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Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
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December 3, 2001
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September 16, 1971
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i~ppro&d*~r Relib-asp O'p51061 ~0~ SCI/ -R .8~70875R00080003 // No 1 oreign Dir.rcn/ DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file Secret N2 605 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000802P1%W;tuber 1971 Approved For Release 2005/06/0 : CIA- P85TOO875R000800010020-7 acre 'I'll(- (;I:N7'11A1, IN'I'1;1,1,1(;l'NCE' BULLETIN is produced by (lie Director of Central Inntelligcnce to meet his responsibilities for providing current intclligcncc bc,u?ing -m issues of uatioual security to the I'resiclcnt, tlrc National Scenrity Council, and other senior gov^rnuuvnl officials, It is produced ill consultation with (lie I)eparltneuts of State ;urd I)efc!rse. WVben, because of, tiro shut factor, adequate consultation NV ill] the d~part- nu9nt of prinru?y concern is not f.;,stltle, items or portions thereof' arc pro- duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets, interpretations of intelligence irrforniation in this publication represent inunecliate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and rnorc complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication iiwy be designated speeiffcally for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated inrther, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING 't'his docttmcnt contains inIornuation affecting the national defense of the United States, within the mcan:ng of Title 13, suctions 793 and 791, of the US Code, as ain.rnded. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohiliFed by las' r 6XOUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2005/06/gee tDP85T00875R000800010020-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/991,:(Ci1tiiF?P85T00875R000800010020-7 No. 0222/71 16 September 1971 Central Intelligence Bulletin LAOS: Government forces enter Paksong. (Page 1) JORDAN-UN: Syrian opposition to Jordan's resolution may complicate Security Council meeting on Jerusalem. (Pnc 2 25X6 25X6A YUGOSLAVIA-CHIN?,: Belgrade closes Chinese exhibit at Zagreb Fair. (Page 5) SPAIN: Death of striking worker may lead to anti- government demonstrations. (Page 6) CHILE: Christian Democrats extract concessions from Allende. (Page 7) PERU: Government moves against enemies on both left and right. (Page 9) RHODESIA-ZAMBIA: Factionalism in Rhodesian exile groups. (Page 10) CONGO (B) - CHINA: Military aid agreement (Page 11) ISRAEL-SYRIA: Israali warning against Syrian provo- cations Page 11) UN: Financial difficulties (Page 11) HONG KONG: Textile exports to US (Page 12) Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06i P85T00875R000800010020-7 LAOS: Bolovens Plateau Area oSaravane ?? ~'V!nfeng 4an Lao 14 gam F Pnkson ,~ Ban Houoi 'ong Bolovens forces o Communist held location ? Government-field location Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :fig5T00875R000800010020-7 LAOS: Government forces have entered Paksong town on the Bolovens Plateau. Elements of two irregular battalions moved into the town on 15 September. By late afternoon, they were fighting from house to house to mop up pockets of enemy resistance and complete the capture. A North Vietnamese counterattack remains a real possi- bility, however. The irregular troops are part of a larger gov- ernment task force that, with artillery and air sup- port, has been pushing toward Paksong since it was airlifted to positions three miles from the town on 11 and 12 September. If Paksong is secured, the government's next step presumably will be to try to link up with other government battalions that have been trying to advance to the town along Route 23 for the past seven weeks. Paksong, the commercial center for the Bolovens Plateau area before its loss to the Communists in mid-May, is an important road junction, and its cap- ture will give Vientiane a welcome psychological boost. (SECRET) 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 4` i"5T00875R000800010020-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/098j9 1 pP185T00875R000800010020-7 25X6 JORDAN-UN: Syria's refusal to support the Jor- danian draft resolution on Jerusalem could compli- cate today's scheduled Security Council meeting. Syria s opposition at the Arab foreign ministers' 25X1X conference last weekend completely surprised the Jordanians and the other delegations. The Syrian foreign minister, acting under "inflexible Baath Party instructions," denounced the draft as too weak, as unnecessary--because he said the facts on Jerusalem are already well known--and as smacking of the internationalization of Jerusalem. Both the Egyptians and the Tunisians argued against these views, and the Syrian foreign minister agreed to convey their opinions to Damascus. The Egyptians have promised further demarches, and the Jordanians have tried to enlist French and Soviet support as well. Amman suspects that Syria is bluffing in order to embarrass Jordan, and that although Syria might haggle in the course of the debate, it would not actually vote in opposition to a position adopted by the other Arabs. aware that if Syria remains inflexible, it will be impossible to confine the Security Council meeting to a brief and limited discussion of the resolution. Nevertheless, Jordan probably believes that it has gone too far at this point to change its course. (CONFIDENTIAL) Jordan is probably 25X6 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0?EeIZ"85T00875R000800010020-7 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 SECRET YUGOSLAVIA-CHINA: Belgrade's decision tc pad- lock the Chinese exhibit at the Zagreb Fair yester- day was designed to avoid prejudicing TiLo's discus- sion with President Nixon in late October. The Yugoslav action followed US complaints about Chinese posters carrying anti-US propaganda in 'lag- rant violation of fair regulations guaranteeing a nonpolemical atmosphere. For several days prior to the padlocking, the Chinese stalled in meeting Yugo- slav requests to remove the offensive material. There is no explanation for the delay but Peking is unlikely to tarnish 4_ts recent rapprochement with Belgrade by failing to make amends. The decision was not an easy one for the Yugoslavs, especially as a Chinese trade delegation was visiting the fair at the time. Belgrade hopes to avoid any sensational press coverage that could inflate the incident. Fur- thermore, Belgrade will now be more wary of Chinese attempts to involve Yugoslavia in their propaganda efforts. (CONFIDENTIAL) 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09SEMQ,P,_,,$5T00875R000800010020-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :, , IFF,$fT00875R000800010020-7 SPAIN: The death of a striking worker at the hands of the police will provide a new rallying point for additional antigovernment demonstrations. The strike of construction workers in Madrid was organized by the illegal workers' commissions ostensibly in connection with negotiations for a new collective bargaining contract. Actually, the strike appears intended to demonstrate the power of the workers' commissions to stir up labor unrest. They chose the construction sector because of its low pay and bad working conditions, and because of their own strength among these workers. Nonethe- less, the strike was not markedly successful. In the face of extensive deployment of police and se- curity forces, even opposition sources reported that ten percent of some 150,000 construction workers had walked out. Although the directorate general of security publicly stated that the worker was killed in a scuffle when he resisted arrest and attempted to disarm the police, the incident has provoked anger among workers throughout industry. Various labor groups are considering ways to exploit the killing to their own tactical advantage through publicity and protest gestures, even including further strikes. They are likely to receive moral support from im- portant Catholic clergymen. The Spanish Government is acting to prevent the incident from getting out of hand. High level officials of the Syndicate Organization--the offi- cial labor establishment--are meeting to deal with the legitimate grievances of the construction workers. Concurrently, the government reportedly is taking precautionary security measures to prevent further disturbances. The timing of the incident is an embarrassment to the government, coming as it does just as the campaign for the elections of 29 September for the national legislature is getting under way. Strikes would detract from the government's efforts to pro- ject a liberal image during the electoral period. (CONFIDENTIAL) 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 SECRET' Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 SECRET CHILE: The opposition Christian Democratic Party PDC) has reportedly extracted several con- cessions from the Allende government. In exchange for the PDC's agreement not to sup- port formal impeachment proceedings brought against the minister of economy by the conservative National Party (PN) , Allende has reportedly agreed to four points: peasants' seizures of farms and workers' Psizures of industries will be stopped; PDC workers discharged following government intervention of textile plants will be reinstated; the government will submit legislation to Congress clarifying which economic sectors are to be state-controlled, which are to remain in private hands, and which are to be mixed; and Allende has agreed eventually to re- move the minister of economy, but this point will not be publicly associated with his bargain with the PDC. The PDC's reported decision not to support the impeachment proceeding effectively kills the attempt. It also exemplifies the PDC's adroitness in maintain- ing an effective opposition while avoiding the in- ternal party strains that would inevitably result from a direct confrontation with the government. Although the specific terms of Allende's concessions are significant, of at least equal importance is the fact that he could be obliged to make any concessions at all to his political enemies. The coincidence of a bleak economic outlook and a considerable realign- ment of forces within the ruling coalition may have thrown Allende off balance. Whether the PDC and other smaller opposition groups will be able to capitalize on their temporary advantage will be de- termined in part by whether they can overcome minor differences and form a united opposition. The opposition may use the occasion of Chile's National Day, on 18 September, to intensify their re- sistance to Allende's programs, although the govern- ment is downplaying the traditional celebration of 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 SS]glg ppl"5T00875R000800010020-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 SECRET the day. Because of their careful adherence to the letter of the law, such groups as the PDC and the PN are unlikely to support any attempt to remove Al- lende or alter his course by force. Some junior military officers, who are disturbed by the worsen- Ing economic situation and by what they see as the danger Allende poses to the Chilean Constitution, could conceivably make such an attempt, but it would be doomed to failure for lack of support. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0 ,85T00875R000800010020-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 PERU: The government has charged the antiregime American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and the "ultra left" with attempting to manipulate the sixteen-day-old teachers' strike. Fourteen individuals charged with counterrevolutionary agitation have been arrested. The move came after many union locals had accepted the government's second wage offer and au- thorized their members to return to work. The teachers' union has been heavily infiltrated by the pro-Soviet Communist Party, and ".he Communist- dominated labor confederation is actively and pub- licly supporting the strike. While the military regime continues to denounce "agitators" of what it terms the extreme left and right--especially APRA, the military's traditional enemy--the Communists responsible for much of the nation's labor unrest continue to enjoy an apparent immunity. (CONFIDEN- TIAL) 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/QgtC P85T00875R000800010020-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 SECJ.I'J.' RHODESIA-ZAMBIA: Both Rhodesian nationalist exile groups are beset by factionalism, and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), once the main guerrilla movement, is on the verge of dis- integration. For some time the Zambian Government has tried unsuccessfully to persuade ZAPU's leaders to paper over their differences and to come to terms with the other Zambian-based exile group. ZAPU, which for over a year has been wracked by an internecine struggle for power, has been all but destroyed. Its ranks have been badly depleted; its organiza- tion has virtually collapsed; and its leaders are more at odds than ever. ZAPU's acting president, James Chikerema, has admitted that he commands the support of less than half of ZAPU's 200 remaining cadre. Fissures also have appeared in the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), ZAPU's smaller rival. Last month ZANU's announcement that it was breaking off "unity" talks with ZAPU because of its faction- alism set off a controversy within ZANU between those who favor unity and those who do not. It is uncertain how serious this split is, but as in ZAPU, it is ap- parently complicated by tribal and clan rivalries. The Zambian Government has plainly become dis- gusted with both groups. President Kaunda recently issued a strong but vague warning that both should settle their differences and unite. Kaunda is un- likely to proscribe ZAPU and ZANU, but he probably will do whatever he can short of that to reduce '.:he security problems created by their constant bickering. He has already handed over to Rhodesian authorities some members of ZAPU who tried earlier this year to oust by force both Chikerema and his opponents from the leadership, and he has also restricted the rest of ZAPU's adherents to camps in Zambia far removed from Lusaka. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/~SI~tgP85T00875R000800010020-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/Q ft I f[ P85T00875R000800010020-7 NOTES XIB 5X1 B CONGO (D) - CHINA: Brazzaville has announced the signing of a military aid agreement with Peking that provides for Chinese technicians and an unde- termined amount of "heavy military equipment." The announcement comes at a time when Brazzaville fears a new attack by Kinshasa-backed exiles. While no details were disclosed, the pact may augment a I Imilitary aid grant concluded late last year under which a number of Congolese military trainees have gone to China; Peking has delivered an assort- ment of ground forces equipment. Earlier this year Peking also agreed to give the Congolese Popular Militial small arms and ammu- nition and to provide severa military instructors. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) ISRAEL-SY,..IA: The Israeli press on 14 Septem- ber quoted "informed security circles" to the effect that Israel would strike back if provocations by the Syrians in the Golan Heights continued. One news- paper speculated that the spate of incidents, about one per day last week, resulted from Damascus' desire to enhance its profedayeen and Arab nationalist image. Any Israeli reaction would be designed to remind the Syrians of their vulnerability and it probably would be limited in scope. (CONFIDENTIAL) UN: The US mission reports that the UN was barely able to meet its mid-September payroll and cannot meet its end-of-the-month obligations with- out substantial contributions from the member states. The UN comptroller believes Secretary General Thant may have to impose arbitrary restrictions on UN pro- grams, although he probably would not consider doing so without the approval of the General Assembly. This is certain to exacerbate the usual Assembly de- bate on budgetary problems, which stem in large meas- ure from Soviet and French refusal to honor :;. number of past assessments for peacekeeping missions. Some $26 million remains outstanding from the US 1971 as- sessment. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) (continued) 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11 Approved For Release 2005/06/QCRP85T00875R000800010020-7 25X1 B Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 SECRE']:' 25X6A HONG KONG: The colony's decision to limit to a six.-percent annual increase the volume of all textile exports to the US still allows for substan- tial growth in this trade. The trend toward sub- stituting high quality man-made fiber apparel for woolens and cottons, which are in less demand, is expected to continue, with the value of textile ex- ports consequently rising. For example, in 1970 the total volume of textile exports to the US stag- nated, although the value rose substantially. Hong Kong's move, however, will put greater pressure on Taiwan and South Korea to impose at least unilateral controls on textile exports. (CONFIDENTIAL) 16 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010020-7 SECRET