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May 14, 1973
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~ rr: {a-.'1 px 'i-. ,.x , q.a' :~r?P i ~ P.' .?s ~ x '3) 3P '~i5 ~~ 1A, 1, ~.i? f , ~~ B9 v ~9, ,~ l A ' 1 q /V I p ed For ea 00110811A CIAPPP ?P85T00875R0064100 2 ' k N L' ' 1, ~ - K Approved For Release 2001/98/14' CIA . -RDP85T00875R000700020 7-2 1 j No 1'nrrrgn Diurm Chinese Affairs 14 May 1973 No. 2012/73 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 No Ulrsr-n el hruuil/iMc?Agruunll Vu. OW11. (.imrrullcd Ul.l.lrni `1h1s rluculnarlt conlain5 infottiiitiorl ,1ffrc1inq thu rlnliollill cillfens' 'A the U litncl Stiito5, within thr, Inunnillg of I itIt 18, Sections /93 lillci i94, of the US Code, 115 i1111OI1(II;(I, Its tliulsInis,lon of I(`w'liltion of its COlltoot5 to of rucnipt by ill) uoiluthoriiucl pr.rson it. prohibited by li1w, PREPARED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE NATIONAI. SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF FURTHER DISSEMINATION 01: INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED Ww'..g Norco $6.0111.4 I' .IUponc6 Say-too end M411.odc 1-61.601 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001 /08/ y CZIJq f P85T00875R000700020007-2 Chinese Affairs This publication hris been prepared by the China branches of the Far East Division of the Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the Individupl articles. (, ON '1!sNTS 14 May 1973 Page Debating the Army's Politle:aI Role I (ere They Come . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Using Foreign Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ('eking Cautions Restraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 "I)ow:rto-thc-C'ountrysikle" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A Union of Crime iF ighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 ('hies ('ashes in on !-long Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A Game Plan for the Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I DistaIT Uishutr 14 1 oreign Affairs Notes I S ('IIRONOLOGY 17 Approved For Release 2001/08;ECRET P85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 S.'',( ;1`.'',''.1 Whaling the Army's Political Role 25X1A9a Last month the "Good I?igliI ('onrprmy of Nankint! Road" an ;army garristm writ stational in Shanghai celchrated Its tenltr anniversary as if national model. and N('NA issued two widely different accuurrls of the unit's activities over the past ten years. The contrasting views suggest that the central leadership is still 1101 agreed on the Future political role of the armed I'ol-ces. The (loon Fight ('onnpany achieved its near-legendary reputation in the early 1960s because of the manner In which its members practiced personal economy switching lights off'. nrenuling clothes, growing their on vegetables, and repairing their own equipment- thereby reducing maintenance costs and strengthening the army's relations with the people. 'T'hese attributes were highlighted in a Peking NCNA broadcast on 2.1 April from Nanking, The broadcast nr;td~ no mention of the unit's activities during the Cultural Revolution, when armed farces personnel were deeply involved in a wide range of political and civic dirties. This omission probably reflects the view of' moderate leaders, both civilian and military, that the armed forces should keep a low pi-file, avoid antagonizing the local population and stay out of politics. A second l'ekitr,t N('NA broadcast, issued on 20 April and datclinal Shanghai, took another tack, focusing almost exclusively on the Good Eight's performance during the Cultural Revolution. In language that has not been heard for ninny months, it noted that the company supported the Red Guards, def'e'nded the "newborn Red power" of the Shanghai municipal revolutionary committee, "sup- ported the Icft" in Shanghai industries, and took control of 85 primary and middle schools. The broadcast asserted that the Good Eight had refuted those who belittled its involvement in civil alTairs and called for connpany pe'' onnel "to plunge more than ever into the heat of struggle." 't'his treatment probably represents the views of' elements within the leadership hierarchy, including some within the military high command itself', that large-scale involvennen' of the armed forces in political and civil affairs is not only necessary but an historic and noble mission. This theme was prominent during the Cultural Revolution, but it became less so after the program to rebuild the civilian party apparatus began in 1970-71. It was muted after the demise of Lin Piao in late 1971, and by early 1973 all references to life army's support-the-lel't" mission had ceased. The contrasting treatment of' the Good Eight Company suggests that friction can be found within the powerful Nanking Military Region in East China. Nanking is the base of Ilsu Shill-yu, the conservative military region commander, and the NCNA broadcast datelined Nanking undoubtedly is lisu's viewpoint. The broadcast datelined Shanghai may indicate the influence of' Ilsu's radical adversary, Chang Chum-chino, who is first political commissar of' the Nanking Military Region and chairman of'Shanghai's "newborn" revolutionary committee. (CONFIDENTIAL) 14 May 1973 Chinese A&irs Page 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 IS J?C;R I~;'I., Nino Chinese umlerltratluates arrived in Canada late last month to study l nglish at Carleton University in Ottawa. These are the first Chinese to enroll I'm l'ornral study abroad since late I966 when all ('hhmse students were recalled Iur the Cultural Revolution, Their arrival is not surprising. Chinese diplomats have spent the past year trying to negotiate scientific, cultural, and educution,tl exchange agree- ments with a ntunber of countrie Canada, UK, US, and Japan. Chinese business- nten and scientists have been hinting broadly that educational and ot.her exchanges were imtttincnl. The number of Chinese students sent abroad before the Cultural Revolution was not great. During the 1950s, over 7,000 went to the Soviet Union to study science and engineering=-with 4,600 receiving degrees (including 1,750 Kandid,ils, the Soviet equivalent of the PlI.I).). With the cooling of' Sino-Soviet relations, I'm students were sent to the USSR alter 1900. More than 1, l 00 Chinese scientists and engineers were educated in the non-Communist world (including almost 700 to the doctoral level) before 1900. Although these numbers are small, the 2,500 scientists and engineers educated abroad to the doctoral level constitute approximately hall' of those at that level in China today. They a re so valuable that many wear two hats-as researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences institutes and as professors at nearby universities. Chinese universities reopened in 1970, but the resumption of' foreign training was delayed in part because Chinese schools were not yet ready to accept foreign studc,tts. The Cultural Revolution had increased pride in China's owrt capabilities and achievements, and the Chinese could not accept training abroad without having foreign trair:ccs in China to assuage that pride. Chinese universities are now suf'- ficiently improved so that at least token exchanges can take place. Three foreign students are currently attending Peking University--an American, a Canadian, and a Laotian and a I'm hundred 'T'anzanians and Zambians are enrolled in railroad engineering and management courses at a Peking engineering college. Willi the obstacle of' reciprocity removed. China should begin to send larger numbers of' students abroad. The Chinese currently are interested only in sending students abroad to receive training in foreign languages and in science and engineering, rather than in the social sciences and liberal arts. Training in foreign languages is obviously important in view of China's expanded role on the international scene; it is also necessary to supply translators for the large number of foreign scientific and technical journals to which the Chinese regularly subscribe. The Chinese will be particularly interested in programs in agronomy. mineral ptospecting. chemical engineering, metallurgical engineering, and solid state physics. Gradually, they can be expected to expand their exchange programs to include areas of' more direct benefit to military research and development, such as nuclear er.,ineering and telecommunications. (S1:C'RI:T NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/144Ee1ft9?85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/1A f4 V lj Df 85T00875R000700020007-2 Using foreign 'I'cehr '!ogy II' Peking is to attain ilb! goal (.)I' "catching up" with the West, ('Iona must acquire extensive foreign tecluu-logy. Since the Cultural [(evolution, China has imported a growing amount of advanced technology from the West. and is ex- panding the el'I'ort through its Import agencies, trade fairs. and technical delegations sent abroad, flow well China is assimilating the new technology is difficult to evaluate, The Chinese scrupulously avoid revealing anything about how they intend to use the equipment they purchase, but much of it is presumably destined for the defense industries. In early 1972, Peking instituted a revitalized, nationwide "technical innovation campaign" stressing the use of foreign technology. New technical goals for the Five-Year Plan have been set and available resources organized to these ends, Since the recent decentralization of scientific and technological organizations, the pro- vincial and municipal technology bureaus have become the focal points l'or pro- moting technological development. 'T'hese local bureaus now control many former national research units that have been closely integrated with production units. The local bureaus coordimae research and development within their jurisdictions and probably oversee the distribution of many imported items. The bureaus rely heavily on ad hoc teams of technologists, factory workers, and stu;lents for advice. To further the campaign, engineers and technicians are encouraged to divide their time between the research institutes and factory workshops. The technical innovation campaign originally confined to the civilian sector, is being extended into defense industries, A high premium is placed on the translation and distribution of foreign publications systematically collected abroad. While individual scientists and engi- neers are well informed on the latest Western research, they admit there are difficulties in translating and distributing technicni data within China. The technical innovation campaign is reported to have overtaxed the scientific and technical information distribution system. The decentralization of China's research establish- ment has probably caused difficulties in the full utilization of foreign technology, although little is known of the organizations that now manage its dissemination. During the Cultural Revolution the numerous offices that had disseminated tech- nology ceased to be mentioned. The China Scientific and Technical Information Institute is the only known clearinghouse for foreign publications, a situation that is not necessarily detrimental. The Ministry of National Defense, which still exercises strong control over technology, has been reasonably successful even during the Cultural Revolution in 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 3 Approved For Release 2001/08/P85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14 : ff" , PP,PT00875R000700020007-2 utilizing Foreign technology, The National I)efensc Science and 'T'echnology Com- mission and the National Defense Industry Office coordinated this effort, Military priorities and tight security restrictions Probably make the transfer of technology between the defense and civil sectors very dil'I'fcult, The Chinese are obviously anxious to assimilate foreign technology both in defense and civilian inclustries. The reinstatement of long-range technical planning, the return of technical experts to leadership roles, and the resumption ol'scientil'ic and technical training Lured more closely to industrial needs all Point to China's resolve to utilize foreitui technology, (SI;CRIi'1' NO FORIiI(;N DISSI:M) 14 May 197' Chinese Affairs Page 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/143EQ,R2L3M5T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14~,_lAt85T00875R000700020007-2 Pekin Can lions Restraint -Peking look a relaxed view of cease-fire violations, apparently in the hope of discouraging a heightening of tensions that might lead to significant re-engagetile nt by the big powers. Chinese u:Ticials sought to explain away North Vietnamese supply shipments to (lie South as defensive mr,asure to offset US deliveries to Saigon just before the I'N:ris Agreement. The Chinese passed off persistent fighting following the cease-fire as mainly local skirmishes which should he viewed in the light of a long and bitter war. For months Peking has made clear that it wants the Fighting in Indochina to end so that both Sino-American rapprochement and Chinese political prospects in Southeast Asia may prosper. -in early March.111111111111111111111 25X1X that Peking stands ready to press Ilanoi to avoid overly provocative military and political moves. The following month, a reportedly said flatly, "North Vietnam will abide by the terms of the agreement; China will see to it." -diplomats subse- 25X1X quently have suggested that Peking was seriously considering a cut-back in military assistance to constrain Ilanoi. Reflections of pressure on Hanoi, in fact, appeared in the North Vietnamese press in early April, and Sihanouk has said publicly that Chinese military assistance to his insurgents ended when the Paris Agreement was concluded. l--eking apparently took another hard look at the situation in April and concluded its larger interests might be undermined by the tough talk coming out of Washington, the US bombing in Cambodia, the retaliatory strikes in Laos, and the interruption of the aid talks in Paris and mine-removal operations in Haiphong harbor. Peking's policy review roughly coincided with the return of Sihanouk from his sensitive mission to Cambodia and Hanoi and the visits to Peking of ranking Lao and Vietnamese Communist officials. The result was a somewhat stronger Chinese stand. -A series of authoritative Chinese statements in late April and private 25X1X comments by in early May suggest that Peking's counsel focused on North Vietnamese involvement in Indochina and on a politi- cal settlement in Cambodia. Running through the statements has been a clear implication that it is tittle for the Communist side in Indochina io make a greater effort to comply with the cease:-fire agreements. An editorial and commentary ;n People's Dail), and government rmessages 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 5 Approved For Release 2001/08/1tjfjgV Approved For Release 2001/08/14,IFi!11 ,pI85TOO875R000700020007-2 signed by Chou VII-lai derdirltt with "foreign" force.; ill llldocllhla srig- gested that Peking had 11:11loi in mind as well as the allied side. In the past, the Chinese have been explicit in assigning the fault to Washington and Saigon. 25X1X ('hind's private coun.;el to its allies has clearly helm more pointed.- tllal troll-interVentioll 'is otlr principle, and we have saki it to everyone."_;ulded Ihal 25X1X Peking has urged its allies to let Ilse indigenous Irlrties fight their own civil wars. In private, the Chinese pr()hably have told Ihanoi !hat a more flexible Communist stance would turn relatively strong Communist positions in Laos and Cambodia to better advantage and would reduce chances For US reinvolvement. Peking may have urged Il;nlob to move ahead with a new government in Laos. --Peking clearly hopes that Sihanouk will have a major share of the power in a postwar government if, I'hnonl Penh, but apparently believes that a more flexible bargaining position alight be more attractive to Washing- ton. An editorial in I'copk's Daily on 25 April called only for an end to US military interference in Cambodia. A month ago, Chou pin-lai was publicly insisting on an end to all US involvement, political and ceo- nomie as well as military. A year ago. in a similar display of flexibility, the North Vietnamese dropped their demand that the US terminate its political and economic involvement in Saigon. (SECRET NO FOlZF'lGN DISSEM/CONTROLLFD DISSEM) 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 6 0 Approved For Release 2001/08/' {'CIIk$CjP85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/144]tyA}gpFl85T00875R000700020007-2 "1 11th the Countrvslde" China's economic difficulties last year and its uncertain prospects this year have prompted a new movement of tinge numbers of recent ii hidlc-school graduates to rural areas. The down-to-the-countryside movema:nt has two ecunontic goals; adding to the fool of educated manpower in agriculture which will facilitate rural modernization, and lessening ti,.,: pressure on the government to provide food, housing and social services for urban residents. At the same time, new sit:ctures on industrial hiring promise to lengthen the tint: graduates spend in the countryside. In recent years, many young people spent two or three years in the countryside before being assigned jobs in urban industry, If the slow pace of industrial expansion continues over the next few years, recent graduates will find it more difficult to find a place in urban areas, and rural-to-urban migration will be discouraged. The economic effectiveness 0, such measures has been uneven. The program has helped the Chinese avoid overly rapid urban growth, with an accontpanying increase of urban unemployment and diversion of investment funds to provide urban services--problems that have plagued the less-developed countries in recent years. Although many youth regard rural service as an onerous interruption of' their careers, the government considers the society's needs-not individual desires-para- mount. Some adjustments and slccommodations doubtless will be made, blot it clear that large numbers of youth will go to the countryside--.perhaps for longer periods of time. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) a 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/1F85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14 P?1T00875R000700020007-2 A Union of Crime lighters Oneol'the main tasksol'the recently reactivated All C'hirui Federation ol" I'r?ade Unions, according to a Canton ol'I'ichol. will he to combat the serious crinie problem in China. The assignment of this role to the trade union organisation would be an a+.lmissiurr of sorts that ttre'eltuiar police l'orce, ill-,' Public Security 1lureau, has not recovered the power it had before the Cultural Itevolulion. Recent dunuesiic radio broadcasts describing track unions as "pillars of the proletarian dictatorship," terminology usually reserved for the Public Security Bureau and the runty, support the official's claim. II' the workers operate under the Firm control of the security bumau, the move may be no more than a temporary expedient for reducing urban crime. II' the trau', unions acquire independent authority in the police field, how- ever, it could have import-!,it political ratuil'ications. The authority of' trade unions used to slop at the factory door, but since the Cultural Revolution, workers have been involved in a variety of politically sensitive tasks that involved keeping order. Although leaders have not been revealed for the national trade union organvation, a drive to rehuil(1 trade-Union organizations throughout China is in progress, and top leaders may already have been designated. A prime candidate for a top trade-union post has been Wang Iltrng-wen, a youthful Shanghai radical who heads the list of leaders just below the Politburo. Formalizing tin: involvement of' the trade union federation in police work, which would certainly enhance the power of union leaders and their allies in Peking, could be a move by leftist elements to prevent the s,:curity apparatus from regaining its former power. (SI CRE f NO FOREIGN I)ISSEN ) 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 8 Approved For Release 2001/08/1 M'tD5T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CM~)PRq$1b0875R000700020007-2 China Cashes in on Ilon Kong IIong K;mg is China's largest source of hard-currelwy earnings,;u-d Ihey offset a major part of' the a'mual deficits that China incurs in Its irade with the developed non-Communist countries. In 1972 total foreign exchange avail, le to Peking from Ilong Kong trade, overseas remittances, and excess deposits from Peking-controlled hunks was roughly US$I billion. Ilong Kong provides China with its largest export market and also serves as an outlet for Chinese exports to third countries. In 1972, China's export earnings (including re-exports) from Hong Kong rose to $680 million compared with $550 million in 1971. Chinese imports from I-long Kong are small, less than $5 million annually. About 95 percent of all overseas remittances to China are channeled through Peking-controlled banks in Ilong Kong and the I-long Kong branch of the Bank of China. About one third of the total originates in I-Iong Kong; the rest conies primarily from Southeast Asia. Remittances are received in hard currency and are then credited, through the Bank of China, to the local bank of' the recipient in China, who is paid in Chinese currency, Since the Cultural Revolution, remittances have risen steadily. In 1972 the annual value was twice that in 1966. Overseas Remittances, 1966-72 ($US million) (SUS million) Year Estimated Value Year Estimated Value 1966 93 1970 137 1967 91 1971 166 1968 101 1972 182 1969 123 1973 (projected) 216 Foreign exchange made available to he Chinese from excess deposits in Peking-controlled banks in Hong Kong has increased sub-tantially in the past three years. Unlike remittances and trade earnings, the excess deposits represent short- term loans to Peking. On a regular basis !bc Peking-controlled banks transfer deposits in excess of reserve and cash requirements to the Bank of China in Hong Kong, which in turn, credits these funds to the head office in Peking where they ar, h,ld in Hong Kong dollars or are converted into other hard currencies, such as sterling, West German marks, or Swiss francs. Last year, Peking had the use of about 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 9 Approved For Release 2001/08/14 :gE"SPT00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 SI,C, IR I;'I.' 5237 trriIliott, tmd it hopes tints this year atr m1diIlottal $ 100 millinn will he avnilahle, I'ckinl?'s hanks In Ilong Kanp have been Instructed to it,,rease remittruicc tutcl deposits this year. Foreign exchtutgc earnings from Ilong Kong will he an especially important I'ctctor to Peking in 1973 hccausc ()['its need to pay for the sharp Jump in Chinese Imports, particuhtriy of agricultural products, (Si;(.'RI:'1' NO FOKI R N DISSI;11/ CONTROLLED IJSSlih1) 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 10 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 ;;I?(;It E'I' (;nme Ilan fc,r Succcssfou A Chinese oll'icial has stated that Peking is working on an elaborate two-part strategy I'm dealing will, (lie succession -guestion, The plan reportedly gives im? portant new authority to Mho's wife, ('Itf;iurt Ching, and designates specific younger members of the I'ohthm-ro to succeed Mao. (.'hots, am' ,ether senior leaders in the (of) party nd govc'rrtntent posts as these positions bc'c rr,, vacant. Alt bough the report seams implausible, proposals along these lines have surfaced in other was, There Is, in fact, reason to believe that members of the more militant faction witltitt the central leadership might he pushing for the a doption ot'such proposals in order to Improve their prospect-, in the post-Mao era. The leaderships has been unable to agree on who should fill present vacancies in the hierarchy; hence, it is difficult to believe that the leadership could reach a consensus on a Iotig?+erm plan for suc- cession, 25X1X 25X1 cccsrding to an the succession plan was outlined In t the plan was drawn up in late 1971 and consists of two parts. 'Ilse first is a contingency proposal for dealing with the sudden death or Inca pacitntloll of Mao Tse-tung or Chou In?lai. Under its provisions, Chiang Ching would become premier if Chou dies or if he replaces Mao as party chairman, Madame Mao does rank hilt!; among the. Politburo leauleis, but this is the first time she has been mentioned as a candidate to succeed Chou. The second part is a longer term arrangement designed to select and train young leaders to take over the top positions from China's aging veterans. The following assignments reportedly have already been made; ? Yao Wen-yuan will succeed Mao as party chairman after his eventual death or incapacitation: ? ('hang Chun?chiau will succeed Chou as premier: ? Li Te?shcng will assume leadership of the armed forces: ? Chi Teng?kuei will handle party organizational affairs. There have been numerous reports since (lie fall of [.in I'iao. who was Mao's designated heir, that the Chinese were grappling with the succession question and that the emphasis would be on youth. Some have even stated that Yao was under 14 May 1973 C'hi':cse.Iffairs Page I I Approved For Release 2001/0q/ jr C tDP85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020007-2 1) 11 110-11 consideration as Mao's successor, This is the first report, however, that purports to spell out l'ekhtit's long-term plans In such detail. The report is less that cautlid about the selection process, Although the plan purportedly was drawn up in late I')71, lifter Lin's departure, all folly of the "younit" c.aclre assigned prominent positions In the long-term plan were in tact named to the ruling Politburo in April I9(,). Thus, their projected accession to these posts seems mute like a prttpos;ll for dividing the spoils among survivors (A the Lin I'iau affair than a new scheme I'm revitalising the leadership. It Is not clear when the second part of the plan is supposed to go into effect, Although the second part makes no specific reference to ('Mang ('hang. site would clearly look on it with favor, Unlike Mao or Chou, site is still relatively young (57) and for some years would be In a position to exercise considerable Influence through Yao Wen?yuan, her reputed son-in-law. The lineup would also seem to deny power to Important interest groups that might be hostile to Chiang Ching because they were criticir,etl, and in some cases publicly hunilliated, during the Cultural Revolu- tion. Key members of ('hoe's governmental bureaucracy, rehabilitated party vet? crans like 'knit ilsiao?ping and China's regional military leaders like Politburo members Ilse Sliihyu and ('hen Iisi?lien are not mentioned. 1n a sense, the scheme described Is as unorthodox and impractical as the naming in adv,ilice of ui tao to to ao s successor. Some of the present party elders will vacate their positions through death or illness before others, and as each please of the successioo problem unfolds, new forces and unforeseen factors obviously will come into play, Under these circumstances it is virtually impossible to program succession in advance. Nevertheless, the parallel between the unprecedented earlier appointincni of Lin I'iao and this latest plan is striking. Lin did not enjoy the confidence of very litany high-level Chinese officials, even within the military, and lie kicked popular support. In retrospect, it is clear that his designation in the party constitution as ~tau's successor was designed in part to give him the legitimacy that lie lacked on his awn. A similar effort may now be under way on behalf of Madame Mao and the four others mentioned in this report. The position of Premier Chou lin'I,n on these matters is a major unknown in the equation. If lie were still around, lie would exercise considerable influence on the final selection process. Chou undoubtedly finds little to his liking in this plan. Presumably lie would argue for a broadly based "collective leadership'' that is more representative of all parties concerned and less scsceptible to manipulation by Maws wif'e`. 'l here are no convincing sii.ith. Iiowevcr, that ('hurl has liven able to trove candidates of his own into positions of authority. particularly in the central party apparatus. 14 May 1973 C71inese.1/fairs Page 12 Approved For Release 2001/0?gWRl; j; jDP85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/,' (Gl(4J1'tpP85T00875R000700020007-2 There is evidence that an effort is being made to forestall the advance of' Chiang Ching and Yao Wart-yuaa, and the effort possibly Is being orchestrated by Chou himself. For example, whenever Chou leaves Peking, senior military leader Ych Chien-yingt is toned ahead ref' Chiang Ching in the Politburo pecking order. C'hlang Ching is widely reared because of' her role in leading Mao's purge during the Cultural Revolution, Thus, the clevalion of Yell when ('11011 leaves town may be it lactic to reassure jittery officials that Madame Mcao will not have I free hand to stir things up in ('Iron's absence, Reassurances of this nature would be especially necessary if the report of the succession plan is accurate, Moreover, while Yao's name is being mentioned in the context of the suc- cession question apparently by Chou himsell' on occasion there are indications of an undercover campaign to discredit Yao. Recent articles attacking nepotism, especially those critical of "fatlier?son" enterprises, may be directed against Yao. It has also been reported that the campaign to criticize Lin Piao's sun, who Is said to have perished with his father in 1971, is actually aimed at Yao. Chiang Ching, Yan's supporter, could also he a target. The succession still seems very much up in the air. Time is running short, and as platters now stand the clock seems to be working against Chou gin-lai. Despite the Immense authority and prestige lie wields, the premier gives the impression or a man on the defensive in domestic politics. Ile could be biding his time while lie waits for Mao to pass from the scene or for the Chairman to delegate him even greater power. At the same time, it' this latest report has any validity, it would appear that Madame Mao is working behind the scenes to improve her position in an eventual showdown. (ST>CRI;T NO FOREIGN DISSIiM/CON`i'ItOLLLD DISSL:M) 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 13 Approved For Release 2001/089 1gIFt-&DP85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/1, :jRIA q 85T00875R000700020007-2 It is an open secret 111111 no love is lost helween Premier Chou lin?lal and C'hlanft ('ping. Recent evidence suggests that ('hue's wife, Ten): Ying?chao, is also on had terms with Chiang ('ping and that the ('hhtese are making little ell'or1 to conceal the rile l. '1'e119 wits particularly active for several weeks prior to May Day and in public accounts was ranked with leaders Just below Politburo level, Peking's Initial account of the May Day festivities, however. buried her far down the list. Chiang Ching. making her first public appearance in nearly two months, was ranked third among those who attended the festivities. A second account restored Madame Chou to her position a nnong the higher ranking leaders. The two ladies, who rarely appear together in public, seemed to go out of their way to avoid contact on May Day. Teng appeared at Chungshan Park in the morning, but had gone to the People's Culture Palace by the lime Chiang arrived at the park in the afternoon. Madame Chou was the only leader noted as attending muse than one I'ete. Peking's second account of May Day events highlighted the meeting between Teng Ying?chao and American actress Shirley Maclaine, who is traveling with a group of American women studying the role of women in China. Last year Chiang Ching had extensive interviews with American scholar Roxanne Witke, who was making a similar study. Mrs. Wilke claims to have received transcripts of Madame Mao's unpublished speeches and plans to publish her material this summer. Miss Maclaine has left Peking without, as far as we know, meeting Madame Mao. (('ON1:11)I:N- TlAI.) 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 14 Approved For Release 2001/08/?eiA-R'85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/85T00875R000700020007-2 Foreign Affairs Notes C'hina's pursuit of more normal relationships with certain Asian countries has produced some ironic twists in recent weeks: Peking has traded an Ceylonese wariness of India in cultivating Sri Lanka, particularly since India's success in the In'lo?I'akistani War. Nonetheless, as a gesture to India, the Chinese ambassador attended airport ceremonies and all official receptions during Indira Gandhi's visit to Sri Lanka in late April. President Marcos has invoked (.'hinesr?supported subversion as one of the main reasons for martial law, and the Philippines rank lower than most Asian countries in Peking's foreign policy priorities. Nevertheless, when an unofficial Philippine trade delegation visited Peking last week, C'hon I'll-lai took time from his busy schedule to receive the entire group. Chou. moreover, was accompanied by a squad of foreign affairs and trade officials. (CONFIDENTIAL) Wooing the Latins Preparations for a visit to Peking by Juan Peron and the arrival of a Chilean military delegation have fo hi:nved the Successful visit of Mexico's President Lehever- ria last month. Peron's wife arrived in Peking on 8 May, reportedly to propose 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 15 Approved For Release 2001/0>gBCRl?-'FDP85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14 JRM,~P85T00875R000700020007-2 Sri, .~'..~.~ discussions on a sizable increase in Sino-Argentine trade and to cxpre,ss hopes for a niccting between her husband and Mao. The vic;it could take place as early as June, The Chilean military delegation, headed by a general of aviation, arrived in Peking on 7 May. Aside from a visit to Shanghai in April 1972 by a Chilean naval training vessel, this Is the First contact at the military level between the two countries. Peking has been eager to expantl its limiter) contacts with Latin American military establishments, but so far its approaches have been received coolly. N,arlier tentative Chinese suggestions for? exchanges of military attaches with Argentina, Chile, and Peru drew blnks, (SLCIZI1"'1' NO F01(1:1GN UISSI;A1/('UN'I'ItOl..l.,fl) I)ISSEM ) 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs Page 16 Approved For Release 2001/0SEICRLY DP85T00875R000700020007-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/14 s~3~-~ q~1f6T00875R000700020007-2 CIIRONOLOGY 28 April - I Mtiy Japanese civil ttvitttion negotiating team In Peking; departs wills talks still stalenuiled, (U) I May Scale(-down May Day festivities ;ttclnde a batulucl and ccle- t)ratlons in the parks. Ten I'ekints-based Politburo inemhers appeal' in public, but riot Mao. (U) 2 May NCNA comments favorably on Kissingrr's "New Atlantic Charter" proposal. (U) 2-I0 May Algerian military delegation led by Revolutionary Council member Colonel Mohammed Ben Amed visits Peking. (U) 3 May First Chinese ambassador arrives In Australia. (U) 4 May Gaston Thorn, Foreign Minister of' Luxembourg, is greeted in Peking by Chou IIn-lai. (U) 7 May Isabel Peron .-.)mes to ('eking to arrange for visit of Juan Peron. (U) 8 May Norwegian Foreign Minister Vaarvik arrives in Peking for visit, (U) 8 May Chilean military delegation led by General of Aviation ;abriel Van Schouwen arrives in Peking. (U) 9 May Chinese friendship delegation begins visit to Okinawa and refrains from propaganda attack on US bas,:s. (U) 14 May 1973 Chinese Affairs rage 1-7 Approved For Release 2001/08k1.i'UP85T00875R000700020007-2