INTELLIGENCE REPORT PEKING-TAIPEI CONTACTS: THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE 'CHINESE SOLUTION' (REFERENCE TITLE: POLO XLVI)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010045-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
ILLEGIB
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence deport
Peking-Taipei Contacts: The Question
of a Possible "Chinese Solution"
(Reference Title: POLO XLVI)
Secret
RSS No. 0055/71
December 1971
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NV A R N EN(.
This clotUnreiit cuntairi'. inforuraticnr allc cling tht? naticmal
cicl:'nsc (,f the l'uitt cl States. ?ithiri the mcaniu(T cri 'I itlc
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Its transrrris',iori ur r( \?elation of ils cunlerits to or re-
eiht In' all rrriauthuri:,-cl luvvir is liruhil,it"cl lly law.
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vii V J. % J..A .4
PEKING-TAIPEI CONTACTS :
THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE "CHINESE SOLUTION"
This study details known contacts over the
years between Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist
figures, judges the intentions of Peking and Taipei,
and advances certain judgments as to whether the
present trauma of the Chinese Nationalists will cause
them to become interested in an accommodation of some
kind with Peking.
Available evidence is firm in very few instances;
the study's judgments are accordingly advanced with
caution. That Communist and Nationalist individuals
have been interested from time to time in at least
learning the other's views is clear: we know definitely
that there have been a few initiatives by Chinese
Communist intermediaries, from time to time, and
some contact between Chinese Communist and Nationalist
figures in third countries. It seems fairly certain
that, until recently at least, the Taipei leadership
has not been interested in sounding out Peking for the
terms of any kind of deal -- that Nationalist interest,
if any, has been confined to individual figures whose
motives have been obscure. Peking's interest has
apparently been principally that of attempting to
undermine Nationalist morale and to sow discord between
Taipei and the US.
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Zl',UKL .L
This study concludes that no significant
Nationalist vulnerabilities to proposed accommodation
have developed to mid-1971, but that Peking's
expectations and confidence in this regard are now
almost certainly on the sharp rise. Indeed, a clear
Nationalist interest in possible deals will probably
soon begin to appear -- but still confined to in-
dividuals. Beyond the near future, and especially
as accumulated misfortune besets Nationalist leader-
ship, such interest will doubtless grow. Whether
it comes to be the policy of the Nationalist lead-
ership depends on a myriad of forces, chief among
them the Nationalist succession, the effect of
Taiwanese pressures, and, most importantly, the state
of Nationalist confidence in outside guarantees of
Taiwan's defense. Given a worst-case combination
of such forces, susceptibilities to Peking will
mount. Meanwhile, Peking will in any event grow
more apprehensive that its Taiwan ambitions may
be impeded by Taiwanese -- and Japanese -- aspirations.
This study has profited from constructive inputs
from many offices in the Central Intelligence Agency.
There is a sizable area of general agreement concerning
Nationalist-Communist contacts to date, but because so
much of the evidence is tenuous, and the future
necessarily speculative, the views expressed in this
study remain essentially those of its principal
author, who wrote much of this
study during an early-1971 tour of duty with this Staff.
This study is based on information available to
1 July 1971. Comments on the study and its judgments
will be welcome.
Hal Ford
Chief, DD/I Special. Research Staff
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PEKING-TAIPEI CONTACTS:
THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE "CHINESE SOLUTION"
Contents
Page
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1. THE CAMPAIGN FOR "PEACEFUL LIBERATION"
BEGINS ?- Spring 1955 to Fall 1958. . . . . . .1
A. Public Overtures and Private Approaches..)
B. Hard Line Interruption of the Campaign. 12
II. PEKING RESUMES A "REASONABLE" POSITION
- Fall :1.958 to 1963. . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. Peking?s Agents Persist . . . . . 15
B. Taipei Denounces the Peace Talk Rumors..18
C. Peking's Approaches, Including Some
From "High-Levels," Continue . . . . . 20
D. Evidence of Peking-Taipei Agent
Contacts . . . . . . . . . . 26
E. Peking's Last Private Overture. . . . . 29
III. PEKING EXPLOIT'S ITS IMPROVED 1NrERNATIONAL
PROSPECTS - Early 1964 to Late 1965. . . . . 33
A. Consequences of French Recognition. . . 33
B. Return to Peking of Li Tsung-?Jen. . . . 35
IV. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
-? Early 1965 to Early 1969 . . . . . . . . . 39
V. PROSPECTS FOR. A "CHINESE SOLUTION"! . . . . . 43
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PEKING-TAIPEI CONTACTS:
TIME QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE "CHINESE SOLUTION"
Summary
It should be noted at the outset that this
study must of necessity be highly speculative. The
evidence is firm only on occasion. At times the
U.S. Government has been informed by Chiang Ching-kuo
of approaches to Chinese Nationalist figures by
Chinese Communists; at other times we have learned of
such contacts only through our own clandestine means;
at still other times some contact must be assumed.
It seems clear that in such contacts to date there
has been neither much Chinese Communist expectation
nor significant Chinese Nationalist vulnerability.
But the accelerating decline of the GFr's fortures
-- and raison d'etre -- is bringing new forces into play
which b Tx this shadowy "Chinese solution" question
more to center stage.
The first known Chinese Nationalist-Communist
contacts, after theNationalist expulsion from the
mainland, took place in 1955-1956. The apparent
causes were various checks at that time upon overt
Chinese Communist advances in the Taiwan Strait: the
conclusion of a US-GRC Mutual Defense Treaty
(December 1.954); Peking's turn (April 1955) to a new,
"peaceful" foreign policy course, overall; and the
initiation ;August 1955) of the US-Chinese Communist
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talks in Warsaw. It was in this context of reduced
military pressures and of Peking's shift to a professed
interest in negotiating a "peaceful" settlement of the
Taiwan issue with the GRC, that Peking began to
supplement its public overtures to Taipei by a series
of private letters to Nationalist leaders -- over a
period of seven years. During the same period Chinese
Communist agents and officials instigated false rumors
of peace talks between the two regimes. Peking
also sought in various ways to entice Nationalist
and unaligned Chinese leaders abroad to return
"home."
These "peaceful liberation" initiatives of
1955 apparently had several related objectives: to
give Peking an appearance of r,iasonableness in the
eyes of the world, to generate mutual suspicion
between Washington and Taipei, to disturb and dis-
credit GRC leaders, and to encourage betrayals. The
relative emphasis on these several objectives seemed
to vary from time to time. Open psychological
warfare -- radio broadcasts, rumors, and written
propa an da -- was predominant in early 1957
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'Tr.e mop: t not. wworthy role in these Communist
ir.itia t i,,F-- , 1955-4962, was perhaps that of a rather
disreput.abl-. Hoag Kong character named Tao Chu-jen,
who wrote
i
Car
ous letters of enticement to Chiang
Chin
k
"
*-
g?-?
uc 0
C-.
a period of several years.
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In any event, Ching-kuo reported Tsao's approaches
to US authorities, and all of these -- and all other
knova' overtures for negotiations in the years i955-
1962 -- were reportedly ignored or flatly rejected by
the GRC. There is no credible evidence to the con-
trary. The Nationalists apparently not only rejected
the idea of peace talks but resented the notion that
they might consider seriously such a course. In late
1958 GRC Vice President Chen Cheng publicly confirmed
rumors and press reports that GRC leaders had privately
been receiving proposals for negotiations from the
Chinese Communists. The Vice President denounced
these initiatives and other peaceful "liberation"
gestures as attempts to divert attention from
Peking's failure to interdict the offshore islands
in 1958, and to create distrust between Taipei
and its US ally. The GRC took this step, three
years after Peking's effort began, only after
deciding that the post-Taiwan Strait crisis rumors
about peace talks required an official denial.
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S 'RFT
When in January 1964 France recognized the Peking
regime, the Chinese Communists, including some of the
senior leaders, sought to create a snowball diplomatic
effect by hinting at improved prospects for a
settlement with the GRC. In late 1965 Peking received
an unprecedented degree of support in the General
Assembly for admission to the United Nations. But
by early 1966 Peking's diplomatic activity was
interrupted by the Cultural Revolution, and the
disorder on the mainland during the next few
years reversed the trend of international. acceptance
of the Chinese Communist regime. During those
years -- 1965 to early 1969 -- no Peking approaches
to Taipei are known to have been made, other than
some tentative, approaches made in Europe through
various in'(:er::iat;ional organizations.
As for motives, Peking's 1955-56 "peaceful
liberation?' talk was moderately effective in gulling
certain governments, and probably was viewed by the
Chinese Communist leadership as worth the low-priority
effort expended, The "reasonable" pooture resulted
in improved public relations and diplomatic gains.
Some of the initiatives probably sharpened Nationalist
(:R FT
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sensitivity to the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw
between the US and Peking
There
was one significant "return" -- in 1965, of the aged
former GRC Vice President, Li Tsung-jen -- ich was
probably a product of Pekin 's ef.f ,
Vice President
Chen Cheng's death in 1965 removed the only apparent
threat to Chiang Cliing-kuo's primacy after the death
or retirement of his father. There were, no consequent
defections by GRC leaders, in response to the Communist
enticements, no apparent major demoralization among
the Nationalists, and no app;-eciable disturbance of
the Taipei-Washington relationship.
In the spring of 1969 the mainland situation
began to stabilize - more or less - and Peking
moved to rehabilitate its diplomacy. Again, the Chinese
Communists were interested in appearing reasonable and
in encouraging the belio,f that the "peaceful liberation"
of Taiwan was not only desirable but probable.
Diplomatic successes in late 1970 and 1971 have
facilitated Peking's strategy of affecting patience
and moderation about Taiwan, and of trying to generate
distrust between Taipei and Washington. Chinese
Conimunis;, figures have meanwhile been busily spreading
reports that the GRC is nearing the end of the road
and that Taiwan will eventually be assimilated back
into China.
Indeed, Peking's expectations have duubtiess
been raised sharply by events of the past year or
so. Communist China is in the process of enjoying the
breakthrough in international status which it has
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long coveted, and Mao and (:hou En-lai must judge that
the dimensions of this breakthrough will markedly
improve Peking's political and psychological leverage
against the Nationalists. Chinese Communist figures
have made certain statements of late apparently aimed
at capitalizing on rising vulnerabilities, and we
must assume that these statements are being
paralleled -- or shortly will be -- by attempts to
make private contact with Nationalist figures or
intermediaries. We should fi.rther assume that Peking
may sweeten its offers somewhat, in the expectation
that the GRC will have virtually no place to go, and
that time may work to Peking's advantage. Even so,
it would seem unlikely that Mao or his successors will
offer any deal in which the small print adds up to
much more than honorific status for ex-Nationalists.
For its part, in accelerating diplomatic
isolation, and apparently uncertain of US intentions,
the GRC is faced with ueclining morale, and doubtless
will experience increased uneasiness over Taiwanese
assertiveness, some greater internal security problems,
and heightened individual Nationalist mainlander
interest in various "worst case" options. Although
disgruntled or despairing Nationalist figures who
have left Taiwan thus far have for the most part
settled in Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, or the USA,
some may come to choose the China mainland -- or
defection in place. To important measure, the
degree of receptiveness which develops among the
Nationalists to Peking will depend upon the feasible
options open to them which circumstance and numerous
variables bring. For the near term -- so long as the
Chi.angs and their mainlander colleagues have no
reason seriously to doubt that the US will defend
Taiwan against attack -- it seems likely that the
respective personal and collective benefits to them
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SI~, CIRF.'1'
of a model Taiwan province (still called "China")
would outweigh any enticements Mao or his heirs
would offer. Indeed, Nationalist resistance to a
deal will probably tend to remain generally staunch
as long as certain circumstances prevail: retention
of the GRC's still-formidable economic, administrative,
and security capabilities; Taiwanese disorganization
and political prudence; some continued international
status and role fo_ the Republic of China; and,
above all, reasonable confidence in a US defense
guarantee of Taiwan. But some of those may give way.
And, additional variables will be at work: the
longevity of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek now 35)
and of Chiang Ching-kuo ;
the. attrition of time upon mainlander dominance of
the great Taiwanese majority; and the existence of
certain other options probably open to some main-
lander Nationalists.
/ by and large,
the Taiwanese will want independence, not still
another. -- and worse -- master. To the degree that
an effective Taiwanese independence movement arises,
we can expect it to become not only an increasing object
of Peking's concern, but in effect a source of pressure
upon Peking to undermine the will of the GRC before
Taiwanese independence -- possibly backed by Japan --
becomes a realistic threat to Peking's objectives.
The long-term prospect -- as well as can be
judged at this time -- may be one of increased Taiwanese
assertiveness; some resulting GRC crackdown; some decline
in stability on Taiwan; and some move toward investigating
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options other than dependence upon the US -- e.g., seeking
increased support from Japan, the USSR, or other
outside countries; making the best of things on Taiwan;
individual flight abroad; or individual accommodation
to Peking. In the event, however, that US or other
outside guarantee of Taiwan's security should come to
appear uncertain, then the long-term and troubled
outcome may remain to be worked out between the great
weight of China and the insular entity of Taiwan.
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Since the founding of the Chinese People's
Republic in 1949, the Chinese Communists have never
deviated from the position that Taiwan is an inter-
nal question to be settled by the Chinese themselves.
The Communists have been careful to foreclose none
of the options about the means to the "liberation"
of Taiwan. They have shared consistently with the
Government of the Republic of China (GRC) in Taipei
the unqualified position that Taiwan is a part of
China, and from t ii,ie to time they have re-emphasized
the legal and historical basis of that position.
Peking views any advocacy o f . Taiwan's autonomy -- e . g . ,
the Taiwan Independence Movement -- as an "imperialist"
intrigue, while Taipei has suppressed Taiwan indepen-
dence leaders as a threat to Nationalist power on
Taiwan and subversive of the GRC claim to be the
government of all China.
Prior to the defeat of Japan in 1945, the
Chinese Communists favored independence for Taiwan,
but when the GRC accepted Japan's surrender on the
island and occupied it, the Communists shifted to
advocacy of an "autonomous" Taiwan within China. It
was not until 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek's exiled
control of Taiwan posed a continuing challenge to the
legitimacy and security of the People's Republic of
China, that the Chinese Communists adopted the
uncompromising position they hold now.
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The legal status of Taiwan is arguable.
Following China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War,
it was ?_eded to Japan. During World War II the
Allied Powers unequivocally committed themselves
in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 to restore Taiwan
to China. In the peace treaties Japan signed with
the Allied Powers in 1951 and, separately, with
the GRC in 1952, Japan renounced sovereignty over
Taiwan but did not hand it specifically to the GRC.
Thus while Poking and Taipei hold the Cairo
Declaration to be an unchallengeable basis for
their claims, Taiwanese independence leaders, citing
political developments since 1945, including the
denial of Taiwanese freedom under the GRC, argue
that legal sovereignty is still to be determined
in the absence of Japanese disposition of the
territory. These advocates point out also that
Article 103 of the United Nations Charter provides
for self-.determination as a principle in fixing
the status of former colonial territories. However,
sirce 1949 the political and military realities of
Natior;,!i t control have eclipsed the juridical
ambiguities about Taiwan's status.
U?i'A:I 1955 Peking's pronour,ccements about
try "iibera.tior." of Taiwan were belligerent. The
out.l:,rE:ak of' th?: Korean VYar in 1950 and the neutrali-
zation of. Taiwan had nullified Communist aspirations
regarding a military takeover of the island, but
Peking continued to address the question in threaten-
ing language. When in December 1954 the US signed a
Mutual Defense Treaty with the GRC, the risk of any
move against. Taiwan became clearly unacceptable,
especially since Peking's Soviet ally had in the
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meantime indicated that support for Peking's claim
to Taiwan did not extend to military support for
'liberation" of it by Peking's resort to force?.
In light of the military impossibility of
-seizing Taiwan, Peking shifted to the political
tactics of sowing Suspicion between Washington and
'Taipei and of trying; to defect prominent Nationalists.
This paper surveys the most important
Communist-initiated letters which are known to be
authentic probes, and will offer an analysis of their
role in the struggle between Peking and Taipei over
the past two decades.
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71Sl~Kl, l
1. THE CAMPAIGN FOR PEACEFUL "LIBERATION" BEGINS -
Spring 1955 to Fall 1958
A. Public Overtures and Private Approaches
On several occasions during the spring of 1955
Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-tai offered publicly
to negotiate the status of Taiwan with the "Taiwan
authc 'ities.1' As the first hint of seeming flexibility
in Peking's position on the issue, Chou's overture was
calculated to give Peking an appearance of reasonable-
ness and to portray the US as the intransigent and
offending party. The offer was ignored officially by
the CRC, but in July 1955 it was rejected by a cabinet-
rank spokesman in Taipei who requested anonymity in
conversation ;pith foreign journalists. Referring
implic.:}; v to the forthcoming US-Peking talks in Warsaw,
the spokasma.n said that Chinese Communist double talk
might fool some Americans but not the Chinese people.*
Since '.;hat time, the themes of Chinese Communist perfidy
and of CRC disdain for those who failed to understand it
*w~ej"s"sock ?Iimes, 31 July 1955.
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have never been absent from comments about dealing
with Peking which Taipei has issued publicly, and
which GRC leaders have made privately to US officials.
Between August and December 1955 and coinci-
dent with. Peking's public enticements, a Hong Kong
Journalist, Tsao Chu-jen, sent three secret letters
to Chiang Ching-kuo, President Chiang Kai-shek's son
and likely successor and then Deputy Secretary General
of the GRC National Defense Council. No aspect of
Peking's peaceful "liberation" campaign from 1955 to
the early 1960's is more puzzling than the role of
this Tsao, whose secret communications to Chiang
Ching-kuo in 1955 anticipated Chou En-lai's formal
declaration in 1956 by almost a year.
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Tsao's three letters to Chiang Ching-kuo in
late 1955 asked Chiang to send a representative to
Hong Kong to receive "important information" about a
Peking-Taipei reconciliation. The existence of these
letters was leaked to the press, probably by the
writer hir;-self; only after the leak did Chiang divulge
the letters to US representatives in Taipei. Origina-
ting with a dubious figure like Tsao, this initiative
was clearly not a serious approach to Taipei. It may
have been encouraged by Peking's Hong Kong apparatus
as a no-cost fishing expedition that might if nothing
else embarrass Chiang Ching-kuo, making it appear that
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in Peking's eyes he was susceptible to such a
suggestion. By reporting the letters to US officials,
Chiang, who had spent 12 years in the USSR and
had temporarily joined the Communist Party there,
showed sensitivity to possible US suspicions and
called attention to his rejection of the approach.
It is noteworthy that a US journalist had published
a report that Chiang had sent an emissary to Hong
Kong who returned with an offer from Peking of
"autonomous" status for Taiwan and a high position
for Chiang Ching-kuo; Chiang now dismissed this as
a fabrication, which undoubtedly it was.
In June 1956 Peking formally established i+
"peaceful liberation" posture. Chou En-lai, addrc s-
ing the National People's Congress in Peking on
28 June, made an authoritative declaration of Peking's
basic negotiating po, H it ion on Taiwan. This declara-
tion was to be cited later by P'eng Te-huai, Chinese
Communist Minister o National Defense, when he
announced the suspension of the bombardment of Chin-
men (Quemoy; in early October 1958. Chou En-lai
said in June 1956:
"Now on behalf of the Government
I formally state: we are willing
to negotiate with the Taiwan
authorities on specific steps and
terms for the peaceful liberation
of Taiwan, and we hope that the
Taiwan authoritie3 will send their
representatives to Peking or
another appropriate place, at a
time which they consider appropriate,
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D.Lflitr, .1
to begin these talks with us.
In order to unite all patriotic
forces to realize at an early
date the complete unification
of our motherland, I wish here
to declare once again that all
patriotic people, regardless
of whether they joined the
patriotic ranks earlier or later,
and regardless of how great the
crimes they committed in the
past may have been, will be
treated in accordance with the
principle that patriots belo.ig
to one family and with the policy
of no punishment for past mis-
deeds. They are all welcome to
perform meritorious services for
the peaceful liberation of Taiwan,
and will be duly rewarded accord-
ing to the degree of their merits
and provided with appropriate
jobs."
This patronizing statement, committing Peking
to nothing, was a strong reaffirmation of Chinese
Communist "reasonableness" on the question of Taiwan.
It was consistent with the relatively moderate style
of policy at the time -- at home and abroad. It was
designed to gain a wider and more attentive interna-
tional audienc(, for Peking's attempt to set the claims
of the family if the Chinese people against the alleged
interference and aggression of outsiders. Chou
provided no details about the shape of a political
accommodation with the GRC, but a diverse assortment
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SFC`,R T
of specific proposals was to be communicated privately
to GRC leaders over the next few years. The tone of
Chou's declaration and its basic themes -- forgive-
ness, flexibility, leniency, patriotism, and partici-
pation -- characterized overtures from the Communist
side from that time on. The declaration set the
stage for Peking's effort during the following decade
to appear "reasonable," to promote distrust between
the GRC and the US, to weaken Chinese Nationalist
morale, to sow suspicion within the GRC leadership,
and to encourage defections and betrayals in Taipei.
There was nothing in Chou En-lai's statement to suggest
the expectation of a positive response, and there was
in fact no response at all.
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S FC`.12 F r
In early 1957, at about the time Tsao Chu-Jen
was writing to Chiang Ching.-kuo and the others, Peking
stepped up its propaganda directed to Taiwan and its
efforts to defect ex-mainlanders in Hong Kong. Radio
broadcasts carried a large number of personal appeals
by mainland residents to individual Nationalist leaders
and their families. These appeals tried to 9xploit
homesickness and stressed patriotism and reconcilia-
tion. Rumors were planted concerning high-level
discussions between Peking and Taipei, and there was
an attempt to generate pressure for peace negotiations
on the GRC among overseas Chinese communities.
This 1957 campaign began to disturb the GRC
leadership. Taipei, dependent upon the US and seeking
US support for eventual recovery of the mainland, did
not want to be taken too much for granted, but neither
did it want suspicion of GRC intentions to develop
in Washington. The rumors of peace talks were starting-
to find foreign believers, even in embassies and foreign
offices around the world where the rumors were traded
and reported on. A sense of the atmosphere at the time
is suggested by the fact that US diplomatic and intelli-
gence officers in Taipei and Hong Kong were urged
periodically to evaluate the possibility that GRC-
Peking negotiations were about to occur, or were already
in progress. President Chiang Kai-shek was personally
concerned, and the question of counter-psychological
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warfare was discussed at Kuomintang Central Committee
meetings. But no counter-campaign was launched -- not
then -- probably because of a judgment that any
formal reaction would give the rumors a measure of
credibility, of serious Nationalist concern. GRC
leaders, when asked about peace talks with Peking,
simply dismissed the idea as preposterous. And it
was preposterous, but GRC sensitivity to the impact
of the rumors was real, just as Chiang Ching-kuo's
personal sensitivity to the letters from Tsao Chu-jen
had induced him to divulge the letters to US officials
and to affirm his rejection of the suggestion they
contained.
B. Hard-Line Interruption of the Campaign
By the early summer of 1957 the Chinese Commui.ist
leadership was shaken and disillusioned by the discon-
tent that surfaced during the Hundred Flowers Movement.
In June the "anti-rightist" campaign began, and domestic
developments eventuated in the assertive hard-line
measures of a year later, the "people's communes" and
the Great Leap Forward. Foreign affairs meanwhile moved
toward significantly hardening Chinese positions with
respect to the Soviet ally.
Meanwhile, in November 1957, Chou En-lai granted
an interview in Peking to the editor of Suddeutsche
Zeitung, the leading Munich daily.* Chou reaffirmed
*Issue of 19 November 1957.
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the Taiwan issue as an internal Chinese question,
stating that Peking might be willing to recognize
Chiang Kai-shek's position as "leader on Taiwan." Thus
he compromised the private approaches made during the
previous year and cast President Chiang in the role of
a powerless supplicant.. Chou in this interview accused
the US of Pursuing a Two-China concept, which he said
Peking would never accept., and he asserted that the US
would never allow a Nationalist attack on the mainland.
Therefore, according to Chou, Chiang Kai-shek would
have to choose a way out, and nothing but the date (of
a deal with the Chinese Communists) was left for him to
decide. When asked by the editor whether Peking had
any confidential connections with Chiang or his inner
circle, Chou seized the opportunity to feed possible
US suspicions of GRC intentions: "If we had any
official (connections), the US would let Chiang down."
Peking generally ignored Taiwan during the
momentous events of 1958, until 23 August, when main-
land batteries in Fukien Province began the shelling
of Chinmen Island, Mao Tse-tung a few -weeks later
denounced the "US occupation of Taiwan." By September
Peking had retreated to a face-saving pretense that the
"liberation" of the offshores or of Taiwan by force
had never been its intention -- Peking having been
compelled to back off by effective, US-supported GRC
counteraction, and by having learned that Moscow was
not about, to bail Peking out. in the, event, of a major
confrontation with the US,
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II. PEKING RESUMES A "REASONABLE" POSITION -
Fall 1958 to 1963
A. Peking's Agents Persist
In September 1958 -- during the offshore island
crisis but prior to the Chinese Communists' backing-
off -- Tsao Chu-jen appeared once again, sending letters
in that month from Hong Kong
In any event, Tsao proceeded to leak
the story about the conditional bombardment suspension
to a Singapore newspaper, possibly a self-serving
indiscretion but more likely a Peking-inspired effort
to amplify publicity favorable to the pose of decency
and conciliation.
Tsao Chu-jen's September 1958 letters contained
terms for the "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan, terms
which Tsao said had the approval of the Peking author-
ities. These included the retention of Chiang Kai-shek's
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control of civilian and military affairs on Taiwan,
Chinmen to become a trading center after the with-
drawal of Nationalist troops, Taiwan to become an
autonomous area "like Tibet and Sinkiang" (:) on a
date to be determined, and the Kuomintang to remain an
independent political party. Tsao described mainland
progress as "terrific" and urged a GRC delegation to
visit, Communist China on an inspection trip. Tsao's
letter to Chiang Ching-kuo said that Peking viewed
Chiang as the logical eventual leader of post-settle-
ment Taiwan, and that Vice-President Chen Cheng was
also highly regarded by the Chinese Communist leader-
ship.
These terms, like those offered by Tsao more
than a year earlier, may have been formulated by him-
self., but were almost certainly based on Tsao's dis-
cussions with persons within, or close to, the Chinese
Communist leadership. They reflected Peking's interest
in re-establishing an ostensibly reasonable stance
-- in fact a tough, though face-saving, one for the
GRC - - on a Taiwan solution, and this was paralleled
at the time by Peking's demonstration of interest in
renewing the talks with the US in Warsaw. Public
expression was given to the shift in Taiwan policy by
Peng Te-,huai when he referred on 6 October 1958 to
Chou En-lai's earlier (1956) declaration, and when
later, on 25 October, he said, "Chinese problems must
be settled by us Chinese alone. If they are diffi-
cult to settle for the time being, things can be
talked over at length."
In any event, when Chiang Ching--kuo showed Tsao
Chu-jen's September 1958 letters to US officials, he
said his father would never enter into direct negotia-
tions with Peking and that the Nationalist leadership
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preferred any status in the free world to selling out
to the Communists. Ching-kuo quoted a Chinese proverb,
"It is better to be a cracked piece of jade than a
whole piece of common clay." He also said that the
letters would be ignored, and that the GRC leadership
wanted to make certain that the US knew about these
approaches lest Peking succeed in creating distrust
between Washington and Taipei.
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B. Taipei Denounces the Peace Offensive
By early November 1958, the Chinese Nationalists
had become convinced of the need to clear the air of a
new flurry of rumors about possible negotiations with
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Peking. the GRC considered
Tsao Chu-,7 en and Chang Shih-chao as Communist
psychological warfare agents and their letters only
one element of an overall program aimed at dividing
the Chinese Nationalists, eroding Nationalist morale,
and rupturing the GRC-US relationship. The GRC
leaders were relatively unconcerned about Tsao Chu-
jen, whom they considered an "opportunist" without
authentic Peking credentials, but they believed
Chang Shih-chao to be a bona fide agent whose reputa-
tion and influence should be 'dee`stroyed.
Accordingly, in mid-November 1958, GRC Vice
President Chen Cheng, in an interview with a Central
News Agency correspondent, acknowledged that Nation-
alist officials had been receiving letters from
Peking representatives urging peace talks. He referred
to radio broadcasts to Taiwan and to the spreading
of rumors in Hong Kong. He denounced the Chinese
Communist campaign as typically treacherous and said
it was calculated to cover up both the failure of
Peking's attack on Chinmen and the mainland "internal
crisis." Another objective, Chen said, was to confuse
the people of the world and drive a wedge between
China and the US. He answered a question about US
Government knowledge of the situation by saying, "The
Chinese and US governments have been exchanging in-
formation and opinions regularly on the peace rumors
of the Communist bandits. Therefore, both the Chinese
and US governments have a clear understanding of such
peace rumors and have confidence in each other... "
This was doubtless intended not only to reassure Wash-
ington, but to give Peking a clear statement that the
letters from its agents - - in case there was any
doubt -- were being divulged to the US and that it
was no use trying to corrode the Taipei-Washington
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relationship. The interview was given a moderate
amount of press coverage on Taiwan during the suc-
ceeding two days. All papers unreservedly praised
the statement, the independent papr;~rs rather more
strongly than the official press.
We know that in December: 1958 TsaoChu-jen
said privately that Peking's peace overtures were
"finished" because of the lack of any response from
Taipei. (In fact, however, they were resumed in
1959.) Tsao described Peking's purpose during the
three-year campaign of direct approaches as that of
simply persuading the GRC to communicate, and he
said that the Chinese Communists would accept "almost
any terms." Since it was clear that Peking had been
driving a hard bargain with Taiwan -- Tibetan status
being no great new status for Chiang Kai-shek -- and
knew that the Nationalists were not about to accept,
Tsao's remark was doubtless another attempt to spread
the idea of Peking's "reasonableness."
C. Peking's Approaches, Including Some From "High
Levels", Continue
For a brief period in 1959 Peking reduced the
level of its public attention to Taiwan. References
to the hope for "peaceful liberation" became in-
frequent, and routine propaganda about Taiwan de-
clined. There was a corresponding decline in mainland
appeals for individual defections. The GRC had ac-
knowledged publicly the private approaches from Peking
and had denounced these moves, and the rumors of peace
talks, in a strong statement aimed at deflating the
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effect of additional overtures and rumor campaigns.
If Peking had hoped. that any of its private initia-
tives, withheld from the US by the GRC but surfaced
by Chinese Communist agents, might create suspicions
in Washington, 'hen Cheng's statements would have
liquidated such hope. Moreover, continuing preoccupa-
tion with Taiwan would have called attention to Peking's
inability, demonstrated during the Taiwan Strait crisis,
to do anything but talk about the Taiwan question.
Finally, economic and political problems on the main-
land diverted the leadership's energies to more im-
mediate concerns. Nevertheless, Tsao Chu-jen once
again sent letters -- urging peace negotiations --
to Chiang Ching-kuo in early January and in late April
1959. In the April letter he proposed that Chiang
Ching-kuo and Chen Cheng govern Taiwan jointly after
a settlement with Peking. Again the proposition fell
on deaf ears.
In late 1959 Peking seemed ready to re-open
the "peaceful liberation" campaign on a large scale.
The release -- after a decade -- of 30 Kuomintang
"war criminals" was announced on 4 December, and
Peking beamed a special broadcast to Taiwan about this
event. Chiang Ching-kuo told a US official that he
regarded the release of prisoners as an extremely
significant development, foreshadowing a new peace
campaign. He said he had evidence that Peking's
agents were again in Hong Kong to promote peace talks.
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The only new idea in the purported Chou mes-
sage was the offer of mainland help to Taiwan in
case of "need." This could have been a hint to Chen
Cheng of Peking's interest in dealing with him
directly and privately.
The Nationalist disclosure of Chou's message to US
officials indicated that the GRC would treat -- and
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would regard -- the initiative in the same way as
previous private approaches from lesser Chinese Com-
munists. Whether or not Chou En-lai himself was in
fact behind this initiative, the message was appar-
ently intended to exploit rivalry between the Vice
President and Chiang Ching-kuo and to stimulate
suspicion of US policy concerning the offshore islands.
SFC;RFT
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Beginning in mid-1960, Peking was concerned
or wanted to appear concerned -- about possible
US support for the Taiwan Independence Movement and
had hoped that GRC sensitivity on this issue was
increasing. Fei I-min in Hong Kong seemed pre-
occupied with the question in September 1960 when
he contended, erroneously, that Thomas Liao, the
leader of the Taiwan Independence Movement in
Japan, would, soon visit the US. Expecting his remarks
to reach the GRC leadership, Fei said there would be
an "almost unconditional approach" from Peking to
Taipei and that although the Communist flag would
have to fly over Taiwan and foreign affairs be handled
by Peking, the GRC leaders otherwise could "do as
they pleased." This was of course an excessively
charitable statement of Chinese Communist policy to-
ward Taiwan once the island had, like Tibet and
Sinkiang, become "autonomous."
In November 1960 Chou En-lai, discussing the
issue of Taiwan with Edgar Snow said:
Since it has been possible for China
and the US to hold ambassadorial talks
in Geneva and Warsaw, talks can also
be held at the same time between the
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Central Government of China and the
Chiang Kai-shek clique.
This was the public component -- designed to persuade
international opinion that Peking considered negotia-
tions with Taipei feasible -- of Chinese Communist
approaches to the G RC during the previous year.
There were no additional overtures to Taipei
until July 1961, when the Kennedy Administration had
been in office about six months.
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SF ,RF171,
Also in July 1961, Tsao Chu-jen sent another
letter to Chiang Ching-kuo containing the proposal
that Chinmen and Amoy be joined as a "buffer zone"
and a "free port." Then in November 1961 and again
in March 1962, Tsao wrote Chiang Ching-kuo urging a
Nationalist investigation of mainland conditions.
All of these letters were brought to the attention
of US officials by Chiang Ching-kuo, who reaffirmed
his intention to ignore them.*
D. Evidence of Peking-Taipei Agent Contacts
In Au-just 1962 the London Observer published a
story by Dennis Bloodworth alleging is Peking and
the "family of Chiang Kai-shek" had reached a secret
agreement on the future of Taiwan. Bloodworth re-
ported that during the previous three months Taipei
representatives had been contacting Hong Kong "peace
brokers" regularly. The reported agreement, undoubt-
edly false and denounced as such by the GRC, could
have been inspired in part by supporters of GRC Vice
*Tsao s 1e ters of 1959-62 tended to ramble and
to elaborate on minor points in a way suggesting pure
invention on his part. Peking by early 1959 may have
given up on Tsao as an effective instrument of psycho-
logical warfare, and probably was no longer briefing
him. Tsao probably wrote most of the letters during
this period largely on his own, as a means of keeping
a personal stake in any possible consequences of
Peking's effort to disturb US-GRC relations.
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President Chen Cheng. There was evidence at the time
that Chen was maneuvering to prepare for a power
struggle with Chiang Ching-kuo following the death
or retirement of President Chiang. The reference to
the "family of Chiang Kai-shek," as Peking's counter-
part in the alleged agreement, su gested an effort
to embarrass the younger Chiang.
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in late June 1962 the US assured Peking through
the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw that Washington
would not support, and was opposed to, GRC military
action. The Chinese Communists, obviously relieved,
acknowledged publicly their satisfaction with the US
assurances.
The GRC leadership had no illusions in 1962
about the US policy of avoiding a crisis with Com-
munist China. But to hear Peking tell the world that
it had received confirmation privately from the US
must have infuriated Taipei even though its visible
reaction was, as always, low-keyed. President Chiang
complained to US officials about the effect on Nation-
alist morale. It may be conjectured that at this
point the GRC, probably at the personal instigation
of Chiang Ching-kuo, decided to set up contacts at
a low level in Hong Kong. As Chang Shih-chao had
pointed out several years earlier, the US was talking
to Peking in Warsaw and allegedly was prepared to
see Peking have the offshore islands. Then why, asked
Chang Shih-chao, should not Peking and Taipei keep
in touch? It was a suggestion to which Chiang Ching-
kuo could have been susceptible in the summer of 1962.
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Although the GRC doubtless had no intention of negotiat-
ing with Peking, nor even of acknowledging any peace-
ful settlement approaches from Peking's agents, Nation-
alist leaders might have seen a low-level channel to
Peking as a posse a means of checking on US reports
to the Nationalists about the ambassadorial talks in
Warsaw. In any case, after 1963 no further reporting
was received on contacts between these two agents in
Hong Kong.
E. Peking's Last Known Private Overture
In late January 1963 the third purported letter
from Fu Tso-i, delivered to Chen Cheng via his sister-
in-law in Tokyo, pursued the alleged "Two Chinas"
threat and introduced the question of Sino-Soviet
relations. It said: "at present China's foreign
debts are just about paid up... In the past some people
persisted in saying China was a fellow traveler with
others. Now no one would believe such remarks."
There was other evidence at about this time that
Peking was interested in signalling privately to the
Nationalists that it was free of Soviet domination
and that the GRC ought to break with the US (as
though the situations were parallel) and negotiate
the unification of a wholly independent China. Later
in 1963 an influential Chinese Communist journalist
told a Hong Kong resident about to leave for Taiwan
where he expected to see GRC officials, that Mao
Tse-tung had never accepted Soviet control, ?;ind that
China was being "oppressed" by Khrushchev, just as
the GRC was being "oppressed" by the US.
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On the margin of this 1963 letter, in what
Chiang Ching-kuo told US officials was Chen Cheng's
hand, was written the word "never" beside a passage
which offered a third period of cooperation between
the Nationalists and the Communists. This no doubt
reflected the true attitude of GRC leaders.
The purported Fu Tso-i letter of 1963 to Chen
Cheng ended, as far as is known, the seven-year pro-
gram of Chinese Communist approaches to the GRC.
Peking's proposals in these overtures focused on an
attempt to persuade the Nationalists that union with
the mainland under Peking's sovereignty would not
deprive the Taipei power structure of most (or any)
of its local privileges. Peking's control over
foreign relations was consistently stated as a con-
dition, and just as consistent was the offer to ar-
range for a delegation of Nationalist observers to
travel the mainland to "see for themselves." The
emphasis here was always on the secrecy and security
of such a delegation, although suggestions were oc-
casionally offered as to its possible composition.
The letters projected attitudes of patience, under-
standing, and sensitivity to the dignity of GRC
leaders.
The GRC ignored the letters, and there is no
evidence that Peking really expected much more than
probing Nationalist sensitivities and attempting to
sow suspicions. The initiatives and the rumors had
not split the: leaders in Taipei, nor subverted the
Taipei-Washington relationship, but they had compelled
the GRC to issue denials from time to time and in
late 1958 to confirm the Communist campaign, thus
acknowledgin its possible impact on public opinion
on Taiwan.
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The reason why no Chinese Communist letters have
come to light since January 1963 is not clear. Others
could have been sent which Chiang Ching-kuo withheld,
as some evidence suggests he may have done prior to
1963. If Chiang did in fact fail to divulge later
communications, knowing that the US might learn of
them in other ways, then his decision to accept this
risk would have indicated reduced sensitivity to pos-
sible US suspicions. Perhaps -- regardless of whether
additional letters were received -- Chiang wanted
the US to suspect him of holding out as implicit
retaliation for his own suspicions, real or pretended,
about the substance of the ambassadorial talks in
Warsaw. But it is equally possible that Peking
abandoned the private letter device after early 1963
as no longer worth the effort.
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SFC;R FT
III. PEKING EXPLOITS ITS IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL
PROSPECTS - Early 1964 to Late 1965
A. Consequences of French Recognition
In January 1964 France recognized the PRC -- a
serious; setback for the GRC, which closed its embassy
in Paris and severed all contacts with France. It was
apparent that Peking viewed French recognition as a
milestone in its effort to supplant the GRC in the
world community and as a new weapon in its psychologi-
cal offensive against Taipei.
An editorial in the Chinese Communist-controlled
Hong Kong daily Wen Wei Pao, in February 1964 had
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q1RCID Uri-,
hinted at a Possible new move in Peking's peaceful
"liberation" campaign:
"The Kuomintang on Taiwan does
not need to be an empty shell.
If it reforms, casts off us
control, becomes independent,
one would not need to speak of
its returning to the bosom of
the motherland to cooperate for
the third time. To avoid being
a completely empty shell it is
only necessary for the Kuomintang
to cast off the US Two-Chinas
plot."
This was the first time a Chinese Communist organ had
intimated that Taiwan could have any future other
than a return to Peking's control. The statement
"one would not need to speak of its returning to the
bosom of the motherland" seemed calculated to provoke
discussion of a possible revision of Peking's claim
to Taiwan. The inspiration for this trial balloon is
unknown, but it was probably related to the high hopes
induced by France's major diplomatic decision the
previous month. Chairman Mao himself appeared to
confirm the pose of a generous attitude toward the
GRC when he talked a few months later to a visiting
Italian delegation. On that occasion he spoke bitterly
of Khrushchev.and, by feigned contrast, mildly of
Chiang Kai-shek, stating that Chiang could be the
governor of an "autonomous" Taiwan under Peking's
sovereignty.
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SFC, R F.T
B. Return to Peking of Li Tsung-jen
In July 1965 former KMT leader Li Tsung-jen with
his wife flew to Paris and then to Peking, where he was
to remain until his death in 1969. Li's possible defec-
tion had been rumored intermittently for years and his
arrival in Peking produced a (Chinese) Roman carnival.
At a large press conference in Peking in late September,
Li appeared in a boiler suit and recited the Chinese Com-
munist line on Soviet revisionism, US "aggression" in Viet-
nam, and other issues. His "bombshell" was an incredible
allegation that a US "Republican bigwig" had approached
him to arrange an anti-Chiang Kai-shek coup d'etat on
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Taiwan. In any event, Li Tsung-jen's return, contrary
to Peking's apparent hopes at the time, did not stimu-
late others. We know that Li and his old associates in
Hong Kong tried to encourage additional returns or
defections through private approaches, but no significant
consequences are known to have resulted. After the first
flush of excitement and publicity, Li was reduced to the
status of a museum piece, without any official position:,
living quietly and apparently in comfort, talking with
old friends in Peking, and writing letters to other
Chinese friends abroad, the US included.
There is inconclusive evidence that Li Tsung-jen's
return was motivated by personal rather than political
considerations. His wife was terminally ill in Jul
1965 -- she died in Peking less than a year later
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IV. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION - Late 1965 to Early 1969
From late 1965 to the spring of 1969, the
Cultural Revolution on the mainland interrupted Peking's
psycholo
gical warfare against the G RC and against
th
e
latter's
relationship with the US. Rumors heard
dur
ing
those ye
ars about Peking-Taipei peace talks were
eve
n
less cre
dible than before, and whatever agent-lev
el
con-
tacts be
less lik
tween the two regimes may have occurred w
ely than ever to imply any movement towar
ere
d
25X1
negotiations.
No significant new approaches to the GRC are known to
have been made by Peking during the Cultural Revolution.
By late 1966 the Chinese Nationalists were
observing mainland disorder with interest and hope. The
spectacle of a strong revolutionary party and bureaucracy
in the process of self-liquidation obviously lent force
to the Nationalist argument about Chinese Communist
impermanence. Chiang Kai-shek reacted to prospects for
effective anti-Peking operations, but he warned his
supporters that the Chinese Communist possession of nuclear
SF.rR FT
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weapons required a cautious policy. Chiang's hope
was to isolate Mao Tse-tung and encourage factionalism
and suspicion on the mainland. GRC propaganda used
the slogans "those who are not our enemies are our
friends" and 'only Mao is the enemy." In March 1967
President Chiang called for the establishment both on
Taiwan and the mainland of an "anti-Mao National
Salvation United Front." GRC radio broadcasts, letters,
and air-dropped leaflets invited defections to the
Nationalists and encouraged guerrilla warfare on the
mainland. Echoing a theme from Chou En-lai's 1956
speech, the GRC told potential mainland defectors "we
will not reckon past accounts."
F Nationalist
spokesmen, seeking to drive a wedge between Mao and
his chief lieutenants, hinted
willingness to do business with Chou En-lai but never
with Mao Tse-tung. There is no evidence that the
Nationalist attitude toward negotiating with the Chinese
Communists had changed; the GRC's objective was simply
to create trouble for Peking, just as Peking's various
overtures had tried earlier to discredit GRC leaders in
the eyes of the US and provoke suspicion in Taipei of
US intentions.
During 1967 and 1968 GRC hopes for significant
Communist defections and the political fragmentation
of the mainland were disappointed. Disorder continued,
but Mao and the People's Liberation Army maintained
control, few significant defections occurred, and the
GRC's return to the mainland seemed as distant a
possibility as ever. However, the bitter Peking-Moscow
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quarrel persisted, and the GRC, again on the defensive,
ceased its attacks on the USSR and opened discreet
contacts with Victor Louis, a Soviet overseas agent.
In March 1969 Chiang Kai-shek appealed for
Japanese support, and again for mainland defections, in
a published interview with a Japanese journalist. Once
more Chiang borrowed from Peking's line by promising
friendly treatment to Chinese Communist cadres who chose
freedom and came to Taiwan. He repeated the familiar
slogan, "only Mao is my enemy," but said that there was
no possibility of accommodation and cooperation with the
Chinese Communists. This last assertion -- denying the
possibility of an accommodation with Peking -- seems
to be the basic guideline of Chiang's policy. There is
no evidence in recent materials that he has changed this
thinking in any degree.
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V. PROSPECTS FOR A "CHINESE SOLUTION"
The central problem at hand now is of course
whether the present precipitous decline of the GRC's
world fortunes will appreciably change Chinese
Nationalist lack of interest to date in overtures:
from Peking.
There is no historical inevitability about the
unii ication of Taiwan and the mainland. "Return to
the Mainland" has long been largely a ritualistic slogan
resembling "next year in Jerusalem" in its political
and psychological content. Peking's slogan, "liberation
of Taiwan," has little more level of realism, at least
while the US defense commitment is still intact. There
are no grass-root passions on either the Communist or
GRC sides to outlast successor leaderships and sustain
the issue of unification-by-force as a political or
emotional. urge; both in Peking and among mainlander
Nationalists, the motivation to risk other equities
over the unification question may well weaken over
the long term. Nonetheless, the salvaging of some
status and fortune under Peking, as part of a great
new China, would -- in extremis --?almost certainly
have more appeal to some mainlander Nationalists
than would a future of taking one's chances with
aspiring and perhaps vengeful Taiwanese overlords.
The chief keys to this problem at the moment,
at least, are probably President Chiang Kai-shek and
the state of his confidence that the US will protect
Taiwan. So long as he has no reason seriously to doubt
the latter, the chances of any deal with Peking on
his part seem remote. He is a proud man -- in his eyes,
a great world figure; the loss of face and the implicit
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admission of past faults that would be involved in
his accepting some kind of figurehead status with
Peking are sizable forces among those holding him
from accommodation. Further, he still believes in
the Nationalist profession of a "Return to the
Mainland." For President Chiang this watchword has
taken on the quality of an article of faith, the
mainland to be redeemed eventually by largely political
means -- if need be by his GRC successors. There is
no way of judging with confidence how that slender
thread of hope would be affected in the event he should
come to feel that the US security guarantee of Taiwan
were no longer a reasonable certainty.
A more significant actor -- and factor -- for
the future is the Generalissimo's putative de facto
successor, Chiang Ching-kuo. Primarily to create sus-
picion in Washington of possible Chinese Nationalist
opportunism, Peking in its efforts over the years has
sought to promote the expectation that the younger
Chiang will be "more flexible" after his father dies
or retires.
The possibility
cannot of course be excluded that Chiang Ching-kuo,
himself a "pragmatist," might feel that he could deal
with a Chinese Communist leadership whose revolutionary
impulses had been replaced by bureaucratic stability
and low-risk policies. Such a regime, perhaps resembling
in at least some aspects his own rule on Taiwan, might
be managed by men whom Ching-kuo could understand
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and -- by calculated risk -- trust. Peking has for many
years targeted Ching-kuo in its peace offensives and
other contacts as the key to the "peaceful liberation
of Taiwan," and we must assume that the prudent Ching-kuo
has secretly kept open the option of a deal, however
far-out or remote this contingency. To some degree,
at least, a future mainland China and he would have
something of value to offer each other, the basis
for settlement being Peking's sovereignty over
Taiwan, in return for the guarantee of Nationalist
proconsular viability on Taiwan -- and over the
Taiwanese. Peking otherwise could not gain this
sovereignty except by force; and, other than by a
deal with Peking, Chiang Ching-kuo might have to rely
on a precarious hold, over growing political pressures
from the majority Taiwanese, to displace mainlander
KMT rule on the island.
Having raised this contingency, it should be
emphasized that the chances of any such eventuality
will doubtless be slight so long as Chiang Ching-kuo
remains reasonably confident of US defense of Taiwan .
He has a realistic appreciation of the worth of Peking's
promises. The personal and political rewards of
being the model boss of a model kingdom -- albeit
one reduced in international status -- would doubtless
outweigh his expectations from some kind of
museum-piece status (even as a PRC Vice President)
under the Chinese Communists. His carefully-structured
apparatus on Taiwan will probably remain a fairly
potent one for some time to come, until eroded over
the long term by his death, extreme GRC adversities,
and/or eventual mainlander decline in the face of
Taiwanese fecundity.
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Somewhat similar considerations would seem
likely to obtain in the event that Chiang Ching-kuo
should predecease his father. Ching-kuo has developed
a broad and efficient cadre of lieutenants in the GRC
administrative, military, and internal security
establishments; and, given reasonable confidence on
their part in the continuing US protection of Taiwan,
they would for the most part doubtless remain
loyal to President Chiang, and might be able for
some time to deflect or neutralize Taiwanese pressures.
A serious situation would arise, nonetheless, with
the passing as well of Chiang Kai-shek. In such
event, political stability might well fragment, and
receptiveness to Peking mount -- the outlook for US
protection of Taiwan probably remaining the principal
operative factor. Beyond an interim such period,
much would depend upon the particular GRC successors --
whether a collegium or not, the degree to which they
were able to hang together, and especially the degree
to which they were to change some fundamental attributes
of Chinese Nationalist rule and begin sharing significant
national authority with the Taiwanese. Upon that
outcome would heavily rest Taiwan's subsequent stability,
viability, and, not least, susceptibility to Chinese
Communist siren songs.
In the meantime, and short of such contingency,
Taiwanese interest in what Peking has Lo offer will
also grow, in almost any event, though to lesser
extent than in the case of individual mainlander
Nationalists. We know that the Chinese Communists
have been successful in recruiting some Taiwanese
abroad. Peking's agents also conduct various low-scale
pamphlet and other psychological warfare efforts on
Taiwan, and we must assume that there is a certain
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5L' VKL'1'
susceptibility among Taiwanese students, intellectuals,
and possibly military personnel to Chinese Communist
themes. We know that there is some vicarious pride,
among such groups, in certain of Peking's achievements
of recent years. Also, Taiwanese independence aspira-
tions and political organization appear overall to be
somewhat fuzzy and future-tensed in nature, not items
creating intense and immediate pressures. Nonetheless,
Peking does not have a very fertile field in which to
sow enticement among the Taiwanese. That population
is fairly well aware of the relative conditions
of life and opportunity in China and Taiwan, and in
the main seem clearly more interested in some day
creating a going Taiwanese state than in trading their
not intolerable present fortunes for something like
the Peking-proffered Tibetan status.
Further speculation is fruitless at this time,
as the Nationalist-Communist future is so much the
product of so many significant unknowns. Suffice it to.
say, what was the general setting of this game is now
radically changed. What was a far-out contingency has
become a much more relevant question -- and one
deserving of close US intelligence watch -- to all
the principal players. For the Chinese Communists,
present circumstances doubtless expand and strengthen
expectation and long-term confidence. For the
respective populations on Taiwan, present circumstances
now make unavoidable the long-evaded question of
feasible alternatives, including even a "worst case"
future of one with Peking.
Not least,
there are new questions of moment for the US.
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