CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: September 18, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

 AooilQU Rd eIdase 2(' 5/ f2
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Chinese Affairs
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Op Secret
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State Department review completed
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18 September 1973
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Chinese Affairs
This publication was preparad by the China branches of the least Asia
Pacific Division of th' Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional
contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence.
Comments and queries are welcome. They should he directed to the authors
of the Individual articles.
C0NTh"NTS
18 September 1973
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Maligning Moscow . . . . . . . . . I
Pleasing Pyonixyang 3
The Subcontinent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
scssin AI iers ? 7
Peking on Indochina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ?
Submarine Cable Purchescs from Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
ANNEX: A Further Look at the New Central Committee . . . . . 12
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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Mali nin t Morrow
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Peking is broadening its propaganda attack on the Soviet Union. In the last two
weeks, N('NA has either originated or replayed ar'liclrs cxtreniely critical of Soviet
policy in virtually every part of dthe world, In all of' these attacks, Moscow is
portrayal as pursuing a policy of detente while in fact it is building up its military
capabilities and seeking world hegemony.
-On I September, N('NA approvingly quoted Secretary of Uc?
I'ense Schlesinger's statements: "the existence of' detente has not
affected Soviet behavioral all," and "Moscow sees no conflict betweell
an atmosphere of detente and improving their active forces.
On 5 September, NCNA accused Moscow of "expansionist
moves" in the Persian (gull' aimed at gaining control of this "highly
strategic area" and its vast oil reserves,
-,.,Oil 7 September. NCNA quoted Western news reports that
Moscow is stepping rip naval and air activities in the Caribbean and
that this has caused "uneasiness" in Washington. NCNA also repeated
its charge that Moscow still refused to sign the protocol on the
prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.
On () September an NCNA "correspondent" denounced the
"Brezhnev clique" for trumpeting the "myth of detente" in world
affairs, while going all out in the arms race and developing multiple
independently targeted missile warheads.
--Also on 9 September, NC'NA denor.nnccd Moscow for renewing
its efforts to revive the concept of an Asian collective security arrange-
ment. NCNA charged that this was in reality ill effort to fill the void
left by withdrawing US forces front Asia. The article cited expanding
Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and thr
Cambodian port of Koinpong Som.
During this sane period, articles critical of the Brezhnev-Nixon summit have
also appeared, but the emphasis has been on Soviet rather than US perfidy. One
article criticized Moscow for using the Soviet-US agreement on the prevention of
nuclear war to proclaim the successes of its "peace diplomacy," while continuing its
"nuclear intimidation and blackmail against the people of various countries";
another replayed a caustic anti-Soviet article by a Japanese leftist journal: a third
cited the annual world defense survey of the London International Institute for
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Strategic Similes to assert that despite the disarmament "promises" of both super-
powers, arms competition between Moscow and Washington is continuing unabated.
Taken tog':tlicr, these articles Will reflect and reinforce Chou I;n-tai's analysis
of' the Sino-Soviet-US triangular relationship. In his report to the Toth forty
Congress, ('hou criticized both superpowers, but labeled Moscow as C'hin's chid'
enemy. Ile said that while "temporary collusion" was passible between the super-
powrrs, it was certain to be eclipsed by continrin; global "competition." ('lion's
statements also probably rellccI Chinese concern that the Nixon-lire'lrnev summit
may have strengthened Moscow's hand and emboldened the Soviets to brunch their
latest propaganda e :npaign against Peking. ('Nina, while almost certainly worried
about the Soviet military threat, is also strongly interested in countering Moscow's
effcrts to norlr:r itsc I' as a )owe i lent on detente and disarmament,
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('leasing Pyongyang
Last week I'cking lavished considerabIL attention on the 25th anniversary of
the North Korean regime. A frlendship delegation headed by Central ('omntittee
Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng traveled to Pyongyang toad was received by Kim II-sung.
Chou En-hi and three of the four other vice chairmen attended a reception at the
Korean Embassy, and Peoples I)WIly ran a long; editorial extending China's "warmest
congratulations and loftiest sululc" to the North Koreans. The editorial, as well as a
speech given by Le ?I'c?sheng in Pyongyang, reiterated Peking's support for Kina
II-song's program for the rett-ail'ication of the peninsula and included a general call
for the withdrawal of US troops and a demunciati,ii of a "two-Koreas" approach.
A display of' good will is not unusual I'or Peking on the special anniversaries of'
its oldest ally in Asia, but the broad high-level attention paid to the event this year
suggests that Peking is making special efforts to shore up its relationship with the
North Koreans at a time when China is coming under increasing propaganda attack
from the USSR. As late as early summer, North Korean leaders were expressing
discontent over their relations with Peking and were praising Moscow. Peking is
obviously trying to tilt the balance back toward C'h;na. Just prior to the anniversary,
Peking had scored points by roundly criticizing Moscow for inviting South Korea to
participate in the World University Games.
The Chinese are also out in front of the Soviets in advancing North Korea's
interests at the UN. In New York last week, Chinese Ambassador 1luang llua
emphasized Peking's support of the Algerian resolution on the Korean question in
private talks with US Ambassador Scali. China, as it did last year, is co-sponsoring
the resolution. This year's document for the first time specifically calls for ter-
minating of the United Nations Command. I Luang said that both UNCURK and the
UN Command are "stumbling blocks" to the unification of Korea and implied that
UN membership for both Koreas would lead to the perpetual division of the
peninsula. a position that is identical to that of North Korea, Huang rejected the US
view that a UN presence was needed to enforce the armistice in Korea and predicted
that "wide controversies would arise when both the Algerian and the US resolu-
tions on the subject were placed before the UN General Assembly. After an initial
round of lobbying last year on behalf of the Algerian resolution, the Chinese
accepted the negative decision of the General Assembly without making a major
issue of its differences with the US on the question. This year the Chinese probably
feel compelled to press somewhat harder, although they will no doubt stop short of
any all-out confrontation.
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With Chinese policy taking on in Increasingly awl-Soviet cast, ('eking appar-
ently 1, -c decided to forgo any Carly normalization of relations with India and
13anglt ' ill, despite the Ingo-Pakistani settlement, Chinese diplomats have indicated
that normal ties with Dacca now depend on the repatriation of all Pakistani
prisoners-Including the 195 singled out I'or trial, Resolution of this issue seems at
least months away. China's chief' UN delegate Iluang Ilea indicated to his US
counterpart last week that Peking would prefer to avoid another embarrassing veto
of' Dacca's bid For UN membership, but he clearly implied that China would vote
nay unless time prisoner exchange were completed.
Delhi's treaty ties with Moscow have intensified Clihha's coolness toward India.
IAn article in the Chinese press asserted
that Moscow has inherited Britain's colonial mantle in India. Sino-Indian relations
have been further aggravated by a planned European trip by the Dalai Lanha. The
Chinese have formally protested to Delhi and have asked several European countries
to refuse visas,
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Peking clearly views its policy in the context of competition with the Soviets
for regional influ,'nce and seems prepared to risk damage to its lesser interests. In his
conversation with the US envoy, Huang Hua said he thought the situation would
become more tense as the Soviets sought to expand their power southward into the
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to compete with the US for the area's strategic
resources primarily oil.
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Assessing Algiers
Vollowing (lie rtncienl Chinese maxim of "doing nothing that everything ciiiglrt
he done," Peking adopted if low posture at the recently concluded nonaligned
summit meeting in Algiers, ('hou I;n-lai's grectintt?' to the nice (lug. which contained
the by-now standard line on resisting dornimc on of the world by the big powers,
was the only ol'f!cial Chinese statement at the affair. Much of Peking's work,
however, was done by others, Many of the speakers at the conference adopted (lie
Chinese thesis that Soviet imperialism is on a par with that of the United States and
that Third World nations should resist the ef'f'orts of' the su )erpowers to achieve
hegeiiton .
Pe King mcc rn gave navy coverage to ae
conference, selectively quoting those speakers who supported a n independent role
I'or Third World countries or opposed the superpowers on various issues. The
Chinese let several incidents speak for themselves For example, they had no
comment on 13 ezhnev's letter protesting the luirpilig of' the USSR and the US
together as hegemonistic superpowers. Castro's tiniil:,r defense of Moscow, and
Libyan President Qadhafi's anti-Soviet rejoinder. By this tactic. China appears to
have gained some political ground vis-a-vis the USSR among the nonaligned nations.
The heavy publicity given the conference underlines the importance Peking
attaches to its pursuit of political support against the USSR throughout the non-
aligned world. Chou En-tai remarked to the Tenth Party Congress that the awaken-
ing of the Third World was a major development in contemporary international life.
An NCNA article published on the opening clay of the Algiers conference, echoing
Chou's remarks of last August, criticized both the USSR and the US. But Moscow
was characterized as a menacing, expansionist power. while the US was described as
a declining power.
Peking must be g.atified at the progress it made at the conference in tarnishing
the image of the USSR., but the Chinese almost certainly realize that the nonaligned
world is still a collection of individual countries with no enmity of goals and with no
recognized leadership. The Third World was not even able I,- agree on permanent
machinery to attend to its interests. Since it lacks the strength o" either of tine two
superpowers, Peking seeks political ties and support wherever it can find theta.
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Peking on Indllehina
Peking is still treating Vietnam developments Mill great restraint., limiting its
comments to expressions of C'hinese support for the Vietnrunese Communists In the
context of post-war economic and political reconstruction. China marked North
Vietnam':; National Day on I September more quietly tha., at any thnc during the
war yeas. It was Yell ('hien-ring who led the Chinese delegation to the DRV
Embassy reception in Peking, not Chou En-lai, who had attended every year since
I904. Briel' toasts rather than lengthy speeches were exchanged, and Peking's
pledges of support at the reception and in the congratulatory message signed by the
Chinese leadership were subdued and were confined to civilian enterprises.
China's priorities and outlook toward Vietnam were clearly reflected in its
handling of the Chinese aid shipment to the PRG in northern South Victnmt on I
September. The Chinese have done to some length to stress that the shipment was
for civilian, not military, uses and there fore consistent with Peking's position that
the war has ended and economic reconstruction started.
Chinese restraint also was apparent during recent stopovers in Peking by North
Vietnamese party leader Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong. NCNA did not go
into any details about Le Duan's meeting with Chou En-lai in late August, and its
description of Chou's Meeting with Dong in mid-August was perfunctory. The North
Vietnamese accounts also were less enthusiastic than usual, suggesting the two sides
encountered several areas of disagreement, almost certainly including Chinese mili-
tary aid.
It has been clear for some time that Peking and Hanoi differ over the
composition and level of assistance that the Chinese should dispatch southward.
North Vietnam obviously wants more military aid than China is willing to send. For
example, Hanoi publicized an account of a ceremcny in Canton in which the North
Vietnamese ambassador decorated Chinese individuals and units involved in trans-
porting military aid to North Vietnam dutirg the war: the Chinese press has not
mentioned the ceremony.
Peking has also maintained a low profile with respect to the situation in
Cambodia. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei offered Peking's first authoritative endorse-
ment of the major statement by Sihanouk's exile government in mid-August, but it
came in a routine way during the DRV National Day reception. Chou En-hi barely
mentioned Cambodia in his political report to China's party congress. While con-
tinuing to replay major statements of' the Cambodian insurgents, Peking recently has
heavily edited out criticism of the US and references to Thai and South Vietnamese
support for Phnom Penh. NCNA did broadcast a lengthy article on current develop-
ments in Cambodia on 6 September, but it apparently was primarily intended as an
anti-Soviet polemic and offered no insights into Peking's current thinking on the
Cambodian situation
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Submarine Cable Purchases From Japan
Japan has emerged as the leading contender for C'hina's potentially lucrative
market for submarine telephone contnnunications cable, After nearly Iwo years of
intensive negotiations with the Chinese and spirited competition with other non-
Communist suppliers, a consortium of Japanese companies has recently announced
winning orders From China to supply underwater coaxial cable systems for both
international and domestic communications, Two of the orders, which Japanese
officials say are firm, total nearly $25 million a $10 million project for installing an
international coaxial cable system between Japan and China, and a 400-kilometer
submarine cable system costing nearly $5 million which reportedly wili be installed
betwc-en the Chinese ports of" fang-ku and Lu-shun. The Japanese expect to receive
additional contracts for submarine cable >-ystenrs and two or more cable-laying ships.
The total value could exceed $50 million,
China's recent decision to go ahead with file project to build a high-capacity
submarine cable between the two countries has been a major victory for Japan. The
Japanese attach considerable importance to being the first conlitry to establish
submarine cable communications with China. The plan initially was proposed in late
1971 by the International Telegraph and Telephone Company Limited (K1)1)), a
private firm which owns and operates Japan's international telecommunications
facilities. -lie Japan-China cable system, which is expected to be in operation by
mid-1976, will have a capacity of 480 telephone circuits. The system is expected to
link Shanghai and Nagasaki, although several other Japanese cities are vying for the
honor of being the terminal site I'or the cable.
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The Japanese principals who were awarded the international submarine cable
contract are expected to be the key suppliers of submarine cable for China's
domestic use as well. In early June, the Chinese concluded an agreement with Asaki
Boeki, Fujitsu Limited, Japan Ocean Submarine. Cable Company, and C. Itok
Company for the supply of equipment and materials for constructing a submarine
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cable !)Ct%' Cn What the .1 al1{I i 111esutned won Id he Ticntsln and Luta. According
to the .1grecnle111, ('I1i1111 will 5e11d tcchntCiall9 In Japan for training by I-'u)itsu and
Jallatt Occcul Submarine ('able Company. I)I11)11 conli)lelion ()I' the trainin Ihcsc
tec1111icia 15 will r 1 1 v SC file actual I"101111 of Inc cable,
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The Tenth ('entral Committee, elected in August 11.)73, Is the hugest ('cntral
Committee ever elected in the history of the paarty. As Central Committees have
continually grown in she front one party congress to the next !hey have hcconlc
more representative, Involving youth, women, workers, peastw;,, ind other groups
that reflect the general composition of the party. Since the Cultural Revolution the
majority of scats has shifted front national to provincial officials.
This expansion of the Central ('ommIItee has tended to decrease its effective-
ness as it policy-making body. The large numbers and the Increasing representation
from the provinces have made the convening of a Central Committee 111cilum 11
cumbersome and time-consuming on-ration. The Eighth Central ("?.munittee, for
example, held 12 plenary sessions in its 12?ycar existence (10 of them during the
first six years). That committee had fewer than '00 members, the majority of whom
were national officials residing in Peking. The Ninth Central Committee, it larger
group with most of its members residing in the provinces. held only two plenums in
its four years. The new Central Committee, larger still, with 311) members (mintus
one who died after the congress) and with roughly the same proportion of members
living outside of Peking, will probably have to rely, as did its predecessor, on
working sessions that include only the most important members of tile committee.
The new Central Committee has more of everything except soldiers. In absolute
numbers, there are more national figures, more provincial representatives, more
workers, peasants, women. young people, ethnic minorities, and mare government
officials-but fewer military men. Still the composition of the new committee has
not drastic; changed from its predecessor except in military representation.
Members of national stature, for example, still make tip about a third of the new
committee, and representatives of mass organizations rose only slightly to approxi-
mately 12 percent. Civilian officials from the provinces, however, hold a larger
proportion of scats, continuing the gain made by this group in the Ninth Central
Committee. Provincial civilian officials, most of whom were only alternate members,
rose from a meager one fifth of the Eighth Central Committee to 27 percent of the
Ninth committee, and are now about 30 percent of the Tenth.
In other respects. the composition of' the new committee does not point to a
continuation of trends evident in 1969, but a partial return to the norms of the
Eighth committee. Civilian government officials at the national level, who made up
29 percent of tttc Eighth Central Committee, dropped to ten percent of the Ninth,
but climbed back to 13 percent of the new group, including eight government
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Composition of the 101hCentral Committee
(319 members)
Malt 000AM110,0"s
l Ifj (t3)
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Chinese Communist Party Central Committees
Military & Civilianw National & Provincial
e'"Central Comnr1Hcc
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ministers, '111r :.ame kited of partial fecllvcry holds true for f-ational party officials,
mainly by reducing the ntunher 1-t natiumal military figurer and adding new civilian
patty and govcrntricnt officials who hnvc never been an cI Central ('onltnitice betorc,
These {IIIitistillellte reflect the 11,11 (Y'S Ilecisiotl to restore an a1111tu1-tiale halance
between military met and civilians and are a further attempt Io make the lop party
leadership mote like the group chosen at the llghth Party Ccmgresc. Military
reprearntaliun has hrcn reduced In every sense. But the. total number and the
percentage of military open has chopped; the percentage of purely military teen who
hold no civilian posts has declined; he proportion of military men from the
province -tiny on the T ighth comttlitlee, much larger on the Ninth 14 down;
central military leaders, who made up more than hall' of the Hallonal figures on the
Ninth Central Committee, have heat cut hack sharply. 01 the 75 military holdovers
from the Nintlt committer, 25 were alternate menlhers and were therefore In line for
promotion to hill mcinhetship on the Tenth cofmnittec; only two of the 25 were
promoted. Although the nall''nal government gained several scats on the new
committee, none of the new seats was given III those government ministers who are
military men,
Twcnty?scvcn military ntcn were added to the new committee, but close to 50
were dropped, Most of them fell either well before or as a result or the [,III Iliao
affair. Most of' the others are figures engaged in strictly military duties with no
civilian assignments. Three military men on the Ninth Central Committee subse-
qucntly lost their civiliain posts, alt'tllotigb rct;-iiiing their military positions, All three
were dropped front the committee.
Earlier this year national party leaders established quotas for military and
civilian representatives to the Tenth Party Congress. One result is that provincial
representation on the new Central Committee does not reflect the actual military/
civilian balance of power in the provinces. The aver-reptc%entation of provincial-
based civili,nls at the expense of their military compatriots continues a trend doted
earlier this year the steady erosion of military influence on provincial party com-
mittees through the addition of civilians Indeed.
national party leaders apparently used the ranee technique in filling the Tenth
Central Corllmittc e.
The absolute number of provincial military figures on the Ninth and Tenth
central committees is roughly equal. But the addition of three times as many
provincial civilians as provincial military, nun has substantially decreased the total
percentag: of provincial military men on the Tenth Central Committee. This
apparent effort to reduce the military's influence is also evident in other ways:
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Provincial Military & Civilians On the 10"
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee'
lilrf win np
Il/tnry 32%
Provincial Military & Civilians On the 9'h
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee'
Mllltarry 41?~
Civilian 59%
(Approximate percentages)
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New & Old Provincial Figures On the 10th
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
(Approximate porcontepes)
Club
NEWCOMER`
HOLDOVERS FROM THE 9'" 69%
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Only one provincial military man was ponnoled from uhernate to lull
membership, atlihoitltlt 17 were eligible; 14 civilians were promoted.
These were 57 additions to the Tenth Central C'ommfttee front the
province:t, but only I-1 were military officers (tall' the number te-
quired to represent the ntiiitary's actual powe1 on provincial ;arty
Cotntriitt'.!C%.
-Military men who currently hold positions In the provinces normally
occupied by civilians fired better in all respects than those who have
only military responsibilities. This parallels the practice at the center
already noted.
The few provincial military officers who were on the Ninth Central Committee,
but were not elected to the Tenth, were dropped primarily for political reasons.
Most were deeply implicated in the Lin Plan affair of Scpteniber 197 I ; a number
disappeared because of various other political indiscretions.
The manner in which the provincial seats urn the new central committee were
filled suggests that a further but gradual effort to reduce the military's role In
provincial politics can be expected. This process, however, will be a selective one; all
military men do not think alike, and politics obviously played a central part in
determining those; who were dropped from the new committee,
Provincial civilian representation on the Tenth Central Committee is dominated
by holdover members from the Ninth. Most of these individuals gained prominence
during and after the Cultural Revolution. Eight former provincial bosses, who were
purged during the Cultural Revolution and lost their seats on the Ninth, regained
them on the Tenth. Only one of the right, however, currently holds a provincial
position. To date, the other seven have only appeared in Peking, and their former
provincial jobs are firmly in the hands of others. It is not yet clear what their role
will be, but should the seven again gain party posts in the provinces, they will
probably be well below their former positions.
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Chronology
3 September
4 September
5 September
6 September
10 September Friendship delegation headed by Vice Chairman Li Te-shen
travels to North Korea; is received by Kini II-sung,
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Peking formally protests New Delhi's -ermission for trip by
the Dalai Lama i.- Lurope.
'Vice Premier Teng Ilsiao-pint receives visiting British ,arlia-
inentarian Roy Jenkins,
concludes in Peking with large leadership turnout,
Chou En-lai receives visiting Romanian delegation.
Prince Gholam Rena Pahlavi of Iran ives in ('eking for tour
of China.
Asian - African - Latin American table tennis tournament
8 September Chinese media hail 25th anniversar of the founding of the
North Korean regime.
Minister of Commerce Kolokassidhis leaves Cy rus for China
I I September French ('resident Pompidou arrives in Peking.
residence by Wang Flung-wen. F- I
Philadelphia Orchestra arrives in Peking for tour of China.
12 S,?'ptember Mao meets with President Pompidou of France. NCNA re-
pcrts that Pompidou and Chou En-lai were greeted at ao's
0
14 September Chadian economic mission visits Peking to Sim economic
cooperation agreements.
S September Upper Volta announces diplomatic recognition of PRC, the
87th nation to do so. The Nationalist government on Taiwan
is recognized by 37 nations, F- 1
16 September Chiao Kuan-hua leaves Peking for New York to head PRC
delegation to UN General Assembly.
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