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Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 12, 2001
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Publication Date: 
December 2, 1971
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1.pdf1.15 MB
@ p 85T008. 5 9 0 !'~if ki. ~~ ~ 1 . ?~ ~. l.~ j L~.. t-.: ~I. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800 No Foreign Disaenl DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central .intelligence bulletin DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File Secret N2 ! 94 2 December 1971 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1 Secret 'T'he CENTRAL INTE!.LIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is proclucecl in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart- ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro- dticed by CIA and enclosed in brackets. Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This documont contains information affcc':ng the national defense of the United States, wiihin the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2005/ q '-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1 Approved For Release 2005/06 ,UNRW-fZDP85TOO875ROO0800010080-1 No. 0288/71 2 December 1971 Central Intelligence bulletin CAMBODIA: Government forces abandon major areas along Route 6. (Page 1) INDIA-PAKISTAN: Situation report. (Page 3) COMMUNIST CHINA: Authoritative editorial reaffirms paramountcy of party leadership. (Page 5) CUBA - SOUTH AMERICA: Castro's imminent departure from Chile apparently will be followed by stopovers in Peru and Ecuador. (Page 7) ARMS CONTROL: Disarmament issues in UN General As- sembly. Page 8) ITALY: Communist Party scores moderate success in conference on EC. (Page 9) COMMUNIST CHINA - PERU - CHILE: Recent agreements strengthen commercial relations. (Page 11) COSTA RICA: Accreditation of two Soviet diplomats may create political tension. (Page 12) AFRICA-RHOD?SI?:: Reaction to UK-Rhodesian agree- men Pagel SOUTH VIETNAM: Reaction to economic reforms (Page 13) 25X6 USSR-SOMALIA: Development a..d (Page 15) VENEZUELA: Policy toward foreign oil companies (PPae16 ) MAURITIUS: Aftermath of assassination attempt (Page 16T MALI-FRANCE: Paris will underwrite development plan (Page 17) Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1 SECRET CAMBODIA: Haute 6 Area ",Nb,IOREIGN 415E !- ri~u;t`v%clz."a._:Ns~, 552207 12-71 CIA Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/ e'LA-12 R85T00875R000800010080-1 N'R CAMBODIA: The government is abandoning major areas along Route 6 in the face of heavy Communist attacks. The Communists routed a nine-battalion govern- ment force from Baray with heavy ground, recoilless rifle, and rocket attacks early yesterday morning. The retreating troops destroyed several tanks, ar- mored vehicles, and artillery pieces prior to pull- ing out. Brigadier General Hou Hang Sin, the army's assistant chief of staff for operations, was in Baray during the attacks and apparently managed to organize a withdrawal of soldiers and their depend- ents toward Tang Kouk, some ten miles to the south. Farther north, a five-battalion government force in Kompong Thmar was still under enemy attack at last report, with all outlying outposts abandoned and government troops digging in near the center of town. There are as yet no reports on the magnitude of government losses in these actions. Prime Minister Lon Nol has ordered the evacua- tion of Kompong Thmar, a move prompted by a desire to avoid the loss of additional battalions. It is not yet clear whether this also means the prime minister has abandoned the idea of maintaining a Chenla force north of Tang Kouk, where the Chenla II operation began last August. He evidently does intend, however, to hold positions south from Tang Kouk to Skoun and has ordered battalions returned to Tancc Kouk from the Phnom Penh area. The continr-ed heavy fighting suggests that the Communists will continue to pressure the remaining Chenla II-North forces, at least for the next sev- eral days. Communist propaganda is laying consider- able stress on the Route 6 campaign, portraying it as a major setback for the Lon Nol government and as evidence that the Cambodians cannot successfully prosecute the war even with allied support. The propaganda calls for the "complete smashing of Op- eration Chenla II," and has mentioned Tang Kouk as a principal target. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 2 Dec 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010090-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 S : CIZLT85T00875R000800010080-1 Jibannagar, - \ Comilla? ia ~~~~, C-'f)ivlll / A Boloni -k~ 101k BARISAL Feni Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/091 5T00875R000800010080-1 E INDIA-PAKISTAN: Fighting continues around the periphery of East Pakistan. Operations evi- dently-are being pursued in the Jessore area, at Hilli--where the Indians acknowledge that Indian troops entered East Pakistan--near Pachagarh, which the Pakistanis now admit they have lost, and at Kamalpur. There is no confirmation of Indian claims that the Mukti Bahi.ni are besieging Feni- an important town on the railway and main road from Chittagong to the 'rest of East Pakistan. In,Sylhet District., the Mukti. Bahini claim to have liberatEd severa.i towns. These are, how- ever, on a remote part of the border. A Pakistani foreign liaison officer, evidently discouraged over developments, told the US defense attache that there are not enough. men to allow Pak- istani troops on the border to move to rear areas for rest, but that the Indians are rotating units to face the Pakistanis with fresh troops, In addi- tion, the Indians are using an "enormcus" amount of artillery which outranges the Pakistani guns to soften positions prior to infantry attacks. The liaison. officer said he believeu that war with India might be necessary and that defeat would be no worse than letting matters go on as they, are. There are signs, moreover, that the movement of Pakistani troops to the border is giving the Mukti Bahini, a much freer hand in the interior. Security forces have abandoned a small area about 15 miles west of Dacca, and to the east the town of Ghorasal is now flying the Bangla Desh flag. The Indian press credits the guerrillas with con- trolling all of Faridpur and Barisal districts. The claim appears, however, to be at least partly exaggerated, and in. any case guerrillas for some time have controlled a large part. of the rural areas of southcent. ra l East. Pakistan. (continued) 2 Dec 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 Approved For Release 2005/06/0~Q; R,q 5T00875R000800010080-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : ~r Li'00875R000800010080-1 5X1 C With Indian military pressure growing in the East, there has been a flurry of political activity in West Pakistan. President Yahya has met with the leaders of the two largest parties--Nurul Amin, an East Pakistani who adheres to the government, and Z. A. Bhutto, the left-leaning West Pakistani. Ac- cording to a Pakistani press report, Bhutto has agreed to accept the post of deputy prime minister in a coalition civilian government headed by Amin. Yahya may intend to establish such a civilian go1rern- ment even before the promulgation of a constitution, now scheduled for 20 December. Yahya may see turn- ing over power as the on:_( means to avoid having personally to choose between negotiating with the Bengalis and fighting a war with India. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 3 2 Dec 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010080-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 SR-1t415T00875R000800010080-1 COMMUNIST CHINA: Peking's first major pro- nouncement on domestic politics since the purge of Lin Piao forcefully reaffirmed the paramountcy of party leadership in all fields but did not forecast a broader purge within the military hierarchy. The joint People's Daily - RReed~ Flag - Liberation Army Journal editorial on 30 oveem November cautiously skirted future policy guidelines but provided the first public rationale for the recent leadership up- heaval in its veiled, yet unmistakable, implication that Lin fell because he was involved in a "conspir- acy." The suggestion that Lin had initiated an abortive power play echoes recent secret briefings given party cadres at all levels, although neither the briefings nor the editorial shed much light on the personal and policy divisions which triggered the purge of Lin. The editorial's failure to praise the political rectitude of the military or to cite its important role in civil administration reinfr)rces the impres- sion that Peking intends to exploit. Lin's fall to pave the way for some diminution of the military's authority in China. The warning to high-ranking cadres to observe Mao's line, the.emphasis on the importance of-unified leadership in all party commit- tees, and the call for observing strict discipline almost certainly are directed at military powerhold- ers who might have reason to fear some ft.ture reduc- tion of their political leverage. The impre3sion that Peking is determined to re- assert party--as opposed to mi.litary --authority was reinforced last week in Hong '.