CEASE-FIRE DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000700010048-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: June 15, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cease-Fire Developments
Secret
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15 June 1973
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Cease-Fire Developments
15 .June 1.9
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CONTENTS
LAOS 4
Milit.u?y Situation
Hanoi's Excuse for Staying.
Some Fighting Still Going On
Concern for Chuong Thien
PUG Lowering Sights
CPONIUODIA
Military ;ituatinn
SOUTH VIF TNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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SOUTH V11-1TNAM
oma P iLhc i n Goo p Ott
Early fragmentary reporting, indicates that
fighting han continued in some areas of South Viet-
nam since the beginning of the "now" cease-fire, most
notably in Kontum Province in the highlands and
Chuong Thion in the delta. It is not yet clear
? whether this is now action or a spillover from earlier
activity. Saigon is claiming numerous Communist vio-
lations, but is also continuing several "clearing"
operations.
Initial reaction from South Vietnamese officials
was predictable. Most are skeptical of Communist in-
tentions to abide by the agreement. The Binh Thuan
Province chief for example, said the cease-fire con-
ditions, including the reversion to the January posi-
tions, are "confusir.g," adeing that "in Vietnam, we
say that if you put the frog in the dish, he jumps
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Conearn for Chuong Thion
South Vietnam's regional commander in the delta,
General Nghi, is reinforcing his troops in Chuong
Thi,an Province, where Communist forces are a growing
threat. He is reported to have ordered each of the
other delta provinces to detail at bast one ter-
ritorial force battalion to Chuong Tien to prevent
the Communists from seizing the entire province.
One province, Phong Dinh, has already sent four bat-
talions. During the past few weeks, the government
dispatched three Ranger battalions, a regiment of
the 9th Division, and reportedly Marines from the
Saigon area to Chuong Thien. The province has been
the responsibility of the 21st Division, which re-
cently underwent a change of commanders intended to
make it more effective.
Arrayed against government forces in Chuonc,
Thien are four North Vietnamese infantry regiments,
two artillery battalions, two sapper battalions,
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and about 2 , 000 local force troops and guerrillas.
The Communintri have been gradually expanding their
holdings in Chuong~j Thien and not. control, most of
the province outside of the provincial capital and
the district headr]uartern. Saigon han been slow
to react to the increasing threat in this utratecti*-
cally located province. The reinforcements may
arrive too late to regain many areas that have fallen
under Commu?iint control but may inhibit, further
cursionn.
-PR' Gawinn'i;z .i jI:trs 25X1
The 1'RG has resigned itself to a gradual process 25X1
of normalizing relations with the Saigon government.
Madame Phan Thi Minh, a PRG delegate to the bilateral
talks claimed in a recent conversation
that the PRG had "td some extent
modified its original goal of politically dominating
the South." She attributed thr PRG's reassessment to
its own growing maturity and advice from Hanoi. She
asserted that under the current circumstances the PRG
hoped only to achieve "simple recognition" of its legal
existence and proportional representation in a future
government.
Madame Minh's comments are probably tailored to
some extent to the exile audience. The PRG, as well
as Hanoi, has gone to some lengths recently to put a
moderate and reasonable face on its goals and policies-
particularly in discussions with potential "third force"
members in Paris. There is little doubt, however, that
the hard realities of the current political and military
situation in the South have indeed comp^_lled the PRG
to downgrade its hopes for any rapid or complete
nation of the South.
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CAMBODIA
Tho Nil i tar ~itua1;io11
There was little significant activity in the
Route 4 arec+ west of Phnom Penh on 16 Juno as gov-
ernment forces rested in preparation for a now at-
tempt to clear the highway., The Khmer Communists,
meanwhile, are still carrying out light harassing
attacks against government positions along Routes
2 and 3 southwest of the capital. Farther south
along Route 2, government forces attempted to re-
take a small outpost a few miles south of Takeo
on 14 Juno, but were repulsed? Communist forces
subsequently launched several attacks against gov-
ernment defensive positions around the city. They
continued to harass government troops around Banam
and Neak Lucng, Southeast of Phrcm Penh.
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The level of military activ3 ty continues to
decline with only 15 minor incidents reported this
weak. Mont action was in the major rice growing
area south of Muong Phalane in the central panhandle.
ilanoi Ia Crr.- ua J'2r ,;_f (xui>i?
A Lao Communist delegation in Hanoi on 14 June
signed an agreement to continua "non-refund aid from
the North Vietnamese government to Laos." According
to Radio Hanoi, the agreement provides for "surveys
and constzuction of semi-durable projects servicing
the finance and food branch." Last month another
Pathet Lao delegation in Hanoi sign-' an "assist
ance" agreement for transport, roar;,, and bridge con-
struction.
These agreements may be designed in part to pro-
vide a cloak of legitimacy for a diminished North
Vietnamese presence in Laos.
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