CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020149-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 21, 2001
Sequence Number:
149
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 5, 1972
Content Type:
BULL
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CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020149-4.pdf | 698.18 KB |
Body:
PorReltase 200/06/09 :vC~IA-RDP85TOD875R0008g0020149-4
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No llnrci/;n I)ir.renl
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
N2 575
5 July 1972
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'I'll(! CE N771111, INTELLIGENCE L3UI,LI,;TIN is prodnccd by the
Director of Central Intcllil;euce to nu'cl his responsibilities for providing
current intclliticnce bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National St-curity Council, and other senior f;ovet'nment officials. It
is produced ill cousnltation with the Dep irtcncuts of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation Willi the dep,a't-
me?ct of primary conc'eri, is not fc:osiblc, items or portions thereof arc pro-
clIl 1'cl by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of iutcliigcuce information in this publication represent
irninccliate and preliminv'y views which are subjcc: to acodilcation in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the. US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of :ts contents to or re-
ceipi by an u:uanthorized person is prohibited by law.
Secret
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No. 0.1.60/12
5 July 1972
Central Intelligence Bullei n
VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1)
ISRAEL: New challenge to Meir coalition over civil
marriage issue. (Page 2)
SUDAN: Trial balloon regarding resumption of diplo-
matic relations with US. (Page 4)
PANAMA: Government commitment to acquire US utility
company. (Page 5)
CHILE: Union election results bogged down in contro-
versy. (Page 6)
KOREA: North-South agreement in secret talks. (Page 7)
CHINA: Tension in the leadership (Page 9)
EGYPT-LIBYA: Economic cooperation (Page 9)
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VIETNAM: South Vietnamese paratroopers are re-
portedly zn Quang 'T'ri City and are encountering only
light resistance.
To the south, the Communists are maintaining
some pressure on Hue. Shelling attacks appear to
have caused about one fourth of the city's residents,
who had returned following the earlier fighting, to
leave once again. The recent flurry of attacks
against Hue notwithstanding, there is some evidence
that the Communists have been forced to scale down
their objectives. 25X1C
Viet Cong cadre near flue are now being o
that there will be no significant assault against
the city until October at the earliest and that the
Communists will confine themselves to artillery and
sapper attacks in the intervening months.
While things are going badly for them in the
north, the Communists have increased the pressure
on government positions throughout the Mekong Delta.
The heaviest action has been in Kien Phong Province,
where enemy ground attacks forced government ter-
ritorials to withdraw from several support bases
yesterday. Additional bases were reported isolated
in nearby Dinh Tong Province, while farther south
in the An Xuyen - Chuong Th4.en provincial area,
several positions were hit by heavy mortar and
rocket fire. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~)
5 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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ISRAEL: Another threat to Prime Minister. Meir's
governing coalition has been raised by Agudat Israel,
a small ultra-orthodox religious party, which has in-
jected itself into the explosive civil marriage issue.
Mrs. Meir's coalition has been squab)rling since
June over a bill introduced by the Independent Lib-
eral party, a coalition member, which would permit
civil marriages in certain cases now denied under
religious law. The proposal has drawn broad popular
support but is sharply opposed by the National Reli-
gious Party (NRP), whose continued par.c.icipation in
the coalition the Prime Minister has up to now con-
sidered essential to maintaining the present govern-
ment. Left-wing members of Mrs. Meir's own party
have been attracted to the civil marriage bill, but
appear to have been brought back into line by her
threat to resign unless they maintain party disci-
pline. Settlement of the issue had been postponed
until the Prime Minister's return on 3 July from the
Socialist International meeting in Vienna.
In her absence, the Agudat party introduced a
counter-bill that would impose even stricter compli-
ance with orthodox religious laws on the "Jewishness"
of immigrants. The effects of this bill would fall
particularly hard on immigrants from the US and the
Soviet Union.
The NRP might have been satisfied merely to
have the civil marriage bill killed, but it is now
strongly tempted to underline its religious bona
fides by going on record in support of the Agudat
bill. It may also see this as a means of burying
the civil marriage proposal altogether. Mrs. Meir
has been forced to warn NRP leaders that they too
must maintain coalition discipline or be expelled
from the government when the Agudat bill comes to
a vote next week.
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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The stage has thus been set for a split in the
coalition that could lead the Prime Minister to re-
sign. Although some leaders of her party think this
might be a good time to hold new elections, Mrs.
Meir probably prefers to work for another compromise
that would permit the present government to continue.
Whatever the true feelings of the parties involved,
the introduction of these two bills has sharply
raised the temperature of the contestants as they
jockey for position for the elections in October
1973. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SUDAN: President Numayri has floated a trial
balloon regarding the resumption of diplomatic re-
lations with the US.
Numayri, in a weekend speech, said that US aid
to the southern provinces had persuaded him to re-
consider normalization of ties. He gave no indica-
tion of timing, but he probably would not act be-
fore his return in two weeks from a swing through
East Africa.
Numayri seems to be mainly concerned with do-
mestic reaction. Sudan's deputy foreign minister
told a US official in Khartoum that the controver-
sial question of renewed ties has not yet been dis-
cussed in the cabinet and that Numayri will no doubt
come under heavy criticism from some pro-Egypti.an
ministers. Numayri will probably answer his ::ritics
by stressing the country's desperate need for US
economic assistance. He will argue that US aid to
the war-torn southern provinces demonstrates Wash-
ington's willingness to contribute to the country's
development. In an effort to balance the move to-
ward the US, Numayri may also propose that relations
be restored with the Soviet Union and Iraq.
The Egyptians are clearly unhappy with Numayri's
latest display of independence. They probably will
attempt to dissuade him as they did last December
when he seemed on the verge of renewing ties with
Washington. Cairo's semi-official newspaper Al
Ahram has already blasted Sudan, as well as Yemen
(Sana) which re-established relations with the US
Saturday, for having "sold out the Arab cause."
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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OIL
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PANAMA: The government has publicly committed
itself to buy or expropriate the US-owned power and
light company.
Negotiations for a new contract governing the
company's operations in Panama were broken off by
the Torrijos government last week. Panama had de-
manded that the company embark upon a sizable in-
vestment program over, the next five years to keep
up with the growing demand for electricity and tele-
phone service in the Panama City area. The cor:ipany,
however, has insisted that it could not carry out
such a program at the rate of profit the government
was prepared to concede.
New government decrees have extended the month-
old occupation of the company for an additional 60
days, authorized the government to acquire all of
the company's assets, and provided for expropriation
if agreement on purchase price and form of payment
is not reached within 60 days. There presumably
would be compensation for, the expropriation.
President Lakas and the more business-oriented
members of the government, worried about possible
effects on private investment, have argued against
expropriation. They also have characterized pur-
chase of the company as a costly diversion of the
government's slender financial resource . General
Torrijos, apparently believing that international
capital mazkcts will share the relatively mild re-
action of the domestic business con.munity, has been
swayed by political rather than economic considera-
tions. He is interested in ove):-comi,ag popular apathy
about next month's legislative elections and in
drumming up additional support for his regime. The
power and light co;ipany, lonq the focus of popular
discontent, is a convenient foil. (CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
5 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
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CHILE. The results of the first direct elec-
tion of oFficers of the Trade Union Confederation
(CUTS are Still bogged down in controversy a month
after the voting.
The Communist Party, which with Socialist Party
cooperation dominated the CUT for years, will show
the largest plurality and get most of the top posts.
The opposition Christian Democrats, however, made
a surprisingly good showing, and their claims of
fraud in vote counting were too loud to be ignored.
Th.!~! Communists, annoyed by an all-out Socialist
challenge for the CUT leadership and in a mood to
butter up the Christian Democrats, appear disposed
to allow the latter to capture second place.
The Communists' partners in the government co-
alition are making public charges that reveal bitter
infighting in the vote counting. Radical Party
representatives stormed out of the CUT electoral
commission last week, charging serious irregt~lari-
ties, and the confusion was compounded when the So-
cialist delegate demanded new elections among con-
struction corkers. The Radicals and the Socialists
both clair: -_? 1 to have full backing for their posi-
tions from their respective parties.
Difficulties among Popular Unity (UP) parties
are becoming harder to conceal. The Communists
value the CUT highly as an important area of influ-
ence. They may feel that favoring the Christian
Democrats will beat back their UP partners' attempts
to assert co-leadership of the CUT. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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KOREA: The agreement reached in the secret
talks is a major step toward resolving differences
between North and South Korea, but Seoul still ap-
pears intent on moving cautiously on fundamental
political problems affecting the two countries.
The text of the communique indicates that Seoul
has resisted Pyongyang's efforts to move the next
round of negotiations to a substantive political
level. The communique deals in general terms on
achieving political unification but focuses specif-
ically only with less controversial humanitarian,
economic, and cultural matters. The cautious South
Korean leaders are likely to insist on tangible
progress in these areas before committing themselves
to substantive political discussions.
The text makes no mention of a future summit
meeting between Kim II-sung and President Pak Chong-
h,ui, which the North Koreans have been seeking. It
also fails to specify the duties, membership, and
future responsibilities of the coordinating commit-
tee set up under the agreement. South Korean CIA
Director Yi Hu--ran implied, however, in his press
conference following the announcement, :.hat the
com iittee' s work would in part be devoted to the
less controversial questions.
The announcement will nonetheless create some
political difficulties for the South Korean Govern-
ment. Opposition politicians are strongly object-
ing to the fact that the agreement was made without
prior consultation--, with the legislature, and they
can be expected to cr-4ticiae the government roundly
at the current special session of the National Assem-
bly. After 20 years of describing Pyongyang as the
epitome of evil, Seoul will need to reassure con-
servative elements, particularly within the militaxy,
that it is exercising caution. It must also move
to curtail popular expectations about where the
talks will eventually lead. CIA Director Yi in his
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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,press conference sought to scotch speculation that
the agreement will mean unification in the near fu-
ture by stressing the need for continued vigilance.
There will also be increased pressure on Seoul
to lift some of the emergency measures and anti-Com-
munist laws directed at protecting the nuition against
North Korean subversion and aggression. The opposi-
tio.,, is calling for an end to the emergency situa-
tion, and Yi's remarks indicate the government may
be prepared to give some ground on this score.
The announcement will also have significant im-
plications for the Korean question at the UN, where
both sides will endeavor to use the talks to buttress
their positions. In addition, Seoul's public accept-
ance of the principle of non-interference will be
used by the North to press for accelerated US with-
drawal from the peninsula.
In the tightly controlled society of North Korea,
Kim will face far fewer problems in writing off two
decades of hysterical, propaganda directed against
South Korea. The North Koreans took steps before
the announcement to prepare party leaders to explain
these developments to cadre and the general popula-
tion. A plenum of the party central committee which
opened on 1 July focused exclusively on the reunifi-
cation question. In his opening report Kim Il-su;:g
almost certainly provided details on the talks and
guidance on handling the matter. Pyongyang is now
giving extensive domestic coverage to the announce-
ment.
In the international sphere, Kim hopes to de-
rive additional prestige and diplomatic recognition
from the dialogue with the South. Japanese Govern-
ment officials,, for example; have already indicated
that the talks could have some effect on Tokyo's
attitude toward North Korea. (CONFIDENTIAL)
5 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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NOTE'S
CHINA: The regime' s lackluster observance of
another major holiday attests to continuing polit-
ical tensions within the top leadership. The an?
niversary of the party on 1 July passed without the
customary joint editoi1al, usrally the forum for
major policy pronouncements. No special. events
were held, although there was a large leadership
turnout for an unrelated event on the same day.
The turnout seemed designed "Co reassure the popu-
~ace of the regime's stability and continuity de-
spite its persistent failure to observe important
events in customary fashion. The muted celebration,
particularly the lack of a joint editorial, strongly
suggests that the recent month-long leadership con-
ference in Peking failed to resolve the many prob-
lems still plaguing the regime. (CONFIDENTIAL)
EGYPT-LIBYA: The two countries have signed
a sera. of agreements intended to improve coopera-
tion in economic matters. Cairo and Tripoli al-
ready had taken some initial steps toward greater
cooperation in a variety of fields, but Egypt will
remain reluctant to move too auickly or too far on
Libyan Premier. Qadhafi's schemes for unification.
One agreement establishes objectives for and coor-
dinates the activities of Egyptian companies al-
ready operating in Libya in construction, reclama-
tion, and electrification. Other agreements pro-
vide for the promotion of bilateral trade and for
the establishment of jointly owned companies to
develop high seas fishing and to study and imple-
ment development projects in the signatory coun-
tries and in other countries of Africa and the Arab
work.. A permanent committee to monitor imple-
mentation of trade and technical cooperation agree-
ments is to be set up. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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