CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 5, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Chinese Affairs
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State Department review completed
EF/P Lc-gad
OUT:.
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Top Secret
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Chinese Affairs
5 September 1973
The Party Congress: The Old and the Young
Pre-Convention Contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A Wariness About Visitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Some Observations on the New Leadership . 5
Peking Strikes Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Increased Dependence on World Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
No Comment on Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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Talks With Japan: A Small Step Forward 13
Keeping the Pakistanis on Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Political and Diplomatic Notes 15
ANNEX: The rongress: Louking Bcyutid the Borders . . . . . . . 16
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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The Party Congrvs%: The Old and the Young
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On 24 August, the opening day of the Tenth Party Congress, the delegates
heard two reports that touched on various aspects of the current political situation.
One was Chou Fri-lai's political report, which wrapped up the major events since the
last co!,gress in 1969 and set forth the party's present tasks. The other was it report
on the revision of the party constitution, delivered by Wang flung-wen, the young
Shanghai official who was catapulted to national prominence its one of the party's
five vice chairmen. Although Wang's speech purported to address itself to the
changes in the constitution, it In fact ranged further, overlapping with Chou's on
some points and diverging on others. Wang's address had much more of it revolution-
ary fervor about it than Chou's. Chou seemed concerned mainly with protecting
gains already made and with orderly. unified progress for China in the future.
Wang seemed to have more zest for political struggle than did Chou. Wang
quoted Mao on the necessity and timeliness of the Cultural Revolution and stated
flatly that many political movements "such as the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution" arc necessary, a concept that appears in the new constitution. While
Chou endorsed the line that the future will bring continual struggles within the
party, he did not describe them as political movements on the scale of the Cultural
Revolution. Apparently recognizing the anxiety the news of more "struggles" will
cause among party officials, Chou urged them to be "fully prepared mentally" for
these struggles.
Both Chou and Wang urged party officials to oppose erroneous policies-"dare
to go against the tide," a phrase included ir, the new constitution. Chou seemed to
be alluding to Ns own opposition to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution,
how'wer, while Wang may have had more in mind the need to oppose current
policies. Chou, seemingly aware that party officials have had problems in the past in
trying to determine which policies are correct at a given time, merely called on party
members to "do their best in discerning" erroneous tendencies. Wang, on the other
hand, insisted that those who study Mao and the other Communist philosophers will
have little trouble distinguishing between correct and erroneous policies.
Wang roundly criticized party officials for failing to accept supervision by the
masses, for stifling criticism, and for engaging in such "unhealthy tendencies" as
influence-peddling. He called on the masses to express their views freely, write
big-character posters, and hold great debates-techniques used extensively during the
Cultural Revolution. Chou, on the other hand, was less severe in his criticism, merely
chiding party officials for concentrating on routine and minor matters. He, too,
noted "unhealthy tendencies" in the party, but did not elaborate on these and did
not call on cadre to accept criticism from the masses.
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Wang In general expressed great faith in the notion that constant Ideological
struggle within the party will keep the organization pure and that outside super-
vision by the r?iasses will check any possible ideological backsliding among its
members. Ile nnted, for tixantple, that "revisionism" is the "train danger today." lie
was ringing In Isle praise of the cultural Revolution and viewed upl!cavals of that
nature as a valid exercise for the future. Chou, while paying lip service to some of
these notions, scetTicd concerned about the practical aspects of traiwaining party
discipline and tarty control, assuring the livelihood of the tnasses, and boosting the
morale of party members. Chou made frequent reference to the need for rules find
regulations, and his resort was the only document released by the congress to assign
to party officials the task of "concerning themselves with the well-being of the
masses."
Differences bctwccn a young and an old leader seeps to be illustrated In the two
reports. Wang is a product of the Cultural Revolution and obviously sees merit in
continued stress on revolutionary ferment; Chou had the thankless task of trying to
keep the country running during that time and is acutely aware of the pitfalls. The
addition of Wang to the top hierarchy suggests he is acceptable to moderates like
Chou. In view of the differences between his report and Chou's, however, the party
has apparently accepted the notion that there is roost at the to different
opinions on specific issues.
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The Asian/African/Latin American table tennis tournament that opened in
Peking on 25 August during the Tenth Party Congress gave spectators more to see
than just ping pong nuttches. On 26 August, fan Chen-lin and Ulanfu, two former
vice premiers of the State Council, attended the matches. It was their first public
appearance since their purge during the Cultural Revolution. Ulanfu was an alternate
member of the Politburo and party boss of inner Mongolia. Ton, ti full member of
the Politburo, was the regime's top agricultural administrator during a period when
Peking was pursuing a relatively moderate and pragmatic course in agricultural
development.
't'hey are the first major figures to be rehabilitated since the reappearance last
April of Teng Illsino-ping, the former party secretary general. Tan's return is
particularly significant in the light of Peking's continuing agricultural difficulties and
the consequent need for the experience he represents. Neither man has been
Identified as holding a government position, but both were elected to the tenth
Central Committee.
The decision to reinstate these two men probably helped stimulate the recent
radical assault in the media on a number of pragmatic policies associated with Chou
En-lai. During the weeks immediately preceding the congress, there were caustic
comments attacking the rehabilitation of disgraced cadre. Stringent birth control
regulations, moderate reforms in education, the role of experts and foreign tech-
nology in economic development, and material incentives and production bonuses in
industry were assailed. Along with these attacks, some modifications have occurred
in Chou's programs. For example, the material incentive program has apparently
been discontinued in some factories.
Such critical propaganda, on the eve of the party congress, shows the type of
opposition Chou and otllc: - moderate leaders continuously face within the leader-
ship. The brevity of the party congress suggests that party leaders have yet to come
to grips with many m;jj.ir issues. That task may have been left to the new Politburo.
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Several recent incidents have indicated the Chinese arc becoming more sensitive
about foreign visitors. During the last few months, it ('Itiner?e-American scholar was
expelled, the exposed film of another visitor was confiscated, a well-known Western
authority on China was detained in Shanghai, and it British correspondent and a
group of American educators In separate Incidents encountered difficulty while
photographing posters. Peking reportedly will issue no new visas until mill-October.
These Incidents may be related, at least in part, to the increased political
activity that has been under way for some months in Chinese cities in connection
with the Tenth Party Congress. The Chin.-se-American scholar, Kai-yu llsu, who was
expelled on I 1 August, is the author of it highly laudatory biography of Chou En-lai,
published in 1967. Two Chinese officials denounced the work, told the author he
was clearly biased in favor of Chou, and said that even the book's title-"Chou
En-lai: China's Grey Eminence implied that the Premier was more important than
Mao. Hsu apparently was expelled because his presence before the congress was an
embarrassment to the leadership.
Apart from this case, it is not at all clear what role, if any, domestic politics
have played in such incidents. There have been occasional signs of an adverse
reaction by radical elements in the leadership to some aspects of the Sino-American
exchange program. This was implicit, for example, in a People's Daily article in
mid-August that included a warning not to "wait for, rely on, or beg for outside
support."
Mao's recent meetings with Chinese-American scientists amount to it personal
endorsement of the exchange program, which would seem to preclude any signifi-
cant tampering with it. The Chinese press, moreover, continues to publicize the visits
of prominent Americans.
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f'Wang (lung-wen
'Yell Chien-ying
Liu Po-cheng
Chiang Ching
'Chu To,
ft Shih?yu?
tHus Kuo-fang
Chi Teng'kuei
tWu Tell
Wang Tung-hiring
tChen Yung-kuei
Chan Hsl-lien
W Iision-nian
'LI To-shong
Yao Wen-yuan
'Kong Shang
'Tung Pi?wu
j{tr1 4C:,
tWu Kuci-hsien
tSu Chen-hus
tNi Chih-fu
tSaifudin
hunrlrer-three man of Shanghai and the fastest rising member of China's trresenl leader.
ship; a Cultural Revolution activist and a probable protege of Chang Chun-01141), he may
have moderated Ilia once-radical political position,
Iloas of Kwanpai Province who carte dowry fiord on rampaging Red Guards during the
Culhiral Revolution,
A military man and do facto defense minister.
Retired marshal; an bona ary older,
Mao's wife and leader of radical elements during the Cultural Revolution.
Retired marshal and early builder of the army; an honorary elder.
Klangsu party boa and commander of Nanking Military Region,
Hunan party boa now residing In Poking and active In national politics since the Cultural
Revolution; little is known of his political views.
From ilonan Province; rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolution,
Peking party boa and fonner head of Kirin Province.
Mao's former bodyguard; director of the central office of the Central Committee.
Boa of Tachal Commune, China's national agricultural model.
Liaoning party boa and commander of Shenyang Military Region.
Finance minister and long-time associate of Chou En-lat.
A military man, head of the Central Political Department of Pcoplr,'s Liberation Army,
and Anhwei Province perly boas.
Party boss of Shanghai and possibly party secretary general; generally believed to be one
of the more powerful members of the Politburo who may have moderated his former
radical views.
Number-two man in Shanghai and a prominent leader of radical forces during the Cultural
Revolution.
Former head of the security apparatus who was criticized for radical exceawes during the
Cultural Revolution; believed to be in poor health.
An honorary eider who Is acting President of the People's Republic of China.
ALTERNATES TO T;IE POLITBURO
A female worker
Deputy commander of ;he navy
A worker
N'aad of Sinkiang Province and, as a Uighur, .,he of the highest ranking minority csdre in
China
? Member of Standing Committee of Politburo f New member of Politburo
THE NEW POLITIJUROOI}? Till! 10th CENTRAL COMMI'1'TEI?
,j r_. ?Meo Too-Tuiip, Chairman
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Sonic ObscrvntionH on the New Leadership
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The new leadership, endorsed last month at the Tenth Party Congress, is a
mixed bag of party regulars, model workers and peasants, rehabilitated party and
government officials, and military men. The new Central Committee is substantially
larger than its predecessor. It consists of about 200 holdovers from the ninth Central
Committee, 95 newcomers, and 20 rehabilitated officials from the cighth com-
mittee. Sixty-two niernbers of the ninth committee were dropped,
The PLA did relatively well, given Peking's desire to reduce the military's
Influence in party affairs. The military reportedly was allowed to make up only one
sixth of the total number of delegates to the congress, it quota that allegedly caused
some grumbling in the ranks. The military won roughly 30 percent of the Central
Committee seats, a cutback from the 40 percent it had on the ninth Central
Committee but possibly it larger allocation than originally intended. The group even
included about ten new military men. A notable absentee was Wang I-isin-ting, a
deputy chief of staff who was a full member of the last committee. Wang failed to
make the new group, as did the second-ranking leaders of Kwangsi and Shantung
provinces, both military men. In all, 38 military men from the old committee were
passed over.
The three former party leaders who were rehabilitated earlier this year were
elected to the Central Committee. The list also included another veteran, Li
Ching-chuan, who was not rehabilitated earlier. Several former provincial party
bosses also were elected to the new committee.
Chou En-lai was successful in placing several of his trusted associates from the
State Council on the Central Committee. The Foreign Ministry is especially well
represented. Chiao Kuan-hua, Chou's alter-ego in the Foreign Ministry, is a new-
comer to the committee, as arc the premier's English language interpreter, Nancy
Tang, and UN ambassador Huang Hua. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei is now in the
group, correcting an unusual situation in which he had no formal party status. Liao
Cheng-chili, a Japan specialist and close associate of Chou's, is back from tli eighth
Central Committee.
Chou did less well on the Politburo. None of the nine newcomers can be said to
be his close associate. Three of Chou's associates had seemed to be in line for
Politburo slots, but did not make it. Moreover, former Politburo members among
the rehabilitated party officials did not regain their seats. These men were not
necessarily personally associated with Chou, but the policies they espoused when
they were in power were virtually identical to Chou's. While ultra-leftists Chiang
Ching and Yao Wen-yuan failed to move up to the elite Standing Committee, it is
worth noting that Chou's closest associate on the Politburo, Li Hsien-nien, was also
passed by.
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There is no scat on the Central Committee for Pal ilsiang-kuo, a military mail
who has done it commendable job as foreign trade minister. Pai was not on the
previous committee, but scented a logical candidate this time around because of his
prominence in government affairs and his apparently good working relationship with
Chou.
Some radicals were also disappointed. Mao's supposed niece, Wang llai Jung, is
not on the committee, nor is Mao's nephew Mao Yunn-hsin, a Liaoning Previncc
party secretary. The radical husband-and-wife team from Szechwan, Liu Chich-ting
and Chang Hsi-ting, both members of the ninth Central Committee, were dropped
from the tenth. The couple, imprisoned in the 1960s by regional party chief Li
Ching-chuan, enjoyed Madame Mao's support and rose to Central Committee mem-
bership after Li fell. With Li back on the Central Committee, it is not surprising that
the radical duo has lost favor. Another radical casualty of the old committee is Nish
Yuan-tze, a Peking University instructor who led a radical Red Guard Group during
the Cultural Revolution.
These are initial observations on the composition of the new Central Com-
mittee. They will be amplified after further analysis.
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Peking Strikes Back
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A round of intensified anti-Soviet propaganda-perhaps Peking's sharpest attack
in two years--has been under way for several months. The Chinese press has carried
numerous articles critical of Soviet diplomacy in Europe, the Middle Fast, Persian
Gulf, and Japan. Soviet international economic, maritime, and strategic arms policies
have all been condemned. Peking has implied widespread support for its views by
carrying a healthy number of official statements and artir'",s critical of Moscow from
such disparate countries as Sierra Leone, Australia, and Nepal.
The Chinese effort picked up steam in July, clearly in response to the stiff,
high-level Soviet assault that followed the Crimea conference. Last month, anti-
Soviet articles appeared almost daily in Peking. The Chinese recalled the anniversary
of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia for the first time in a formal commentary
and in the process condemned Brezhnev by name. In one of the sharpest attacks yet,
NCNA on 25 August asserted that Moscow's current policies regarding neighboring
countries, Soviet republics, and non-Russian nationalities in the USSR are as aggres-
sive, colonial, and oppressive as the policies of Czarist Russia.
Chinese commentary in the main has lacked an authoritative stamp, despite the
fact that Moscow, has pressed its campaign with anti-Chinese statements from
Brezhnev himself and with a host of authoritative articles in Pravda, Kommunist,
and the official organs of Moscow's staunch Eastern European allies. Early this
month, Peking did issue a government statement critical of Moscow's nuclear policy,
but it was on the occasion of China's accession to a treaty making Latin America a
nuclear-free zone, and it simply reiterated long-standing Chinese themes. Moreover,
Peking's propaganda lacks the edge of Moscow's; the Chinese, for instance, have
developed no major new themes, nor have they belabored the Soviets on a specific
bilateral issue.
The Chinese seem to have been stimulated primarily by external events;
virtually all attacks are centered on Soviet foreign policy. Aside from Moscow's own
propaganda campaign, the Chinese are mindful of Soviet efforts to promote a
collective security scheme in Asia, a world-wide conference of Communist parties
aimed at reading Peking out of the movement, and European detente, which Peking
long has believed works to its disadvantage. Peking is also concerned about Soviet
competition for influence in Japan and in the Persian Gulf - Indian Ocean area.
Peking has been particularly critical of Soviet diplomacy in the latter regions. The
highly critical 25 August article recalled Czarist Russia's aggression not only against
China but also against Iran. China has made no bones about its intention to try to
shoulder the Soviets aside in Iran.
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 Increased Dependence on World Economy
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Agricultural difficulties )vcr the past two years, along with a slowdown in
industrial growth and a greater need for foreign technology, have prompted Peking
to retreat from the Maoist ideal of self-reliance. Evidence of China's abruptly
increased dependence on the world economy-notably on American granaries and on
Japanese and Western high-technology industries-is found in:
-costly increases in imports of grain, cotton, and other agricultural
products, from $450 million in 1972 to an anticipated record level of
$1.2 billion in 1973; more than one half of the 1973 total will be
supplied by the United States;
-a substantial expansion in investment in agriculture and supporting
industries, an expansion requiring foreign plants, equipment, and tech-
nology;
-a willingness to relax the self-imposed policy of no foreign debt by
incurring medium-terns obligations on foreign plants;
-a drive to develop new sources of foreign exchange to help pay the
mounting import bill.
Peking's greater reliance on foreign sources for food, machinery, and tech-
nology almost certainly will extend through the remainder of the current Fourth
Five-Year Plan (1971-75). Agricultural production in the first eight months of 1973
has been hampered by drought in the north and floods in the south and may not
greatly surpass the disappointing harvest of 1972, which was roughly five percent
below 1971. Investment in the agricultural sector must be increased substantially if
production is to grow two percent a year and thus keep up with the population
growth rate. The modernization of industry, transportation, and the military (in-
cluding steel, petroleum exploratio;i and refining, electronics, chemicals, and
machine-building) all depends on foreign technology.
China's current purchases from the US are largely agricultural products. Be-
cause of world-wide food shortages, the United States almost overnight has become
China's principal supplier of agricultural products and its third leading trading
partner, behind Japan and Hong Kong. In the industrial field, the United States is a
latecomer to a market previously shared by Japan and the leading industrial nations
of Western Europe. The US has sold communications equipment, ten Boeing 707
aircraft, and, most recently, three ammonia plants. As for technology, the Chinese
will continue to rely on several non-Communist industrial nations. The United States
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will have an advantage in high-technology branches like civil aircraft, advanced
comlputert, colmntill ica(Ioils equipment, and oil-drilling equipment, China will not
enter into joint ventures with foreign firms, however, and will sc.k to minimize tile
number of fo;cIgn icchnic:d specialists on Chinese soil. Peking could readily increase
its nlctiiunl-term debt scvcralfold alxwc the present $200.300 million, but will move
cautiously. The US share in file financing of Industrial purchases will be tiny in
alktolutc terms. The United States will share the impact of China's efforts to raise its
foreign exchange earnings. Peking is trying to expand its market in the US for silk
textiles, specialty foods, objets d'art, and handicrafts.
Regardless of who eventually succeeds the aging Mao and Chou, China's
economic problems will pose constraints on political action. Any regime probably
would be under strong pressure (a) to retain the United States as a key hack-up
source of foot] and cotton merely to maintain the spartan living standards of the vast
population, (b) to look to the outside world for modern equipment and technology
in order not to lag further behind international technical standards ].l industry and
agriculture, and (c) to improve Its military c:ipabilities on file. basis of foreign
support in the fields of communication equipment, transport equipment, instru-
ments, and metal alloys. The rhetoric of political controversy will continue to
exhibit wider swings than artoul economic policy, which itencrally will reflect these
economic realities. Nonetheless, the history of political conflict in China casts doubt
on straight-line forecasts of economic policies based on calculations of economic
]necessity
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No Comment On Cnmbodin
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Chinn passed tit) several opportunities tills month tip ! mmnlcnt on significant
developments in Cambodia. There has been no official ells- .;neat, for example. of
it statement by Sihanouk's exile government In mid-August -cgarding the US bomh-
ing halt, although a response to such statements is usually oracle within days. The
Chinese press did carry truncated versions of official Lao and Vietnamese supporting
statements, but this only underscored the absence of Chinese comment. Peking's
own news accounts of the bombing halt were straightforward and brief.
In the process of heavily editing other Vietnamese and Cambodian Conlin till ist
commentary, Peking has downplayed warnings against Thai or South Vietnamese
intervention, criticism of the US and its Irdochina policies, and the more militant
positions of the Cambodian Insurgents. Peking has not kept pace with its Asian
Communist allies in reporting insurgent military successes; accounts of such suc-
cesses actually tapered off sharply its the Chinese press after mid-August.
There have been other signs that Peking is attempting to put some distance
between itself and the Cambodian insurgents. Chou En-tai (lid not play host at a
banquet for Sihanouk when the prince returned from North Korea in mid-August,
although Chou has done so in the past. There have been no indications since
mid-July that Peking is urging tic; insurgents to negotiate. Indeed. the last authorita-
tive Chinese statement on Cambodia-Chou En-lai's brief remarks at a banquet for a
foreign visitor on 28 July-anmounted to little more than a reiteration of support for
Sihanouk's five-point proposal, now more than three years old.
There are several plausible explanations: Peking m. -y believe that negotiations
are unlikely at this time; policy disagreements may have sharpened among the
insurgent factions, or even between them and their principal backers in Hanoi and
Peking; or Peking may simply have decided to withdraw from more direct involve-
ment for the present, leaving it up to the Cambodians and others to settle matter:..
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 Talks With Jn )an; A Sandi Step horwnrd
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Japanese and Chinese trade officials in Tokyo reached broad agreement last
week on a proposed treaty of trade and commerce. The treaty will %et general trade
levels and cover nmst?favorcd?naIion treatment, procedures for trade contacts, and
related issues such as patents and trademarks. Many specific problems remain to he
negotiated, and it appears doubtful that the agreement will be initialed by 29
September, the anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations. The delay In
initialing can be traced to contradictions between Chinese demands and trade
practices atkl Japanese procedures, which were ton great to resolve during the two
weeks of negotiations in 'f okyo. Both countries have been clugrined by their failure
to conclude any of the major commercial agreements envisaged when relations were
normalized last year.
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A proposed aviation agreement received primary attention over the past year,
but negotiations have been stuck on the question of Japan's continuing airline
connections with Taiwan. Despite Tokyo's desire to normalize commercial relations
with Peking and promote further political ties, the Japanese have been unwilling to
sacrifice the profitable Taiwan air link. Thus, in political terms, the air agreement
remains the most important hurdle to overcome and the most significant objective
to be gained. F7 I
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Keeping She Pakistanis on Board
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Chinese officials tried to put Sino-Ihtkistani ties on it firm anti-Soviet footintt
during talks with Pakistani Minister of State for i)cfcnum and Foreign Affairs Azir.
Ahmed I me lust week in Peking, Foreign Minister Chi Pcng-fci, in formal remarks at
a hanqucc for Ahmed, indicated that Moscow's continued presence in the Indian
Ocean basin Jcopardizec.`? regional stability, even though the freshly concluded
Indo-Pakistani agreement improved prospects for more normal relationships in thr
region.
In private, Peking may have renewed warnings that the new regime in Afghanis-
tan may well be a stalking horse for Soviet expansionist ambitions and that the
common Sino-Pakistani interest In curbing Soviet influence in the region should
form the basis for continuing close tics. Chinese military officials took part in the
talks, suggesting that military assistance was also discussed.
Peking clearly has come to see its interests in the region in terms of blunting
Soviet advances, particularly in light of Soviet attempts to gain support in the Indian
Ocean area for its Asian collective security scheme. As China and Pakistan consider
closer relations with India in the wake of the India-Pakistan agreement, Peking
clearly hopes to prevent c weakening of its alliance with Pakistan ar.3 to me vital
alliance against the Soviets on the subcontinent
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politit?nl and Diplomatic Notes
iwen 'tiheir Ilmt Friends Didn't Know
Some of ('Finn's closest allies were unaware that Peking had held its Tenth
Party Congress until it was all over. On 29 August, just prior to the announcement
about the congress. an FaQ German diplomat was at the airport when North
Vietnam's Le Duan arrived In Peking and wits obviously interested in any news about
it. In response to Le Duan's query if there was anything new on that score, Chou
merely replied, "Nothing," The Romanian and Albanian ambassadors were not told
about the congress until It had ended.
Yuan lo-sheng, a veteran party cadre in Kirin Province, made his first public
appearance in 11 months on 16 August, attending an athletic meet in Cluangchun.
lie has been a secretary on the provincial party committee since 1959 and was
criticized by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, but had survived to
become an alternate member of the ninth Central Committee. There is no apparent
reason for his long absence from public view, but he evidently has retained full
authority. At his reappearance, he was ranked fourth as before and was given both
his party and government title. Moreover, lie was again elected as an alternate
member of the Central Committee at the Tenth Party Congress.
Chinese Affairs
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The Congres: Looking Beyond the Border,,
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Chou I n-lai's political report to the Tenth Party Congress roaffirmcd in
extremely strong terms the basic anti-Soviet direction of China's lorelr,n policy after
the Cultural Revolution. Chou implied that Peking intended to curl, the spread of
Soviet influence wherever it could: Chinese policy is In effect It cor,talnment policy
aimed at Moscow. Ile branded the Soviets as China's chief cncrn;', both as the most
immediate and dangerous threat to Chinese security and as Peking's foremost
ideological foe. Chou urged the Chinese populace to be on guard against it surprise
Soviet attack, and he called on Marxist-Leninist parties to join Peking in a struggle
"to the etxl" against Soviet-style communist doctrine.
Chou was unreserved In his indictment of Moscow. I Ic said the Soviet regime
has restored capitalism, enforced a "fascist dictatorship," and pursued an aggressive,
militaristic policy worthy of a "new Czar." Chou implied that both Lin Piao and Liu
Shao-chi were Soviet agents, fully supported by Brexhnev, and that Moscow was
attempting to exploit internal Chinese politics. Chcu also spoke about the current
Sino-Soviet polemic; in Peking's most authoritative statement to date, he attributed
Moscow's campaign to an effort to curry favor with "monopoly capitalists" now
involved in commercial arrangements with Moscow. lie called on the USSR to
withdraw its troops from Mongolia or Czechoslovakia, or to return the Kurile Islands
to Japan, as it sign of good will.
Chou left scant hope for a Sino-Soviet ideolo3ical reconciliation, but he
reiterated Peking's call for improved state relations and a negotiated settlement to
the boundary dispute. Chou, moreover, seemed less alarmed about an imminent
Soviet attack than in the report to the Ninth Party Congress in 1969.
Chou's treatment of the US was mild in contrast to his remarks regarding the
USSR. It was much milder than the ninth congress political report, which termed
the US "the most ferocious enemy of the people of the whole world." Chou did not
comment on American military expenditures, overseas bases, or domestic problems
as the 1969 political report had. Chou's report contained the first public ideological
rationale for Sino-American detente. lie argued that "necessary compromises be-
tween ideologically disparate countries should be distinguished from the "collusion
and compromise" between the US and USSR.
Chou reiterated Peking's long standing opposition to attempts by the US and
USSR-"the world's two nuclear superpowers"-to dominate international affairs.
Here again, Chou's report was easier on the US than on the Soviets, and milder than
the report to the ninth congress. Chou depicted the Soviets as expanding into the
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Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and "every place their hands can reach," while lie
said the US has been in "decline" since the Korean War. 11k said nothing of
American policy regarding Taiwan, Korea, and Indochina; the 1969 report had
attacked Washington sharply on these issues.
To the smaller countries, Chou seemed to offer a close relationship with China
as leverage against the pressures of the bit; powers a-xl, he reaffirmed the Chinese
policy of championing the interests of the Third World. lie invited ('onununist and
Third World countries as well as Japan and European states chafing at bit; power
"bullying" to Join China in a broad, united front aimed against the "hegemonisn-"
of the superpowers. Chou made it clear, however, that most of the bullying
originated in Moscow; unlike the 1969 report, Chou (lid not indicate that the U.S.
was the direct target of the "just struggles" of the 'T'hird World.
In a major turnabout from 1969 formulations, Chou stressed the contention
between the US and USSR in their quest for hegemony; (lie ninth congress political
report focused on Soviet-American collusion. Chou indicated that relaxation of
tension between Moscow and Washington was passing and superficial, citing the case
of both powers supporting disarmament while "expanding their armaments daily."
lie said that Soviet-American friction maintains the world's balance of power. In
short. Chou seemed to sec advantages in Soviet-US rivalry similar to those Washing-
ton sees in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Chou specifically warned that Soviet-American
detente could work to Peking's disadvantage in Europe. lie said that the West,
through European detente, is seeking to divert the Soviet peril eastward toward
China, but that Moscow is feinting eastward while aiming to expand into Western
Europe.
While citing Chinese diplomatic gains since 1969, Chou hardly mentioned the
ideological and revolutionary goals that (lie ninth congress heavily stressed. Unlike
the 1969 report, Chou slid not use the term "revolutionary struggle of the proletar-
iat" and said nothing of "armed struggles" in Burma, Indonesia. or elsewhere, or of
"revolutionary mass movements" in Japan and the West. Chou did reiterate Chinese
support for the peaceful reunification of Korea, for the Palestinian struggle against
Zionism, and for claims by Latin American countries to 200-nautical-mile territorial
waters.
Chou's remarks differed in tone--although not greatly in conter,t-from the
foreign policy section of Wang Hung-wen's report on the party constitution. Wang
seemed harder on the US, indicating that Peking should be alert to surprise attacks
from the US as well as theUSSR and charged both with posing a "subversive" threat
to the party.
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16 August
18 August
20 August
Sihanouk returns to Peking from North Korea; ntct by Choti
Dutch parliamentary group arrives In Peking; meets with ('Iron
Fn-Iai on 21 August.
Chiao Kuan-hua meets with Justice William 0. Douglas.
21 August China accedes to the Treaty of 'flatelolco, declaring Latin
America a nuclear-free zone; accompanying government and
People's Dally "Commentator" statements reiterate Chinese posi-
tions on nuclear weapons.
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23 August
First of Boeing 707 jet aircraft purchased by Peking arrive!: ii
Yell Chien-ying meets with military delegation from North
24-28 August Tenth Party Congress held in Peking.
25 August Madame Binh stops over in Peking en route to Algiers nonaligned
conference; met by Ilan Nien-lung.
Asian/African/Latin American table tennis tournament opens in
Peking with SG nations represented: ceremonies attended by
Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chia-),
Yao Wen-vuan. Li Ilsien-nien. Chi Tent';-kuci. Li Te-sheng, Wang
Tung-hsing, and Sihanouk.
26 August
Rehabilitation of'Tan Chen-lin and Ulanfu disclosed.
28 August Chinese delegates walk out of meeting of regional committee of
29 August Peking releases communique on Tcn'h Party Congress and list of
new Central Committee.
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29-3 1 August North Viet mm~csc I:irst Secrctury Le Dmin stup% over in Peking
en route to Ilanoi after six weeks in USSR' Illects with Cht)lu
Tin fai anti Sili lnrnlk.
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:1t) August First flenar session of flew Cenif;fl Committee elects new Polit-
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huf'o.
?
3 1 August Peking lcIe ises l:n-Tai's ilolitical report to the
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I September Peking releases text of Want; flung-wen's speech on the r-::aivn
of the party constitution and the text of (lie new constitution.
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