CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
16
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 26, 2001
Sequence Number: 
44
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 16, 1971
Content Type: 
BULL
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it1: CIA-RDP$ST`0~F0(8~75R(/,~0~008T00019044r1~ ]]((''??~~~~ App?oded For Release 200510619ry~9 J.l C~Jt L >r .I .J 1{AA RSA II. J o~ n~. Approved For Release 5/06/09OGI~D08548~151iO& Bd1'0 444)1 (/ . ' ~~~ ~ Secret No Foreign llicrent DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bullefin USAID declassification & release instructions on file Secret N?. 56i J.6 October. 1971 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 Secret 'fhc CE'jt.I'1'BM, IN'1'1;1,1,1(;1;NC1,; li(11,1,1s'1'IN is 1,'odnecd by the Director oi' Cettt.ttl lulclligcrrcc t'? meet his respollSihilities for providing current intelligcrtce hearing on issues oI' national s('cnrity to the I'residcnt, thu! National Security Council, and other senior govcrutnent officials. It is produced ill consultation with the I)clmrltucnls of State and I)cfcuse. When, bccscItse of the tituc factor, adequate cPi)Soltatioll with the c.elru't- ntcut of' primary concert is not fcasiblc, items or portions thereof' arc pro- duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets. In; ~rpretations of intelligence iltformatiou in this pilI,lication represent immediate vtd prelintioary views which are subject to modification in the light of hurt"rer infornrationn and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may ;e (Icsignate(1 specifically for no further dissemination, Other intelligence items tnay be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This c'octunent contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, secti;;ns 793 and 794, of the US Code, as III] CI IdC(). Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an innwthorized person is prohibited by law. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2005/0&C tRDP85T00875R000800010044-1 Approved For Release 2005/06~49(;~i F DP85T00875R000800010044-1 lio. 0248/71 16 Octobnx? 1971 Central Intelligence Bulletin NORTH VIETNAM - USSR ?? CHINA: Hanoi remain3 silent on President Nixon 's trip to Moscow. (Page 1) 25X6 INDIA-PAKISTAN: Indian leaders still pushing for the return of refugees to East Pakistan. (Page 5) 25X6 INTERNATIONAL OIL: OPEC to seek ten percent more revenue from oil companies. (Page 7) WESTERN EUROPE: Summit meeting contemplated to strengthen ties. (Page 8) CHILE: Military expresses dissatisfaction with per- formance of government. (Page 10) COMMUNIST CHINA - ETHIOPIA: Chinese aid said to total some $84 million (Page 11) SOUTH KOREA: Government exercises caution in han- dling students (Page 11) USSR-LEBANON: Arms purchase talks in Beirut (Page 12) GREECE: Athens unhappy over West German contacts with Greek opposition (Page 12) ANDEAN GROUP: :,outh American group seeks additional capital resources (Page 13) PERU: Lima agrees to compensation for property seizure (Page 13) Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09?CP85T00875R000800010044-1 NORTH VIETNAM - USSR - CHINA: Hanoi has so far failed to comment on President Nixon' s planned visit to the Soviet Union, although it probably recognizes the trip will intensify speculation abroad that a war settlement may be eventually reached behind Hanoi's back. The only Vietnamese Communist response so far has come from a Viet Cong spokesman in Paris who attempted to minimize the significance of the President's trip by claiming that it was an in- ternal matter between the US and the Soviet Union. As yet, there is no indication that the Vietnamese plan to level the kind of criticism at Moscow that they directed at Peking in the wake of its deci- sio:i to host,the President. Although Hanoi has never commented directly on the China trip, its propaganda for several weeks following the announce- ment was filled with statements indicating suspicion of a Chinese sellout. Visits to North Vietnam by a Chinese politburo member in late September and subsequently by Soviet President Podgorny doubtless served to reassure the Vietnamese somewhat concerning the intentions of Moscow and. Peking. Both visits produced substantial economic aid grants for North Vietnam and pledges of support for Vietnamese proposals on a war settle- ment. Hanoi will probably now intensify its effort to portray these agreements as indications of com- plete backing from its allies. The North Vietnamese ambassador in Paris recently claimed the Chinese visit had produced the largest aid package ever concluded between Peking and Hanoi, If so, the new commitment could carry a price tag of at least $225 million, the value of total Chinese military and economic assistance in the peak year of 1967. The 1970 total was an estimated $180 million. Although no details are known of Moscow's aid package, the Soviet allusions to their generosity following the agreement in Hanoi suggest thy-.:t aid 16 Oct 71 Central intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 clA; P, i5T00875R000800010044-1 S Approved For Release 2005/06/@~1.(GP85T00875R000800010044-1 for 1972 will at least match i'losc'w's commitment for the present year, some $400 million of economic and military assistance. In the past, Soviet and Chinese aid has not been translated i:,.to substantial political influ- ence in Hanoi, in part because Sino-Soviet rivalry left Hanoi free to pursue its own path. If the up- coming summit meetings, however, should convince Hanoi that both Moscow and Poking, for their own interests, were changing their views on the war, the Vietnamese Communists might be inclined to alter their own approach to a war settlement. (SE- CRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 16 Oct 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0 EXAj{2 ,fl85T00875R000800010044-1 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 8VC- P1 5T00875R000800010044-1 INDIA-PAKISTAN: Indian leaders continue to ewphasize that they are primarily concerned with the return of the Pakistani refugees. Both Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minis- ter Swaran Singh, in several speeches this week, asserted that India's main concern is the return of the over nine million East Pakistani refugees now ir, India. Commenting on the frequently asked question of when India would grant formal recogni- tion to an independent East Pakistani regime, Mrs. Gandhi stated on 14 October that recognizing Bangla Desh is "not going to help." The prime minister had earlier said "what we want- is that th?a refugees be taken back in safety and dignity." Indian leaders are also emphasizing that they are willing to buy any solution to the Pakistani problem that is acceptable to the elected leaders of East Pakistan. Last weekend SJ.ngh, speaking at a Ruling Congress Party conference, said India would accept a settlement of the East Pakistani problem "within the framework of Pakistan, or in- dependence, or regional autonomy." Singh explained, however, that Islamabad must work out a solution with East Pakistan's "already elected" r.eprezenta- tives. Mrs. Gandhi has been less specific. According to her, it is for the "Bengali people" or "the peo- ple of Bangla Desh" to decide their fate. Her for- mulation does not refer directly to the "already elected" representatives of East Pakistan. These are the leaders of the province's popular Awami League. The party is banned now, but it won a ma- jority of National Assembly seats in elections last December. India would probably not accept an agreement which excluded these leaders. (CONFIDEN- TIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09S.rE-1 5T00875R000800010044-1 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 SECRET INTERNATIONAL OIL: The Organization of Petro- leum Exporting Countries has formulated its demands on the oil companies for increased revenue to offset the decline in the value of the dollar. A meeting of central bankers from the 11 member states was held ir, Vienna this week, and recommenda- tions were drawn up to guide OPEC members in their talks with the oil companies. The first showdown will take place between the Persian Gulf OPEC mem- bers and Western oil companies "very soon." The ministers of finance from t;uwait and Iran will rep- resent all Gulf members. They will seek a ten-percent increase in posted prices retroactive to 15 August. Lengthy negotiations are likely to ensue; a "progress report" on discussions already is scheduled for the next OPEC ministerial meeting on 7 December. The oil companies will probably resist the demands and prolong the negotiations as long as pos- s;.ble. Their initial position apparently will be that any OPEC effort involving price adjustment would violate the five-year revenue pacts signed this year. A compromise settlement is, however, likely. The other complicated and contentious issue- -OP"-C's demand for "participation" in Western oil company operations within member countries--will probably be put off until the devaluation issue is settled. (CONFIDENTIAL) 16 Oct 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09SE IQ Pj~5T00875R000800010044-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 SECRET 25X1X WESTERN EUROPE: West European countries are contemplating a summit meeting early next year to give new impetus and direction to the unification movement. The summit would be the first since the suc- cessful Hague conference of the Six at the end of 1969 and the first including both present and pro- spective Community members. largement of the EC now almost certain and with the commercial, political, and military implications for Europe of the US' new economic policy still un- clear, many West Europeans feel a strong need for a basic reassessment of where they are heading. terest in a hign-ievei review o urope's future reflects more basic considerations. With the en- 25X1X 25X1X the general in- (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/0W0L85T00875R000800010044-1 Therc have also been signs that the community members and applicants are not content with existing mechanisms . Even the French, who have been reluc- tant to institutionalize the consultations on for- eign policy initiated last year, recently indicated that the current procedures are inadequate. (CONFI- DENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/095 A.&iP5T00875R000800010044-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/6$?,.{i1Jl4d?'085T00875R000800010044-1 CHILE: Many military officers reportedly are dissatis d with the effects of the Popular Unity government's political and economic programs. Some officers who until recently hoped thaw Allende would improve the lot of most Chileans are growing skeptical. They are particularly critical of the latitude given the pro-Moscow Communist Party and leftist exl.remists. Several ranking officers reportedly plan to complain directly to Allende. They will include a request that the military not be exploited for his government's political pur- Top government officials, including Allende, ere concerned over evidence of military dissatis- faction and will try to blunt it. Pay raises and reassurances would placate some officers. Others particularly mistrusted by the government could be isolated and differences among them exacerbated. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 16 Oct 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 C Approved For Release 2005/06/0?9 -& ` 85T00875R000800010044-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 SJ (JtP,1' COMMUNIST CHINA - ETHIOPIA: Peking agreed to 25X1C provide its first economic aid to Ethiopia during Emnerr)r le Sol-assie's recent visit to China. The irs p. - ects to be undertaken will be in agricultural devel- opment, and the only Chinese technicians initially scheduled to go to Ethiopia will be for these proj- ects. Ethiopia established diplomatic relations with Communist China last year. It has now found a new source of assistance for much-desired agri- cultural development and further strengthened its credentials as a nonaligned nation. It is not known, however, whether the Emperor was able ;:o in- duce the Chinese to suspend their assistance to in- surgents operating in Eritrea. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) SOUTH KOREA: The governmen't's decisive action yesterday in authorizing police and army forces to seize and close Seoul's major universities has none- theless been tempered by caution to minimize an ad- verse aftermath. Only a sr ill percentage of the estimated 500 students arrested are to be held for trial, and the military presence on the campuses has already been reduced. Pak, moreover, has not crit- icized either the opposition New Democratic Party, which had condemned the current actions, or any par- ticular student organization. Rather, he has chosen the safe course of claiming that Pyongyang's hostil- ity toward the South and its efforts to manipulate South Korean students caused him to act. Despite all this, the issues behind the student demonstra- tions remain unresolved. There could be further outbursts once the pressures of the moment ease. (CONFIDENTIAL) (continued) 16 Oct 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06CbP85T00875R000800010044-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 USSR-LEBANON: A Soviet military delegation is scheduled 'arrive in Lebanon on 21 October. to pur- sue discussions on Beirut's purchase of Soviet mili- tary equipment. Beirut announced last summer it would purchase ground forces equipment from Moscow, reportedly in order to quiet leftists in the Lebanese Government and elicit additional aid from Western suppliers. The Soviets have shown greater interest in Lebanon since the anti-Communist purge in the Su- dan. Moscow apparently wants to expand its ties to Arab states noc affiliated with the Confederation of Arab Republics, the formation of which probably has heightened Soviet interest in arms talks with Leba- non, South Yemen, and Iraq and partially accounts for Kosygin's visits to Algeria and Morocco. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) GREECE: The Greek Government has warned the West German Government that economic ties between the two countries are dependent on their political relations. The minister of national economy, at the signing of an agreement for construction projects with West German firms, publicly expressed Athens' displeasure over the C._:rman ambassador's insistence on meeting with opposition politicians. Athens has little economic leverage for influencing Bonn's pol- icy. The West German market, however, is of great importance to Greece, taking about 20 percent of Greek exports and supplying a large share of its emigrants' remittances. (CONFIDENTIAL) (continued) 16 Oct 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010044-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 ? CI Q,P?5T00875R000800010044-1 S 1. ANDEAN GROUP: The Washington visit last week by officials of t e Andean Development Corporation marked the conclusion of their worldwide effort to increase the organization's capital resources. In discussions with US officials, they pressed mainly for $10 million from AID to enable the corporation to make loans to the private sector. This meeting follows similar exploratory discussions in several West European and Communist capitals, as well as in Ottawa and Tokyo. The main objective cr the corporation, which began operation in June 1970, is to promote integration among the group's members through regional investment in industrial and other projects. Thus far, its capital resources are lim- ited to the $25 million subscribed by member coun- tries, but officials hope that foreign credits will increase the figure to $150 million by 1974. (CON- FIDENTIAL) PERU: Lima has signed an agreement with W. R. Grace and Company providing compensaticn for the Cartavio and Par.amrnga sugar estates and properties. These were seized in 1969 by the Velasco government under its agrarian reform law. The agreement, which i3 apparently acceptable to the company, followed extensive negotiations. The final price will depend on a technical-financial audit to determine the cur- rent value of the properties. Grace has agreed to assist the government =n finding financing for its immediate purchase of majority ownership, but the company's management team will remain in charge of the properties until its equity is reduced to about one third. At t:iat time, company control will shift to a management contract basis. This settlement should bolster Peru's improving image with foreign investors, reflected in recent weeks in important development contracts in the oil, copper, and fish- ing industries. (CONFIDENTIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin 13 Approved For Release 2005/06/0 : LAffg85T00875R000800010044-1