CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: December 2, 1971
• Content Type: BULL

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No Foreign Disaenl
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central .intelligence bulletin
DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Secret
N2 ! 94
2 December 1971
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Secret
'T'he CENTRAL INTE!.LIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is proclucecl in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
dticed by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This documont contains information affcc':ng the national
defense of the United States, wiihin the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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 Approved For Release 2005/06 ,UNRW-fZDP85TOO875ROO0800010080-1
No. 0288/71
2 December 1971
Central Intelligence bulletin
CAMBODIA: Government forces abandon major areas
along Route 6. (Page 1)
INDIA-PAKISTAN: Situation report. (Page 3)
COMMUNIST CHINA: Authoritative editorial reaffirms
paramountcy of party leadership. (Page 5)
CUBA - SOUTH AMERICA: Castro's imminent departure
from Chile apparently will be followed by stopovers
in Peru and Ecuador. (Page 7)
ARMS CONTROL: Disarmament issues in UN General As-
sembly. Page 8)
ITALY: Communist Party scores moderate success in
conference on EC. (Page 9)
COMMUNIST CHINA - PERU - CHILE: Recent agreements
strengthen commercial relations. (Page 11)
COSTA RICA: Accreditation of two Soviet diplomats
may create political tension. (Page 12)
AFRICA-RHOD?SI?:: Reaction to UK-Rhodesian agree-
men Pagel
SOUTH VIETNAM: Reaction to economic reforms
(Page 13)
25X6
USSR-SOMALIA: Development a..d (Page 15)
VENEZUELA: Policy toward foreign oil companies
(PPae16 )
MAURITIUS: Aftermath of assassination attempt
(Page 16T
MALI-FRANCE: Paris will underwrite development
plan (Page 17)
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SECRET
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SECRET
CAMBODIA: Haute 6 Area
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552207 12-71 CIA
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SECRET
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N'R
CAMBODIA: The government is abandoning major
areas along Route 6 in the face of heavy Communist
attacks.
The Communists routed a nine-battalion govern-
ment force from Baray with heavy ground, recoilless
rifle, and rocket attacks early yesterday morning.
The retreating troops destroyed several tanks, ar-
mored vehicles, and artillery pieces prior to pull-
ing out. Brigadier General Hou Hang Sin, the army's
assistant chief of staff for operations, was in
Baray during the attacks and apparently managed to
organize a withdrawal of soldiers and their depend-
ents toward Tang Kouk, some ten miles to the south.
Farther north, a five-battalion government force in
Kompong Thmar was still under enemy attack at last
report, with all outlying outposts abandoned and
government troops digging in near the center of
town. There are as yet no reports on the magnitude
of government losses in these actions.
Prime Minister Lon Nol has ordered the evacua-
tion of Kompong Thmar, a move prompted by a desire
to avoid the loss of additional battalions. It is
not yet clear whether this also means the prime
minister has abandoned the idea of maintaining a
Chenla force north of Tang Kouk, where the Chenla
II operation began last August. He evidently does
intend, however, to hold positions south from Tang
Kouk to Skoun and has ordered battalions returned
to Tancc Kouk from the Phnom Penh area.
The continr-ed heavy fighting suggests that the
Communists will continue to pressure the remaining
Chenla II-North forces, at least for the next sev-
eral days. Communist propaganda is laying consider-
able stress on the Route 6 campaign, portraying it
as a major setback for the Lon Nol government and
as evidence that the Cambodians cannot successfully
prosecute the war even with allied support. The
propaganda calls for the "complete smashing of Op-
eration Chenla II," and has mentioned Tang Kouk as
a principal target. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
2 Dec 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SECRET
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Jibannagar, - \ Comilla?
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BARISAL Feni
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SECRET
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E INDIA-PAKISTAN: Fighting continues around
the periphery of East Pakistan. Operations evi-
dently-are being pursued in the Jessore area, at
Hilli--where the Indians acknowledge that Indian
troops entered East Pakistan--near Pachagarh, which
the Pakistanis now admit they have lost, and at
Kamalpur. There is no confirmation of Indian
claims that the Mukti Bahi.ni are besieging Feni-
an important town on the railway and main road
from Chittagong to the 'rest of East Pakistan.
In,Sylhet District., the Mukti. Bahini claim
to have liberatEd severa.i towns. These are, how-
ever, on a remote part of the border.
A Pakistani foreign liaison officer, evidently
discouraged over developments, told the US defense
attache that there are not enough. men to allow Pak-
istani troops on the border to move to rear areas
for rest, but that the Indians are rotating units
to face the Pakistanis with fresh troops, In addi-
tion, the Indians are using an "enormcus" amount of
artillery which outranges the Pakistani guns to
soften positions prior to infantry attacks. The
liaison. officer said he believeu that war with India
might be necessary and that defeat would be no worse
than letting matters go on as they, are.
There are signs, moreover, that the movement
of Pakistani troops to the border is giving the
Mukti Bahini, a much freer hand in the interior.
Security forces have abandoned a small area about
15 miles west of Dacca, and to the east the town
of Ghorasal is now flying the Bangla Desh flag.
The Indian press credits the guerrillas with con-
trolling all of Faridpur and Barisal districts.
The claim appears, however, to be at least partly
exaggerated, and in. any case guerrillas for some
time have controlled a large part. of the rural
areas of southcent. ra l East. Pakistan.
(continued)
2 Dec 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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5X1 C
With Indian military pressure growing in the
East, there has been a flurry of political activity
in West Pakistan. President Yahya has met with the
leaders of the two largest parties--Nurul Amin, an
East Pakistani who adheres to the government, and
Z. A. Bhutto, the left-leaning West Pakistani. Ac-
cording to a Pakistani press report, Bhutto has
agreed to accept the post of deputy prime minister
in a coalition civilian government headed by Amin.
Yahya may intend to establish such a civilian go1rern-
ment even before the promulgation of a constitution,
now scheduled for 20 December. Yahya may see turn-
ing over power as the on:_( means to avoid having
personally to choose between negotiating with the
Bengalis and fighting a war with India. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 3
2 Dec 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SECRET
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COMMUNIST CHINA: Peking's first major pro-
nouncement on domestic politics since the purge of
Lin Piao forcefully reaffirmed the paramountcy of
party leadership in all fields but did not forecast
a broader purge within the military hierarchy.
The joint People's Daily - RReed~ Flag - Liberation
Army Journal editorial on 30 oveem November cautiously
skirted future policy guidelines but provided the
first public rationale for the recent leadership up-
heaval in its veiled, yet unmistakable, implication
that Lin fell because he was involved in a "conspir-
acy." The suggestion that Lin had initiated an
abortive power play echoes recent secret briefings
given party cadres at all levels, although neither
the briefings nor the editorial shed much light on
the personal and policy divisions which triggered
the purge of Lin.
The editorial's failure to praise the political
rectitude of the military or to cite its important
role in civil administration reinfr)rces the impres-
sion that Peking intends to exploit. Lin's fall to
pave the way for some diminution of the military's
authority in China. The warning to high-ranking
cadres to observe Mao's line, the.emphasis on the
importance of-unified leadership in all party commit-
tees, and the call for observing strict discipline
almost certainly are directed at military powerhold-
ers who might have reason to fear some ft.ture reduc-
tion of their political leverage.
The impre3sion that Peking is determined to re-
assert party--as opposed to mi.litary --authority was
reinforced last week in Hong '.