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December 19, 2016
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December 21, 2001
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July 5, 1972
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PorReltase 200/06/09 :vC~IA-RDP85TOD875R0008g0020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R0008000!t'f4 No llnrci/;n I)ir.renl DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file N2 575 5 July 1972 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/06DP85T00875R000800020149-4 'I'll(! CE N771111, INTELLIGENCE L3UI,LI,;TIN is prodnccd by the Director of Central Intcllil;euce to nu'cl his responsibilities for providing current intclliticnce bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National St-curity Council, and other senior f;ovet'nment officials. It is produced ill cousnltation with the Dep irtcncuts of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation Willi the dep,a't- me?ct of primary conc'eri, is not fc:osiblc, items or portions thereof arc pro- clIl 1'cl by CIA and enclosed in brackets. Interpretations of iutcliigcuce information in this publication represent irninccliate and preliminv'y views which are subjcc: to acodilcation in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the. US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of :ts contents to or re- ceipi by an u:uanthorized person is prohibited by law. Secret Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020149-4 No. 0.1.60/12 5 July 1972 Central Intelligence Bullei n VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1) ISRAEL: New challenge to Meir coalition over civil marriage issue. (Page 2) SUDAN: Trial balloon regarding resumption of diplo- matic relations with US. (Page 4) PANAMA: Government commitment to acquire US utility company. (Page 5) CHILE: Union election results bogged down in contro- versy. (Page 6) KOREA: North-South agreement in secret talks. (Page 7) CHINA: Tension in the leadership (Page 9) EGYPT-LIBYA: Economic cooperation (Page 9) Approved For Release 2005/0E( RJ-TbP85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/061~ di-R6P85T00875R000800020149-4 (IIIATIO 'Uri c9N T 718Jh "Ild '~ rrln^I,r.~ ) \ n( n ... ? / -,l, 'iR ANTI Approved For Release 2005/06ic,P85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/0609'Q-RDP85T00875R000800020149-4 VIETNAM: South Vietnamese paratroopers are re- portedly zn Quang 'T'ri City and are encountering only light resistance. To the south, the Communists are maintaining some pressure on Hue. Shelling attacks appear to have caused about one fourth of the city's residents, who had returned following the earlier fighting, to leave once again. The recent flurry of attacks against Hue notwithstanding, there is some evidence that the Communists have been forced to scale down their objectives. 25X1C Viet Cong cadre near flue are now being o that there will be no significant assault against the city until October at the earliest and that the Communists will confine themselves to artillery and sapper attacks in the intervening months. While things are going badly for them in the north, the Communists have increased the pressure on government positions throughout the Mekong Delta. The heaviest action has been in Kien Phong Province, where enemy ground attacks forced government ter- ritorials to withdraw from several support bases yesterday. Additional bases were reported isolated in nearby Dinh Tong Province, while farther south in the An Xuyen - Chuong Th4.en provincial area, several positions were hit by heavy mortar and rocket fire. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~) 5 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/0, 'RI P85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/611'?1. 85T00875R000800020149-4 ISRAEL: Another threat to Prime Minister. Meir's governing coalition has been raised by Agudat Israel, a small ultra-orthodox religious party, which has in- jected itself into the explosive civil marriage issue. Mrs. Meir's coalition has been squab)rling since June over a bill introduced by the Independent Lib- eral party, a coalition member, which would permit civil marriages in certain cases now denied under religious law. The proposal has drawn broad popular support but is sharply opposed by the National Reli- gious Party (NRP), whose continued par.c.icipation in the coalition the Prime Minister has up to now con- sidered essential to maintaining the present govern- ment. Left-wing members of Mrs. Meir's own party have been attracted to the civil marriage bill, but appear to have been brought back into line by her threat to resign unless they maintain party disci- pline. Settlement of the issue had been postponed until the Prime Minister's return on 3 July from the Socialist International meeting in Vienna. In her absence, the Agudat party introduced a counter-bill that would impose even stricter compli- ance with orthodox religious laws on the "Jewishness" of immigrants. The effects of this bill would fall particularly hard on immigrants from the US and the Soviet Union. The NRP might have been satisfied merely to have the civil marriage bill killed, but it is now strongly tempted to underline its religious bona fides by going on record in support of the Agudat bill. It may also see this as a means of burying the civil marriage proposal altogether. Mrs. Meir has been forced to warn NRP leaders that they too must maintain coalition discipline or be expelled from the government when the Agudat bill comes to a vote next week. (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/( ? i P85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/'6J'-Gla-RDP85T00875R000800020149-4 The stage has thus been set for a split in the coalition that could lead the Prime Minister to re- sign. Although some leaders of her party think this might be a good time to hold new elections, Mrs. Meir probably prefers to work for another compromise that would permit the present government to continue. Whatever the true feelings of the parties involved, the introduction of these two bills has sharply raised the temperature of the contestants as they jockey for position for the elections in October 1973. (CONFIDENTIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/0609CRi fIDP85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/O9 'CA=`RDP85T00875R000800020149-4 SUDAN: President Numayri has floated a trial balloon regarding the resumption of diplomatic re- lations with the US. Numayri, in a weekend speech, said that US aid to the southern provinces had persuaded him to re- consider normalization of ties. He gave no indica- tion of timing, but he probably would not act be- fore his return in two weeks from a swing through East Africa. Numayri seems to be mainly concerned with do- mestic reaction. Sudan's deputy foreign minister told a US official in Khartoum that the controver- sial question of renewed ties has not yet been dis- cussed in the cabinet and that Numayri will no doubt come under heavy criticism from some pro-Egypti.an ministers. Numayri will probably answer his ::ritics by stressing the country's desperate need for US economic assistance. He will argue that US aid to the war-torn southern provinces demonstrates Wash- ington's willingness to contribute to the country's development. In an effort to balance the move to- ward the US, Numayri may also propose that relations be restored with the Soviet Union and Iraq. The Egyptians are clearly unhappy with Numayri's latest display of independence. They probably will attempt to dissuade him as they did last December when he seemed on the verge of renewing ties with Washington. Cairo's semi-official newspaper Al Ahram has already blasted Sudan, as well as Yemen (Sana) which re-established relations with the US Saturday, for having "sold out the Arab cause." (CONFIDENTIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/69':9N~ '85T00875R000800020149-4 OIL i r Approved For Release 2005/061cy1 09'gRDP85T00875R000800020149-4 PANAMA: The government has publicly committed itself to buy or expropriate the US-owned power and light company. Negotiations for a new contract governing the company's operations in Panama were broken off by the Torrijos government last week. Panama had de- manded that the company embark upon a sizable in- vestment program over, the next five years to keep up with the growing demand for electricity and tele- phone service in the Panama City area. The cor:ipany, however, has insisted that it could not carry out such a program at the rate of profit the government was prepared to concede. New government decrees have extended the month- old occupation of the company for an additional 60 days, authorized the government to acquire all of the company's assets, and provided for expropriation if agreement on purchase price and form of payment is not reached within 60 days. There presumably would be compensation for, the expropriation. President Lakas and the more business-oriented members of the government, worried about possible effects on private investment, have argued against expropriation. They also have characterized pur- chase of the company as a costly diversion of the government's slender financial resource . General Torrijos, apparently believing that international capital mazkcts will share the relatively mild re- action of the domestic business con.munity, has been swayed by political rather than economic considera- tions. He is interested in ove):-comi,ag popular apathy about next month's legislative elections and in drumming up additional support for his regime. The power and light co;ipany, lonq the focus of popular discontent, is a convenient foil. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 5 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5 Approved For Release 2005/06/V-BP85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/0? C1- t P85T00875R000800020149-4 CHILE. The results of the first direct elec- tion of oFficers of the Trade Union Confederation (CUTS are Still bogged down in controversy a month after the voting. The Communist Party, which with Socialist Party cooperation dominated the CUT for years, will show the largest plurality and get most of the top posts. The opposition Christian Democrats, however, made a surprisingly good showing, and their claims of fraud in vote counting were too loud to be ignored. Th.!~! Communists, annoyed by an all-out Socialist challenge for the CUT leadership and in a mood to butter up the Christian Democrats, appear disposed to allow the latter to capture second place. The Communists' partners in the government co- alition are making public charges that reveal bitter infighting in the vote counting. Radical Party representatives stormed out of the CUT electoral commission last week, charging serious irregt~lari- ties, and the confusion was compounded when the So- cialist delegate demanded new elections among con- struction corkers. The Radicals and the Socialists both clair: -_? 1 to have full backing for their posi- tions from their respective parties. Difficulties among Popular Unity (UP) parties are becoming harder to conceal. The Communists value the CUT highly as an important area of influ- ence. They may feel that favoring the Christian Democrats will beat back their UP partners' attempts to assert co-leadership of the CUT. (CONFIDENTIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/ EI -R P85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 ~ 85T00875R000800020149-4 KOREA: The agreement reached in the secret talks is a major step toward resolving differences between North and South Korea, but Seoul still ap- pears intent on moving cautiously on fundamental political problems affecting the two countries. The text of the communique indicates that Seoul has resisted Pyongyang's efforts to move the next round of negotiations to a substantive political level. The communique deals in general terms on achieving political unification but focuses specif- ically only with less controversial humanitarian, economic, and cultural matters. The cautious South Korean leaders are likely to insist on tangible progress in these areas before committing themselves to substantive political discussions. The text makes no mention of a future summit meeting between Kim II-sung and President Pak Chong- h,ui, which the North Koreans have been seeking. It also fails to specify the duties, membership, and future responsibilities of the coordinating commit- tee set up under the agreement. South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu--ran implied, however, in his press conference following the announcement, :.hat the com iittee' s work would in part be devoted to the less controversial questions. The announcement will nonetheless create some political difficulties for the South Korean Govern- ment. Opposition politicians are strongly object- ing to the fact that the agreement was made without prior consultation--, with the legislature, and they can be expected to cr-4ticiae the government roundly at the current special session of the National Assem- bly. After 20 years of describing Pyongyang as the epitome of evil, Seoul will need to reassure con- servative elements, particularly within the militaxy, that it is exercising caution. It must also move to curtail popular expectations about where the talks will eventually lead. CIA Director Yi in his Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09Sk 1 5T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/06/09`:q-3'P85T00875R000800020149-4 ,press conference sought to scotch speculation that the agreement will mean unification in the near fu- ture by stressing the need for continued vigilance. There will also be increased pressure on Seoul to lift some of the emergency measures and anti-Com- munist laws directed at protecting the nuition against North Korean subversion and aggression. The opposi- tio.,, is calling for an end to the emergency situa- tion, and Yi's remarks indicate the government may be prepared to give some ground on this score. The announcement will also have significant im- plications for the Korean question at the UN, where both sides will endeavor to use the talks to buttress their positions. In addition, Seoul's public accept- ance of the principle of non-interference will be used by the North to press for accelerated US with- drawal from the peninsula. In the tightly controlled society of North Korea, Kim will face far fewer problems in writing off two decades of hysterical, propaganda directed against South Korea. The North Koreans took steps before the announcement to prepare party leaders to explain these developments to cadre and the general popula- tion. A plenum of the party central committee which opened on 1 July focused exclusively on the reunifi- cation question. In his opening report Kim Il-su;:g almost certainly provided details on the talks and guidance on handling the matter. Pyongyang is now giving extensive domestic coverage to the announce- ment. In the international sphere, Kim hopes to de- rive additional prestige and diplomatic recognition from the dialogue with the South. Japanese Govern- ment officials,, for example; have already indicated that the talks could have some effect on Tokyo's attitude toward North Korea. (CONFIDENTIAL) 5 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06 h-'M P85T00875R000800020149-4 Approved For Release 2005/0:;DP85T00875R000800020149-4 NOTE'S CHINA: The regime' s lackluster observance of another major holiday attests to continuing polit- ical tensions within the top leadership. The an? niversary of the party on 1 July passed without the customary joint editoi1al, usrally the forum for major policy pronouncements. No special. events were held, although there was a large leadership turnout for an unrelated event on the same day. The turnout seemed designed "Co reassure the popu- ~ace of the regime's stability and continuity de- spite its persistent failure to observe important events in customary fashion. The muted celebration, particularly the lack of a joint editorial, strongly suggests that the recent month-long leadership con- ference in Peking failed to resolve the many prob- lems still plaguing the regime. (CONFIDENTIAL) EGYPT-LIBYA: The two countries have signed a sera. of agreements intended to improve coopera- tion in economic matters. Cairo and Tripoli al- ready had taken some initial steps toward greater cooperation in a variety of fields, but Egypt will remain reluctant to move too auickly or too far on Libyan Premier. Qadhafi's schemes for unification. One agreement establishes objectives for and coor- dinates the activities of Egyptian companies al- ready operating in Libya in construction, reclama- tion, and electrification. Other agreements pro- vide for the promotion of bilateral trade and for the establishment of jointly owned companies to develop high seas fishing and to study and imple- ment development projects in the signatory coun- tries and in other countries of Africa and the Arab work.. A permanent committee to monitor imple- mentation of trade and technical cooperation agree- ments is to be set up. (CONFIDENTIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/0P85T00875R000800020149-4