Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 20, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 10, 1972
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2.pdf880.59 KB
..-~, n.i+. m.._:o.. ... .r.. ?rr: .. .,. .n u..ep :.un,?'-.u.. .~. ~:: -. -rr- - n. 6rv u... uG..- __-__ -___ ___ - .,. ; . t ? i .....:.. t , _ .,.. .... , .,...~.. ,.,. ~ ~ ,:;;. i, c,: t... P~l I '1~~. ? ? ~.~ .I ~~~f 1 ~,.. Via.: ~....l. ?:;a 1::. ~~~ ? ? l.., I :, I ~ ~, i.,, i... ~ .c ~ ti ~ ?. ~ t, i t ~~ .11, 0 "L 9 No Foreign Dircem Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence bulletin DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File Secret N2 537 10 r'ebrizary 1972 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/0: CIA-FpP85T00875R000800020033-2 ~CII'f The CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by t1le Director of Central Intelligence to meet his reshousihilities for providing current intelligence hearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart- ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro- duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets. Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national c'efense of the United States, within the meaning of 'T'itle 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. GROUP 1 Excluded from automalic downgrading and declassification Secret Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/0lf~,-,gfW-IZDP85T00875R000800020033-2 No. 0035/72 10 February 1972 Central Intelligence bulletin 25X6 25X6 WEST GERMANY - FRANCE: Assessment of Brandt-Pompi- dou meeting. (Page 1) USSR-BANGLADESH: Mujibur Rahman invited to Moscow. (Page 3) COMMUNIST CHINA: Mao's program for higher education being revised. (Page 5) PHILIPPINES-CHINA: Manila may intend to broaden contacts with Peking. (Page 7) NICARAGUA: Government manipulates election results. (Page 8) PANAMA: Government plc.ns major political rally. Page 9) SOUTH AFRICA: African leader will demand govern- ment grant more land. (Page 11) CHILE-USSR: Army chief under pressure to accept Soviet credit offers (Page 13) INDOCHINA: Improvements in enemy roadnet (Page 13) NEW ZEALAND: New cabinet (Page 14) ALGERIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Proposal for economic agreement. (Page .15) LIBYA: Elections to Arab Confederation assembly (Page 15) Approved For Release 2005/"BCATDP85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-Rp'85T00875R000800020033-2 S1:?.CRE i WEST GERMANY - FRANCE: The two-day meeting be- tween Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou that begins today will focus on future development of the European Communities. Of immediate concern are the differences over how the EC should rE;sume movement toward monetary and economic union, which was disrupted by the 1971 monetary crisis. While France attaches priority to narrowing the margins between EC currencies, Germany continues to emphasize the need to balance any such steps with moves trmard coordinated economic pol- icies. The meeting will also provide the occasion for a discussion of preparations for the likely summit meeting of the present and prospective community members later this year. The summit will involve a survey of the future role of the community in Euro- pean and world affairs generally. EC enlargement, the prospect of global trade negotiations, the com- munity's nascent political consultations and the drive for East-West detente have all made this role a crucial question. Brandt and Pompidou nevertheless may find them- selves in substantial disagreement over Europe's future political organization. Although German For- eign Minister Scheel has partially endorsed Pompi- dou's view that each government should appoint a "European minister" to represent it in community affairs, both Scheel and Brandt have also emphasized the need to develop further existing community in- stitutions. In interviews earlier this week both en- dorsed majority voting in the EC Council, a stronger Commission, and a popularly elected European Parlia- ment--all of which are anathema to the French. Given these differences, it seems likely that the position adopted by Prime Minister Heath--who will be seeing Pompidou later this month, and Brandt 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/4P85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 SECRET in April--will become increasingly important. Al- though Heath seemed to go far toward endorsing Pom- pidou's positions in Paris last summer, his recent statements suggest that his endorsement is by no means complete. He has, for example, publicly re-? jected the "European ministers" idea and has sup- ported strengthening the European Parliament. (CON- FIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/O9ECLff 85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 SECRET USSR-BANGLADESH: Moscow's invitation to Prime Minister Mujibur Ra man to visit in March is the latest indication of Soviet interest in close rela- tions with Bangladesh. The Soviets are trying to capitalize on their present favorable position in Bangladesh. Prior to formal recognition of the new regime, Soviet planes ferried token relief aid and Soviet officials in talks with Dacca leaders held out the promise of assistance, especially in the areas of flood con- trol, transportation, and communications. A draft trade agreement was signed on 9 February. The East Wing branch of the old Soviet-Pakistan friendship society was resurrected as the "Society of Friend- ship Between the Peoples of Bangladesh and the So- viet Union." After recognition on 25 January, Aeroflot added Dacca to its Moscow-Djakarta route, and the Soviets reportedly offered to supply aircraft for Bangla- desh's national airline. The Soviets have a strong interest in assist- ing Bangladesh in reconstruction. They have bris- tled at Chinese charges that Mujib's government is a creature of "Indian aggression, supported by so- cial-imperialism." In addition, Moscow doubtless hopes that early support for Bangladesh will enable the USSR to maintain its position as Dacca's pri- mary "great power" supporter. The Soviets have ad- mitted misgivings about the bourgeois character of the Bangladesh leaders, but Moscow wants to ensure that the US and China--especially the latter--are prevented from overtaking the USSR's lead in Dacca. (CONFIDENTIAL) 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 SECRET 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/Q -eA- P85T00875R000800020033-2 25X1 C 25X1X4 COMMUNIST CHINA: Elements of Mao Tse-tung's program for "revolutionizing" China's higher edu- cation are being selectively revised. I local variations are cropping up in applying the Maoist prescription that secondary school graduates must undergo a lengthy period of rustication as a pre- requisite for university admission. The original formula called for all graduates to spend a minimum of three years in the countryside prior to univer- sity entrance. This requirement apparently is be- ing relaxed in favor of allowing individual local- ities to set their own standards. Some areas now require only a year and others just three months of service in the rural areas to become eligible for recommendation to a university. In a sharp reversal of Maoist policies, authorities in at least one city are recommending certain well- qualified middle school students for direct entry into universities without first completing a rural assignment. The relaxation of the rural labor requirement almost certainly is designed to ensure that she universities, which have been enrolling large num- bers of politically correct but poorly educated workers, peasants, and soldiers, are supplied with at least some better-qualified students. Presumably the relaxation reflects a growing concern among moderate elements in the leadership that Mao's rad- ical prescription for higher education will not meet China's increasing technological needs. I a de- cision already has been taken to alter the Maoist program and to reorient higher education toward academic pursuits. Although there has baen no of- ficial announcement of such a decision, the national education conference held last summer probably ad- dressed itselt to this question. In any case, a Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/b'Z'BP85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/O~185T00875R000800020033-2 steadily increasing volume of propaganda has called for resurrecting academic policies in vogue before the Cultural Revolution. These include emphasis on basic theoretical studies, the selective use of foreign textbooks, and the reintroduction on a lim- ited basis of the examination system. On the other hand, the current effort to raise academic standards at China's universities is un- likely to alter the basic fact that most secondary graduates still stand little chance of ever getting a higher education. Moreover, not all universities have reopened, and to date those that have reopened have enrolled only a fraction of the number of pre- Cultural Revolution students. More importantly, urban areas are unable to absorb the large numbers of educated youth who reach working age each year. Thus, for the near term at least, the majority of China's educated yL uth can continue to expect to be sent down for a mandatory stint of labor on the farm. This is partly explained by an apparent con- ;'ensus in Peking on the notion that the quality of l..:fe in rural areas will be raised by the infusion of large 'lumbers--some 10 million during the past three years--of educated young people. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligen,;e Bulletin 6 Approved For Release 2005/06/O@E6RkhP85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 SECRE'T' 25X1X4 PHILIPPINES-CHINA: The Philippines may be preparing to broaden contacts with Communist China. 25X1X4 Benjamin Romualdez, the younger brother of Mrs. Marcos, apparently is en route to Peking for a semi-official visit. The Romualdez trip represents another step in the slow weakening of the Philippines' traditional aloofness from the Communist world. Manila an- nounced last month that it would esta')l.ish its first diplomatic ties with Communist countries--Yugo- slavia and Romania. Although early diplomatic re- lations with Peking are unlikely, Manila recognizes the need for an eventual detente with Peking in view of what it sees as a declining US commitment in the Western Pacific. A trip to China by Mrs. Marcos would :-early accelerate the move toward closer cultural and economic ties and would pave the way for additional steps in the future. (SE- CF:ET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7 Approved For Release 2005/06/0~hm 7 5T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : J~~T00875R000800020033-2 NICARAGUA: The government has suddenly thrown a blanket of secrecy over the ballot counting in an effort to juggle the results--not in favor of the government, but to make the opposition appear stronger. In voting for a constituent assembly on 6 Feb- ruary, the governing Liberal Party was at least a four-to-one favorite, according to Embassy estimates, but early returns showed the Liberals running 15 to 1 ahead of the Conservatives. The sting of such a resounding defeat was too much for Conservative leader Aguero, who charged that the elections were fraudulent and threatened to withdraw from partici- pation in the interim government. In an effort to forestall this, President Somoza has suspenO.ed pub- lic disclosure of the count and has, offered to ar- range for a higher percentage of the vote for the opposition. Embassy officials believe both sides can agree on approximately 25 percent for the Con- servatives. The number of votes does not matter a:s far as the composition of the constituent assembly is con- cerned, since it has already been agreed that the Conservatives will rece:Lve 40 of the 100 seats re- gardless of the actual count. What is at stake is the preservation of a Liberal-Con.servative pact, which practically guarantees Aguero's credibility as an opposition leader and Somoza a return to power following a 30-month interim government. Aguero's charges of fraud, on the other hand, are credible; 25X6 (CONF IDENTIAL ) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :F8trT00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 SECRET PANAMA: The government is planning a major political rally next month. Torrijos' political operatives met with labor leaders last week to organize a massive rally for 1 March. The rally is designed primarily to dem- onstrate labor's support for the government's new labor code; which has run into stiff business op- position. It will also show labor's support for Torrijos as Panama's next president. The government is also apparently resurrecting the Ncw Panama Movement, an official government party designed to replace the traditional oligarchy- dominated parties that have been proscribed since the 1968 coup. The New Panama Movement was first adcrertised in 1969, but never got off the ground. More recently, however, a leadership cadre has been formed, and the movement is providing funds for the planned labor rally. The government party is still only a shell, but it may soon take on real life in preparation for the election in August of a legis- lature, which will in turn elect the new president. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9 Approved For Release 2005/06/0M k f85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/R? (Ck?P85T00875R000800020033-2 SOUTH-WEST AFRICA 1lntornolionol Trrritory) WAIVI`i fAY. P., f At' OlocnNnnl^_in MASERU LUURENQO MARQUES ,..) ' Outbdn Approved For Release 2005/0609 1 P85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 SEGRI:','.[' SOUTH AFRICA: The Government may be heading for another showdown with the Transkei. Kaiser Matanzima, the chief minister of the Transkei--South Africa's largest, oldest, and at one time most cooperative bantustan (African re- serve)--is meeting with Prime Minister Vorster this week and reportedly plans to demand additional land, including a seaport. The Transkei leader has threat- ened to denounce apartheid as a fraud and to pursue a policy of multiracialism if the government refuses to grant his demands. Although requests for more land are not new, Matanzima may have been encouraged to be more aggressive now by the success that the Zulu and the Ovambo have apparently had in extract- ing concessions from Pretoria. This action could pose a dilemma for the gov- ernment. Right-wingers would view concessions to the Transkei as a display of weakness. On the other hand, granting these demands would open the floodgates of demands from other bantustan leaders. Moreover, denunciation of separate development by one of its oldest supporters .ould make the govern- ment look bad just when recent UN Security Council actions have focused international attention once again on South Africa. The Transkei has put the government on the spot on other occasions, however, and the two have always reached an accommodation. (CONFIDENTIAL) 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11 Approved For Release 2005/06/QOo. ~P85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/QR ? 1,711 OP85T00875R000800020033-2 New Communist Road Construction THUA Ti?1IEN Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 S1?C.RE'i. NOTES CHILE-USSR: Army commander in chief Prats claims that he is under constant pressure from the Allende governmena-. to accept "many attractive offers" of credit for the purchase of Soviet military equip- ment. 25X1X he may no be a e to continue postponing acceptance of these offers or of an official invitation to visit the USSR. Top generals have opposed acquisition of Soviet equipment, but this attitude may change fol- lowing recent shifts in many top army assignments. Perhaps more important, army representatives in the Chilean military delegation that recently visited Cuba reportedly were favorably impressed by the Soviet military equipment demonstrated by the Cuban armed forces. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) INDOCHINA: The North Vietnamese are rapidly improving tieir logistical roadnet into northern South Vietnam. Photography of late January showed the early stages of construction of an extension of Route 102, apparently heading fcr cache sues just north and west of Fire Support Base Fuller near Route 9. The other two. roads that cross the DMZ are in the final stages of construction, but some segments north of Khe Sanh are inactive. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) (continued) 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/OEBW- &-VP85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2 SI?C.k]?,'U NEW ZEALAND: Prime Minister Marshall's cabinet, announced 9 February, includes several new faces but strengthens the impression that it will bring no significant policy changes. Former prime minis- ter Holyoake retains the foreign affairs portfolio, the able Robert Muldoon remains minister of finance, while former defense minister David Thomsun takes on the labor portfolio. Thomson's appointment was without the blessing of organized labor and may signal a hard line toward labor unrest during 1972, The new and younger faces presumably are intended to give the government a revitalized appearance in preparation for national elections later this year, which are expected to be close. Marshall has also created two new portfolios for environment and so- cial welfare in a clear effort to disarm the oppo- sition Labor Party's criticism that the government has neglected these areas. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOR- EIGN DISSEM) (continued) 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/gti6* P85T00875R000800020033-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/g~,,( -R PP85TOO875R000800020033-2 ALGERIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Prague promised to conclude "as early as possible" a new economic agreement with, Algiers during the recent session of the joint c:o'.imittee for economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. Under the proposed pact Czechoslovakia would provide a $50-million long-term loan for complete plants and equipment. With this new aid Czechoslovakia would play a more active role in Algeria's economic development. Previously, Prague had extended $15 million in credit but only one third has been used. (CONFI- DENTIAL) LIBYA: The first elections to the National Assembly-of the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR) will be held in Libya on 27 February, accord- ing to an announcement by the official. Libyan news agency. Libya will be represented by 20 members, whose candidature must be submitted on 15 February, although details have not yet been published con- cerning the qualifications of candidates or how they will be selected. It is in keeping with Qa- dhafi's fervent support of CAR, however, that Libya will hold elections for the CAR assembly, even be- fore it has elected a Libyan National Assembly. (CONFIDENTIAL) 10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06 ( J RDP85T00875R000800020033-2