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November 17, 1972
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1 jj~tjj j(I 0 jj { Approved orXfeletasel! 0 +5 0 109 "CIAt(-Rdp8bT0087 1YDOP1fj0Ju ojtg!7i E ~t?~"- i" .J.. f`M {je Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE No foreign Disseiv Central Intelligence Bulletin Mate Dept. declassification & release instructions on file v i 5 ~1;'~ ?ra ~Fs^a V Secret N9 582 IA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 CIA SRVfl~sS B,PANCH Approved For Release 2005/06Y09-~r bP85T00875R000800020259-2 Ibo (:I Nfl(/\I. IN II:I.I.ICI N(:I M11 1.1 1IN i~r poo(luced by the Director of Central Intelligence t') rileet Iris w)11 sibilities lot providilrg current intelligence bearing on issues of nalinn,ll security to the lllw,iclerrt, Iliv National Security Council, mid other senior (lov,'Inrncnl officiils? II 1?, plodur,cd in comull.)lion With the Ueparlnulnis of Stale and I)ef(ur,(? When, hec,lov! of the how factor, ,ulecluate consultation with the dep'-.11 till (m It of prlrony concern is 111)1 (c)able, item; ur portions thereof arc produced by the Central I nlelliyence Agency and enclosed in hi l(lo ts. Intcll)relntioly; of irrtelhgcnce inlurnraliun in this publication represent in)nu(liale and p(eIirnlnary views which are 5(Ihject to modification in lint: light. of further infnrrnation ,Ii((I nrow complctc analysis. Cert:rirr ndclligence item'. in finis publication miry In (lesignated specifically for no further (Ir,semrr1ition. Other intellirlence item; nray be dissemin,rtc(I further, bill only on it nc,:rl?to-lcnnw basis. (Ili,, docnrnent contains infoinr,)tion affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sec lions 193 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or reccihl by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. 1'I ,1)I e,I Iq' '2 Urllll In{rl If r?Itr pu rrl! r l r r I . . , l i r, ' t 11.11 ,~ h r ? I I r I ? ' , I1 11 I I"S.` )1)1,11')1) irl?!?.r`rv VIII 111:1.111 r. In,?rl rcrl r~nll ,r,,r 1.1?rr rr~l r,! 111) Ilrrr.:lr?r .?1 l'.nlrrl Irrt?III,;?'n,e Approved For Release 2005/0~II W NDP85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/ffl~,(C.1% 4P85T00875R000800020259-2 No. 0276/72 17 November 1972 Central Intellz~ence Bulletin 25X6 ARGENTINA: Army out in force for Peron homecoming today. Page 2) EGYPT: More signs of political ferment. (Page 4) CHILE: Lawsuits involving copper exports may in- crease. (Page 5) LAOS: Souvanna tries to step up pace of talks. (Page 6) CYPRUS: Greek Cypriots concerned over activities of forces loyal to Grivas. (Page 7) HONG KONG - CHINA: Economic ties strengthened (Page 8) LAOS: The rainy season in retrospect. (Page 9) Approved For Release 2005/06/ (C W'85T00875R000800020259-2 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 SECRET ARGENTINA: Juan Peron's homecoming today will be tightly controlled by the armed forces. Some 30,000 troops have cordoned off Ezeiza Airport, where the former president is scheduled to arrive at 0900 EST, using tanks to block the few roads that lead from central Buenos Aires 21 miles to Ezeiza. The Lanusse government has also reminded the nation that the state of siege remains in effect and that mass rallies and demonstrations are for- bidden. Troops have occupied radio and television stations to prevent extremist take-overs, and all schools, public establishments, and private busi- nesses have been closed down. One aspect of the government's security pre- cautions to "protect" Peron that is particularly galling to the Peronists is the restriction of the airport welcoming party to only 300. Peronist sources suggested that this might cause Peron's aircraft to be diverted to Uruguay, although in Rome Peron's private secretary labeled as false all reports that the trip might be delayed or canceled. Peron has termed his visit--expected to last no longer than a week--a "mission of peace" and has called upon the Peronist masses to take no ac- tion that might -thwart him. Nonetheless, his pres- ence in the country will provide dissidents on the right and terrorists on the left with the best chance they are likely to get to sabotage the elec- tions scheduled for next March. This risk is com- pounded by the possibility that an over-reaction by Peronists or the security forces could set off a chain reaction of violence desired by neither side. Neither President Lanusse nor Peron has con- firmed that, a political agreement has been reached, but earlier repcrting indicated that both sides expected Peron to give his approval to Lanusse's election plan and possibly to endorse another can- didate to carry the Peronist banner. Lanusse will3. 17 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0_tIfP85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09, 1Q- ?p 5TOO875R000800020259-2 be out of the capital. when Peron arrives, but he is due back Saturday. No meeting between the two long-time rivals is scheduled, but there are indi- cations that an understanding exists and they may get together to put the finishing touches on an agreement. (CONFIDENTIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/AEClg 85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 SECRET EGYPT: Signs of political ferment continue to surface. According to several contacts of the US In- terests Section in Cairo, an incident, possibly a coup attempt by a group of air force officers, oc- curred at an Egyptian airbase south of Cairo within the past few days. Although details of the episode are sketchy, as many as 20 arrests may have been made. One version of the affair alleges that the director of military intelligence was dismissed following the incident. The recent activities of Egypt's two leading military figures provide an indication of official concern over the episode. War Minister Ahmad Is- mail Ali, who had been scheduled to attend the meeting of Arab foreign and defense ministers in Kuwait beginning on 15 November, apparently delayed his departure by one day, during which he continued his recent series of visits with Egyptian troops, exhorting them to "maintain discipline" and focus on strictly military matters in preparation for "the battle against Israel." Chief of Staff Shazli did go to Kuwait, but returned after only one day. A number of other manifestations of the malaise in Egyptian society have appeared in recent weeks. In early October, Ln incident involving a small number of army personnel who publicly denounced the Sadat regime took place in Cairo but was quickly quelled by security forces. More recently, there was an outburst of sectarian strife between Egyp- tian Muslims and adherents of the Coptic faith. All these were apparently isolated incidents, and so far there is no evidence that the many dis- affected elements in Egyptian society are coalescing. SL.3at presumably is taking greater security pre- cautions, but as discontent increases, so do the dangers to his position. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DI SEM) 17 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 4 Approved For Release 2005/06/0tj R85T00875R000800020259-2 P85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/4JJ,Q1 J \ CHILE: Lawsuits involving Chile's copper ex- ports may increase. The Swedish Government, despite its sympathy for President Allende, turned down Santiago's re- quest last week to circumvent a preliminary court decision favorable to the Kennecott Corporation which is contesting proceeds from copper sold from its nationalized El Teniente mine. Stockholm re- fused to buy some Chilean copper that came under jurisdiction of a Swedish court, telling Santiago that it could not intervene in a dispute over com- pensation for nationalized resources. Now there are indications that Cerro Corpora- tion, another of three US companies whose copper holdings were nationalized, may eventually launch a legal campaign similar to that of the Kennecott Corporation. Chile signed a compensation agreement with Cerro, but has failed to meet scheduled pay- ments. To put pressure on the Chilean Government, Cerio has informed Santiago that it has an even stronger legal position than Kennecott and could easily seize the proceeds from Chilean copper sales to Japan from Cerro's nationalized mine. These lega actions and threats of others pose substantial pi .ilems for a nearly bankrupt Chile. Although the sums involved so far are not large, some copper buyers in Western Europe are holding off on negotiations for 1973 sales contracts. Per- haps in an attempt to minimize further legal pro- ceedings, Chile is reportedly considering a barter deal with China to exchange some copper, presumably from Kennecott.'s El Teniente mine, for soybean oil and other foodstuffs. (CONFIDENTIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09-."eta ?P85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/O 1p .. 85T00875R000800020259-2 LAOS: Prime Minister Souvanna is attempting, to step up the pace of negotiations. Souvanna has invited Lao Communist leader Sou- phanouvong to come to Luang Prabang, the royal cap- ital, for discussions. Souvanna presumably believes that direct private dealings with his half-brother are the best way tc move forward on such difficult issues as a Lao cease-fire and the shape of any fu- ture government. Many of the arrangements for the Lao settlement of 1962 were worked out in face-to- face meetings between the two leauers. The government is clearly attempting to create a favorable atmosphere for the ongoing sessions in Vientiane. The official Lao newspaper on 14 Novem- ber carried an optimistic account of the fifth ses- sion of the peace talks on Tuesday, emphasizing the similarity of the positions of both sides. The Communists have thwarted government efforts to re-establish a presence north of the Bolovens Plateau before a possible cease-fire. Communist ar- tillery attacks and ground assaults by two North Vietnamese battalions forced irregular units on 15 November to withdraw from Saravane, a provincial capital that had been reoccupied by the government earlier this month. Irregular units attempting to retake the town are meeting stiff resistance. (CON- FIDENTIA,L ) Central Intrlliger ce Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0 `CI'A-RO 85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 SECRET CYPRUS: Increased activity by forces loyal to General Gr vas has created concern in the Greek Cypriot community, but President Makarios maintains that there is no reason for alarm. Last week Greek Cypriot authorities uncovered a new undergound organization known as EOKA B, be- lieved to be headed by Grivas, a persistent cam- paigner for enosis--union with Greece. Authorities have since intensified security precautions and in- creased police patrols around the island. Makarios, in a conversation with a US Embassy official, played down the significance of groups such as EOKA B, claiming he can control any moves by Grivas supporters. At least some of his out- ward confidence may be for popular consumption; he may feel expressions of concern would only add to tensions within the Greek Cypriot community. In recent months, the community has seemed unusually united in its willingness to end differences with the Turkish Cypriots, and this has led to a more forthcoming attitude in the intercommunal talks. In an attempt, to undermine the talks by de- stroying this unity, Grivas could decide on a cam- paign of violence. The effects of such tactics would depend largely on the ability and willing- ness of Greek Cypriot security forces to ferret out Grivas supporters. Pro-Grivas sentiment is known to exist among some elements of the security forces. The outcome of Grivas' effort would also depend upon Makarios' success in turning the con- siderable support he enjoys,within the Greek Cyp- riot community against Grivas. (SECRET) 17 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/09'?85T00875R000800020259-2 HONG KONG CHINA: Economic ties between Hong Kong and C iii na are b ng strengthened. Early thins week Peking agreed to sell an additional 3.5 bil- lion gallons of water to the colony through August 1973. As a result, Hong Kong will receive about one fourth of its water from China. Peking will earn an additional $3.9 million in hard currency from the arrangement, slightly increasing the col- ony's importance as a source of foreign exchange. Meanwhile, a Chinese delegation is in Hong Kong in- vestigating the hotel business with an eye toward setting up operations there or developing tourist facilities in China. (CONFIDENTIAL) 17 Nov 7 2 Centrel Intelligence Bulletin EC, Approved For Release 2005/06/0 85T00875R000800020259-2 X Approved For Release 2005/06/09SJ 1? bF185T00875R000800020259-2 LAOS: The Rainy Season in Retrospect As the, new dry season begins in Laos e the Com- munists must view the results of their military activities during the ~:ecer,tly ended rainy season with some satisfaction. In the north, they managed to turn hack all of Vang Pao's efforts to match last year's recapture of the Plaine des Jarres-- despit:e the fact that a full North Vietnamese di vision withdrew for service in South Vietnam. In the south, they succeeded in keeping government forces well away from the Ho Chi Minh supply cor- ridor to South Vietnam and Cambodia. The Contest for the Plaine As the rainy season began in April in north Laos, the Communists were still maintaining pres- sure against Long Tieng. Their siege of Vang Pao's headquarters quickly ended, however, because of the early arrival of rainy weather, which washed out their supply route, and the redeployment of the North Vietnamese 312th Division to South Vietnam. When the Communists abandoned positions overlooking Long Tieng, they shifted the bulk of their forces to a line of hills southwest of the Plaine to check possible government offensives. With the departure of the 312th, the North Vietnamese were left with four regiments--the same number they had during the 1971 rainy season when they did not make any real attempt to defend the Plaine. The North Vietnamese pullback allowed govern- ment forces to recapture Sam Thong, a former refugee center just north of Long Tieng, and several nearby hills. The irregulars tried unsuccessfully to breach the Communist defensive line southwest of the Plaine in June and July, but relatively few ir- regular units were involved because most of Vang Pao's tribal forces were returned to rear areas for badly needed rest and refitting. The respite 17 Nov 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09=RDP'g5T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06id9(%BiA'DP85T00875R000800020259-2 delayed any major government rainy season campaign in the north. 13y mid--August, Vang Pao was able to commit nearly all of his G,000 retrained tribal troops, plus some 4 , 000 t~ oL ps from other areas, to a major offensive against the Plaine. The militory objective was to push the Communists far enough back to limit: the effectiveness of any enemy drive on Long Tieng the following dry season. It! politic~~l aim was to regain as much territory as possible to strengthen Prime Minister Souvanna's hand in any possible peace negotiations with the Communists. For the next two and a half months, irregular task forces tried to move onto the Plaine from the north, west, and south. The North Vietnamese used one of their crack regiments to hold the defensive line southwest of the Plaine, while their other three regiments--despite heavy air strikes--ianeuvered from one sector of the Plaine to another to inflict a series of defeats on the irregulars. Vang Pao had intended a simultaneous advance to prevent the Com- munists from concentrating their limited manpower, but the irregular columns made no real effort unless the Meo general was personally on the scene. As the rains began to taper off in mid-October, Vang Pao concentrated over 5,000 men--including some of the government's best troops--in a single task force on the southern tip of the Plaine. After making some limited progress, these troops lost just enough momentum to allow the Communists to concen- trate the bull-, of three. regiments against them. On 26 October Communist ground forces, tanks, ond ar- tillery routed the government troops, killing over 100, wounding 200, and capturing many more. Vz,ng Pao is currently attempting to regroup the remaining elements of his ball y battered force in thr- hi a few miles south of the Plaine, but they are still under heavy -nemy pressure. (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin 10 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/081t.4. i 1elI i2DP85T00875R000800020259-2 Fighting in the South In south Laos, the North Vietnamese objective was little different from previous years--to keep the government at ax::-is-length from the Ho Chi Minh trail complex. But they were a hit more aggref~;sivo. Communist pre-emptive moves began in mid-May, when a North Vietnamese regiment for the first time oc- cupied Khong Sedone, a provincial. capital north of Pakse. Although government troops managed to re- capture Khong Sedone in early June, it took them another two months to drive the North Vir?;tnamese well away from the surrounding area. The fighting at Khong Sedone resulted in some heavy casualties on both sides, and the irregulars had to have sev- eral weeks of rest and retraining before they could be committed to regain .l_~st ground. At the same time that the North Vietnamese moved into Khong Sedone, other, Communists were launching strong attacks farther south against gov- ernment defensive positions just 15 miles from Pakse. Elements of one North Vietnamese regiment kept up these attacks throughout the summer, suc- cessfully tying down government troops east of that important southern town. The combined pressure in the Khong Sedone and Paksr~ sectors prevented the government from organizing any sizable offensive operations in the south until mid-October. In early November eight irregular battalions managed to occupy Saravane--a provincial. capital north of the Bolovens Plateau--while other government units moved into the village of Ban Lao Ngam, which is on an important Communist supply route. The Com- aunists attempted to forestall this government of- fe,7sive by once again attacking Khong Sedone and the frontline east of Pakse, but they failed. The North Vie Lnamese are now focusing their al.ti_ Mien on eliminating the government presence north of the Bolove_,s and have already reoccupied Saravane. (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin 11 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/0664 L th-IkDP85T00875R000800020259-2 XIenV !nm I'a4 ~.ny f.t l,mlpi' f1!la:n CU,t,rnunltlf Controlled Mn.,' I h? 1'~,,,,,,,,I ???.', , + , cla :nn,., a rlh,.,l., ,.,la? V,Ir,,. qn appp?,d P? N!?,,,, CUnleffOd Ares, II,,',,,, r. nh,, I, r ?,.n,y nno,,,, ir, l.,...,,.. rr ~, I,vr?;,, n,,..? 1., ., ,,,I., Ir,n ?f',.?, 71,,.: he.l?r?, n r. ' Oilr ,. n,Ihe, + 'MY L? l l' ,I,,..I - ul VAVr Irwtll,,,,,,., ,I,In?I',?Itln,,,, It In ll,,,l I? n?,,,In It,., t!I,n ltlnu"f t1r,,,,a lrm,? rltll,q ,h, ,n,,,., pnl .,, ., I n I,. , , t h.4t I?, n,,, n, un,,. l,,.LI'Lvl.,?I ?un.4.l,t'.nhnl l enll n,,,. ,', 111.1; I 1 .' i IA SECRET NO Fui2FIGN oltsrn4 Approved For Release 2005/ R DP85T00875R000800020259-2 sJi:(,JtF"i' Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 Looka.rq n11-)ad 'rho governw,~ ;,c :'r; fa].lu.re to the l.o:;r)e:; ,;ustainoca in the previous dry season :Leave:; the Com- nluni sts in a good military po51.Li.on. `.I.'he prospect of an .umninent settlement in Vietnam and a cease- fire in Laos, however, add:; political caimonsions to the military situai:ion. An end to the fighting is now obviously uppermost in the thoughts and actions of both sides, and the dry season socill-s likely to bring a series of attacks and maneuvers in a.nticipa- tion of some form of in-place cease-fire. In some area- this seams well under way. The Communists staged their strongest attacks in over a year to drive dispirited irregular battalions back to within ton miles of the royal. capital of Luang Prahang and have recently attacked the air- field there with rockets. Enemy units made an un- precedented attack on Kong Kok, southeast of Savan- nokhot, and broke a long-standing informal. local arrangement by attacking Thakhek, a provincial cap- ital on the Mekong and several other positions to the north near Route 1.3. The timing of these un- usual attacks suggests that they were probably aimed in part at making some limited territorial c7.-ing7 in licrht- of i-.hn nnmrn talks now under wav in Vientiane. At a minimum, they serve to remind the ,government: that mi 1 i 1_ -ry crn he i ncr. fared if the negotiations remain stalled. In the north, i-le course of future fighting seems loss clear. 3t is not at all certain that the North Vietnamese will mount a major attack on Long Tieng once they have mopped up Vang Pao's remnants near the Plaine. Any full-scale attack on Vang Pao's defenses around Long Tieng would re- auire a respectable buildup of new troops and sup- plies from North Vietnam. Some troops to fill out Central IntclUgcrlcc Btarlctln 13 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020259-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/Ol,,kCf&' 1agP85T00875R000800020259-2 the minks; of unity; already in place have been (le- tocted moving toward the Plr.tine, but no :;.i.gnt.iIcant remount:, of supplies have boon shipped. a cease-fire is arrancfed in the next sev- eral weeks, the Communist,-.; will clearly control more than half of Laos, morc-, territory than t','-ey held at the time of the 1962 cease-fire. An exact comparison betuoen 1.962 and 1.972, however, is not possible because no effort was made ton years ago to draw an agreed upon cease-fire line or to pin- point troop locations. Government and Communist negotiaf.ors in Vien- tiane have not yet come to grips with the questions of a cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign troops. If, however, North Vietnamese forces are eventually withdrawn and the government accedes to Communist demands that irregular units be disbanded, the op- posing military forces would consist of the Royal Lao Army and the Pathet Lao. Vientiane's regular army stands at some 48,000 men--including some nominally "neutralist" units--while the Lao Commu- nists have approximately 35,000 to 45,000 combat and support troops spread throughout the country. JV4Y -ho years 1..11Gse J.r.1-l eno s l ac, forces of ibo L1 f uV 111 sides have not been particularly aggressive or of- fcctivc. i-:ithout foreign prodding they would prob- ably be generally willing, if not eager, to comply with the terms of any cease-fire. (SECRET NO FOR- EIGN DISSEM) 17 Nov 72 Central IntdIligcncc Bulletin 14 Approved For Release 2005/06M : & -libP85T00875R000800020259-2