CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020059-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: March 13, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
No Foreign Diisem
Central Intellzence Bulletin
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Secret
N2 537
13 March 1972
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Seen, t
The CENTIIAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council. and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
(]need by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in tho
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
13, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by lrw.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
dotlossification
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Central Intelligence
No. 0062/72
13 March 1972
AD
ulletil2
CYPRUS: Makarios is trying to ensure Greek accept-
ance of his reply. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: Lon Nol moves closer to authoritarian
rule. (Page 2)
CHILE: Government difficulties with the private
sector. (Page 3)
URUGUAY: The president pushes for new authority to
cope with terrorism. (Page 4)
MAURITIUS: The government curtails opposition's
activities. (Page 5)
DAHOMEY: Ahomadegbe moves to forestall another
coup. (Page 6)
USSR: Construction plans for natural gas pipelines
are altered. (Page 7)
YEMEN (SANA) - YEMEN (ADEN): Sana threat against.
Aden (Page 8)
BOTSWANA: Financing of the Shashi copper-nickel
mine (Page 8)
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CYPRUS: President Makarios appears to be or-
chestrating a carefully thought-out plan aimed at
ensuring Greek acceptance of his reply to Athens'
demands.
The US Embassy in Nicosia has reported that
Makarios is telling diplomatic callers that the
controversial Czechoslovak arms delivery to Cyprus
was made on the advice of Athens. The Greeks,
Makarios reportedly added, asked that the purchase
be represented as a Cypriot initiative in an at-
tempt to avoid Turkish criticism. Reports of
Makarios' remarks have been leaked to the press,
in an apparent effort to arouse Turkish suspicions
of Athens. Turkish Cypriot reaction already re-
flects a growing anxiety, but Ankara officials
have not exhibited undue concern so far. Makarios
is probably hoping that this information will
eventually erode Turkish confidence in Greece.
At the same time, Makarios undoubtedly is be-
hind the mounting opposition to the Bishops' re-
quest for his resignation as president. Greek
Cypriots in one of the districts are calling for
a referendum demanding the replacement of the
Bishop of Paphos. Although this procedure is not
legal in the eyes of the church, it could prevent
the Bishop from returning to his seat and substan-
tially lessen the net effect of the three Bishops'
united pressure on the Archbishop.
While all of these campaigns are going on,
Makarios has sequestered himself to prepare a formal
reply which is estimated to be a strong effort to
seek a compromise with the Greeks. Makarios is
probably calculating that Greece will be more re-
ceptive to his reply later in the week when his
press campaigns have had time to take effect. The
US Embassy in Nicosia suspects that Makarios is on
the offensive and, depending on Athens' reactions,
stability on the island may face yet another chal-
lenge this week. (SECRET)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CAMBODIA: Lon Nol's erratic performance over
the past few days underlines his continuing drift
toward authoritarian one-man rule.
In a series of moves reminiscent of the years
when Sihanouk was running Cambodia, Lon Nol this
weekend dissolved the constituent assembly, sus-
pended work on a new constitution, dismissed the
cabinet, and assumed the title of president under
a still to be defined new government setup. The
measures appear to have been taken with only the
most cursory consultation with principal figures
within the government, and with little consideration
of the impact on those political elements in Phnom
Penh already restive at what they consider to be
the betrayal of the promise of more democratic
government after Sihanouk's ouster.
It seems likely that Lon Nol's next move will
be to make some gesture toward broadening the base
of his government, perhaps by offering someone like
In Tam a position of ostensible importance. He
also has to decide what to do with Sirik Matak, whose
administrative skills are much needed and for whom
Lon Nol apparently still has considerable personal
respect. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHILE: Government difficulties with the private
sector are likely to increase within the next febv
weeks.
Business leaders who oppose government efforts
to nationalize industry are attempting to persuade
workers in firms marked for expropriation to seize
the firms, hoping thereby to thwart government plans.
Private sector leaders are also concerned that the
large farms expropriated under the government's
agrarian reform program will be turned into state
farms rather than divided into smaller tracts for
private campesino ownership. They are attempting,
therefore, to organize a massive seizure by agri-
cultural workers of government agrarian reform
centers in southern Chile. Business leaders are
reportedly collecting food, vehicles, and weapons
for the seizures that they hope can begin shortly
before the third UN Conference of Trade and Develop-
ment opens in Santiago on 13 April.
Organizing and coordinating worker action is
likely to be difficult. Many Chilean workers in
both agriculture and industry have become apprehen-
sive about the effect of government take-overs on
their salary and independence and may be in a mood
to cooperate. Nevertheless, the government is
probably aware of the danger and President Allende,
a consummate politician, may be able to take steps
which would undermine the businessmen's efforts.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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URUGUAY: President Bordaberry is pushing for
enactment of a permanent law giving the military
extensive authority to deal with terrorism and in-
creasing criminal penalties for subversives.
The government has been promoting an aggressive
counter-insurgency effort and has captured about 100
Tupamaro guerrillas since January. The administra-
tion has been upset, however, by congressional sus-
pension of several emergency security measures which
had been decreed by former president Pacheco in 1968.
An opposition coalition has struck down govern-
ment power to shut down newspapers and prohibit im-
portation of subversive propaganda and has ended
restrictions on public assemblies and meetings.
Moreover, military and police power to arrest and
hold suspects without trial is to be terminated on
30 April.
Bordaberry, seeking to avoid a major executive-
legislative collision, has not directly opposed con-
gressional action and is seeking instead a new con-
gressionally enacted security law restoring the
government's previous powers. The opposition is
unhappy with the tough measures proposed by the
government, but a compromise solution may be pos-
sible. (CONFIDENTIAL)
13 Mar 72
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MAURITIUS: The government has decided to cur-
tail furt her the activities of the opposition Mau-
ritian Militant Movement (MMM) by ordering the ar-
rest of its leaders.
Prime Minister Ramgoolam ordered the arrc is
after receiving information that the MMM had ten-
tatively decided to carry out at least one act of
sabotage just before the arrival of Queen Elizabeth
on a royal visit scheduled for 24-26 March. Se:u-
rity authorities have already arrested nine MMM
members, including party leader Paul Berenger.
Approximately 20 other key party militants report-
edly will be detained.
The arrests were made under emergency powers,
in force since mid-December, that authorize deten-
tions without formal charges. The majority of those
arrested will be released after the royal visit,
but the top MMM leaders may be kept in jail for six
months, the maximum allowed by law. The government
has already used the powers, originally invoked to
end a general strike among MMM unions, to place the
MISIM under severe restrictions that have virtually
ended overt political activity on the island. Prior
to the invocation of the powers, the MMM had mounted
an increasingly serious challenge to the coalition
government.
The arrests seem likely to provoke little re-
action from rank-and-file MMM members. The party
has enjoyed widespread popular support, but its
members have proven less willing than its leaders
to provoke confrontations with the government.
However, MMM members from the Moslem community, the
most volatile element of the island's population,
might proceed with sortie act of terrorism even with-
out the guidance of the party's leaders. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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DAHOMEY: Justin Ahomadegbe, who is slated to
succeed Hubert Maga as head of the ruling civilian
triumvirate in May; is moving to forestall another
coup attempt by his opponents.
In the wake of the coup attempt on 23 February
by a group of dissident military officers, Ahomadegbe
and his supporters have taken steps to neutralize
their opponents and to secure Ahomadegbe's succes-
sion. An i.nquiry commission set up after the coup
attempt reportedly is made up largely of pro-
Ahomadegbe gendarmerie officers. The commission
has apparently brought about at least the temporary
detention of Lt. Col. Kouandet.e, who probably
masterminded the coup attempt but was not arrested
along with lower-ranking participants. Kouandete,
who is opposed to Ahomadegbe, is being held for
questioning while the commission strives to develop
concrete evidence of his involvement in the coup
plot.
Meanwhile, Ahomadegbe supporters are trying to
build up public pressure on Maga to take a hard line
with the suspects. The major newspaper and Cotonou
radio, both of which are under the aegis of a cab-
inet minister who is an Ahomadegbe man, have been
demanding severe punishment of all coup plctters to
demonstrate the cohesion of the three-man Presiden-
tial Council. Late last week some 1,500 demonstra-
tors, apparently mostly Ahomadegbe adherents,
marched to 11aga's residence with similar demands.
Although Ahomadegbe and his cohorts now seem
to have the initiative, the political scene remains
unsettled and Ahomadegbe's succession in May is by
no means assured. Even if the government succeeds
in keeping Kouandete in check, there are other mili-
tary officers who are apprehensive about their pos-
sible fate under Ahomadegbe's rule and might be
tempted to make a move. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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USSR: Apparent shortages of large-diameter
pipe and compressors have forced the Soviets to
make significant changes in their construction
plans for natural gas pipelines during 1972-75.
A Soviet petroleum journal reported that two
major gas pipelines currently under construction
from central Asia and west Siberia to the European
USSR will use a large-diameter pipe for about half
the distance and two smaller-diameter lines for
the remainder, with a corresponding reduction in
pressure. These revisions will increase the total
cost of the projects by requiring more steel and a
greater number of compressors. They also mean that
the pipeline system will be less efficient than the
one originally planned.
The simultaneous construction of pipeline proj-
ects in west Siberia and central Asia probably is
aggravating the chronic shortage of large-diameter
pipe and compressors in the USSR. The Soviets have
agreed to deliver large quantities of natural gas
to Austria, West Germany, and Italy over an extended
period of time in exchange for about 2.5 million
tons of large-diameter pipe. The Soviets also are
negotiating for additional pipe deliveries from
these countries as well as France in return for
increased gas exports. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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YEMEN (SANA) -? YEMEN (ADEN): The Yemen (Sana)
cabinet in emergency meeting on 12 March accused
the radical Yemen (Aden) regime of acts of provoca-
tion which "could lead to the most dangerous results."
The government's warning is apparently meant to sup-
port a threat by tribal leaders to retaliate against
Aden for its killing of 65 tribal members in a cross-
border incident in late February. Yemen (Sana) Prime
Minister al-7lyni has gone to Syria to consult, with
President Iryani, who is convalescing there. Those
political and military leaders in Sana who have. been
eager to hermit dissidents 25X6
and mercenaries to use Sana territory in their ef-
forts to harass AdEn have apparently been able to
overcome al-Ayni's opposition. (SECRET)
BOTSWANA: The conclusion Last week of arrange-
ments to finance a $200 million copper-nickel mining
project at Shashi is a milestone in Botswana's ef-
forts to achieve economic viability. Feasibility
studies and complicated financial negotiations have
been in progress for approximately six years, in-
volving private firms, foreign aid organizations,
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. Construction will start soon, and
mining operations are planned two begin neat year.
Revenues from the Shashi project will help free
Botswana from dependence on British budgetary sub-
sidies and reduce the country's reliance on income
from a customs union dominated by South Africa.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
13 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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