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December 19, 2016
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January 14, 2002
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December 23, 1972
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# ,,, .: ! f f ., ... .!, .( ~.. {,,,. i. J ++)! ?. ~ F# l., ,j( +) +! i(, ~{J; .. ~..:d 1., i ~~ ~.,? ~;;. !~ a l.,i h:.. ~.,: ~;;. 1_ a. {p~11' ' ~ ~ 't:.? !. ~. ~ 1,., 1., t .. ..._ .i J elgase 2005/0/09 t C1~ 72DP8~~0 875R06~} 60~'L??~ 8-~ j - ' Approved for i i rs- Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800"r$t~ DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin u N2 582 23 December 1972 State Dept. declq*0 &p4 N bN l4ftiMn"A-fit9P85T00875R000800020288-0 Approved For Release 2005/069 DP85T00875R000800020288-0 Tile C[.:NTRAL. INTE:LLIGFNCL: BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet Inc respon sibilitres fur providing current intelligence hearing on issues of national tiacnrity to the President, the National Security Council, aiuI other senior govelnnlent official,. It is produced in consultation with the Departments 01 State and Defense. When, because of the tirne factor, adequare consultation with the department of primary concern is not fe, sihle, items or portions thereof are produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and enclosed in brackets. Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and prelitnirrary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Con lain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. This ?iocument contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmi_sion or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Semnnc IIIICIIIHI'lla? 51nll.cc and .Neural, hla.',cll f1.I~.i 1,cJ by 6 7' . H ) 0l ecrlnpl r1,". Rrlirl ll Ars I.,"'f,can?n 101, 'W!, ?I I (I 1In',1 rwemptirrn catnRr?ry 51!111,1_'01 Jcda.vdmd unh on rpproval cf Illr Irnrc l?.,r ,rl (corral Inlclligcncr Approved For Release 2005/0W RX'1RDP85T00875R000800020288-0 Approved For Release 2005/O pIE DP85TOO875R000800020288-0 No. 0307/72 23 December 1972 Central Intellzgence Bulletin CONTENTS USSR-CHILE: Allende reportedly disappointed with result&, of Moscow trip. (Page 1) 25X6A 25X6A CAMBODIA: Recent low level of fighting contrasts markedly with last year. (Page 5) INDIA: Widespread hunger likely until spring har- vest. (Page 6) CHINA - US - NORTH VIETNAM: Chinese merchant ship damaged by US air attack (Page 7) 5X6 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/O ]W& bP85TOO875R000800020288-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/0%145T00875R000800020288-0 25X1X4 25X1X4 I I, the lack of results and the coolness of the Soviets explain why Allende has been so quiet about his trip since his return to Santiago. Soviet com- mentary on the Allende visit was extensive while he was in the USSR, but since then has been infrequent. The most authoritative media treatment, in Pravda on 15 December, gave no indication that any new agreements had been signed. USSR-CHILE: President Allende reportedly was disappointed with the results of his visit to Moscow two weeks ago. Evidence is mounting that Moscow refused Allende lac a-scale "bail-out" assistance. 25X1C the Soviets apparently i agree to provide some immediate help in the form of $25 to $30 million in foodstuffs, but this is far short of the $300 to $500 million in hard currency credits Allende reportedly requested. Prior to Allende's arrival, Luis Corvalan, Chile's Communist Party chief, and Alfonso Inoztroza, the head of Chile's Central Bank, reportedly had been treated very coldly by the Soviets and the tenor of President Allende's The Soviets apparently believe that Chile is in serious economic difficulty because of errors in economic policy that will take many years to correct. They reportedly informed Allende that they are watch- ing the Chilean experience with interest and ap- plaud it, but that the USSR could not afford to support Chile and Cuba at the same time. If Moscow were to provide Allende with the massive hard cur- rency assistance he sought, it would entail major sacrifices for the USSR at a time when its foreign exchange position is being strained by the need to finance large grain imports. Moscow's apparent refusal to bail out Allende leaves the Chilean economy in dire straits. Chile is encountering increasing difficulty in obtaining Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/0IS85T00875R000800020288-0 Approved For Release 2005/O6/8F,. P85T00875R000800020288-0 financial help from traditional West European cred- itors and an approach to Swiss banks, following Al- lende' s visit to Moscow, reportedly was rebuffed. Because of falling exports and exhausted foreign ex- change reserves, Chile's import capacity will be down by more than $300 million in 1973, unless ad- ditional hard currency credits are obtained. Al- though the foodstuffs allegedly promised by the USSR will be helpful, they amount to less than eight per- cent of Chile's food import needs and will not allow Chile to avert a major cutback in imports and con- sumption during 1973. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 23 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin cF TT Approved For Release 2005/06/09"~DP85T00875R000800020288-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/0t85T00875R000800020288-0 25X6A Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/01S85T00875R000800020288-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/M,(C~, ~-t~85TOO875R000800020288-0 25X6A 23 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/06 I bW85TOO875R000800020288-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : ft85T00875R000800020288-0 CAMBODIA: The low level of combat in recent months stands in marked contrast to the fighting a year ago. Last year at this time government units north and west of Phnom Penh were engaged in heavy fight- ing with seasoned Vietnamese Communist units. With the Communist spring offensive in South Vietnam, however, most of these enemy forces were returned to South Vietnam, leaving the Khmer Communists largely on their own. Although the insurgents' ability to conduct and coordinate tactical operations continues to improve, they do not appear capable of dealing any decisive military setbacks to the defensive-minded Cambodian Army. Most of the fighting during the last four months has resulted from periodic Khmer Communist interdictions of major highways. Diminished Commu- nist activity along Routes 4 and 5 is making it possible for the government to move badly needed supplies of rice and other goods to Phnom Penh. Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces are now try- ing to clear Route 2 between Takeo and the South Vietnamese border. In addition to interdiction operations, the Communists have also been putting pressure on sev- eral provincial capitals--most recently the iso- lated northern town of Kompong Thom. Since 7 De- cember, Communist forces have carried out a series of shellings and ground probes against Cambodian positions in and around the town. Although the Cambodians have abandoned a few positions, the 2,600-man garrison does not appear to be in grave danger. The government is now airlifting rein- forcements and has replaced the inept local com- mander. (SECRET) 23 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : ~~8j`T00875R000800020288-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/OESfD5T00875R000800020288-0 INDIA: Widespread hunger is likely to last until the spring harvest begins in April. Drought has affected many areas, and acute food shortages are occurring in a wide belt across central India. State officials expressed concern that the central government has provided them with only half the amount of foodstuffs needed in recent weeks. US officials and volunteer agencies on the scene believe that central government stocks and distribution are insufficient to deal with the emergency. Government foodgrain stocks, which totaled nine million tons in August, dropped to four mil- lion as of 1 November, and 3.2 million tons a month later. Exports to other states by private treaders in some surplus states were banned in an effort to get the grain into government hands. This move, however, has aggravated food shortages in nearby drought-affected states. The government has purchased an estimated 500,000 tons of foodgrains abroad since mid-Novem- ber, about half of this from the US. Although New Delhi claims shipments will begin arriving next month, the volume will not reach substantial proportions until February or later. In any case, imported grains usually are distributed to the large coastal cities, thereby doing little to help the hardest hit inland areas. In an effort to achieve a more equitable dis- tribution of grain throughout the nation, New Delhi is using the emergency situation to push the state governments to take over the wholesale grain trade beginning with next spring's harvest. Be- cause the states lack facilities, however, such moves will further disrupt distribution channels and may cause even greater hardship. (CONFIDENTIAL) 23 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2005/06/06 -RIA5T00875R000800020288-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :Sq1Jq-,w$,T00875R000800020288-0 CHINA - US - NORTH VIETNAM: Peking has reacted in a low-key and measured way to a US air attack on 20 December that damaged a Chinese merchant ship in Haiphong harbor. In a terse broadcast on 21 Decem- ber, the New China News Agency expressed the Chinese people's "extreme indignation" over the incident, but implied there were no casualties and little dam- age. The broadcast said that the Chinese Government "strongly protests the provocative act" and insists that the US "immediately stop attacking" Chinese ships and "guarantee" against any recurrence. NCNA asserted that Peking "is closely watching the devel- opment of da,ly expanding US war activities"--the first hint that renewed US military operations against North Vietnam have engaged Peking's serious attention. This formulation stops far short of a Chinese statement last June that such operations "threatened" China's security. (CONFIDENTIAL) Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/06/09,5Vt- T00875R000800020288-0