CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 9, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Chinese Affairs
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State Department review completed
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Chinese A ffei rs
CON7'ENTS
9 July 1973
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Movement in the Provinces 2
Communications Satellites 4
A Rehabilitation Scorecard 5
Model Agriculture Unit list by Drought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Rural Health Program Strengthened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
China and the UN: Slow Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Toward the Normalization of Sino-US Agricultural Trade . . . . . . I I
Smiles for the Militia 12
CHRONOLOGY 14
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Movement in (lie Provinces
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Leadership turnouts during the past ttnonth or so reveal important new addi-
tions to provincial party eotnntittees and clarify the status of a numhcr of long-ah-
sent leaders, At the saute time. the campaign to rebuild mass organizations in the
provinces highlighted in the New Year's Day editorial is moving along gradually
but steadily. In short, the regime appears to he on its way toward resolving the
problems precipitated by the death of former defense minister Lin Piao in I')71. It is
most doubtt'oI, however, that all difficulties have been overcome.
The most important changes were announced In Sinkiang on 3 July in conjunc-
tion Willi the return to China of'( 'anthodiat Prince Sihanouk from in extended trip
abroad. Sail'utlin, a Uighur who has long served as the most prominent minority
cadre in the region, is now the first party secretary Ior Sinkiang. lie replaces it
military man who dropped from public view shortly after the Lin affair. The new
second-ranked leader in Sinkiang is Yang Yung, a highly regarded professional
soldier who. along with a number of other military leaders in Peking, was purged in
an early phase of the Cultural Revolution. Yang was publicly rehabilitated last July
and, like many other veteran party and military leaders, is apparently being given a
second chance to demonstrate his loyalty and skill. Both Sait'udin and Yang
apparently lack real authority, which, at the moment, seems to rest with a group of
local military leaders w'to hold lower ranking posts on the regional party committee.
In late June three other important provincial military leaders, who were
suspected of having suffered the same fate as the former Sinkiang chief', resurfaced
in evident good standing: Iicilongkiang boss Wang Chia-tao: Ningsia first party
secretary Kang Chien-min; and the number-two party leader in Tibet, Chen Ming-i.
The three made their appearances in conjunction with local congresses of the youth
corps or the trade unions. The formation of these party-affiliated mass organiiations
is a major step forward in Peking's efforts to re-establish orthodox party rule.
Beyond the announcements themselves, there is very little information on the actual
functions or duties of these newly reconstituted bodies.
In sonic areas, the changes in provincial leadership have been so sweeping that
they have anto'inted to a reorganization of the provincial party committees formed
throughout C'hi?na prior to Lin's fall. The re-staffing has hit the military hard. but has
by no means brought a complete return to civil rule. Those civilian officials-most of
them youthful activists-who carne forward during the Cultural Revolution do not
appear to be gaining as much ground as might be expected. Instead, most of the
vacancies on the committees, as well as the new positions that are being added, are
being tilled by veterans-usually civilians but also some military officers-who had
been removed from power and often publicly humiliated during the Cultural
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Revolution.
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This curious blend of old and new, rnliltary and civilian, ardent Ichist and
chastened bureaucrat, has apparentry pleased no one and upset almost everyone. The
national and provincial press has been replete with discussions of cadre dissension
and admonitions concerning the proper balance hetween old and new officials. In
IleUungkiang Province, no less than eight additional people, most of them returning
veterans, have appeared on the provincial party committee In the last month. An
attempt to clarify their relationship in as rambling radiobroadcast on 20 June was not
very successful.
The divisions between old and new cadre impose serious limitations on el'I'i-
clency and control, These constraints are not likely to be removed quickly. Peking
undoubtedly wants to create it more unified and stable provincial leadership, but the
present formula seems to call for the infusion of hots old it td new cadre and then
lettilist the participants thrash out their own duties and responsibilities as best they
can. 1 -1
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Conlmitldclillolls Satellites
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Willi little prior notice, seven Chinese cuminunicatlolls specialists are scheduled
to visit the US in July at the Invitation of the ('omrnurricutiom: Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT). The Chinese will tour US companies involved in the construction,
launching, and operation of the lntelsal IV communications satellites, 'I'bis delega-
tion will he the first Chinese industrial survey team to visit the US and the first
Chinese group to arrange a visit directly with an individual company.
The Chinese appear to be operations and administrative personnel, essentially
counterparts of the C'OMISAT people who are arranging the visit, Very little back-
ground information on the Chinese is available, but they probably worked on the
satellite communications facilities set up in Peking and Shanghai for President
Nixon's visit. COMSAT officials played a major role in the negotiations for the
installation of the Peking earth station, The visit will provide the C'hine,^ with a
better understanding of the Intelsat system operations, which will facilitate China's
effective use of imported ground-station equipment for international cornmuniea-
tions. At the same tints, the Chinese may he seeking something more significant.
possibly technical assistance.
Within the past year there have been a number of indications that the Chinese
desire to develop or acquire a satellite communications sy,tem for domestic use. If
the Chinese wish to achieve such a goal in the near future, they could use ill existing
Intelsat IV satellite for domestic as well as international traffic or they could
purchase a satellite for exclusive domestic use until they can launch a satellite of
their own. In either event, the Chinese would be likely to seek technical assistance
from COMSAT, which manages the Intelsat system and provides consultative serv-
ices in setting up domestic satellite systems,
The Chinese are also known to he inrerested in obtaining full Intelsat Con-
sortium membership, which would give them greater influence than they have as
only a user. As a condition for accepting membership, China has demanded the
removal of Taiwan from the Consortium. China recognizes the influential position of
COMSAT in determining Intelsat policy and through discussions w' T they
may hope to t'acilitate Taiwan's expulsion.
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A ltehuhilitutinn Scorecard
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The rehubiIll ation in April of former party secretary general Tong Ilsiao-ping
oils toticllell ul'I' ;a wave of ',pectilation that other disgraced party leaders may he
restored to good standing. Although 'l'ent( is the only p;:rty leader to reemerge thus
l'ar, the rttn-mrs cover almost every leading party figure purged in recent years -frond
the victims of the Cultural Revolution to those who prospered during that upheaval
but I'ell during the Lin fiat, affair. 'I'eng's return has even sparked renewed interest in
the slates of Liu Shao-chi, the chicl'vietim of the Cultural Revolution.
Dormer chief' of staff Lo Jui-cling, thought to be an opponent oI' Lin Piao, is
variously reported to have died (luring the Cultural Revolution, to have rejected an
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111111 11Y c s pion t. uc a o tic Speculation in South China centers on the
possibility of all imminent return of' the former boss of (lie region. Tao ('fill. Tao's
wile reappeared on May t.)ay, but Tao's own status is unclear. A rumored return o''.
hluang Yung-sheng, the former chief' of staff who I'ell with Lin Piao, may have be-;n
promptid by a party document that criticizes Lin's son and portrays Iluang as
powerless to resist young Lin's demands I'or greater authority.
Party documents on the rehabilitation issue only add to the confusion. Accord-
ing to the official explanation, Teng Ilsiao-ping strayed from the party line but
upheld party principles, a blurred distinction at best. A Peking c'irective reportedly
denies rehabilitation only to cadres who have committed any of' four unforgivable
crimes. The four categories are so broad they encompass almost any kind of'political
action. Complicating the issue, according to sonic reports, is Peking's worry that the
rehabilitation process will antagonize the workers who rude high (luring the latter
stages of the Cultural Revolution, On the other hand, Peking is probably even more
reluctant to offend the military, which was given even greater power in the Cultural
Revolution than the workers.
For all the tclk, there has been little action. Many experienced cadres have been
reinstated at the lower levels, but Ten g Ilsiao-ping remains a lonely figure at the top.
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recent airpor reception, leaving Tong by himself. An opportunity to reveal further
returnees slipped by on I July, when Peking failed to celebrate the anniversary of
the party. Ne'crtheless, Teng Ilsiao-ping, the man who started all the talk, is being
kept in the public eye. The message seems to be that the difficult Process of
rehabilitation is not intended to end with Teng.
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Model Agriculture Unit lilt by Drought
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Prolonged drought in the northern China province of Shansi has obliged the
regime to make an embarrassing admission about the near-legendary "'1'aehai"
l'arming brigade. For nearly ten years this small agriculture unit has served as a
national model of how to hest nature by local self'-reliance achieved by intense
political indoctrination. On "'25 June, the official Chinese news agency reported,
however, that sowing at Tachai this spring was made possible only "by carrying
water from elsewhere."
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Tachai is tucked away in one of' the many barren ravines that scar the foothills
of northern Shansi Province. It is almost completely dependent on local rainfall for 25X1
its water supply. Peking evidently is making great efforts-at considerable expense to
the state-to keep its model alive.
the famous farming brigade has gone without rain For
months an( as water was being trucked in from outside,
Over the years, Peking has regularly held up Tachai as an example of the power
of the collective where everyone struggles against nature in an egalitarian spirit
without regard for personal gain. in the mid-1960s, conservative-minded critics
charged that Tachai's yearly increases in grain yields were achieved largely by shady
bookkeeping, such as understating the amount of land under cultivation.
These critics asserted, correctly, that the conditions at Tachai were not repre-
sentative of the nation's farming problems at large and argued that emphasis should
be placed on acquiring modern aids to agriculture such as fertilizers, mechanical
pumps for wells and irrigation, and improved seeds. They added that material
incentives for the peasants needed to be encouraged or at bast tolerated and
certainly not curtailed when food production is lagging.
A recent Red Flag article on Tachai suggests that these critics have not been
forgotten. Not only is water being trucked to Tachai, but according to a news
account of Tachai on 25 June, the town has a "newly sunk well." Undoubtedly
there will be other innovations at Tachai to help the faltering model survive the
harsh realities of extended drought.
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Rural I lealth Program Strengthened
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Before the Cultural Revolution, health authorities had already established
hospitals in nearly all of' the 2,000 or so counties throughout China. Yet, the old
party apparatus, in general, and the Ministry of Public Ilcalth. in particular, were
severely criticized during the ('ultural Revolution I'or neglecting the countryside in
favor ()l' urban areas. A recent NCNA broadcast, timed to the aunivcrsary of Mao's
scathing indictment of the public health service in 1965, has provided important
details on fit,,- improvement of health facilities and services since the Cultural
Revolution. The NCNA a~count demonstrates that the most important and enduring
health gains have been achieved by the same methods that were so harshly con-
demned by Mao's militant adherents.
According to NCNA, nearly every one of China's 50,000 people's communes
has it clinic. This statement is newsworthy on two scores. First, it shows that
permanent health facilities exist at the administrative level below the county, and,
second. it is the first authoritative information in some years on the number of
communes in China. Since communes were instituted in 1958, they have alternately
contracted and expanded in number depending on whether the collectivization drive
was being pushed or not; 50,000 is a nnid-range figure, indicating that today's
communes are roughly the equivalent of the administrative districts in use prior to
the advent of' the communes.
In unusually specific language, NCNA notes that the new commune clinics are
of' two types: those paid for by the state and those paid for by the collective. Clinics
paid for by the state account for one third of the total; they have all the facilities
and personnel normally found in it hospital meeting certain minitmnnn standards-
physicians and surgeons, x-ray machines, compound microscopes, refrigerators,
high-pressure sterilizers-and can handle fairly complicated surgery and other medi-
cal treatment. As l'or the more than 30,000 clinics financed locally, NCNA merely
notes that their technical level is "improving steadily." The contrasting description is
intended to show that most local collectives, using their own resources, are unable to
develop the kind of' facilitie3 needed for adequate health care in the rural areas.
During the Cultural Revolution, the ideologues who were attacking the old
party hierarchy posited precisely the opposite result. They insisted that the localities
could pay their own way and do a better job because of their familiarity with local
condition'.. llealth care would be dispensed by roving medical teams assisted by
"barefoot doctors." Decertralization also seemed to fit in nicely with the concept of'
the "people's war" that places a premium on small, dispersed, and mobile medical
units. By squeezing whatever money is allotted for public health out of the meager
income of peasants, the leaders of the Cultural Revolution were, of course, seeking
to free state funds for other objectives.
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Although the militants miscalet, Inted the wilIingnessand ability of local author-
ities to fintuice major health improvements, some of tIrt Innovations during the
Cultural Revolution were beneficial and will probably become institutionalised over
time. For exam pie, the "barefoot doctor" program, which teaches ordinary farmers
certain basic skills, seems clestined to survive. NCNA noted that it majority of' the
''million or mere" barefoot doctors in the cooperativ' medical service received
special training at the new commune cCnics.
Overall the gains achieved by the radical treasures of the Cultural Revolution
are slight compared to the havoc wreaked by the Cultural Revolution on the public
health system, In their heyday the militants suspended all medical training, para-
lyzed health research, and thoroughly intimidated China's small corps of veteran
medical specialists. Indeed, there arc hints in the media that responsible persons in
China ore beginning to question whether the country really needed a full-blown
Cultural Revohition to correct what seem today to have been minor inadequacies In
a basically sound and responsive governing apparatus. NCNA's acknowledgment that
ni al health development is movie along the old route undoubtedly will serve to
reinforce these doubts.
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i;hina and the UN: Slow Ex tansion
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While Chinese activities in the Security Council and the General Assembly have
attracted most of the publicity, Peking has gradually expanded its membership in
UN subsidiary organizations over the last year and a lwll'.
During 1972, Peking a ttended the 'T'hird UN Confercr, ce on 'T'rade and Develop-
ment (UNC I'AD) and the UN-sponsored Stockholm conference on the environment.
China joined the International 1'elecomn-nications Union (I'I'U) and the UN In-
dustrial Development Organization, to which it pledged a modest $ 176,000. Lust
fall, China accepted membership on the executive board of the UN Economic and
Social Council (UNESCO). China's increasing contacts with the various international
organizations in Geneva led Peking to appoint a deputy permanent representative to
the UN in Geneva last August,
This year Peking has become active in the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), where it has a representative on the executive committee; the World I lealth
Organization (WI10), where it is represented on the executive board and holds an
assistant directorship; the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO); and the UN Commission
on Narcotic Drugs. Last April, China attended a session of the UN Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) for the first time.
The main reason for Peking's deliberate approach to participation in the
numerous UN organizations has been a shortage of teained, experienced personnel.
As a result, China was at first forced to devote its assets to issues like the law of the
sea and organizations like UNESCO and WMO, which might provide political or
economic-technological benefits. Membership in UNESCO Wright help in gaining
scientific contacts which Peking could use in its stepped up effort to modernize its
economy and technology. Joining an organization such as WMO ties the I'RC into a
worldwide meteorological network. Both ECAFE and UNCTAD provide forums in
which China can polish its image as a champion of the interests of underdeveloped
nations. Participation in the UN Narcotics Commission shows China as a responsible
nation willing to cooperate in the search for a soIut-on of a highly publicized world
problem.
So far most of Peking's delegates to the meetings of the various UN organiza-
tions have played an observer role. The increasing number of Chinese -nemberships
on the various executive boards, however, suggests that Peking intends to expand its
art,',ci pation in the UN network as personnel limitations and finances nern *t.
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Toward the Normalisation of Sinu-US Agricultural Trade
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I'eking has informed agricultural officials In the US that ('Itin-t Intends to
import US agricultural commodities for the next several years, Since last August,
Peking has acquired enough US grain. cotton, vegetable oil, and soybeans in
Increasing quantities I'or the US to emerge as China's prInclpal source of agricultural
Imports. Initially, the ('tt'ncse appeared to he looking to the US as an interim source
of Imports, but it appears now lltat the US role will he p erm;uient,
't'he, US has become China's leading source of agricultural imports because of'
the large quantities and great diversity of agricultural commodities available in this
country. Until recently, the merit of US commodities as a continuing source of
imports was tfuestionable because of high cost. The C'Wnese acquired US agricultural
commodities throupJl third country brokers for cost?plus-freight delivery. Under this
system, ownership is not transferred until the grain is unloaded at a Chinese port.
This arrangement is much more expensive than f.o.h, purchases, where the title
transfer takes place at the time the grain is loaded, Peking appatently believed that
using cost-plus-freight delivery would forestall attachments by US citizens with
claims against China. The question ol'cargo attachment has now been resolved.
Peking is now negotiating directly with US firms, purchasing US agricultural
commodities on an f.o.b, basis, and shipping them in vessels under Chinese charter.
So far, only small quantities have been involved. One of the problems is that China
has made provisions for shipping a major bargaining point.1
ncreasing quantities of
u-S agricultural exports will move to China under f.o.b. contracts as Chinese
chartered shipping becomes available for use in American trade.
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Smiles for the Militia
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Tilt, I"urtuties of ('lima's militia farce - reported by Peking at uric time to
number over 100,000,000 - hove ebbed and Unwed during the part decade, Now, the
n-ilitary role of the militia is once again being emphasized. Two accent columns In
the Liberation Arnt-p L-alr', China's widely distributed) Military newspaper, stress
Peking's concern over strengthening its irregular forces,
The first column, "An Apprveialion of Studying l'copl,''s War Thinking,"
condemns "swindlers like Liu S11,10-ch"i" (the usual way of referring to former
defense minister Lin Mao) who fought ('hairman Mao's thinking on peoples' war and
tried to destroy the militia. The second colmn, "Talks on Militia Work." provides
instructions to the many new cadres in the militia. It critici es unnamed opponents
r,t Ow regime who have contended that "the time of the Militia has already passed"
and that "the militia is useless."
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intros tad in militia units. training has been
members of the militia are 25X1
assuming duties formerly carried out iy tar cop c s Liberation Army. A radio.
broadcast on 18 June from Ilainan Island stressed the role of minorities in the
militia, and it broadcast from Kiangsi Province on 22 June emphasized the impor-
tance of the Communist Youth League in strengthening the militia.
The preeminent force within the militia is the "armed militia," which may
number as high as 5,000,000 It has the capah;lity to assist the PLA in China's
defense. Military training for the armed militia is carried out twice a year for a
period of two weeks, and regular sessions are held every week. The remainder of the
force has more limited training. Both the armed and regular militia are responsible
for such duties as patrolling border arras and guarding industrial and transportation
facilities.
It his long been a keystone of China's military thought that the country's
defense is a responsibility of the whole population. The militia apparently is being
strengthened as the PLA withdraws from many tasks not as%ocial with its central
military role.
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CIIIWNOLOGY
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14.27 June Allchiro Ftijiyanta, chairman of file Japanese Association ror the
Promotion of Fconontic Trade. visits China for talks on Sino-
Japanesc economic matters,
Japan and Chitin exchange draft proposals for it new trade agree-
Negotiations begin on new Sino-Japanese fisheries aptrccntenI
21 June
24.25 June
25 June
Chinese and Malaysian emissaries be tin ne ut orts at the UN on
diplomatic recognition.
Le I)uc 'l'ho stops over in Peking en route to Ilanol 1?rom Paris:
sees ('hoe l;n-Ins, I'cnn Noutlt and Yell ('hien-ying.
Sinn-Malaysian talks recess,
27 June President `1'raore leaves China for Mali after signing sill a -o c
and technical cooperation agreement.
211 June PRC announces successful nuclear bomb test on 27 June. (Formal
protests from Japan. Australia, and others rejected b;' Peking.
29 June Delegation from Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine. led by 'faysin Khalid, visits China.
29 June Bank of China establishes correspondent relationship with Chase
Manhattan after 12 day visit by David Rockelellcr.
30 June Sudanese Minister of Finance and National Economy arrives in
Peking to sign 1973 trade protocol.
Iranian parliamentary delegation arrives in China.
I July For the second year in a row, the party anniversary paned without
fanfare. No special events were held, there was no joint editorial.
and the leadership did not torn out in Peking's parks.
2 July US Congressional group arrives in Peking. received by Chou En?lai
on 0 July.
2.b July (sigh-level Lao Communist delegation passes throe h P? ?' g en
route hoe^.e; t.:?:: Chou Fn-lap. Li Ilsien?nicn.
2-8 July Delegation from IBM in Peking; Chinese express stro ' tterest in
purchasing advanced computers.
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3 July LI Chao lecwes Pekin to become first 1'RC ambassador to.1snnaica.
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4 July Somc 60 Chinese officials attend LIS independence day celehra-
lions, with Ambassador Bruce serving as host. 25X1
(, July Ituang ('hen, haul of the (Trines. liaison office in Washirt .tarn,
nice Is with I'residen: Nixon at the Western White Ilouse. 25X1
(- July Chou tin-lai warns against South Vietnamese or Thai intervention
In Cambodia after the US bombing deadihr : of 15 August.
Remarks clone In banquet celebrating Sih:m ak', return from trip
abroad.
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