Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 12, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 18, 1971
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4.pdf837.99 KB
C ~ 1.V rl ' ~.ti ~.~ ~~ .~V .L~ .l.'..~ ~ ~ ~. ~ 1.~ 1 ,1~+ .I,:a`' ., Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R0008000 t No Va; ,'n I )u -n; 4 DI It IsCTOIt ATE OF I1` TEI.1,IGENCIE Cciitral Intelligence Bulletin Secret N2 544 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R0008000'6L9uVember 1971 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 Secret '1111. (;1?:,v1'll;ll, I,\'I.1:1,1,1(:1':.\?('1: 11111,1,1':1.1,\' i., Itt?ttlurrtl h tic' I)irtvitr tl (;'nlr,tl Inlrllil; nrt It nowt Iii, rr.Itun.iIIiIiIir?, lur lntaitlit}: rnrrrnt ifilrlli};rfirt? Itllttltl}; to i?,?,ut ti natiun;tl ',''mill, lu Iltt Iht ?.',I'fil, IIn? N'mliotml tirrntity (,until, mt,.I olln?r ,'niur };tit tint fit oflit i,tl',, It i?? lutrtlur'tl in rtt?,filtmlitt \% Hit flit, I)rlaulfin?nl: (If Stool' mill Il'Irrt"r, \1'Itrn, Io'ratr.r ti lilt, li;t,? I.trlut, mtl'tlnal' rtt?.ttlt;?.liot wills flit- tlrit,ttt- nn?tl tl Inint;uV r lin't'' o i?. toot Ic;t?.iltlr, ilrfir?. Ili butt1irnr, Iltrtrttl ;11' Ittt ;ul,rt?.. tlurrtl by (;I;A ;lilt) rnrlt'.'(I in Ili Inlrtttrri tlitn?, of inl'lli};t?ut.? inltrutmtiofi in llti', Itttiilirmlittt tt?Itrr?.t?ul unntrcliat' anti Iurlitnitt;tty \i,\+'; \%.Iutlt at' ?,ttl'lrrl It tuttlilit;ttitn it Iltr light nl Ifirtltt r itftrntatitfi and ntmr rtlltltlt'tt? anmly,i?,. (;rttaifi int'Ili}rt'nr1, it( 111% in Ilti. Itttltliratitn nutv itr tlt?',ilmml'tl ?.1t1-rilira11?' flit fill Itt:tlo'r tli~,ttni,t;tlitn. Otltt?r intt?lli};rnrr itrnt?, nt;'\' Ili, tli??rrniumt'tl lurtltt?t, Itut ttlN? (ill .t tr'lI-It, I,oico II;t?.i'.. \VAIt N1ING 'I Ili' tloocuntrfil'attain, iulttntatita ;tll'riitt}; Ilnc uatitttml tl'I n,r tl tit' I'fiilrtl 4t;itr:, \Vitltitt tilt fitr.tttitl; of 'b'ill' 1`i, ',rrtiutt?, 79:i ;uttl 79 1, of tit' I'S '1 )(11% ;n ;un'ntl't1. I1?. trmt?,ttiINitu tr rr\t?l.ttitn tl it , rttntrfit' to tr? tr- t'riltt IbY? ;tt :n:.tnllttrii'tl Itrt,tn i?. IntltiI)ilI In? l;1Wc. GitouP 1 Gurudal lion, au,omatic do*r'jr,i'i fig an,l ,Ietlai f otinn Approved For Release 2005/065ccEI'A?RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 ; Clq R ,'85T00875R000800010069-4 No. 0216/71 18 N'vomb'r 1471 Gmtral intelligence Builethi THAILAND: Military's reassertion of full power will. have-no si Ini fl cant of I:ect on Thai polio, . (Paste 1) INI).IA-PAKISTAN : Mrs. Gandhi apparently plauv, to con- tinue~ present-pressure tactics for the time being. (Page 3) SOUTH VIETNAM: Army plans pre-emptive strikes in central provinces. (Page 5) COMMUNIS'E' CHINA: Pol'.ti.cal role of armed forces be- mnc downplayed-since Lin Pico's fall. (Page 6) USSR: Soviet leaders are log, ing .interest in economic rclnr.ms. (Page 8) YUGOSLAVIA: New Federal Executive Council is in trou'bT7,. -(I':Tgc 10) C11IL.: Opposition may benefit from struggle against government control of national university. (Page 11) ITALY: Assessment of president:ial election prospects. Page 13) PORTUGAL: Caetano moves to suppress subversive ac-- t.ivi. ties. ',Page 14) CHILE. Government moves against narcotics traffic Tag,- 15) TCE,JAND: Controversy over fishing rights (Page 15) USSR: New light tank (Page 17) Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 S1';( ;J I I'll I' 't'HA L I,ANI) : 'l'hr, reannerti.on of fu.l.1 power by the Thai mi itar.y will have no significant c'1 fecL on the way Thailand .i:,; governed or on the country',; domestic or foreign pol..ici.es. i io 11111 i t..ary announced i. L:; comple to take-over o1.' the Government on 1.7 Novr?moer under a new "Rrv- olutionary ParLy. The 19(;13 Con.-Ititution has 1)(2011 annulled, the cabinet. and martial law has been declared. All minis tries will be run, at least for the time being, by undersecretaries under the direct leadership of the Revolutionary Party commander, Field Marshal Tllatlom. The goverr,ment an- nounced that there would be no immediate changes in military or police commanders. These events do not appear to be a direct con- sequence of arguments within the military over sub- stantive policies, either domestic or foreign. There is no evidence so far that issues of direct interest to the US figured in the considerations that led to the government's moves. The military has become increasingly exasper- ated over its difficulties with opposition elements and particularly with parliament, which was abol- ished with the annulment of the constitution that created it. The mi.li.tary leadership has had serious reservations about the suitability to Thailand of constitutional government ever since the constitu- tion was promulgated after several years of desul- tory drafting. The decision to rule by military decree co-.Me;; at a time of another flurry of restiveness among junior officers within the military establishment Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 SECRET 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 . 1,CIP 85T00875R000800010069-4 i.L:;eif . of LIie coy nt-D.ution and parl.iamunt will. be popular all. through tho military and w.i..l.. give a :,e:n:;e of cleci;ivenec;, and direction that has been absent at the top. It will not, how- ever, reduce resentment among younger, officers over their poor promotion prospect_,, cause(] by they fail- ure of top leaders, to retire on schedule. The chances are good that the military will bring off its reas:;umpti.of of full power with a min- imum of difficulty. IL seems unlikely that any troop commanders will chailer.go the leadership, par- ticularly ranee the inunudiatce 'cargeLs of the govern- ment are civilian elements. 't'here will be consider- able grumbling among the Bangkok citizenry, but any demonstrations should be easy to contain. (CONFI- DENTIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin 2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 SEC,RET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 S I';(, It l';' I' 25X1 C INDIA-PAKISTAN: Prime Minister Gandhi appar- ently plans o continue for the time being to rely on pressure on President Yahya to negotiate an ac- commodation with East Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi, has adopted a restrained posture since her return from Western Europe and the US. She told parliament she had found sympathy and ap- preciation among Western leaders for India's posi- tion. She indicated that she still hopes Western countries will be able to bring Islamabad to nego- tiate with imprisoned Bengali leader. Mujibur Rahman. On 15 November she told a meeting of her own party's parliamentarians that India must not act "in haste or anger" but instead should continue to explore all possible avenues to a solution. Mrs. Gandhi's statements suggest that her gov- ernment is willing to give Western pressures on Pakistan more time to hear fruit. Islamabad is also under growing pressure from the Mukti IIahini guer- rillas who, with Indian support, are making in- creased inroads in many areas of East Pakistan. There have beer some signs that President Yahya may at least be attempting to test West Pakistani public attitudes toward the idea of releasinci Mujibur Rahman. During the past two weeks the government has allowed West Pakistani o osition groups to call publicly for Mu;ib's release There remain, however, serious obstacles to any attempt by Yahya to deal with Mujib. The West Pakistani public would probably acquiesce, but the reaction of military leaders is likely to be mixed. Moreover, it is unlikely that either Mujib or Yahya could make significant concessions without seriously jeopardizing his position of leadership. (SECRET NO FGREIGN DISSEM) 18 Nov 71 Central lntelligenc Bulletin 25X1 C Approved For Release 2005/06/09~,CJ q$5T00875R000800010069-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 // t).rntljIo,I, d lon. /1,1/, ,If r1w 1iM rrl IIr.NN 1,1r (/ 1 .. MNrI \. N~~S yr rl '_...... Y AN XUY[N NOAIIt V1tiNAM SOUTH VIETNAM CONTIO[NTIAL Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09: i4f~?I?~85T00875R000800010069-4 "OUTII V1I TNAM: '1'lie south Vietnamese plan to s trilce c~n~_~my bac areas in hopes of pre-empting anticipated Commun:i t; t military operations in the central provinces during the coming dry Season. General rJgo Dzu, the conunander of Military Region (MR) 2, plans to campaign initially in north- eastern Cambodia near the South Vietnamese border. I:c plans initial cautious probes, to be followed by the commitment of additional forces if the situa- tion develops satisfactorily. The Communists use bases in Cambodia and the Vietnamese highlands to refit ard resupply, and as staging areas for incur- sions into Kontum and Pleiku provinces during each winter dry season. Dzu also plans to go after enemy bases nearer the main population centers of MR 2 along the coast. He would use his territorial forces as well as reg- ular units for this purpose, and he also hopes to persuade Korean forces in MR 2 to participate. Dzu faces a number of operational problems in mounting a pre-emptive offensive that would require considerable mobility and aggressiveness by his forces to keep the enemy off balance. Since the withdrawal of US units from MR 2, Dzu has had to assume responsibility for a larger area, and as a consequence his forces nov' are spread relatively thin. in addition, high morale, aggressiveness, and mobility have :ot, at least until recently, been strong points among his units or th;, South Vietnar.- ese Army as a whole. During the past year there have been substantial improvements in each of these areas, and some of Dzu's units have, in fact, shown considerable initiative in contested areas within MR 2. As a result, they clearly are in a better position now to carry the offensive to the enemy's sanctuaries. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/095 Al 5T00875R000800010069-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09`'b1All b-Pb5T00875R000800010069-4 COMMtJN.i ;;T ('I11 NA: '.I'll.. 1)olit.ica.1 role of the armedforce:.i i .,J tir,.i net downp.ldyed in the wake of the leadership ul>hceaval.. There h~..u3 bct!u a marked chanclu in the treatment accoi.ded the People',, L.iberation Army (PLA) in do- mestic prop;lrlanida since the fall of Defense Minister. Lin Piao and other Chinese military leaders. Pre- viously the armed forces were touted as a model for nationwide emulation, but recent radiobr.oadcasts have ernpha:;i.-!.e.d heavily the necessity for the mili- tary to subordinate .itself to "collective leadership" under the party. There also has been a correspond- ing decline in the attention given the PLA perform- ance in the many civil. administrative tasks it in- herited as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Army units have been warned a number of times to observe strict discipl'ne and obey all orders from the Party center. Much of the current propaganda reflects Peking's concern about the impact of the top-level purges on regional military commanders--a concern undoubtedly heightened by recognition that 1-cal military figures have exhibited some of the same factional tendencies that contributed to the recent ruptures in the ruling politburo. Beyond that, however, there have been in- dications in propaganda since at least last summer that some in Peking have been arguing for a reduction of the overwhelming influence of the FLA in party and government affairs. Premier Chou En-lai publicly ha,, indicated his concern that China had assumed somewhat the image of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship. He his remarked privately that some of the institu-? tional changes of the Cultural Revolution are likely to L. only temporary. This inay imply that he fore- sees some further reduction of military influence in civil party and government organs. A by-product of the recent military purges may well be the elevation of larger numbers of civilian party cadres to positions in the central organs of Central InMlligOue Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0 :L~g85T00875R000800010069-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 SE(1R.E'l' the party and government. One sign of this it., the probable trantfor to Peking of the Hunan provincial party boss, a veteran civilian cadre. lie is the first :major provincial figure to appear publicly in the capital since early September, and his ranking just below the active politburo members in a recent leadership turnout suggest:, that he is slated for a high post. The process of rectifying the imbalance between civilian and military authority, however, will take time, and it almost ccr+.a'.oi1 will not result in a broad purge of the prec;ont military administrators. There is still no noticeable diminution of the mili- tary presence in the middle and lower levels of the central bureaucracy. The military was well repre- sented among the large turnout of party and govern- ment figures in Peking last week, and on 13 Novem- ber a former army political commissar was identified as the new head of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry. Ile is the sixth milit i one of the other bomb- ings. Preliminary indications are that these brigades are rlii -eren - from le ARA 25X1C and resemble earlier Portuguese dissident Communist groups with a Maoist orientation. The government believes that the difficulty of monitoring and rounding up such bands requires extra police powers. By moving quickly Cactano will head off right-wing criticism of police failure to control these terrorist groups. (CONFIDENTIAL) Central Intclligenuc Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010069-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09" ~ p~A-~IPF85T00875R000800010069-4 N( 'I 1 CIIIL1:: The ;ovor1,1111ont ijlY Oar"'; to I.,c+ LnC'r'ea:;in