CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800010081-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 81
• Publication Date: December 3, 1971
• Content Type: BULL

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
9bf
No Foreign Dicre u
Central Inteliience Bulletin
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Secret
N2 535
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secirah't
The GI NT1tAL 1N1'ELLJCFNCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
-luced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a acct.-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmi: siov or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
I - GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading anJ
declassification
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No. 0289/71
j December 1971
Central Intellzgence bulletin
25X6
CHILE: Uneasy truce follows government crackdown
on opposition protests. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: Military setbacks cause political rever-
berations. (Page 3)
EAST GERMANY: Debate continues over future economic
policy. Page 5)
YUGOSLAVIA: Struggle between Tito avid Croat leaders
comes to a head. (Page 7)
INDIA: West Bengal attempts to stimulate state's
economy. (Page 8`
WARSAW PACT: Foreign ministers' communique (Page 9)
SUDAN-EGYPT: Relations cool (Page 9)
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SECRET
0
CHILE: There is an uneasy truce in Santiago
following the Allende government's sharp crackdown
on opposition protests.
The imposition of a state of emergency on 2
December will inhibit further opposition demonstra-
tions that were planned and curtail critical press
comment. Tensions are running high, however, and
some incidents continue to occur. There is much
resentment over the treatment of several thousand
women whose demonstration against the government
.yet off the violence. The numbers and determina-
tion of the female marchers apparently surprised
the government, which provided only minimal police
escort. This was inadequate to protect the women
against stonings and other attacks by leftist gron
squads. The police themselves caused many of the
numerous injuries by using tear gas heavily against
marchers and bystanders in downtown Santiago.
Charges have been brought in Congress against In-
terior Minister Toha as responsible for the police
behavior.
Toha has charged the outbreaks are part of a
seditious plot. Aware that further repressive
measures could trigger greater public disapproval,
the government will now probably lean heavily on
propaganda claims that the Christian Democrats,
Chilean rightists, and the US are trying to bring
down Allende.
The women's march was the most recent evidence
of mounting disgruntlement among students, workers,
businessmen and other Chileans. One of the most
serious disagreements continues to be the admin-
istration's plans to reorganize and exert control
over the University of Chile. After several weeks
of violence, the rector has collected enough sig-
natures to call a plebiscite on the issue on 21
December. Approval would greatly strengthen his
hand against the administration-dominated governing
council of the university.
(continued)
3 Dec 71 Central In'elligence 3ulletin
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rIP Meanwhile, Army General Augusto Pinochet, who
is in command of Santiago under the state of emer-
gency, is attempting to get opposition students to
vacate the university buildings they have held for
some time in defiance of the government and attack-
ing leftist students. Pinochet is reportedly in
line tc become commander in chief of the army soon
and will probably heed Allende's instructions care-
fully during this tense period. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM) I
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SECRET
CAMBODIA: Military reverses apparently are
causing some political reverberations in Phnom Penh.
Civilian leaders in the cabinet have been re-
markably frank and caustic concerning the deficien-
cies of the army in recent meetings with militar
The civilian leae.ers were reacting to the gen-
erals' assertions that the army was spread too thin
to provide better security in Phnom Penh, and that
civilian commandos would have to play a greater role
in the capital's defense. The meetings took place
before this week's rout on Route 6, which presumably
will add to the dissatisfaction with the military
and the over-all situation in the country that al-
legedly is being expressed by a w'.de range of ci-
vilians in the capital.
Much of this grumbling is the natural reaction
of civilians to battlefield reverse;; and ti:e mili-
tary's growing political role. Although the critical
civilians might have some influence? on Lon Nol's
policies, they will not have a major impact on the
political situation as long as Lon Nol is still on
the scene to hold things together. Any serious
threat to political stability would have to come
from the military establishment itself. There is
as yet no evidence, however, of any restiveness in
either the ranks or the officer corps in reaction
to the recent military setbacks. (SECRET NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM)
3 Dec 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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EAST GERMANY: The specific goals of the five-
year plan (1971-75) are apparently still under mod-
ification and there are indications that debate about
the future thrust of economic policy is continuing.
Premier Stoph, in a recent address to the East
German People's Chamber, promised that the draft
plan for 1972, as well. as for the five-;ear period,
soon will be submitted for "discussion and approval."
He said that all related problems and tasks will be
explained in detail at that time. Draft goals were
published last June, but the new regime apparently
decided that it would replace clearly unattainable
targets with more realistic ones.
Stoph attributed present economic difficulties
to imbalances in previous investment priorities.
The regime is particularly conce?-ned about serious
agricultural failure?. Three consecutive yezrs of
bad weather have struck a blow to the hope that
alternative use could be made of the investment
resources that have gone to agriculture. An offi-
cial noted that this year imports valued at almost
$180 million were necessary to make up for the short-
fall in grain production alone.
The prospect of organizational changes was sug-
gested by repeated references to the need to perfect
management and to strengthen centralized control
over the economy. The regime also promised to cut
the size of the administrative bureaucracy and to
shift technical skills now allocated to the admin-
istrative sphere to production. New jobs are not
to be created unless the same amount of labor is
economized elsewhere. The East German worker once
again will be called upon to increase production
rates without increased resources.
In anticipation of another winter of chronic
food, power, arid fuel supply shortages, vague state-
ments were made about the plan's aim to improve
further the standard of living. It is clear, how-
ever, that the first order of business will be to
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atteript to solve the broader economic problems that
Pankow has faced over a period of years and to at-
tempt to placate the people with promises of a better
future if they work harder now. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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SECRET
YUGOSLAVIA: The climax of a sharp infra-party
struggle between an angry Tito and Croat leaders
could come during today'o second session of a fed-
eral party presidium meeting.
In'a speech at the first session yesterday,
Tito accused some members of the Croat party leader-
ship of "rotten liberalism, levity and lack of
vigilance," and called for the federal party to
take the strongest action against there. Tito blamed
the student strike in Zagreb on "counter-revolution-
ary forces" flourishing under the loose rein of the
republic party leadership. He said there are only
a few hundred chauvinists in Croatia but that they
have created a wide base of support.
Tito has differed with the liberal Croats be-
fore and it remains to be seen whether or how he
will settle accounts this time. Tito said that he
had met with the Croat party leaders for over 20
hours---probably late last week e.fter he returned
several days early from his annual meeting with
Ceausescu--trying to convince them of their errors.
Earlier this week Croat party leaders Mrs.
Savka Dabcevie-Kucar and Mika Tripalo referred
vaguely during radio and television appearanras to
criticism of their leadership and made an all-out
attempt to convince students to drop their strike.
Ironically, Tito's attack comes at a time when the
strike is losing momentum and a return to order
seems imminent. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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INDIA: The state government of West Bengal
reportedly is granting a new round of concessions
to industry in order to boost the state's economy.
Industrial units will be exempt from payment
of sales tax for six yGars and will be eligible for
interest-free loans equivalent to 30 percent of
working capital. Loans would not have to be re-
paid until the firms become profitable, in addi-
tion, the state government is proposing a ten-
percent capital subsidy for small industrial units
in selected backward areas.
West Bengal has been hit hard by political
instability, an inadequate supply of raw materials,
massive labor disruptions, and a lack of finances.
Although the state government is dealing firmly
with labor problems and there has been some im-
provement in the law and order situation, alm^'
three quarters of the state's industrial units
are operating below 50 percent of capacity anri
over 300 firms remain closed. The state's plight
is aggravated by the massive influx of refugees
from Pakistan.
The central government, apparently prompted
by the failure of earlier efforts -.o revive in-
dustry, announced a 16-point program to spur in-
dustrial production in the state three months ago.
This program, however, has not been implemented.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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NOTES
WARSAW PACT: The communique issued following
this wee? 's conference of the Pact foreign ministers
is aimed at increasing pressure on the West on the
eve of the NATO ministerial meeting for a more fortiz-
coming attitude toward early convocation of a Confer-
ence on European Security and Cooperation. It says
that the bloc governments plan to name plenipoten-
tiary representatives for multilateral preparatory
talks, and it calls on other interested states to
follow suit and to initiate practical preparations
to permit convening of a conference during 1972.
The statement does not mention mutual force reduc-
tions in Europe. (CONFIDENTTAL_,)
SUDAN-EGYPT: A former Sudanese foreign min-
.;.ster has told US officials in Khartoum that Sudan's
relations with Egypt have become markedly cool as a
result of President Numayri's effort to improve re-
lations with the West. The former official speculated
that the deterioration in relations resulted in part
from the fact that Sadat visited Moscow while Sudan's
relations with the USSR were at a low point as a
result of the unsuccessful Communist-backed coup
last July in the Sudan. According to the US Inter-
ests Section, recent. public statements by Numayri,
in contrast to past months, have not touched on the
Confederation of Arab Republics or on general ties
binding Egypt and the Sudan, but have instead merely
emphasized Sudanese support for the Arab mission in
the "battle of destiny." According to a rumor cir-
culating in Khartoum, a high-level Egyptian emi.~sary
recently visited the Sudan, but was ii,-t received by
Numayri. Numayri cannot permit relatic.ns with Egypt
to deteriorate too far, and the US Interests Section
believes that to prevent such a d',iterioration Numayri
may hold off on the anticipated resumption in rela-
tions with the US. (SECRET)
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The United States Intelligence Board on 2 De-
cember 1971 approved the following national intelli-
gence estimate:
NIE 29.2-71 "Turkey's Prospects"
(SECRET)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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