CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 6, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

 OpooWddb('Rase(~-XA-RDP5rt60875'R0009b00 01 25X1
iop Secret
25X1
Chinese Affairs
25X1
State Department review completed
Top Secret
36
25X1
25X1
6 August 1971
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000 00020013-5
 Approved For Relelse 2004/1 - 00700020013-5 25X1
C'b ues e Affairs
25X1
(,() NT1;NI'S
6 August 1973
Page
Agricultural Productivity and Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
Issues and Options . . . . . 3
Between Persians and Arabs 5 25X1
Korean Contretemps . 6
Concern About Kabul 8 25X1
Reforming the Reform Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Law of the Sea-Another Round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
New Image for Tachai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I
25X1
China's Trade Relations with the Third World . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
ANNEX: Provincial Party Committees:
New Faces of '73 16
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875FJ000700020013-5 25X1
 Approved For Releas
Agricultural Productivity and Foreign Trade
25X1
A recent study of Chinese agriculture indicates that despite it favorable 2.0
percent rate of growth of grain output since 1965. total factor productivity (output
per unit of combined factor inputs in this case, land, labor, and modern industrial
inputs) has declined some 19 percent over the same period. Declining factor
productivity has haunted agriculture throughout the 1960s. In 1965 productivity
was I I percent lower than in 1957; now it Is 28 percent lower than in 1957. This
means that while China's agriculture-firs: policy has produced results, It has been a
very costly process; today it unit of grain output costs 1.40 units of inputs, whereas
in 1957 the same unit of output cost only 1,0 units.
2004/11/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R0 0700020013-5
Because agriculture accounts for approximately 30 percent or GNP and because
investment in agriculture has been given top priority since 1962, it is inconceivable
that the 28-percent drop In productivity has gone unnoticed and unappreciated by
China's leadership. Grain output and productivity are so important that it is
tempting to interpret China's diplomatic and foreign trade efforts over the past two
years in light of' this decline in productivity. It can be argued that this decline has
been one more force making rapprochement with the West attractive to the Chinese.
An important aspect of the improvement in China's International relations has
been the regularization and expansion of trade with the industrial East and West.
Until recently it appeared that China's imports would increase slowly but steadily,
matching increases in export earnings. Since 1971, however, Peking has signed
contracts in the West for industrial plants worth between $400-450 million, more
than double the value of plant purchases during the entire decade of the 1960s. The
contracts signed so far this year amount to at least $385 million; negotiations now
under way could raise the figure to more than, $1 billion.
Significantly, a large. portion (perhaps 70 percent) of these contracts involves
either plants that produce modern agricultural inputs (fertilizer plants) or plants that
manufacture substitutes for agricultural products (synthetic fiber plants). The
growth in imports for the mid and late 1970s implied by these purchases and the
nature of the purchases themselves indicate a heightened concern for agricultural
performance.
Imports of grain, cotton and vegetable oils have doubled in 1973, but they
appear to be associated with the disappointing harvests in 1972. In contrast, the
sudden expansion of trade in whole plants designed to produce agricultural inputs or
substitutes for agricultural products appears to be related to chronic, long-run
difficulties in agriculture.
6 August 1973
Chinese Affairs
Page 1
Approved For Releas
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/03 - 700020013-5 25X1
According to this Interpretation, 111r need to arrest the decline In productivity
Is one more reason for the Chinese to collie to terms with the Industrialized nations,
for only th..ti can the requisite plants and equipment be acquired, The high costs of
these items means that the Chinese must also relax their nrevionT strictions on
accepting credit.
25X1
6 August 1973
c'7dnese Affairs
Page 2
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875RI00700020013-5 25X1
 Approved For Rele
Peking Is holding to a flexible tinietablc, but preparations are moving ahead Ior
mcclings of the leadership scheduled to begin later this year. Although outside
attention Is focused on the parts congress, much of the real work will be done at the
preceding central committee plenum, it restri;;ted session which will allow fuller
discussion of the issues and debate over allo;rna-ive solutions
Issues and Options
Spadework for the plenum seems to be occupying much of the leaders' time.
This may be why l'eking has poste uned the scheduled visits of several foreign
delegations. The announcement of the new Politburo will probably be the highlight
of the congress, but a number of other dil'ficult decisions will also demand the
regime's attention.
25X1
5X1
A new administrative framework is high on the agenda. The revolutionary
committees, administrative organs established during the Cultural Revolution to
implement party policy, are being phased out at the lower levels. Whether to replace
them with new organizations or transfer their functions to the party committees has
yet to be decided. There is apparently some dis't: lion about retaining the revolu-
tionary committees at the higher levels, but sharply reducing their responsibilities. A
return to a regional system, which would group several provinces wider a single
administrative unit, is also being considered. A regional system would facilitate the
implementation of economic policies occasionally obstructed in the past by unre-
sponsive provincial officials.
Another unanswered question is what to do about the post of head of state.
According to the official story, this was a major bone of' contention in the year
preceding the fall of Lin Piao. The leadership is now trying to decide whether to
abolish the post, hand it over to Mrao. Chou, or some other prestigious individual, or
create a collective presidency. Study documents on this question are reportedly
slated for distribution after I October. Why this controversy has developed is a
mystery. In the past, the post appeared to be largely ceremonial and its occupants,
while distinguished, drew their power from their party positions.
The lackluster Army Day celebrations on I August highlighted yet another
unsettled issue-what role, if any, the military is to have in civilian affairs.
1
6 August 1973
Chinese Affairs
Page 3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 Approved For Rtlease 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T0087~5R000700020013-5
 Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
25X1
I By forgoing an official Army Day stateiiient, Peking
avoided any comment on t to current status of the military. China's leaders can hc;
expected to r%mnin similarly noncommittal on the other open questions until after
the plenum.
25X1
6 August 1973 ChinescAffairs
25X1
Page 4
Approved For Releas 7 i ites I - 00020013-5 25X1
 Approved For Release - 700020013-5
25X1
25X1
Peking's efforts to improve Its ties with Iran as it counterweight to the spread of
Soviet and Indian hilluclice in the Persian Gull is adversely affecting its relations 25X1
with the Arab states of the Middle I?ast.
25X1
The one country that would be likely to take offense at developments in
Sino-Iranian relations is Iraq. Peking's friendship with Baghdad has been going
downhill since Iraq signed it friendship treaty with the USSR in April 1972. As Iraq's
ties with the USSR became closer over the last year or Iwo, Peking has shown its
increasing displeasure by it series of small symbolic acts, such as moving slowly to
implement the $45-million economic aid agreement it signed with Baghdad in June
197 I. Most recently the Chinese manifested their displeasure by giving till., celebra-
tion of the Iraqi national day only limited attention. During the previous two years,
the Chinese had marked the occasion with special messages of congratulations from
Premier Chou Ein-lai, and ('Ill Pcng-fci had attended ceremonies at Iraq's embassy in
Peking. This year there were no messages at all, and the Chinese representatives at
the ceremonies were the ministers of agriculture and forestry and of public health.
25X1
In their concern over blocking the expansion of Soviet influence, the Chinese
do not appear particularly worried about Arab sensitivities. Despite an Egyptian
request to vote for the recent UN Security Council resolution on the Middle East in
order to further isolate the US on the issue. China abstained, publicly justifying its
action by arguing that the resolution was not hard enough on Israel. In Dhofar. tile
PRC has ceased giving aid to the rebels, a move Iran appreciates, but one which will
disillusion Peking's admirers in the Arab nationalist left and in those Palestinian
fedaycen groups with close ties to the insurgents.
25X1
6 August 1973
Chinese Affairs
Page 5
Approved For Releas 7 i Wes I - 0700020013-5 25X1
 X1
Approved For Rele - 00700020013-5
25X1
Korean Contretemps
As the summer wears on, it is becoming increasingly clear that Peking will not
agree to defer discussion of the Korean issue at the UN General Assembly session
this autumn, Ambassador Iluang Ilea made this explicit in conversation with US
officials at the end of July. The Chines,; also have made it clear that they will follow
North Korea's lead in opposing admission of both North and South Korea to the
United Nations. In addition, Peking has somewhat stepped up its propaganda
support of North Korean positions. A recent NCNA article quoted, a North Korean
general's attack on "US imperialist provocations," another replayed a demand for
the immediate withdrawal of US troops from the South. While there is little new in
such propaganda (which in any event leaves the condemnations in the mouths of
others). Peking has recently given greater prominence to this material. Several such
articles were grouped together with other anti-American mate' ial in a recent edition
of People's Dally.
At the United Nations, China will probably adopt tactics similar to those it
used last year. At that time the Chinese allowed others, such as the Algerians, to aet
as the cutting edge in putting forth the North Korean position. Chinese support for
Pyongyang will therefore be lukewarm, but it is unlikely that Peking will actively
attempt to push North Korea into a modification of its positions. Indeed, the
Chinese probably would not be unhappy to see the Korean situation develop in ways
that depart from Pyongyang's formal position-so long as this does not involve active
intervention, iublicl or behind the scenes, on China's part. A Chinese diplomat as
I Irecently claimed that Peking was prepared to see UNCURK
p tasc out gr: c ua y, adding that while the UN command must "ultimately" be
ended, its continued presence would not hinder progress toward reunification.
Needless to say, these views would hardly create much enthusiasm in North Korea.
This is almost certainly the crux of the matter. One North Korean diplomat
recently expressed concern that the developing Chinese relationship with the US was
leading Peking to sacrifice Pyongyang's interests. Evt-n more to the point, Kim
II-sung recently complained not only that Peking too often interfered in North
Korean affairs, but offered the view that the Soviet Union was an easier ally at this
point than was China. 'T'hese comments are symptomatic of North Korean resent-
ment of previous Chinese pressures on Pyongyang to moderate its po';tion; any hint
that such pressures have led North Korea to lean toward Moscow obviously would
cause concern in Peking.
The Soviets of course have their own difficulties with North Korea, and the
Chinese probably are not worried about a complete reversal of form in Pyongyang.
6 August 1973 Chinese Affairs
Page 6
Approved For Relea 00700020013-5
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Rel - 000700020013-5 25X1
But this is a particularly delicate time in China. With a party congress in prospect,
the formulators of Chinese foreign policy, such as Chou 1171 11111, cannot afford to
appear as errand boys for Washington, ,n ssuring unwilling allies to adopt unpaiat-
25X1
6 August 1973
Approved For Re
Chinese Affairs
25X1
Page 7
25X1
 Approved For Release
25X1
Concern About Kabul
25X1
Peking appears to believe that the newly installed I)aurd government in Afghan-
istan is even more pro-Soviet than Its predecessor and over the long terns could
adversely affect Chinese strategic interests in the western Indian Ocean basin, Several
Chinese officials have professed to sec Moscow's hand in the mid-July coup, and
Peking withheld recognition for nearly two weeks. When it finally recognized the
new government, the New China News Agency pointedly referred to I)aud's pledge
that he would follow a non-aligned foreign policy.
25X1
X1
prime minister ten years ago, Daud called or tile creation of an independent state of'
Pushtunistan from the frontier provinces of Pakistan. Shortly after his coup last
month, Daud referred to this problem as "unresolved." Peking has long been
strongly opposed to further dismentbcrnwnt of Pakistan, and moves against either
Pakistan or Iran, particularly if clearly supported by Moscow, almost certainly
would lead to heightened tensions. Peking, however, will probably await a clearer
reading of Daud's political strength and intentions before further defining its policy
toward Kabul.
tempt3 to improve relations with !ran and Pakistan. Peking may believe that it can
exploit Pakistani and Iranian concern as leverage to forge an alliance anchored in
Tehran and Islamabad and aimed indirectly at curbing Soviet gains in the region.
Much of this Chinese "concern" over Soviet intentions may be a tactic designed
to alarm Pakistan and Iran. We have no evidence of Soviet complicity in the Zahir
government's downfall, and Peking probably does not either. Moreover, the Chinese
believed that Moscow had a close and profitable relationship with the Zahir regime,
and Peking clearly counted Kabul as in Moscow's camp prior to Daud's accession.
There is also evidence that Moscow itself is concerned that Daud's support for tribal
autoncmy might cause undue aggravation in the region, undercutting Soviet at-
25X1
6 August 1973 Chinese Affairs
Approved For Releo
Page 8
se - 00700020013-5
25X1
 Approved For Releas 700020013-5
Iteforming the Reform Schools
25X1
Peking recently announced glans to overhaul and regularize the system of cadre
reform schools established in 1908. Under this system--one of many progr;uns
instituted at the close of the Cultural Revolution--party and government officials are
supposed to attend special schools on a rotational basis for ideological rectification.
'T'hese "7 May" cadre schools, which take their mine from the chile of a directive
from Mau 'I'se-twig, are highly unpopular, and in the past year or so some have
closed and rumors have circulated that all of them were to be phased out. The plans
for revising them, however, strongly suggest that in one Porn) or another the schools
will be around for a long time.
According to a Chinese news agency report on I I July and a l'ollow-up editorial
in the People's Daily, the new guidelines on the 7 May schools were produced at a
conference held recently by departments under the party central committee and the
State Council. In an apparent effort to make the schools more palatable to assignees,
the t;uidelines emphasize upgrading the quality of political instnrction. The stand-
ards of the school staff are to be improved, and steps are to be taken to ensure an
adequate supply of teaching material, When these changes are iniplentented, the 7
May schools will more closely resemble the orthodox party schools that existed
prior to the Cultural Revolution.
Although it appears that 7 May students will be spending more time studying,
manual labor is still part of'the curriculum. The announcement on I I July stipulates
that the schools will send their students to work at designated farms and factories.
In the past, most cadres worked along with other cadres in workshops and farming
plots at the school. The new arrangements will quickly turn the farms and factories
that are selected into special showcases and theoretically, at least, will bring the
schools more in line with Mao's original idea that cadre should mix with the masses
so as to avoid assuming bureaucratic airs.
The conference of central party and government organizations was probably
convened following a sharply worded defense of the 7 May school system broadcast
on the Peking domestic radio service on 9 May. The broadcast stated that anyone
who agreed with the theory that 7 May schools are another form of unemploy-
ment-a view attributed to Lin Piao-could "go to hell." On the key matter of
whether all cadre would have to attend the schools, even if they had not erred, the
conference stated only that the question was "discussed."
Criticism of the 7 May schools conics from several quarters. The new plans for
overhauling the system doubtless represent a compromise on several scores, but the
emerging 7 May system seems to smack a good deal of that old maneuver: "left in
form but right in essence."
25X1
6 August 1973 ClineseAffairs Page 9
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
25X1
25X1
Cldnese statements made at the July UN Seabeds Committee meeting in
Geneva indicate that ('eking is more sharply defining, and in some cases modifying,
its stand on several important issues.
Peking's basic positions on the issues of (lie extc,it of territorial seas and the
creation and breadth of national maritime economic zones remain as stated in the
draft articles informally circulated for discussion at the previous con),,nittee meeting
in April, At the July meeting, however, l' C representative Shen Wci?li;nng modified
the claim that each nation may define the limits of its own territorial seas. Although
Shen asserted that coastal states are entitled to reasonably determine the extent of
their territorial seas, he suggested that such issues should be settled on a regional
basis, with each nation taking into account the legitimate interests of neighboring
states and the conveniences oi* international navigation, This emphasis on regional
negotiations probably was prompted by China's desire to reach agreement with the
Koreas and Japan on jurisdiction over potential oil-bearing areas in the Yellow and
East China seas. Shen's statements suggest that the PRC favors a maximum world
limit on territorial seas considerably beyond its own 12 nautical mile claim. but
probably less than the 200-mile limit claimed by Latin American states,
In another modification of Peking's position, Shen advocated that the proposed
maritime economic zones be limited to 200 nautical miles or to a 200 nicter depth,
whichever is greater. Earlier the Chinese had merely endorsed the concept of
exclusive national maritime economic zones without suggesting a limit.
As in previous committee meetings, Shen attacked the superpowers for seeking
"maritime hegemony." Not surprisingly, his sharpest remarks were reserved for the
USSR, which he accused of opposing the concept of a 200-mile economic zone
while advocating an increase in the limits of the continental shelf from the 200 to
the 500 meter depth line, thereby extending the USSR's continental shelf more than
200 miles,
25X1
6 August 1973
Chinese Affairs
Page 10
25X1
Approved For Releas 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00 700020013-5
 Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
25X1
New linage for Tuchni
25X1
I:allowing a severe drou ht in the northern province of ;+Iiansi, the ret!imc in
laitc' June had to admit (lint the only way it could sustain Taclini, its model
arl!Ncul(tiral unil, was "by carrying water from elsewhere" 25X1
25X1 Late lost month, however, the official line was revise , o mac ac aas
plight seem less ominous, According to NCNA, the model harming brigade could
have tapped the water supply from a nearby reservoir, but decided to conserve that
supply fc.. other, less fortunate farming units in the ai,:a. To make up for this
self-imposed deprivation, Tachal members carried water from distant wells and
storage pits by shoulder pole and "even in jars and wash basins." With water
provided in this fashion, sowing of the crops required ten limes the normal labor
Input.
't'hus, China's nnodel for self-reliance in :agriculture is being held tip his summer
as in example of self-sacrifice. The regime probably hopes that the new Tachai
image will encourage areas that have relatively good harvests this year to sham;
generously and consume fnigally. The task of grain distribution may become a
touchy political issue if the 1973 crop does not show an improvement over last
year's disappointing harvest. The treatment of Tachai's problems again underscores
Peking's desire to allocate all available resources to support agriculture.
The Image of Tachai that emerged in late July is in many ways a real-life
enactment of the struggle dramatized in "Ode to Dragon River," an opera performed
In 1971 under the aegis of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching. In that opera a farming
community deliberately sacrifices its own land so that adjacent farm communities
may survive. Occasionally, some provinces have urged adoption of the so-called
Dragon River spirit, but the regime has not as yet revived the
cxhori~d people to act out its theme. pcrifically F77 1'
25X1
6 August 1973
Chinese Affairs
Page 11
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T008751~000700020013-5 25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
 Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
"llna's Trn'ke (telations with the Third World
25X1
lm11lownicnt of political and economic relations with the lhitd World av.
cotnpnnied China's tc?ernetgence on the world scene following the Cultural Itevolii-
tion, China Is participating in UN(-TAD and i?( All; and has endorsed such Third
World isrurs as expanded limits of territorial sells. Prospects of increased trade and
aid on pencrous trans have induce) a numhc?r of the less cicvc?lopecl countries (I l)('s)
to conclude trade and aid agreements Willi China. Sino?l..l)C trade has taken a sharp
upturn in the 1970s, reaching S1,3 billion In 1972--about 26 percent of C'hina's
total fradc.'1'radc with Aftiea and Latin America has shown the greatest gains.
't'rade Willi the Third World i.i important to China as a source of industrial raw
materials and a meads of earning foreign exchange. The LDC's provide China with all
Its Imports of natural rubber, a major portion of its purchases of textile fibers, and
the bulk of Its copper. These three products stake up about 70 percent of China's
Imports from the LDCs. ilard?currency earnings from trade with the Third world are
an important offset tc? the annual deficits that China incurs in Its trade with the
developed countries. Fast Asia makes the largest contributions-$200 million last
year to China's trade surplus with the L.LX's. The decline in China's export surplus
with tlic Li)Cs from 5225 million In 1970 to 5175 million In 1972 is hccausc trade
deficits with Latin America resulted in sharp increases in nonferrous metal Imports.
Still, trade with China makes up less than one percent of the Third World's
total trade. For a number of the LDCs, however, China provides a sizable market for
raw materials and an Important source of low-priced foodstuffs, textile, and light
manufactures. As a market for raw materials. China is a major customer for
Sudanese cotton, Malaysian and Sri Lankan rubber, and Chilean and Zambian
copper. C hinece good` find their hest markets in East Asia, where many Ovet eas
Chinese reside.
Sine-LDC trade this year will total between $1.4 and S 1.5 billion, It 10-20
percent increase over 1972. China's imports will probably show a greater gain than
its exports. largely because of increased purchases of cotton and rubber. Also. China
has recently turned to Kuwait and Greece for chemical (crtililcrs Exports will also
rise, though to a lesser extent, as new trading relations with countries such as
(Treece, Zaire. and Mexico expand the markets for Chinese goods.
China is likely to continue its strong interest in Third World trade for both
economic and political reasons. Sino-LIX' trade will face some problems in the
? future, however. in the near term. China may have difficulty in producing enough to
satisfy its growing markets in the Third World. In the longer terra, the LDC's will he
25X1 able to rzchuce domestic f goods now imported from China.
0 August 1973
C hincsr Affairs
Page 13
25X1
25X1
25X1 Approved For F4elease 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85TO08
 Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Mao and Chou receive Dt. Yung ('hen.nint, visiting
Cltiticse?Aincrican scientist
Algcri;ut Minister of Public Itcaliii Onear lioudjellab visits
Peking atltlounce% lust direct aid agreement wilh South
Victnanicse communists. heretofore aid has been Ilumcled
through North Vietnam.
Liaoning Province began it series of broadcasts attacking
moderate educational policies such as the college entrance
examination.
20 July Chou lin.lai pleas with visitin North Vietnamese journal.
isis.
21 July
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
release all detained civilians. 25X1
21.27 July Foreign Trade Minister Pai Ilsiang?kuo leads government
trade dt:legation to Australia; signs three- ear Sino-
Au:stralian trade agreement on 24th.
27 July Prople't /)ally "Commentator" article calls on Saigon to
:7=31 July Foreign Trade ,:Mini ter Pai ll iang=kuo lead: governrrtrnt
trade delegation on olfielal visit to New Zealand.
27 July-1 August President of the Congo Ngouabi visits China. Received by
Mao. holds extensive talks with Chou. signs loan agreenlcnt.
28 July
Peking recognizes new Daud government in Afghanistan.
Chou hn?Iai comments roulitlely on Catnhtxlia at Public
banctuct for Congolese president.
I August Annual Trade Agreement concluded with Moscow
Army Day features an uneventful 1)cfensc Minis!ry tecep.
lion. No editorial. and no new PLA appointments an-
nounced. Chou Fn?lai away from Peking on the occasion.
6 August 1973 C).uww Affatn Page 14
Approved For Rele
0700020013-5
T- ---- ' I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Releale 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875ROQ0700020013-5 25X1
August
Mao meets with two outer C'hinrrc-American scientists,
friends of Mao'.r from Ilunan. Chou 1?,n-lui a i i t t for the
lrnt time since Mao began the practice of icceivin visitors
In I?is study, 25X1
3 August People's !;ally "Cornntcnt:tor" article supports Vietnamese
communist Foreign Ministr SInI mcnts rc garrfin Vietnam
ccau?ftrc conrpliancc, 25X1
6 August 1973
aWm A/)'atrr
P a g e I S
Approved For Rele4se 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00700020013-5 25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
Composition of Provincial Party Committees
Original total at formation,
Soptombar 1971 158
Unknown,,-'
1 Civilian 64
~
? Now 17
1
Military 93
Total additions since formation 57
Civilian 2$ Military 11
Votaran 74
Currant total,
July 1973 171
Civilian 70
/ New I s
Total promotions since formation 13
Civilian 10 Military 3
Veteran 9 Unknown 0
New I
Military 82
Total purged, absent since January 1, 1973 or demoted
25X1
Civilian 6 Military 20
Veteran 4 Unknown 3
Nerr 7
'Vrroroln ,..n?o it. r gArr rthn hold a parry or p'.rr--,tirenr "llfion
p., ,. on rho rom,,.oI firm/uhnn
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
 Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020013-5
Provincial Party Committees: Now Faces of '73
25X1
Since the formation of new provincial party comrnitlees in 1971. there has
been a steady, if' gradual, erosion of the military presence on he committees. Partly
through purges and partly through enlargement, Peking has moved to increase the
iiifuencc of civilians on the committees, especially veteran party officials who were
purged by the radicals during the Cultural Revolution and were later replaced by the
military, On the whole, these additions are second?lcvcl party cadre--. former pro-
vincial party secretaries and vice goveniors who have special administrative skills
and in some cases expertise in agricultural and rural problems. With few exceptions,
the once powerful rogional party bosses and provincial party first secretaries have,
not been rehabilitated.
"The Gun" Rules the Party
The confusion and breakdown in order engendered by the Cultural Revolution
forced Peking to order the military into provincial politics. The permanence of the
PLA's "temporary" intrusion was clearly reflected in the composition of the new
party committees formed in late 1970 and 1971 (sec chart). Of China's 29 provinces
and independent municipalities, only two- Peking and Shanghai, hotbed% of Cultural
Revolution activity-did not have it military man in either of the top two spots, The
committees themselves were manned mostly by military men. and the few civilians
who did sit on them were often isolated from real decision making.
The situation proved to be embarrassing for China's leaden, who had long
prided themselves on having a party that puled "the gun." 11eginninn with, and
probably spurred by, the Lin Piao crisis of September-October 1971, Peking took
steps to Icsscn the military's influence. In tie succeeding 22 months the effort has
been relatively successful, given the factionalism that exists within the provinces and
in Peking.
Increased Civilian Influence
Today there is a rough parity between civilian and military representation on
provincial party committees (sac chart). These numbers are a hit misleading, how-
ever, because the military still has an overwhelming command of the top spots. Even
after the purge of 16 top provincial figures-all PLA men--in the wake of the Lin
affair, only -,-.-,c of the lb replacements were civilians. Furthermore, aside from
Shanghai and Peking only Hunan and Ifonan provinces arc without a military man in
either of the top two positions.
6 August 1973 C7rlncse Affairs
Page 16
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T0087512000700020013-5
 Approved For Rel GIA-RDERSTOORZ 000700020013-5
Nonetheless, the current trend clearly favors the civilians:
since the formation of provincial party committees, more than twice as
nuiny civilians have been added as military men, and these additions
have favored vclcran cadre on the order of six to tote;
civilians have been promoted to posts of xecrclary and above at a ratio
of better than three to one over the military; most of the additions and
promotions have come this year.
more than three Iiines as many military men as civilians have dropped
from view, ?utd the trend seems to be accelerating,
New Faces
On the whole, it Is second-level veteran cadre who are returning-i.e., those
Individuals who served in positions Just below the top provincial and regional
leadership spots prior to the Cultural iRevolution. These men were for the most part
provincial party secretaries and vice governors, and ninny have special expertise in
rural and agricultural matters; all are experienced administrators. Given the clouded
agricultural outlook and thc? current drive to revive mass organizations, men with
special talents in rural work and party organization are especially valuable.
Willi few exceptions, thr former top pride in provincial politics-- pre-Cultural
Revolution regional party bosses and provincial party first secretaries- have not been
rehabilitated. The decision on their rehabilitation presumably is now being made,
and will probably be ratified at the 10th Party Congress, These people, unlike those
who already have been rehabilitated, were serious contenders for political power at
the national level before their fall. Should they regain responsible positions, the
military's influence in provincial politics will decline further.
in the immediate future, the current trend toward increased numbers of
veteran cadre returning to provincial committees and a corresponding decline In the
percentage of military will probably continue. Revolutionary Committees, the
administrative units set up during the Cultural Revolution, which still contain a
relatively large proportion of Cultural Revolutionary activists and PLA personnel,
have Inca in control in the countryside. If more of their administrative respon-
sibility is shifted to party committees, there will be an even larger voice for party
veterans in provincial matters. Such a move seems likely. There are reports that
senior military personnel will be asked to choose between a civilian appointment and
a military carer.
6 August 1973
Chincw Affairs
Page 17
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875F4000700020013-5 25X1
 Approved For Relea e -
Whatever the outcome, the coin nlt(ees will continue to face many problems.
1)ivisidns between younger and older cadre, the tendency to add lnople without
temoving others, disagreement over the liberalizing trend, and other vexing issues
will hinder the. political initiative and efficiency Peking appears to be seeking. A
clear Indication of it united leadership in Peking irmains the key-a% it always has
been-?to smoother functioning in the provinces,
25X1
25X1
6 August 1973 Chinese Affain
Page 18
Approved For Releas - 00020013-5
25X1
25X1