agricultural tractors which were obviously inadequate The bottleneck for our artillery was the weak supply of mechanized prime moveral and this seriously reduced artillery's mobility and maneuverability. The question was not n new one. As far back ns 5 June 1929 Triandafillov han reported to the RVSR (Revolutionary Military Council for the Republic - 1918-1934) on a project for a tank-tractor ArmAment system. The report advanced the thesis thnt"overy mechnnicn1 means of transportation produced in the country should lend itself to use in the army under wartime conditions and, conversely, every special means of transportation for the army should have a peace Lime use in serving the economic needs of the country." 1 It is also useful to recall that M. N. Tokhachevskiy, in 1932, wrote that auto- mobiles rind tractors which could become the mechanical base for a tank should be introduced into the national economy. 2 The military leadership, as well as many artillerymen, saw the only answer in the creation of a "family" of special'artillery prime movers. The first models appeared before the war (in the form of tractors such as the "Komsomolets," "Komintern," and "Voroshilovets"), but their total in the artill- ery tractor park at the beginning of .he war was only 20.5%. 3 It should be noted that throughout the war the only tractors delivered were agricultural types. The reasons for this have not yet been given sufficient study. At the beginning of the 1930s it would have been opportune to have dealt with yet another problem, that of gradual elimination of horse-drawn prime movers. It is possible that this problem could have been resolved in the 10 to 12 years remaining before the war. Of the other problems, we will discuss that concerned with the supply of technical equipment for reconnaissance. The available instruments did not solve the problem of engaging in massed artillery firing and controlling such fire accurately and without observation from ground observation points. The anti- aircraft fire-control instruments were not designed for the high aircraft speeds involved nor could they cope with the anti-antiaircraft maneuvers used. 1. TsGASA (Central State Archives of the Soviet Army), Vol. 4, Schedule 2, D. 504, p. 16. 2. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, Selected Works, Vol. 2, MiFtary Publishing House, 1964 p. 187. 3. History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-194r, Vol. 1, Military Publishing House, 1963, p. 452. A so roved For Releas - III I: I' " m : is: ssssss ? te6A-RDP8FRODS RAP APPAPP.19A,, Adgoig'sfObit'Reliasotle@ette8Kte eircrt mailable in the corps aviation detachments, wan obsolete mid was not nuited to nerviog with the ertitlory. The Air Force eed the INioplein Cemmiwde... Lit for the Aviation Liduntry failed to provide the help needed in order to desiga end build a spotter plane which would satisfy the requirements of the time. The repeated appeala. of N. M. Rogovskiy in 1935-19371 and of N. N. Voronov Iii 1938- 194i, to the leading military authoritien lied no reaults. The resolution oC the Defense Committee of the SNK (the Council of Poop1.(i,a Commissars) of the USSR concerning the building of a now spotter aircraft remained tweeted upon. The organization of our artillery on the eve of the war was quite modern. All types of artillery were represented and the forces were equipped with art- illery from top to bottom. Included was company, battalion, regiment, and corps artillery, as well as RVGK artillery. There was no artillery organic to operat- ional combinations (armies, fronts) since plans called for reinforcing them as needed from the 'WM artillery. Artillery in the rifle divisions comprised 90% of the entire mass of ground field artillery and was distributed as follows. Company artillery (50-mm mortars) had 28.2%, battalion (82-mm mortars and 45-mm guns) 22%, regiment (120-mm mortars, 45- and 76-mm guns) 14%, division (45- and 76-mm guns, 122- and 152-mm howitzers), 26%. The share of each type of weapon looked like this: mortars in the allowances totalled 49.2%, 45-mm and 76-mm guns 32.7%, and howitzers 18.1%. If the 50-mm mortars are disregarded the 82-mm and 120-mm mortars made up 29.3% of the total mass of armaments allowed the troops, while guns totalled 45.5% and howitzers 25.2%. The company 50-mm mortar had poor fire qualities, and the rifle company, because of the constant shortage of personnel, lest the tactical importance assigned it prior to the war during the Great Patl-iotic War. hence, production of the 50-mm mortar was sharply curtailed as the war went along, from 116,600 in the first half of the war to 28,500 in the second period of the war, and was finally stopped completely, while these mortars were removed from the armaments provided.1' 2 It should be noted that prior to the outbreak of war we had a low percentage of RVGK artillery, despite the fact that it was the primary source of artillery for maneuvering in operations. At tlie end of World War I the most advanced countries had 30 to 40% of all their low-maneuverable artillery in the RVGK. This, included the entire mass of artillery weapons (less the mortars).* We had 12.4% of our guns in the RVGK artillery. V. D. Grendal', N. M. Rogovskiy, and N. N. Voronov, former artillery heads in the 12 to 15 years before the war, repeatedly raised the question of increasing the share of RVGK artillery. ?They were unable to find persuasive arguments. That %WM ? Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Vol. 81, Schedule 12076, pp. 2-12. . Later references and discussions did not take the 50-mm mortars into consider- ation. Approved For Release 2000/08/9 : CIA-RDP85T0087.WM090019-6 - ( ;1 artillery wh cli wo lust was. t in an offet t %, ApprovethEoNFOleaket RasniqWP*71S14-WrfriRR. WINA. e the esta.aishet norms for arti ery support for fronts and armies. It should he emphasized Chat tho main body of artillery was divisional artillery. This fact indicates that the artillery organization did not fully respond to tlp doctrine of maneuverable war. Moreover, divisional artillery was top heavy in howitzers, since they hold 84% of all howitzer S in the Soviet Army. This was irrational, oven from an economic point of view. The howitzer is basically the weapon of the offensive. Ordinarily, from one-third to one-hal of all the divisions in an army in the field in time of war will take part in a simultaneous offensive, even when several fronts are involved. Consequently, from one-half to two-thirds of divisional howitzers were always in "mothballs." The theory of the combat employment of artillery had been developed by us o the basis of the general theory of military science, and provided for the wise USC of artillery's combat possibilities. Volume I of the History of the Great Patriotic War lcA1-194", (Chlpter 10) reflects the high level of theory of our military science in detail and correctly. However, there were assumptions made, and, in our view, there were certain inaccuracies in some of .the details. The question of antitank defense (pp. 445-446 of the above mentioned work) is a case in point. The authors did not understand the prewar regulations and instructions in ou orderly system of antitank defense, but saw in them only "various methods of struggle." These regulations and instructions sanctioned the fact that when a ta fired by direct aiming only "special antitank artillery" was used and that "anti tank artillery was not grouped into individual antitank strong points and defens pivots," but rather that all antitank weapons "were to be concentrated to hold t non-tank-traversable areas in the locality." The 1936 Field Regulations recommended the organization of antitank areas within defense perimeters (as is obvious, tactically speaking this means within the main and second lines of defense). In the textbook on general tactics these Regulations recommendations have been developed to point out that "...there must a system of antitank areas coordinated with the mobile antitank reserve in order to stop and destroy these tanks." 1 An even more detailed exposition of the antitank defense system j.s contained at pages 228 to 240 of the Combat Regulations for Artillery, Part II, 1937, which were still in force in 1943. "Artillery is the principle source of fire power 3. The sole exception was the concluding warfare during the 1945 campaign. 1. General Tactics, Vol. 1. Military Publishing House, 1940, p. 207. 2. "Special" antitank artillery .included the batteries in the rifle regiments and the battalionsin the rifle divisions. Ordinarily, the.guns which were in- cluded in the PTO system for use in direct firing at tanks were called antitank gun. Ap.jiuvtd Fyi Rvivabw 9 . CIAE YRC HT r 0 rAvikovedieof iTeelsise12000t08009 : CIA-RIDR-2,51-00875RONAMPPA1PAh the chin- ince 'no the locality, and the natural obstacles, is the antitank defense system." (Page 228). Further on Lilo Regulations explain in detail what is Meant by the PTO (antitank defense) system, and provide recommendation for tho organization of the system. And further on Are the firing assaulLs'on tank units In areas where the tanks are concentrated and on assembly areas (page 230), and barrages to be laid down along the routes over which the battle dispositions of tanks are moving towards the loLding edge of the defense (page 232), ahd mooting tanks with point blank /are directly in front of the forward defense perimeter (page 234). And further, in case the tanks break throuuh the perimeter, the Regulations required the positioning of antitank guns deep within the defense' in such a way as to "provide for a system of continuous antitank fire along the front and in depth to the areas in which the PP (infantry-support) and DD (general- support) groups are located, inclusively." (Pape 234). As antitank guns the Regulations recommended the assignment of battalion and regimental guns, and in- dividual guns from the PP group gun batteries. Even the "firing positions of the PP and DD group batteries themselves are included in the overall system of anti- tank defense," that is, in the area of their firing positions these guns too were to fire directly on any tanks breaking through. And, finally, at page 240 is a discussion of the place, and the tasks, of the mobile reserve of antitank guns i4 the overall PTO system, while, at page 229, is the statement that "the entire art- illery of the defense must be ready to repel a tank attack." Thus, so far as the legend concerning the concentration of the means for the struggle with the tanks in non-tank-traversable areas is concerned, it is obviously founded on.misunderstanding. In commenting on the PU-36 (the 1936 Field Service Regulations), M. N. Takhachevskiy wrote: "It is desirable to select the forward edge along obstacles it would be difficult for tanks to overcome, and to make widespread use of artificial and natural obstacles." 3 As will be seen, this has absolutely no resemblance to the attempt to conceal from the ehemy the antitank defense means in non-tank-traversable areas. During the Great Patriotic War we linked up the antitank areas (they were also called strong points and centers and areas) with firing coordination within the overall system, set up this PTOR (antitank defense area) system throughout the army zone (as of the summer of 1942), and then throughout the front as well (in the battle along the Volga, around Kursk, and in the Lake Balaton area). It was augmented by coordinated artillery antitank reserves from the rifle regiment to the front. We have not refuted the principles on which front, army, corps, and division antitank defenses were founded, but rather, on the basis of what actually was done, supplemented the correct recommendations contained in PU-36 and 1= (Combat Regulations for Art!..11ery), Sectirxi II, 1937, with new methods used in the struggle and the system of PTO developed beyond the boundaries of the rifle division defense area. 411???11111?1?16 Approved For Release 1A-RDPeti 0840003000900196 - 3. M. N. Tukhachevskiy. Selected Works, Ica 2p 25 C1?)YRGH fiffroal reittWierise'21100/08169):VAJFMR85T008175R0003-000900194AH the very , mples. methods of arriving at the initial data for firing and adjusting fir- ing tere more widely used than were sophisticated methods available to us. This latter can be explained by the fact that most battery and divisions commanders had not been in their assignments over one or two years. Artillery officers were in general young, 67% were not over 30 years of age, while the period of service in the army for 83% of the officers was under 8 years. The overwhelming majority (86%) of the officers were Communists and Young Communists. This fact not only provided the Motherland and the Party with unlimited devotion, but also a maximum of activity and initiative on their part in carrying out their service and combat duties. The first part of the war, and particularly its initial campaign, was an extremely difficult period for the Soviet Army. It not only lost men and equip- ment, but the army in the field had to retreat deep into the interior and, at the same time, face a situation in which many hundreds of industrial enterpr.ises had to be evacuated on an urgent basis. There was a sharp, temporary, curtailment in the production of guns and ammunition. The difficulties were compounded by the loss of most of the GAU (Main Artillery Directorate) depots located close to the western border. Tank troops and aviation also took tremendous losses. The demands for artillery armament never the less were increased by the. colossal growth of new formations. In the first five moats of the war almost as many combined arms units (division and above) were formed as there were divisions at the beginning of the war. Industry, in the first months of the war, was unable to fill the combat losses of the army in equipment and armaments, with the result that the technical equipment available to the troops fell off sharply. By the end of 1941 the trem- endous exertions on the part of the Soviet people were able to improve somewhat the supply to the Soviet Army of armaments and ammunition, and from that time ^xi the technical supply to the troops increased without interruption. 1 Artillery power, as will be seen from the data in Table 1, increased at a great rate. Table 1. The restoration of artillery power in the Soviet Army during the first period of the war in the basic indices (in %) Artillery Of which mortars Available 22 June 1941 1 December 1941 1 May 1942 It 15-20 November 1942 100 66.1 112.8 185.3 ** 26.2 20.1 57.5 110.6 * Mortars, less 50-mm. ** Apart from tank guns, of which ce+,egory industry provided some 20,600. 1. Histor of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945, Vol. 2, Military Publishin Hou riQPIINSgtotiakie/04TbiAIRD0185T00675R0003000(90021A. Restora,Vieg This was A44419)09Mdm 3009an tS producing various artillery shell compoiwnts had to be urgently evacuated to the eastern regions of the country. The monthly prod- uction of these plants had been 11.1 million shell casings and mine casings, 7.9 million fuzes, 5.1 million cartdige cases, 7,800 tons of gunpowder, 3,000 tons of TNT, and other products. 1 As a result, and despite the heroic efforts to restore tiee ammunition industry, the increase in ammunition production lagged behind the increase An the number of guns and mortars, and supplies of ammunition per unit armament fell 1.8 times at the end of the first period of the war. The struggle to increase this supply lasted into the succeeding period of the war. It was at this same time that a number of organizational changes were made in order to alleviate the adverse effects of shortages of armaments and ammunit- ion!, and there was a simultaneous change in artillery organization as well, mainly the result of an inadequate mobile artillery reserve. The most important of the changes involved reductions in the allcwance lists for organic artillery, and seek- ing ways in which to organize so as to obtain the highest number of mortars and light weapons and to cut back on the produntion of hi..avy (152-mm) howitzers, and of all guns of larger calibers. In the difficult situation which existed at the be- ginning ci the war, it was necessary to make a maximum effort to form the anti- tank and antioircraft artillery, in which troops were so badly needed. The mobile nature of the war required an operationally mobile artillery reserve, and there was very little of this. Hence, it became necessary to re- duce the combat strength of individual artillery regiments in order to increase the number of weapons in the reserves. Table of organization and equipment (T/0&10 were changed for organic artillery in the first period of the war because of necessity, and it was natural, therefore, that every opportunity was used to restore previous artillery saturat- ion norms in the rifle divisions, which were the basic skeleton under the entire land army structure. Just how the artillery saturation norms for the rifle divis- ions were changed may be seen from the data in Table 2. Table 2. T/O&E Changes in Artillery for Rifle Divisions in the First Period of the War Artillery Projectile Per Rifle Division No. in armament weight, kg A B C D E % at 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 start of war Mortars: .150 50-mm 0.9 84 76 54 49 72 65 76 68 85 77 101.2 82-mm 3.1 54 167 18 56 72 223 76 236 85 264 157.4 4 120-mm 15.9 12 191 6 95 18 286 18 286 18 286 150.0 Total mortars 434 78 200 162 574 170 590 188 627 125.3 CPYRGHT 1. N. Voznesenskiy. Military Economy of the USSR in the Period of the Patriotic War. State Political Literature Publishing House i47 : CPYRGHT Artillery: ? ApproyegnFiorpRelypre 20090/097: 76-mm PA 6.2 18 112 76-mm DA 6.2 16 99 122 mm g 21.8 32 698 152-mm g 40.0 12 480 Total guns / 132 1466 9-6 30 43 55.. 12 74 12 74 12 74 12 74 66. 16 99 16 99 20 124 20 124 125. 8 174 8 174 12 262 12 262 37. 54 373 66 390 74 503 74 503 56. GRAND TOTAL 282 1900 132 573 228 964 244 1093 262 1130 92.9 A - at beginning of 'ar; B - Summer 1941; C - at beginning of winter campaign of 1941/42; D - Spring 1942; E - Summer 1942. 1 - Number of guns; 2 - weight of salvo (kg). PTP - Antitank obstacles; PA Regimental artillery; DA - divisional artillery; g - howitzer. It is to be noted that the General Staff gradually, but persistently, increased the number of artillery pieces in divisions after the sharp tdrop (by 55.2%) which had occurred at the beginning of the summer-fall campaign of 1941. In one year the artillery had been increased to 92.9% of its pre- war level. This resulted from the increase in the number of mortars and 76- mm divisional guns (273 more, as against the initial allowance in 1941). How- ever, since the numbev. of howitzers per division full 3.5 times, and since these were replaced by 120-mm mortars (because there were no 160-mm), for a net in- crease of only 6 pieces, the weight per salvo by an artillery division contin- ued low (one-third that of the prewar weight). Andjust because the salvo weight plays so large a part in offensive operations, whereas two campaigns of three at the beginning of the war were defensive, the effect was not so great as was the shortage in numbers of guns. At the same time, and despite the difficulties involved in creating the new artillery formations, there was a sharp increase in the specific weight of RVGK artillery and its role in operations (thanks to its maneuverability). The pro- cess of development of RVGK artillery in the first part of the war can very well be seen from the data in Table 3. As will be seen from the table, the Army had no rocket installations at the beginning of the war. And the decision to include them in the armaments was not taken until 21 June 1941. Even so, the number of rocket Installations increased sharply in the first year of the war. There were five times as many in mid-1942 as there were on 1 December 1941. This was definite proof of their ability to survive and of the big part they played in massed artillery fire. At the great tempos prevailing the growth in the number of M-30 (300-mm rockets) racks almost doubled, indicative of the growing demand for fire power activity at the immed- iate depth of enemy combat formations covered by defensive armaments. The over- running of this first defensive position, which offered attacking troops the best 4organized and stiffest resistance, was a necessary prerequisite to penetrating the enemy's defense throughout is depth. The Table reveals that the maneuvering reserve of artillery increased con- siderably during the difficult situation prevailing during the first period of the war. At the end of this first period the number of RVGK artillery regiments had increased 10 times. There were five times as many RVGK artillery regiments, on the average, per rifle division as there had been at the beginning of the war. One combined-arms army for use in conducting a large, frontal craeration came to vpprOVeelfFortnieaser2000108i094 eapineaturaz175EKIMPOAM01@t6 another ha serious problem; control over iarge masses of maneuvering, or mobile, artilipry_ rs..) divisi promeclAW KM,RkEtPriATIEMPM.10. bit* le solut or! was found iri.stlurpsaapkiqt0bilifvingoOprocititeR'war the State Committee on Defense issued the appropriate decrees. At this time the RVGK had all types of artillery, except for the self- propelled artillery. Now the RVGK artillery became what it should havo. been, not only lctill,ery for qualitiative reinforcement of combined-arms teams, but an all-around entity as well, forming a large, mobile reserve for GHQ, Front commanders, and armies. The increase in RVGK artillery outstripped that of organic artillery in subsequent periods of the war as well. In the second and third periods organic artillery increased 1.1 times; RVGK increased 2.1 times. Its specifid share increased to 32% (in availability of guns and mortars), without the M-30 racks taken into consideration. At the end of the Great Patriotic War the specific share of RVGK artillery was what it had been at the end of the first World War. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : alA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGH-f Table 3. Development of RVGK Artillery in the 1 Dates of beginning Number of computed regiments mid end of campaignsABCD E F G H 22 Juno 1941 15 64 20 11** 110 - 110 1 December 1941 101* 58 58 14** 24 255 - 255 1 May 1942 177 149 122 63 72 583 - 583 15-20 November 1942 199 196 240 83 138 856. 256 1112 A - Heavy guns; B ? Howitzers; C - Antitank; D - Mortar; E - I - Mortars; J - Small caliber guns; K - 76-mm guns; L - 122-n P - Total; Q - In 9/0. * * The sharp jump is explained by the transfer to the RVGK of thc of the corps commands. Mortar battalions were the equivalent of a mortar regiment. *** Including 480 85-mm AA guns used as antitank guns. In addition to 4560 M-30 racks. Division in one ptabr. (sic - unknown). It is known that they were not included in the RVGK artillery inventory. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 65 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT ?r its the First Period Of the4:War regiments ^ 110 ? 255 ? 583 256 ..112 Number of guns in them I J K L M N 0 P Q 528 - 960***, 3070 4030 - 160 4718 100 582 382 1016 ? 3712 5110 584 12***** 6288 133 1516 198 2604 5750 8552 1720 12 11800 250 2296 1494 3960 7203 12657 2592**** 3180 20725 439 Ttar; E - Rocket; F - Total ground 4rti1lery; G - AA; H - Total AA; L - 122-mm and larger; M Total; N - Rocket installations; 0 - AA; RVGK of the surviving corps regiments resulting from the disbanding regiment. known that the forces had 720 AA guns on 1 December 1941, but ventory. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :661A-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 Strengthening the organizational structures of tilttalcUic wilh4.1140,1/ also con- tig05110roved PerlReilea8ey20001Q8409e1CIAIROPfig9Q07frOWFPfrms t4, over 60% word Included within the ranks of 10 artillery corps, 105 artillery battalions, and 85 independent brigades. 1 So now tAoro were large staffs for artillery units (brigade and larger) ,oxer HT So direct control of ths fire and maneuvering of approximately 1,200 artillery regiments, between the small artillery staffs in the combined-arms units and oper- ational units on the one hand, and the artillery regiments and battalions (the tactical artillery groups) on the other. The staffs of the artillery units (brig- ade and higher), through the staffs in the various artillery groups, had under their control ovor 50% of all artillery participating in a particular operation. Only now was it possible to speak of real possibilities of contro;ized control of massed fire, not only at the beginning of artillery preparations for the attack (or counter- preparations in defense), but throughout the engagement as well. In the course of developing the project for the new Regulations in 1943, it was decided to recommend that the fronts and armies refrain from forming a multi- plicity of artillery groups. The fundamental principle involved in forming such groups would have to be provision of a clear cut correlation with combined-arms units (brigage and higher) and other, smaller, units of the same type. Every combined-arms commander, from rifle regiment to army commander, and in some cases even as high as front commander, had his inclusive artillery group. This violated the basic concept of correlation: .every combined-arms commander had "availabl.,,H artillery. The experience u the war revealed that, in the interests or massing artillery what was needed was centralized control of the artillery on the scale of some combined-arms unit (division add above)(combined-arms unit groupings into larger still groupings). Therefore, the artillery commanders in such combined-arms group- ings, being the deputies of the commanders of such groupings, received the right to control the fire and maneuvering of all, or of those parts of the artillery they needed, to monitor the combat utilization of the artillery in subordinate combined- arms units and sections and to make iime]y corrections in case mistukus were made:. Large, controlled, mass,?s of artillery became a reliable instrument for wide- spread, mass ai-tillery fire. The massing of artillery in operations Increased, and so, correspondingly, did enemy losses from our artillery fire; at the same time the conditions for breaching the enemy's defenses were eased. The role of artillery was improved as a result of the growth in its capability to fire, because difficulties with prime movers were overcome, as were those con- cerned with control, and because of skilful control of its massed fire power. 1. All data are in conventional regiments, that is, in accordance with the strength of independent battalions; they were taken by re-pective types of artillery, two or three to a regiment. The percentage of independent regiments in the ground artillery was considerable l'wer. The medium caliber AA battalions ia AA artillery remai*p~OffinkeleWe tit Der.01/0g :ttC4A4tRDP85T00875R000300090012:12_-_ 67 Artillery, in two defensive iwkiprgliksmilus144.11tribp74 Ogooti?b604"1 war, nild 3.407-in 41Mil-WWW""niMird periods, gained n APRAW (WA!. -P AM? o2 g9P great deal of experience, and learned how to inflict losses on the enemy, how to break tr) tank and infanvry attacks, to stop him advance while giving own infantry and tanks invalonble assistance. In the first days of the war the artillery units, as a result of the complicated conditions, the small amount of equipment, and the poor mobility, absorbed heavy losses, and although they inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy, they failed to achieve the expected results, only briefly delaying h.:m on individual sections. However, by the end of the initial campaign of the war, and even in the battle around Moscow, artillery began to gain more and more strength, began to break up enemy attacks, and forced him to look for now directions in which to strike because of the artillery fire he was encountering. Even so, artillery still had extremely limited means for the struggle in the defence around Moscow. This will bc seen from Table 4. Table 4 Available weapons and mortars on the Western Front Weapons Mortars Total PM-13 AA Guns PTO DA RVGV 2 October 1941 769/2.2 832/2.5 364/1.0 1586/4.5 3551/10.2 21 94 16 November 1941 804/2.1 647/1.7 337/0.8 648/1.7 2436/6.3 268 113 5 December 1941 1287/2.7 1189/2.5 323/0.7 2119/4.4 4918/10.3 372 226 ? RVGK weapons do not include antitank; the latter are shown together with all antitank guns. Numerator - number of weapons; denominator - density per km of defense front. *IP Despite the most strenuous exertions on the part of the General Headquarters were unsuccessfu in increasing artillery density, particularly antitank. It became necessary to seek the solution to the problem in operational terms - by maneuvering equipment along the direction taken by the enemy's main blows. Thus, the 160 Army, defending the Volokolamsk direction, was assigned 6 antitank regiments; the 50 Army, in the Mozhaysk direction, 11 regiments; the 430 Army in the Maloyaroslavets direction, 8 regiments and 1 battalion. . . The result of these actions was to increase the density of antitank equipment in the 160 Army to 3.2 guns per kilometer by 16 November; that for the 43rd Army to 3 guns per kilometer. However, even these changes failed to raise the density to the norms set forth in Regulations. S:rength was low. The answer had to be sought in decisive maneuvering of antitank artillery in a tactical zone. So there evolved successful increase, but not without risk, in the artillery density along the Minsk-Moscow highway (82nd Motorized Rifle Division) to 14 guns, in the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division sector (Naro-Fominsk) to 18 guns, and in the 43rd Army, along the Warftpliciginigeortliteleagen2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 68 CPYRGHT AdbfoVeld,Fbt,ReletaSe120001018/0,9 dertA-ARDP.85T041875130ANNORPARAy the 00m/int; frem?lo November to 6 December 1941, over 400 tanks and armored vehiclon, 20 uircraf some WO vehicles, were destroyed by artillery fire from the Weotern Front, while up to 15,000 enemy soldiers.and officers were taken out ri action. Thin was no smal contribution to the struggle with the invaders in the battle in the clone-in approac to the capital. / 1 An artillery density increased, oo too did experience in its uric; as the artill erymen mastered their combat asnignmento the role of artillery in defensive operation increased with each year the war went on. In the aalingrad area the density of antitank guns along the main directions increased to 10 (62nd Army) and even 19 (66th Army) weapons per kilometer, while the W3E3vera1l density increaoed to from 50 to 85 guns per kilometer. Around Kursk the density in PTO weapons increased to 18 (13th Army), while the overall density in- creased to 86 guns an2 mortars, etc. The artillery density inside the defensive sectors of the divisions along the probable avenues of tank approach increased 1.5 to 2 times. Organizational skill in maneuvering was brilliantly evidenced by artillery and tank commanders at all levels in the Kursk battle, in the defensive battles around Kiev at the end of 1943, and in the Lake Balaton region. We countered the enemy's' tank unit maneuvers by our artillery maneuvers, and, as a result of the growing' strength of the arttllery we formed an inpenetrable fire barrier. The significance of maneuver and control of artillery in these operations have Lot yet been adequately studied in depth, and all the lessons have not been extracted for the future. Aiso to be noted is the great skill of our artillerymen in organizing tactical maneuvers with artillery batteries, as a result of which guns, and even howitzers, successfully fought the heavy tanks used by the enemy, despite the fact that they did not pierce frontal armor, and were inferior to the tanks in grazing shot range. Thus, the tactics used to fight tanks were developed in the crucible of war, the war that was so rich an arsenal of examples and methods. Practise has confirmed the fact that the greatest successes are achieved only with the skilful correlation of the various branches of arms. Effective examples and methods of correlation, leading to tactical and operational successes, were gradually worked out. This was the way in which methods and examples of AA cover for the troops were ? developed. Recognition of the direct dependence between the selection of enemy air strike areas on the selection of the areas in which his main forces would act and on the operational concentration of own troops opened up a vast scope within which to forestall enemy maneuvers by the use of antiaircraft artillery. Artillery had to be closely coordinated with aviation in carrying out combat assignments. AA artillery forces and fighter aviation were coordinated within the overall system of PVO troop measures when covering ground forces against enemy air strikes. The coordination between artillery and assault aviation was close knit dur- ing the struggle with the enemy's artil enr irqgtOtgr201f0i6665/611f5V's def en"' Approved ror Release 2000/00/03 : IA-Rur tactical dopplpt enemy/WPM/Par offensive itself, furces during our skit0e0fibditob140 ?itiAlIZE08-514?08V8K460021C0090012-60toc t ed no. ue t on under artillery fire. As we know, the artillery together with air offensives, preceded the attack by the ground own first periods. The exporignce gained in the otruggle the artillorymen of b000iged Leningrad had with the onemy'& artillery waa also of tremendous value in the overall advancement of knowledge. It was of decisive importance in this sector. And there is no question that the city wes saved from extensive destruction, and its inhabitants from destruct- ion by the German artillery, by the great service rendered by the Leningrad artillery- men. Artillery density increased at a greater rate in the offensive operation S than was the case in the defensive ones. The tactical densities in the sectors in which the enemy's defenses were breached increased approximately as follows: 1st period of the war: 41 guns/km, 160 Army, 6 December 1941, Moscow area; 35.3 guns/km, 60 Army, 12 May 1942, Khar'kov area; 86.7 guns/km, 80 Army, 27 August 1942, Sinyavin area; 2nd period of the war: 71.5 guns/km, 650 Army, 19 November 1942, in thebattle along the Volga; 133.1 guns/km, 63rd Army, 12 July 1943, Oryol area; 139.0 guns/km, 53rd Army, 3 August 1943, Belgorod area; 380 guns/km, 380 Army, 3 November 1943, Kiyev area. The latter figure is not typical for the large offensive operations during the second period of the war and the first half of 1944. The tactical density at that time increased from 130 to 180 guns/kilometer (including only the artillery which fired during artillery preparation and artillery support for the attack, and excluding 50-mm mortars). The increase in the artillery density resulted in an objective increase in its capacity to fire, and this, in its turn, led to a solution to the problem of simul- taneous, continuous delivery of artillery fire against the enemy defenses along the entire front in the break through sector and along his flanks; The artillery played the part of the main firing striking force in cracking the defenses in the offensive battles and operations. Its role became larger, thee greater its ability to shoot became; the more skilful its use, the greater became the mastery of how to control its fire and maneuver it. The directive letter from the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK), dated 10 January 1942, and better known by the designation of the letter "Concerning the Shock Armies and the Artillery Offensive," was of great importance in the development of combat mastery by the artillerymen. There are reasons to Suppose that the letter came about for a number of reasons, chief among which were: Appruved For Release 2000/00/0 . CIA-RDP05T00075R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT A.,the bt rOvg-a-liiit?IgSil2tititife118909c)PeliMR1131P8670008764/0003000900let6s set for the . offNKRive operations uring the counterattack dm the Moscow area; efforts to understand the causes of the results, and to eliminate them before the Soviet Army went over to' the general offensive. All of the correct, in principle, and extremely important conditions set forth in the letter were not new, but were in fact known ever since the time of the war of 1914-1918: concentration of the maximum possible artillery in the break through sector in order to use its fire power to the maximum; prepare for, and support, the attack with massol fire by artillery prior to the complete breaching of the enemy's defenses; follow the attackers right behind the curtain of fire. All of this re- flected the main idea; continuity of participation of artillery in battle, its close coordination with the infantry, with the tanks, and with aviation, and contin- uity of neutralization of the enemy along the entire accessible depth of the defense. The extraordinary situation pertaining in the initial campaign of the war led Many of the commanders to distrust the Regulations, to shift them around temporarily to correspond with actual conditions, and to attempt to get along, generally speak- ing, without their recommendations. One of the consequences of this was the uniform distribution of forces and fire power along the entire, unusually broad front of the defensive zone and of the establishment of subordinate, unrealistic, missions for their combat capabilities and the time allotted to carry out maneuvers and get ready for combat. A letter on the subject of artillery offensives, written by I. V. Stalin, despit some inaccuracies in military terminology which gaVe rise to a number of puzzling and practical errors among the troops, played a tremendous role. The letter pointed out, precisely, and clearly, the shortcomings which were actually apparent, and pointed ou what had to be done. In the winter of 1942 the letter's contents sounded like some sort of a revelation. One of the main features of the effect the letter had was the moral strength it cemmunicated to those who had to carry on the struggle for the introduction of sensible methods and examples of the combat utilization of artillery. It stirred the initiative of the artillerymt:n and limited those commanders who had not taken into consideration the objective difficulties of the combat operations of artillery units. The letter played a particularly great role for the workers in the artillery industry, and for that industry's supervisors, placing them in the position of work- ers in one of the most important sectors in the struggle to strengthen the country's defenses. The rapid growth of the artillery fire capability was the indirect result of the recognition of the decisive role of the artillery in the offensive. There gradually crystallized among the troops an understanding of the artillery offensive as that means of combat action by the artillery which was :organically link- ed with the actions of the infantry and of the tanks and which was similar in charact- er and methods to the action of the combined-arms battle order. It therefore came to be divided into three periods: Approved For ReiragiC2100-0/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 arhi31-6WdRii2RttlAtter(20016/06/99APIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 artillery support of the attack; artillery support of the battle in the depth of the enemy defenses. Tho purpoop of artillery preparation did not come under review, but its miss- ions and the methods used to carry out those missions changed with the growth in artillery fire capability and the accumulation of experience in the use of artillery. What was learned was how to eliminate the gap between the end of artillery preparation for the attack and the beginning of artillery support of that attack, something which was not successfully done in 1914-1918. The great advantages of density of massed fire over its duration were revealed. But if the enemy was not reliably neutralized soon after he ceased firing (in accord- ance with the norms for the expenditure of projectiles on neutralization), he would resume firing and, even if weakened, still had the capacity to foil an attack in any particular sector. Also revealed was that only simultaneous, and continuous, neutralization of the enemy's order of battle along the entire front of the sector in which a breakthrough was in progress, and throughout its depth, from which the enemy could fire on the at- tackers, would ensure a completely successful attack. An, finally, it became clear that with the increase in artillery density, and the density of its massed firepower, it was possible to reduce the time of firing during the artillery preparation for the attack, primarily because of doing away with the period of "destruction" requiring methodical firing and correction of such fire. Then with a further increase in the artillery firing capabilities it would be possible to shift from alternating concentrations in depth of enemy order of battle to a single, powerful, firing attack lasting for from 15 to 20 minutes. Rushing the enemy during the attack, ringing the attackers with a continuous curtain of fire ahead of the front and on the flanks of the break through sector, with simultaneous neutralization of the depth of the defense, or at least the first defensive position, and of the enemy's artillery, ensuring cracking the defense. This was culminating point in the gr.owth of artillery power. As fire capability increased there developed, in the artillery support of the attack, a process of progressive seizure and simultaneously massed fire power of more and more depth of the enemy's defense. At the end of the war dual rolling bar- ages covered the depth of the entire first defensiV.e, position. Simultaneously, the most important targets in the regimeital and divisional reserve positions were neufi'alized by concentrated fire. This fire, together with the break through of the attackers into the second and three defensive positions, was transformed into a PSO (successive concentration) throughout the depth of the main defense sector. The result of this was a continuing need for the artillery offensive during the third period, because the fire slackened off, fire resistance increased, the attack bogged down temporarily, ch,nging from a continuous ahead movement to an alternating one of maneuver and stike the targets of the attack in turn. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 7fLIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 :reat credit belongs to artiljAu ps9iiikaiasisiwd.;ktuw9A3brorot?ida4.?ray to its corn- mAppripVeldLEPrMileka?Eb40A019?My W'r*LIM5PAM'Idf"fff successPui solutions to the complex problems involved in the growth and in the qualitative development of artillery, in providing artillery with everything needed for battle operations, in the growth in the mastery of the control of maneuvering and firing by .large masses of artillery, aild in its constant combat coordination with the troops. Marshal Voronov headed the artillery continuously from 1937 to 1950, and won universal re- spect for himself. Marshal of Artillery N. D. Yakovlev and General I. I. Volko- trubenko carried on their shoulders the completely superhuman load of the tremendout organizational work done, leading the most important sectors in the work of combat supply for the artillery throughout the war. No small part in developing scientif- ically based tactical and technical requirements for the models of artillery arma- ments was played by the Artillery Committee, headed by V. I. Khokhlov. The closest assistants to N. N. Voronov, Marshal of Artillery M. N. Chistyakov, and other genera and officers, who handled organizational and operational questions, combat training, training and distribution of cadres, did quite a bit of work on the matter of the overall development of Soviet artillery. Exceptionally great was the role played by the artillery commanders of Fronts and Armies in organizing maneuvers and the totally crushing fire of large masses Of artillery, in organizing and carrying out the combat and operational coordination between artillery and infantry, tanks, aviation, and engineering troops. The widely known artillery commanders in the fronts during the war period generals V. I. Kazakov, N. S. Fomin, G. F. Odintsov, M. I. Nedelin, N. M. Khlebnikov, M. M. Barsukc G. S. Kariofilli - grew into important combat commanders during the war, as did Army artillery commanders, generals P. S. Semenov and, N. N. Semenov, V. S. Korobchenko, M. S. Mikhalkin, V. M. Likhachev, P. I. Kosenko, G. V. Godin, corps, battalion, and brigade artillery commanders N. V. Ignatov, L. I. Kozhukhov, P. M. Koroltkov, N. F. Salichko, N. N. Zhdanov, A. I. Ratov, A. F. Pavlov? N. D. Chevola, and many others. The staffs were the direct organizers of maneuvering and firing, carrying out the idea of the commander's concept and the operations of command by fronts and by.artil ery of fronts. Talented generals, such as G. S. Nadysev, S. B. Sofronin, G. M. Brus ser, G. D. Barsukov, and others, should be mentioned. We lost many of our most prominent artillery men during the war, the Deputy Commander of Artillery of the Soviet Army, General V. G. Kornilov-Drugov, the Deputy Chief of the GAU (the Main Artillery Directorate), K. R. Myshkov, Front artillery ,commanders A. K. Sivkov, P. M. Belov, and many army, corps, and battalion artillery commanders, as well as large and small artillery unit commanders. We remember them, and we bow our heads to their courage, spirit, and heroism. . Artillery commanders, enriched by the war experience, continue the noble work or-strengthening the might of present day artillery and missile troops under condit- ions prevailing today. Among them are the former Commander of Artillery, 2nd Shock Army, K. P. Kazakov, who gained fame around Leningrad and Narva, and in the battles on the fields of what used to be East Prussia, the former artillery battalion comman( er I. F. San'ko, the former Front Deputy Artillery Commander, and then Commander, Guards Mortar Units, General P. N. Kuleshov, former regimental artillery commander M. I. Sobolev, and others. They not only are guardians of the glorious,traditions ai combat experience of artillery in the Great Patriotic War, but are also the teachers Pcf4E191gRelease 2000/08/09 : CIAADP85T00875R000300090019-6 of young c ommand cadres, solxWoicayt?oc.4411)AeAri668.000110 1?3,6-ther grow tickiiiinMCInfEfrtRedieW AV6W/Y?"ffsortraner Orl-M arT:=ry, and n maintaining them in a constantly high state of ccabat readiness to protect the honor, freedom, and independence of the soqialist notherland. Tho Soviet/government ha a placed a high value on the combat deeds of ,Soviet artillery during the years of the Great Patriotic War and, in 1944, established a national holiday - Artillery Day. 137 of the most outstanding artillery units were awarded the Guards honorary title. 1 Several hundred artillery units were awarded orders of the Soviet Union, and of these 14 were so awarded five times, while the 300 and 400 Gun Brigades won the honor 6 times. One of the combat distinctions during the war was the confer- ring of the name of a particular city on the unit which distinguished, itself the most in the freeing of that city. These honorary designations were awarded to artillery units, large and small, 1,186 times. The first awards of the Order of the Patriotic War, established in 1942, went to the artillerymen who beat back the counter attacks of two enemy tank divisions around Khar'kov. The batteries, ,the troops who were first awarded this Order de- stroyed and put out of action many tanks, fighting to the last man, to the last shell. Artillerymen won almost 1,200,000 orders and medals during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The most heroic deeds were noted by the awarding of the highest. military honor, Hero of the Soviet Union. Some 1,800 artillerymen were so honored. There is no question that there are many deeds, particularly deeds done in the defensive battles; which have still not come to light, and the names of the heroes are unknown.. We know only that all of the artillery sub-units and units foughf the enemy to the last man, barring the way to the insolent invader, sacrificing them- selves because they loved their Motherland. The glory of our Army, the defender of the honor, freedom, and independence of the Motherland, will never cease to be talked about. And the deeds of the artillery- men, and of the workers in the artillery industry, occupy an merited place in this historic victory. 1. This figure does not include those units which received this designation when they were formed (the Guards Mortar Units, for example). Approved For Release 2000/08/014: CIA-RDP85TOOMAWA0090019-6 Approved For Release 2MORptivgifrRpwww00300090019-6 CPYRGHT by Col V. mono:ov Investigation of the laws of wars and armed conflict represents a most important task of Soviet military science, for true science begins where a description of facts is supplemented and replaced by the discovery of internal, law-governed relationships. In recent years alone, a number of books have been published which consider individual facets of this great problem and which have tremen- dous practical significance. They include the following works o sovethkoLvoyennoy nauke On Soviet Military Science), authored by Prof N. V. Pukhovekiy and published in 1959 Voprosy dialektiki v voyennom dele, Problems of Dialectics in Military Affairsi: authored by I. A. Grudinin and published in 1960; Ob osnovhazkh zakonakh kboda 1. iskhoda sovremennoy vozhy '21stsic Laws of the Course and Outcome of Modern War), authored by P. I. Trifonenkov and published in 1962; Neobkhodimost' sluchaynost' v nynt (Necessity and Chance in War), authored by S. A. Tyushkevich and pdblished in 1962; Dialektika i vaennaya nauka (Dialec- tics and Military Science), authored by S. I. Tyushkevich and pub- lished in 1962; Dialektika I. voyennaya nauka (Dialectics and Military Science), authored by S. I. Krupnov and published in 1963; 0212y1tEllsy voyennoz_nauke (On Soviet Military Science), second edition published in 1964; 0 voyenno-teoreticheskom nasiediy V. I. Lenina (The Military- Theoretical Legacy of V. I. Lenin), published in 1964; Marksism-Lenin- ism o voynehi armiyi (Marxism. Leainism on War and the Arm.5775Mished 171-1.762; Voyennaya strategiya (Military Strategy), the second edition published in 1963; and others which are completely or partially devoted to the investigation of the laws of modern war. Attention to this problem is completely natural. The military dan- ger is not eliminated as long as imperialism exists, and our military cadres are facing the need to deeply penetrate the nature of a possible war in order to ensure the best execution of the task of strengthening the defense capability of the country and the most rapid defeat of the imperialist aggressors were they to unleash war Much has been done in the investigation of the laws of war and armed combat But nevertheless, the problem cannot be considered solved since, for a number of problems, there are different viewpoints which contradict each other at times.. Least investigated remains the methodological side of the problem and this leads to diverse interpre- tations of individual problems and, at times, engenders an incorrect approach to their solution. Up to now, the relation of the objective and the subjective in military affairs, the laws of war and armed combat, and the relationship of the laws of war and principles of military art have not been completely clear. 75 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 V mo The recently published work bz.1.0',QM..40=W444ElvicrwrstAitcavig-6 esshappWledffiotaekbalseANNWA . bt1HglitfiffeanTWorieworlo which are available in that it focuses primary attention on methodolog- ical problems and reveals the most important principles of approaching the solution of a problem Relying on the results of investigations achieved in Soviet military theory, the author "strived to show the methodology of recognizing the laws and noting their characteristic fea- tures and peculiarities (page 4) Characteristic of the entire book is a profound theoretical approach supported by convincing illustrations from the history of wars and military' art. The author succeeded in developing a harmonious and to a great degree original system of view- points on the laws of armed conflict. Considering this problem historically, M. V. POPOV evaluates the attempts of representatives of bourgeois military science to find a way to understand the laws of war, and he analyzes the views of individual modern bourgeois ideologies. The book draws the correct conclusion that bourgeois military theoreticians, subconsciously sensing the operation of the objective laws of armed conflict, try to explain their nature and to understand their significance for the course and outcome of war. But they are not capable of doing this because of their class positions and the fallaciousness of their methodology. In solving problems of the laws of war, the bourgeois ideologists switch from voluntarism to fat- alism. Understanding the laws of war is possible only on the basis of dia- lectical-materialistic methodology, the author discloses the tremendous significance of the statements by V. I.. Lenin on the laws of war and armed conflict and his profound analysis of the operation of these laws under conditions of war at the start of the 20th century (page 27). TheApook examines the basic stages in the development of the views of Soviet military theoreticians on the laws of war and armed conflict. The author properly stresses that the overcoming of Stalin's cult of the personality opened a broad expanse for the development of Soviet military science and for creative discussion in the press of many impor- tant military-theoretical problems, including the laws of war The central point in the work is occupied by the second and third chapters which present the author's view on the system of laws of armed conflict and investigate various groups of these laws. We will dwell on the basic features of the contents of the chapters which we have men- tioned. The author absolutely correctly considers the initial theoretical prerequisites for understanding the' laws of war and armed conflict to be first, the dialectical-materialistic concept of law and principles and M. V. Popov, Zushnost'zakonov vooruzhennoy Laws AppramectEfitriggilagies?99P/{)?pg -K DO 104 iN4405indi06311?-6 A CPYRGHT 3 D RAWrrthY Rogiat2600/0111691'019VROP85T008i75R000300090049?81.1 phe n - nomeno. . or does the treatment givee to these propositions cause doubts. It is uelieved, however, that the author devoted unjustifiedly little attention to one more theoretical prerequisite which can be placed among the first. We have in mind the Marxist solution of the problem of the relationship of subjective and objective phenomena in social devel- opment The author carried a more or less detailed examination of this problem over to the concluding chapter of the book Perhaps this was the reason for the inadequate treatment of .che objective nature of the laws of war which operate on the basis of conditions created to, a consid- erable degree by people in the process of their practical activity Subjective and Objective categories in dialectical materialistic philosophy serve to explain the relationship between the conscious, pur- poseful activity of people on the one hand and the historical process as it takes. shape on the other. By subject in history we understand the consciousness and the will of people, considered in all the wealth- of their social relations, people combined in classes, parties, nations, and making history with their activity. V. I. Lenin pointed out that an objectively necessary chain of events of social life is made up of the actions of people -- subjects of history:" ... all history is made up namely of the actions of personalities who undoubtedly consider themselves leaders (Complete Collected Works, Vol 1, page 159). Each person steps forth as a subject in relation with the world which surrounds him and this also means with respect to other people each class is a subject, with respect to its existence, etc. The subjective and objective in history are inseparably related to each other. The consciousness and will of 'people reflect their being and2 in the final analysis, are determined by objective conditions. At the same time the consciousness and will of people subjects ,of history perform their practical activity on the objective course of history, trans- forming the surrounding world in the interests of man. Purposeful socio- historic practice represents the unity of the subjective and objective, and their interrelations and interchangeability. The dialectics of the subjective and the objective has great signif- icance for an analysis of the laws Df war and armed conflict. It provides the opportunity to clarify how the purposeful practical activity of people under conditions of war leads to the emergence of objective, essential, stable ties -- the laws of war and armed conflict The dialectics of the subjective and the objective leads to an understanding of the tremendous role of command personnel, their organizational capabilities, knowledge, experience and will in the attainment of victory. 08 09 : CIA-RD085T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT The sqtt.ectialsei!..uttarniiiSmilb-raIL C; abP850)01875R T.31 0009001SA as 414.1.Cae?tre?E(011fft'A 41. 'flose objective tondo nc i es which operate Ln the process of war. Owing to this, the objective relations in war may stand out as the relationships between the goal which is consciously advanced and the means for its achievement, especially as both the goal and the means have a certain objective basis This means that the law of war and armed conflict can be connected with one pole being the con- sciousness and the will of the people and their practical activity; this does not deprive the law of its objective character Such, for example, is the law of the dependence of the course and outcome of war on the relationship of moral and political forces and the capabilities of the combatant sides. The laws of war and armed conflict are related to each other in the closest manner and represent a definite sysm. The author of the book believes that a system of the laws of war includes three groups of essen- tial ties and relationships. The first group of laws expresses the "dependence of the course and outcome of war on the economics of the war- ring powers, their socio-political system, the political-moral state of the Tie-,11,ttion and the arm, the level of development of science, and the quantity and quality of armaments" (page 4)4). The second group of laws of war expresses the "dependence of the means and forms of armed coralict on the political content of the war, on the properties of the weapons and combat equipment, means of communications and signals, ter- rain, time of year, etc." Gege 45). Finally, the third group of laws includes the internal laws of armed conflict concerning operations on strategic, operational, and tactical Scales. In our opinion, this classification of the laws of war and armed conflict is completely acceptable basically. However, it Is havdly cor- rect to assert, as the author does, that the second group of laws of war constitutes the external relation of armed conflict with those con- ditions under which war proceeds. Neither the political content of war nor, what is more, weapons and quality of personnel should be considered only as conditions of war -- these are its integral internal aspects. With respect to the third p:roup of laws, they are the laws of the course and outcome of military operations and differ from the laws of the course and outcome primarily according to the scale of phenomena which they embrace and this is also the basis of their qualitative uniqueness. The difference between the laws of war and the laws of armed con- flict which are presented in the book remains insufficiently clear for the reader. Pointing out that there is no absolute boundary between these laws, the author notes "Any law of war is more or less a law of armed conflict and every law of armed conflict is more or less a law of war as a whole" (Page )45 , This proposition for which there is no explanation, cannot be considered satisfactory when the discussion con- cerns objective laws which either operate in a certain region or do not A roved For Release 2000/08/09 :ISIA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT ApprevetbFor-Releasg20001081096WoRreftg99?7?IMMPAR Olf& exp rens- ion which is presented engenders an incorrect impresaion of some "partial" or incomplete operation of one or another law. The book examines in detatl the lave which the author has relegated to the second and third groups and, flret or all, the relationship of the political content and armed violence in war. Disclosed in this rela- tionship is the essence of war which cannot be unilaterally reduced either to politico or to violence. "In a Lentniet definition of war," writes the author, "forming a dialectic unity are t?se two semantic parts which cor- respond to the two most Important facet o of the nature of war: the first -- war se a continuation of politics, ars, the seceea -- war is armed violence. As a continuation of politics, any war has its political content and as violence, war is armed conflict" (Page )7). These thoughte of the author appear to us to be absolutely correct. The specifics of war -- armed conflict -- cannot be considered as something foreign with respect to it essence. The essence of war is many-faceted and this found its expression in the Leninist definition of war. The book examines the decisive significance of the political content of wars to explain their character. Depending upon their political goals, wars are divided into jest and unjust, progreesive and reactionary. In addition to that which was said by the author on this question, one must stress the unity of the Marxist evaluation of wars from the point of .view of their justification and progressiveness. Just wars cannot be con- ducted in the name of reactionary goals, and reactionary wars cannot be just. At the basis of an ethical evaluation of wars, Marxism places the conformity or nonconformity of their goals with the interests of the lib- eration struggle of the laboring masses, with the interests of the pro- gressive development of society. "In history", wrote V. I. Lenin, "there have repeatedly been wars which, despite all the horrors, beastiality, misfortune, and torture inevitably connected with any war, were progress- ive, i.e., they were of benefit to the development of mankind, helping to destroy especially harmful and reactionary institutions ..." (Complete Collected Works, Volume 26, page ill). Of course, the progressiveness of various just wars is relative. Even toe most just war leads to a greater or lesser degree to the destruction of productive forces of society, the development of which is the most profound criterion of progress. It is especially important to have this in mind in modern conditions where imperialism is threatening humonity with nuclear war. War with the employment of nuclear weapons can undermine the very foundations for the existence of human society and inflict tremendous damage to its progress- ive development. Therefore, the most important requirement for progress in our time is the prevention of a new world war. Oaritalism, as the main obstacle on the way to the progressive development. Therefore, the most important requirement for progress in our time is the prevention of a new world war. Capitalism, as the main obstacle on the wa to the I ? ? a ? - liTITatiTg/iteNlf 61 /kW ri r4111111111F.1111Mkniii????,...-.'- the progressive development of human societ,y, must and should he elimi- nated by the revolutionary atuggle of tht popelar manees under condi- tionn of peaceful coexistence of states with different nocial systems -- world war is nut necensary for this. But if the imperialists nucceed in unleashing a world war it will consequently be a juet war on the part of the eociallst countries who are protecting the most progressive social system -- socialism, and who are protecting the interents of the workers of the entire world. If a nuclear war become a Cant despite the will of the people, the decisive conditions for preserving the achievements of progress and for further development will be the most rapid defeat of the aggresoor with the leaat los :es for mankind. The essential relation between the political content and armed violence in war represents, in the author's opinion, the baeic law of war which is formulated in the following manner " ... the political content of a war has a decieive effect on the general nature of armed conflict, on the methods and forms of its .conduct, and on the employ- ment of one or another type of armament" (page 53). The author pro- ceeds on the basin that a basic law, in contrast to other laws, does not express any aspects or features of the essence, but the essence itself, and, consequently in a decisive manner, affects all aspects and proc- esses of the development of a given field of nature or social life. The dependence of armed violence in war on its political content, in the opinion of the author, eatiefiea these requirements to the great- est degree. The operation of a given law permeates all processes of armed conflict from the largest strategic operations to the actions of an individual soldier. "This law," writes the author of the book, "represents the pivot around which the operation of other laws of war and armed conflict develops" (page 54). Attempts have been made repeat- edly in our press and in the vorks of various authors to cormulate a basic law of war. M. V. Popov ..ent further than his predecessors in this problem and found, as is thought, a more correct path to its solution. He does not try to include in the basic law all or nearly all the determining relationships of war and, what is more no attempt is made to provide an exhaustive formula for the achievement of vic- tory in the basic law. The author takes one decisive element and establishes its rela- tion to other aspects of war and armed conflict. Such an approach must be recognized as correct, But neverthelese, the solution to the problem of a basic law of war which is provided in ,the book appar- ently requires refinement. The question inevitably arises for the reader: is the relationship of the political content of war and armed violence in it the only decisivc relationship determining all the remaining aspects of war and armed conflict? In this, do we not lone sight of the dependence of war and the forms an. 10, ? ? ? SIII I; I P ; II; III III II op") CPYRGHT CPYRG HT Amcor q iverpcmclvitmut9 F which un v..UribdtliirrU,t8rittibriKtrUleU; Uo3rOUt Uhe e1/81890-nbc0 of war will nos bn eomplotely adeqoate. War cannot be comprehensively understood witnout conaideration of the deciofvo eifect on its development of the concrete forms not only of the political content but also of euth factors as weapons and the qual- ity of pereonnel. And theae factors are very closely related to the method of prodnction and to /he level of development of productive forces and the nature of the social. syttem. Perhapnv therefore, one should apeak not of one tut at least of two basis lawn of war which express the different aspects. of its essence. Of great. interest to the .reader is the third chapter which examines the laws of armed confliet ae an integrated, two-sided process of combat operation of troopa. Es, eased here are many interesting although, in individual caeca, debatable propoaitiona. The author shows that the course and outcome of armed conflicts depend a on a whole series of inter- nal essential relationships which arise in the course of military. opera. tion, "Wary" writes. M. V. Popov? "ueually represents a unity of several strategic' campaigns which conaiet of a large number of operations which, in turn, break down into a tremendous number of engagements and battles. And each battle, operation, and campaign has certain limits in time and space which stand oat in known limita as an independent process" (page 70). The author alao sees in the relaSiore independence of the processes of armed conflict the cbjeetivs beats for the existence of its special laws. However, without dwelling on thia, one should have disclosed the qualita- tive uniqueness of the processes of armed conflict at its various scales and its difference from war aa a whole. The author formulates fos17 laws of armed conflict (1) "The depen- dence of the course and outcome of an engagement (operation) on the cor- relation of combat power' of those armed forces Vnich take direct part in it ..." (page 77); (2) The essential dependence of the course and out.s come of any engagement, battle, and operation on the concentration of the main efforts of the troops of the oppoaing sides in the decisive direction..." (page 81); (3) "Military operasiona on an operational-tactical scale from force of necessity are subordinated to the interests of stsategy which, in turn, depends on the results of the individual engagements in battles" (page 92); (4) In any engagement, battle, or operation, the advantage is obtained by the one of the opposing sides which manues to forestall the ? enemy in deploying his troops in combat formation and operational forma- tions and forestalling hem in the initiation of active combat operations" (page 97). All the aforementioned principles are factually treated in a lively. and interesting manner. 'in our opinion, the most important is the first of the laws. It is closely related to the law of the dependence of the roved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RbP85T00875R000300090019-6 m . lik-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 co0APPRiaeguFaringethilael.2mo 9urb n tie matinee of the military forces of the warring sidee but it has its own epecificationa since it expresses the essential relation of a completely diiferent eale and different con- tent (the combat power of' the troops which are directly' participating in the battle is not identieal with the military force of the combatant sides). It seems to ua that the matter of the second relatiOnablp is some- what different. V. I. Lenin, as is known, called the. requirement to have an overwhelming balance of forces at the decisive point at the decisive moment a "law" for military auccesses," he placed the word law in quotation marks (Complete Clollected Works, Volume 140, page 6), thereby' stressing a certain conditionality in use of this concept in a given case. "The law of combat success is nothing more than in indis- putable law of practical activity by following which one can achieve success. In other words, it ie a scientiSically based prinriple of military art. Does there lie at the basis of the:, principle a certain objective tie which determines the course of military operations?' Yes, there undoubtedly is such a tie. It consists of the fact that the course and outcome of a battle, engagement, and operation depends not only on the relationship of the combat power of the sides in general but, first of all, on the relationship of forces of the videe on the decisive directions. An objective character is also had tinl!. the dependence of success of military operations on an entire front or sector of the front on the success on the decisive sectors. These relationships, taken in the aggregate, have all the indicators of a law of armed conflict. Essentially, the fourth law is also formulated as a principle of military art . The ability to forestall the enemy in the deployment of combat formations and operational formations and when necessary, also at the start of combat operations -- is a rule of practical activity of the military commander and the troops subordinate to him. Lying at the basis of this rule Is the objective relationship in accoedance with which the course and outcome of an engagement or an operation depend on the degree of readiness of the troops of the opposing sides for active operations. Combat power of the troops may be completely manifested only under conditions where they adopt combat formationo or a specific operational formation and with the corresponding moral-political and psy- chological preparedness of the pereonnel. Thus, in investigating the laws of armed conflict, it is necessary persistently to distinguish the objective laws and principles of mili- tary art. The extremely fruitful idea of euch a distinction was first developed, by the way, in the other works of M. V. ropove in this book, this problem is examined in the last, fousth chapter carrying the title "The Relationship of Laws and the Conscious Activity of People in Armed Conflict". The author absolutely correctly considers the principles of military art as the "most general, basic, and guiding ideas on the method Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : C3A-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 CPYRGHT CPYRG Ari0r09@tiblIbrMlien2000/08/09Fx CobA-RDPKIM7?F9pqn,p104001.9 6 uuaces in armed conflict" (page 122). In contrast to objective lawe, principles always remain within the sphere of conscioueness or people, having an objective besets in the laws of war and armed eonflict. These laws by themselves do not provide practical recommendations and instructions for the activity of people. The formulation of various laws states a certain objective relationship and a necessary, existing, and repeated dependence of some processes on others. On the basis of knowledge of the, natnral ties of' war and military affairs, people work out principles of military art which directly point to the necessity for a certain activity to achieve an assigned goal. "A fundamental difference of any principle of military art from a law of military science," writes M. V. Popov, "iis that the principle is not only a concept which states the presence of a certain essential tie in the phenomena of armed conflict and which expresses its basic content, but is also an idea, conclusion, or recommendation for the methods of combat operations of troops" (page 125). Scientifically based principles of military art, being a subjective reflection of objective necessIty, stand out as obligatory norms in the operations of a military chief. At the same time, principles do not paralyze the freedom of his creativity and initiative since they only indicate the general direction of practical activity. The book discloses the historical nature of the principles of mil- itary art. It consists first of all of the fact that principles arose simultaneously with soldiers and will cease their existence together with them. With s change in weaoibsm cinvat equipment, and qualities of personnel, some principles are replaced by others and the content of those principles which retain their significance for the duration of a long period of time is eesentially changed. The author shows that such principles as coordination, concentration, and economy of force retain their significance in a nuclear war, too, but their content will be dif- ferent. In a short epilogue which closes the book, the concept is expressed that under modern conditions, for the Soviet Armed Forces, special and great sienificance is had by the explanation of specific laws and law- governed elements of armed combat with the employment of nuclear wea- pons. The discussion is not only concerning the laws which are exam- ined in the book Othe specifics of their appearance in nuclear war is shown by the author as he presents his material), but also of the laws and law-governed elements of combat operations at strategic, operational and tactical scales and of the specific law-governed elements of opeTa- tion of one or another combat arm in various types of battle. :86IA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6 P6P0APParRiteaA020010i08/0SEICAL4REWSMOMRCI@ONNNUM to loN Tor and inveetigate the law-governed elements of individual facets and fields of military affairs. "It would be incorrect," it says in the book, "to cearch for in a preconceived manner, the peculiar laws in each specific type of combat operations of troops, for example, in an offen- sive defensive, in forcing water obetacles, in airborne operatione, in combat operations at night, in a forest, or in meuntatn terrain, Nor should one refrain ahead of time from assuming their existence in these phenomena of armed conflict. Only a ocientific inveetigation can pro- vide the answer" (page 129). The author does not support these propositions with opeeific Howaver? the very posing of the problem is completely proper on the grounds that regular ties and relationships Should he tnecetigated in various facets and phenomena of armed conflict. Recognizetion of the qualitatively epeciel field of strategy, operational art, and tactics leads to a recognition of the special natural laws for each of thee fields. Dialectical-materialistic methodology proceeds from the fact that natural ties of reality are infinitely varied and there arc no limits to their perception by man. It is only necelesary to keep in mind that a law is a form of generality and, eonsequently, every nat- ural tie should not be raised to the rank of law. The perception of the natural ties of war and armed conflict is not a goal in itself. It should be the basis of expedient activity of command cadres in the building of the armed forces and the leader- ship of military operations. The book stresses that knowledge of the laws and regularities of armed conflict permit the commander clearly to see the internal dynamics and the moving forces of the development of military operations. "Instead of the apparent chaos of e count- less number of large and small events of armed conflict, there stands before him (the commander -- Editor) an aggregate of processes of var- eannwsus swan bus scales of military troop operations which are causatively condi- tioned and necessarily connected with each other" (page 130)" An understanding of the laws of armed conflict is especially impor- tant under modern conditions in anticipation of a possible nuclear war; it Is capable of making up, to a known degree, for the deficiencies or absence of experience in the conduct of combat operations. Such are the basic problems raised in the book "The Essence of Laws of Armed Conflict." Their brief analysis permits drawing the con- clusion that this book represents original research on the important methodological problems of Soviet military science which represents a step forward in comparison with the works which are presently available In this field. The presence of a number of new propositions which have been set forth in the book bespeaks the bold and creative approach of the author to the solution of the problem and its high general oved For Release 2000/08/09 : VA-RDP85T00875R000300090019-6tPYRGHT CPYRGHT 09 ? CIA-RDP85100875R000300090019-6 ARPNVO; Fe,4@fPe PcRine -s'aia wit n conr iaence that the work of M.V. Popov 14111 cause great interest among military readers and will be of great value to the officers in the Soviet Armed Forces in their creative mastery of modern military theory. roved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA5RDP85T00875R000300090019-6