CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 19, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

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 1D e t Af e.
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No Foreign Duran
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Gen tra / In teilzen ce bulletin
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Secret
N2 i3~
19 January 197?
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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to -ncet his responsibilities for l:roviding
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the Nationai Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence, ittmms in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
farther, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This documc:it contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is proLd. ited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
d;.wngrading and
declassification
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No. 0016/72
19 January 1972
Central Intelligence
13
25X6
5X1 B
LAOS: Government forces making slow progress on
Skyline Ridge. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: Government is encountering military man-,
power problems. (Page 2)
SOUTH VIETNAM: President Thieu's efforts to build
political party gain momentum, (Page 4)
CHILE: Opposition encouraged by victory in by-elec-
tions. (Page 7)
WESTERN EUROPE - BANGLADESH: EC countries and UK
may announce recognition next week. (Page 8)
CEYLON: Protests against McNamara visit may lead to
anti-US violence. (Page 9)
GUATEMALA: Government adopts stronger stance against
independence for British Honduras. (P;Age 11)
EAST GERMANY: Assessment of 1971 economic per`orm-
ance. (Page 13)
COSTA RICA: Government prepares indictments against
right-wing coup plotters.. (Page 14)
(Page 35)
SOUTH AFRICA: Zulu leader wins confidence vote
(Page 16)
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ARGENTINA: Terrorist activity
~lletin
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4/t3
tuong Kasry
Vientiane
Q, GmgnmMt-held ler_lien
0 Communist-hold !ncallon
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C LAOS: Government forces are continuing to
make Tow progress along Skyline Ridge.
On 18 January new irregular units were rotated
into front-line positions on the ridge and succeeded
in recapturing a second position on the central sec-
tion of the ridge. At the same time, however, new
information indicates that enemy units--probably
as many as three battalions--have moved south of
Long Tieng to join two battalions in that area.
From these positions they could mount a flanking
attack on the Long Tieng Valley or establish anti-
aircraft positions to hamper government air resupply
and medical evacuation operations. They would also
be in position to attack a projected fire support
base, about five miles south of Long Tieng, or to
act as a blocking force should irregulars try to
withdraw southward from the valley.
A North Vietnamese I Iclaims that he was 25X10
told that Long Tieng was to e captured no later
than early February, but that it must be taken "at
all costs." Following the capture of Long Tieng,
North Vietnamese units allegedly are to move to
"a steel bridge along the main route to Vientiane."
After this unspecified area is captured, North
Vietnamese units allegedly will pull back to the
Laos - North Vietnam border.
Speaking about matters of which he has some
first-hand knowledge, the prisoner said that North
Vietnamese units around Long Tieng are having
supply problems. He noted that all supplies had
to be portered from the western edge of the Plaine
des Jarres to the front-line areas and that small-
arms ammunition and rood were in particularly short
supply. These shortages and transportation diffi-
culties could well account for the apparent in-
ability of the North Vietnamese to launch large-
scale ground attacks against Long Tieng's irregular
defenders. The government's heavy artillery and
air strikes against the enemy's lines of communi-
cation are probably contributing heavily to the
North Vietnamese difficulties. (CONFIDENTIAL)
19 Jan 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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25X1 C
CAMBODIA: The government is encountering some
military manpower problems.
Phnom Penh is having trouble recruiting replace-
ment troops for the army,
Young Ca o cans apparently are
increasingly reluctant to join the armed forces be-
cause of recent military reverses such as the fail-
ure of the Chenla II campaign which they attribute
to incompetent military leadership. Many youths
are also reportedly disturbed over corrupt practices
in the army, particularly the tendency of some field
commanders to pocket the pay of their troops.
The recruiting problem is compounded by the
government's lack of a centralized recruitment sys-
tem. Under the present arrangement, each field unit
has its own recruiting officer, who is given funds
with which to "buir" new troops and who is given a
bonus for each man he enlists. A high proportion of
recruits desert after obtaining their enlistment pay
and basic equipment. Officers in the army's person-
nel bureau are aware of these problems, but they are
pessimistic about prospects for improvement.
Desertions are increasing even among some of the
elite Khmer Krom forces. Khmer Krom morale has de-
clined as a result of the heavy casualties they have
suffered in what they regard as a disproportionate
share of the army's combat load.
The authorized strength of the Cambodian armed
forces is 220,000, but it seems likely that there
are far fewer troops actually on duty. Efforts to
get an accurate head count have been frustrated by
commanders who pocket the pay of "ghost troops,"'
even though Lon Nol himself has come out strongly
against such practices. One recent survey found
that two active combat brigades ranged from eight
percent to as much as 30 percent below their claimed
19 Jan 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
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strength, but Cambodian investigators thought it
unlikely that any punitive action would be taken
against the brigade commanders because of their
close relationship to Lon Nol. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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 X10
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SOUTH VIETNAM: President Thieu's behind-the-
scenes efforts to build his own political party
appear to be gaining some momentum.
appealed to some 20 pro-government senators for help
in forming his "Democracy Party." 25X10
he Presi ent s men have
een lining up support among Lower House deputies
and influential figures in the provinces, especially
in the northern part of the country. Although none
of this acti,~rity has been aired publicly, the recruit-
ing seems to have been successful enough to cause
some concern among the traditional political parties,
which see some of their own members slipping away
to the new group.
Thieu recently
25X1 C
25X1 C
Thieu has claimed that
he hopes to build a broadly based party to mobilize
wide popular support for his regime and its policies.
Recent reporting, however, makes it clear that. he
is also determined to build a disciplined organiza-
tion that will be responsive to his direction.
In his recent talk with the
senators, Thieu emphasized that he intended to main-
tain personal command over the Democracy Party even
after his current term is over.
Thieu reportedly made a good impression on -:he
senators, who evidently were flattered at being
brought into his confidence, but there have: seen
some reports from both Saigon and the hinterlands
that strong-arm tactics by Thieu's lieutenants
ha e intimidated or alienated other prospective mem-
bers. If he presses too hard for personal loyalty
and gives the covert apparatus too much frESedom of
action, Thieu could revive the specter of President
Diem's repressive Can Lao Party. The Democracy
19 Jan 72 Central Intelligence Bulietin 4
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? Party is still in its early formative stage, however,
and Thieu still has im;ch work to do over a sustained
period to turn it intc a mechanism either for con-
trol or for rallying popu'.-r G'iuport-. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
19 Jan 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHILE: Political opponents of the Allende re-
gime are encouraged by their victory in Sunday's
by-elections and may now offer greater resistance
to government efforts to divide and weaken them.
The political momentum that characterized
Allende's first year in office has been slowed and
it will be difficult for him to regain the initia-
tive. The President has scheduled a major policy
speech for tomorrow; some cabinet changes are likely.
The speech originally was planned for delivery ten
days ago, but was repeatedly postponed. The delays
may reflect some pulling and hauling within the ad-
ministration over important policy pronouncements
and perhaps also the need first to assess the polit-
ical impact of the elections.
The government probably will claim that the
elections do not represent a national plebiscite.
The psychological blow to the Allende forces is
serious, however, and the decline in the govern-
ment's percentage of votes compared with the elec-
tions last April will be hard to ignore. At the
very least the government coalition will make a
thorough reappraisal of its future plans. It will
now be more difficult for Allende to carry out his
plan to amend the constitution. (SECRET NO FOPEIGN
DISSEM)
19 Jan 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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WESTERN EUROPE - BANGLADESH: The European
Communi~ ty countries and Britain have decided on
the desirability of nearly simultaneous recogni-
tion of Bangladesh, possibly next week.
M&.eting at the initiative of Belgium, repre-
sentatives of the seven'aareed last week to give
each other two to three days notice of their in-
dividual announcements so as to effect a coordinated
recognition policy. By presenting Pakistani Presi-
dent Bhutto with a united front, the seven hope to
dissuade him from breaking diplomatic relations.
Bhutto has so far broken relations with Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Mongolia over recognition
of Bangladesh. The four Communist countries were
of little importance to Islamabad and relations
could be sacrificed. However, when Burma and
Nepal--countries much closer to Pakistan--recog-
nized the Bengali regime, Bhutto only recalled
his ambassadors in Rangoon and Kathmandu.
The seven European governments believe Bangla-
desh meets the requirements for recognition and are
anxious to counter any advantage gained by Communist
bloc nations through early recognition. The Euro-
peans--preferably in conjunction with the US, Can-
ada, and Japan--will offer humanitarian aid to
Bangladesh and Pakistan, which apparently will be
channeled through the Red Cross and a reconstituted
UNJ mission.
The EC's consideration of policy toward Bangla-
desh results from the agreement reached by the mem-
ber countries in December 1969 to consult on = _
coordinate their foreign policies. The UK, pa_.-
ticipating directly for the first time, played a
leading role in these consultations. (CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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CEYLON: Protests against World Bank President
Robert McNamara's visit to Ceylon this weekend could
expand into anti-government and anti-US violence.
The US Embassy in Colombo reports that various
far left groups are planning to use McNamara's two- 25X10
day visit as an occasion to express opposition both
to the present anver d to the US.
the government, ? earful
or emons rations next Saturday along the 18-mile
route from the airport to Colombo, has decided to
use a helicopter to ferry McNamara over most of
this route.
A demonstration appears probable by dissident
groups within the two left-wing parties which, along
with Mrs. Bandaranaike's party, form the present
United Front (UF) government. Both of these parties,
the Trotskyite LSSP and the Communist Party/Moscow
(CCP/M), contain elements highly critical of the
present coalition and its failure since it took
office in mid-1970 to remedy some of Ceylon's more
glaring economic problems. During the election
campaign of 1970, the parties in the UF had strongly
condemned ties between the International Bank and
the previous government. Now in power and facing
increasingly serious economic and financial prob-
lems, the UF leaders recognize the necessity of
making a good impression on McNamara. Rebels
within the LSSP and CCP/M, however, appear deter-
mined to embarrass the government.
Presumably the far leftists also will seek to
protest the US role in Vietnam. This could expand
into demonstrations against the US Embassy where
Ceylon Navy guards, who had been stationed at the
embassy compound since a bomb attack in March 1971,
have recently been removed. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
19 Jan 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Territorial Claims
gainst British Honduras
TefIN u r FF.
III LA NDO
BRITISH
HONDURAS,
(BELIZE)
1RUN1)URe S.
Area clairra it by Mexico (in ahoyance
unless Guatemala gains territory)
Area claimed by Guatemala
.11
f `[9L
EL SAV/ADO1:
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GUATEMALA: The Arana government appears to be
adopting a:i increasingly inflexible position in op-
position to independence for British Honduras.
ing in central America for about a week,
25X1X
25X1 C
25X1X
There is no hard evidence that an invasion is
imminent however, 25X1X
5X1X T eye is virtually
no c ance a the colon wi move toward inde-
endence soon. 1 1. 25X6
a ems a as not ocuse public attention on e
colony and, in the absence of any radical change
in the colony's political status, the Arana regime
will be sufficiently preoccupied with internal
politics to forgo a major adventure in British
Honduras at this tima.
The rumors, therefore, may be the resu'.t of
a Guatemalan effort to inhibit any proposed me
toward independence before its historic claim co
the colony is resolved. Guatemala has persistently
demanded an arrangement that would tie British
Honduras' economy, foreign policy, and security to
Guatemala but the colonials; unwilling to go from
a British to a Guatemalan possession, have resisted.
The two sides seem as far apart as ever and hopes
for a se?41-tlement remain dim.
(continued)
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If independence plans are puy:sued in spite of
Guatemalan objections, Arana woulc: be predisposed
to threct action, both for nationalistic reasons
and because he fears that British Honduras would
become a center for Cuban subversive acti'.-ity di-
rected against Guatemala. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
19 Jan 72 Central Inteh Bence Bulletin 12
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EAST GERMANY: Economic achievements last year
were very modest despite regime claims that most
goals were fulfilled.
Energy shortages and the third successive year
of crop difficulties continue to be the bleakest
spots in the economic picture. Other data indicate
that East Germany is off to a very slow start toward
achievement of its modest 1971-75 five-year plan
goals.
Consumer goods production registered some in-
crease, although the Germans apparently failed to
reach planned levels. Moreover, Pankow had placed
great stress on the need to improve housing in 1971,
but statistif..ii evidence reveals that new construc-
tion did not reach the level of 1970. National in-
come and industrial production almost met planned
targets, but industrial labor productivity and for-
eign trade fell far short of their goals.
The regime undoubtedly is anxious to assure
the populace that its living standard will improve,
but Pankow at the same time apparently has decided
that a real attempt must be made to solve the
broader economic problems that East Germany has
faced over a period of years.
Publication of more statistical information
than has been customary in East Germany and the ad-
mission that serious economic problems persist are
evidence of the Honecker regime's greater candor
in discouraging expectations of drastic improvement.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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Si?,GRIi 1'I'
COSTA RICA: The government is preparing in-
dictments against right-wing coup plotters.
In several press conferences during the past
week, President Figueres brought the plotting out
into the open by charging that members of the ultra-
conservative Free Costa Rica Movement. (MCRL) had
been planning to overthrow his government. He has
asked his public security minister to take legal
action against them.
MCRL leaders reportedly were in touch with
Guatemalan rightists and government officials in an
attempt to enlist their support. After learning of
these contacts, Figueres sent his foreign minister
to Guatemala to get a clarification of that govern-
ment's position on the coup activities. He also
requested and received assurances from other Central
American nations that they are not involved.
The government's decision to admit a Soviet em-
bassy appears to be the main factor promoting right-
wing unrest, although Figueres maintains that the
real motivation of the coup plotters is their oppo-
sition to his tax reforms. Whatever the cause, the
government appears to be in control of the situation
and possesses enough evidence of plotting to dis-
courage any coup attempt at this time. The US Em-
bassy reports that Figueres is exaggerating the
danger to his government and that he is using the
present situation to denounce opponents of his do-
mestic and fors>ign policy as extremists willing to
resort to illegal means. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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5LC ,..Z.1,. ,
5X1.6
ARGENTINA: The pro-Castro Armed Forces of
Liberation group has taken credit for the explosion
in Buenos Aires on 14 January in which fcsur police
demolition experts were killed while attempting to
defuse a bomb placed outside the home of a former
minister of justice. At least seven police offi-
cers and one terrorist have been killed so far this
month. Stepped up operations against guerrillas
are under way in several major cities and police
have told US officials that bombing attacks prob-
ably will increase as terrorists become more des-
perate. (CONFIDENTIAL)
(continued)
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SOUTH AFRICA: Gatsha Buthelezi, head of the
Zululand Territorial Authority, has won a strong
vote of confidence from his fellow Zulus. At a
recently concluded session of the authority, which
is composed of tribal leaders, Buthelezi triumphed
over efforts of forces backing the newly crowned
Paramount Chief Goodwill to undercut Buthelezi's
political position within the authority. The South
African Government has been quietly supporting
Goodwill, hoping he would be more amenable to
guidance from Pretoria.
The territorial. authority rejected a provision
in the draft constitution for Zululand that legisla-
tive assembly members swear allegiance to the South
African Government, proposing instead an oath of
honor and respect for the state president. It also
passed resolutions calling on the government to
permit Zululand to receive direct foreign aid and
to use English from the fifth grade in Zululand
schools. These demands represent a challenge to
the South African Government's proposed plan for
the Zulu homeland and will receive little sympathy
in Pretoria. '(SECRET)
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