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December 19, 2016
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December 14, 2001
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March 18, 1972
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~ {F { ` Apprnvgd FbriRelease 2005/06109 CIA-RDP85T00875R00080002D063-9 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800 No Foreign Disse,, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence bulletin Secret N? 542 18 March 1972 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020063-9 Approved For Release 2005/0qt y i~f?; plP RDP85T00875R000800020063-9 The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence hearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart- ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro- duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets. Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and dec'assification Searet Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020063-9 Approved For Release 2005/RDP85T00875R000800020063-9 No. 0067/72 18 March 1972 Central Intelligence bulletin CHILE: Military leaders may seek Soviet noncombat equipment. (Page 1) USSR-GREECE-CYPRUS: Assessment of Soviet policy. (Page 2) TUNISIA: Crisis brewing over presidential succes- sion. (Page 3) ZAIRE: Government continues efforts to control Catholic Church. (Page 4) ISRAEL-LEBANON: New incident could lead to reprisal (Page Approved For Release 2005/($BCfJ''PDP85T00875R000800020063-9 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020063-9 SECRET CHILE: The chiefs of the armed services may try to use proffered Soviet military credits to ac- quire useful but noncombat equipment. President Allende recently summoned the three service commanders to discuss the acquisition of DIA 25X1 Soviet equipment, DIA 25X1 F A1.1 gave reasons tor not u i izi g a reporte -million offer of Soviet military credit. The navy chief added, :1owever, that a So- viet hydrographic vessel would be acceptable; the air force and army commanders said that they could use telecommunications equipment and vehicles. DIA The choices were based, on the commanders' desire to avoid sending . i eans to the 25X1 USSR for training or accepting Soviet advisers. They have similar objections, he added, to accepting the Soviet Komar and Osa missile patrol boats that the Cubans and Soviets are urging on the Chileans. The subject was raised by Army Chief Prats, the key military leader, in a discussion with his gen- erals of the problems facing the armed forces under a freely elected Marxist government. Although he said that Chile needs high quality weaponry to main- tain military preparedness, the army was unable to take advantage of the Soviet credit. Prats explained that in addition to the difficulties of incorporating Soviet equipment, the presence of Soviet tanks in Chile would increase suspicions among neighboring governments. Although Allende wants to weaken Chilean mili- tary ties with the West, he is concerned, as are the military chiefs, over the implications of Chil- ean acceptance of Soviet military aid. If the com- manders themselves can settle on noncombat equip- ment to utilize some of the Soviet offer, both the President and the military might find this an ac- ceptable way out of this dilemma, at least for the time being. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 18 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/QY6 1,~P85T00875R000800020063-9 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020063-9 SECRET' USSR-GREECE-CYPRUS: The USSR has resorted to a modest level of political and propaganda pressure against Athens in reaction to Greek demands on Arch- bishop Makarios but wants to avoid direct involve- ment. Soviet press statements, however, reflect Mos- cow's concern over the viability of an independent Cyprus. These statements have connected Athens' pressure on Makarios with the establishment of a "base" in Greece for the US Sixth Fleet. The So- viets waited more than two weeks to comment on the homeporting arrangement and then timed their reac- tion to coincide with the Greek demarche. Makarios has not sought either Soviet or local Communist assistance. Nevertheless, the Soviets are uncomfortable about these developments and feel obligated to take up the cudgels for the Archbishop. Moscow continues to favor an independent and non- aligned Cyprus. It wants the removal of British bases on the island and fears the incorporation of Cyprus into NATO by some form of enosis. The So- viets will continue to apply cautious pressure on Greece and, if the situation worsens, will probably encourage Makarios to take the issue to the Secu- rity Council where the Soviet UN representative is serving as president for the month of March. (SE- CRET) Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/QWif*P85T00875R000800020063-9 Approved For Release 2005/06~Q?~TIPVTP85T00875R000800020063-9 25X6 TUNISIA: A governmental crisis is brewing over the issue of presidential succession. and now is disinclined to create the post of vice president, which he first proposed nearly two years President Bourguiba has changed his mind again 25X6 A joint meeting of the council of ministers and the political bureau of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party, chaired by Bourguiba on 14 March, adjourned without agreeing on a solution to the succession issue, which has dominated Tunisian pol- itics for more than two years. The President's equivocation has generated serious conflicts in the ruling circles of both government and party. Bour- guiba and Prime Minister Hedi Nouira are reported to be in profound disagreement, and there are per- sistent rumors that several ministers, including Nouira himself, have threatened to resign. Bourguiba probably will be able to secure ac- ceptance of the succession formula he prefers, but this may be achieved at the cost of greater divi- sions and dissatisfaction with his leadership. (SE- CRET) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06gEP85T00875R000800020063-9 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RbP85T00875R000800020063-9 SECRET ZAIRE: The government continues to press its efforts to gain political control over the Catholic Church. The political bureau of the offi,;ial party re- cently reconfirmed President Mobutu Sese Seko's tough stance against the Church by issuing a strong statement calling for chapters of the party youth wing to be installed in all seminaries by 1 April. Seminaries failing to comply will be closed and their bishops will be subject to "legal action." According to local press reports, chapters have now been installed in various small seminaries around the country. The political bureau also upheld the closure of the Church's major seminary in Kinshasa and the charges against Cardinal "'alu la, presently "on consultation" at the Vatican following a clash with Mobutu earlier this year. The statement from the political bureau was a swift response to petitions presented to Mobutu last week by the Council of Bishops. The petitions expressed support for Malula and reaffirmed the Church's refusal to allow party youth chapters in seminaries. The bishops argued that political or- ganizations have no business in centers of theolog- ical study. The party's pronouncement amounts to a final rejection of the bishops' position and makes clear that the isaue is not subject to negotiation. The government long has suspected the Church, hereto- fore an independent institution, of being a source of social agitation and believes that it must be brought under government direction. Although some members of the clergy, , particularly the foreign priests, are likely to continue resisting govern- ment pressures, any united opposition seems improb- able. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 18 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0519 85T00875R000800020063-9 Approved For Release 2005/b6/095E' fU5T00875R000800020063-9 ISRAEL-LEBANON: The landmine explosion in northern Israel on 16 March that killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded five was the second sach inci- dent since last month's four-day search-and-destroy attack on fedayeen bases in southern Lebanon. The Israelis are investigating to determine if the mine was planted by infiltrators from Lebanon. If Tel Aviv decides this is the case, retaliation could occur. Fedayeen targets in Lebanon were last hit on 9 March, following rocket attacks on Israeli bor- der settlements. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Map on reverse) 18 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09S~ A=i d~85T00875R000800020063-9 Approved For Release 2005/06/fE I P85TOO875R000800020063-9 CsiJ .AN" .r . l~ Approved For Release 2005/06~P85T00875R000800020063-9