WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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C/Aoc? / C. ltvR
DSO FILE COPY
FETMS N TO 111-1107
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Top Secret
Weekly Review
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Copy N!
State Dept. review completed
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Tt,o WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif.
(cant developments of the week through noon on Thursday.
It frequently Includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
fore published separately as Special Reports are listed In the
contents.
CONTENTS (January 4,1974)
1
The Middle East
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
7
Cambodia: A Fresh Start
12
Oil: Europe Gets the Bad News
12
West European Communists Prepare
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
16
India: A Troubled Economy
17
Greece: Acting in Character
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
18
Argentina: Peron Unveils a "Plan"
18
Panama: An Anniversary
19
Peru: A Decisive Year
UNITED
NATIONS
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THE
MIDDLE
EAST
25X6 a~
With the Israeli election now completed,
Egypt will look for quick progress toward a
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Page 3
disengagement of forces along the Suez Canal.
Cairo wants this both to satisfy its own need for
an Israeli withdrawal and to serve as a salutary
example, for the benefit of doubting Syrians, of
the wisdom of the decision to proceed with nego-
tiations. Although content to let the initial ses-
sions of the military talks in Geneva proceed
slowly in anticipation of the election, Cairo is
unlikely to view the process of governmental
reorganization in Israel as sufficient reason for
further postponement of an agreement on dis-
engagement.
The Egyptians used the slow start of the
talks to advantage, attempting to pin down the
basic principles that will govern disengagement
before turning to the specifics of territorial delin-
eation. This is undoubtedly an effort to establish
clear guidelines for the talks in order to prevent
some of the inconclusive hoggling that marred and
ultimately caused the breakdown of the Kilo-
meter 101 talks.
Egyptian and Israeli military negotiators ap-
parently reached general agreement on some of
their respective negotiating principles at the first
three sessions on December 26 and 28 and Janu-
ary 2. There remains, however, a major divergence
of view on at least one Israeli principle, that of
"mutuality." Tel Aviv insists that any Israeli with-
drawal under a disengagement formula be ac-
companied by a reciprocal Egyptian withdrawal,
while Cairo is equally insistent that the territory
it has retaken on the canal's east bank remain
under its full military control.
Over the years, dramatic purges, advances,
and put-downs of Chinese Traders have become
almost rommonplace. The startling souffle of top
regional military leaders that was revealed this
week, however, is absolutoly unprecedented and
must rank near the top of the inscrutable moves
made by Peking in the seemingly endless jockey-
ing for position among power-holders in China.
Seven of the eleven commanders of Peking's
regional military forces-its main-line armed
Cairo media commentary on the Israeli elec-
tion, although thus far sparse, has reflected mis-
givings that right-wing gains will in fact lead to
Israeli procrastination. Cairo's message is clear:
that the Egyptians cannot tolerate further dally-
ing and have the military strength necessary
to achieve Egypt's goals forcibly if this cannot be
accomplished through negotiation. Although the
Egyptians have not, in public commentary, tied
the election question directly to the disengage-
ment talks, the media's constant reminders that
Egypt has a force to be reckoned with on the
canal's east bank are an indication that Cairo does
not intend to relinquish that bridgehead.
Heavy artillery fire erupted along the Suez
front on January 2 after several days of relative
quiet. The firing took place throughout the day
and apparently was more intensive than previous
sporadic incidents. Eight Israeli soldiers were
wounded in the shelling. It was not clear which
side began the shooting, but harassing artillery
fire provides Cairo with a means of pressuring Tel
Aviv and keeping world attention on the battle-
front. Artillery fire also was exchanged on the
Syrian front and three Israelis reportedly were
strength-were switched from one regional post to
another, in several cases leaving power bases they
had held since the 1950s. One of the command-
ers, Chen Hsi-lien, was pulled out of his strong-
hold in Manchuria and sent to Peking, doubtless
to be under the eye of the central leadership
although he may retain an ability to make some
mischief at the center. Hsu Shih-yu, who held a
strategic regional post in east China, traded places
with his neighbor in the Canton Military Region,
an assignment of less importance.
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Peking Rotates Military Region Commanders
Sinkiang
SINKIANG
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Province Boundary
555037 1-74
LAN?CHOU -w- Han Hslen?chu
NAN-CHING Ting Sheng-
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SHEN-YANG
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Chen Hsi-lion----m- PEKING
-LI To-sheng-e- SHEN?YANG
Page 4 WEEKLY REVIEW Jan 4, 74
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From all appearances, it looks as If Chou
En-lai and his associates masterminded the move,
doubtless with the close collaboration of Mao,
who is known to endorse reduction of military
influence in party affairs. Actually the reduction
of the authority of these military commanders,
who garnered their power in the course of sup-
porting the restoration of order after the excesses
of the Cultural Revolution, has been under way
for some time. Military membership on the Cen-
tral Committee and Politburo was substantially
reduced at the Tenth Party Congress in August.
The move will almost certainly result in con-
fining the shuffled leaders to their military duties
for the time being and reduce their ability to
influence civilian affairs in their new areas. Six of
them had held the top civilian posts in their
headquarters' province and had greatly influenced
the implementation of government policy
throughout their regions. Peking, perhaps slowly,
but doubtless surely, will give the civil posts to
civilian provincial figures, a process which has also
been gradually under way during the past several
years.
While the moves testify to Chou's upper
hand in party councils, the measured nature of
the switches reveals that the military is still a
powerful force in China with at important role to
play. No leaders were purged, and the shuffle was
a carefully balanced tradeoff. The moves seem to
indicate that the top party leadership has en-
dorsed the continuation of existing defense policy
and authority in China. Some continued military
influence on civilian policy can probably be anti-
cipated, but the ability of the armed forces to
bring extensive pressure to bear has been greatly
reduced for some time to come.
The careful, measured nature of the shuffle
suggests that a majority of the military leadership
in China was in agreement with the switches,
although there may have been strong resistance
by one or two of the commanders in the months
prior to the move. It can be speculated that they
have been given some assurances by Chou and his
associates on the political cast-if not the iden-
tity-of the civil leaders to be appointed to the
vacated first secretaryships. And some agreements
may have been reached on the men to be ap-
pointed to the post of minister of defense and
other key military jobs at the center, which have
gone unfilled since the purge of Lin Piao and his
associates.
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The new government, relatively well-
qualified to tackle the country's increasingly dif-
ficult economic and political problems, has lost
no time in getting down to business. It has al-
ready announced that it intends to combat infla-
tion, impose austerity measures and fiscal re-
forms, increase the salaries of military personnel
and civil servants, and improve the distribution of
rice. It has also pledged closer military-civil co-
operation and better results in conscription and
pacification. Prime Minister Long Boret will have
to make full use of his political skills to move
toward these objectives, but his solid standing
with President Lon Nol should help.
The Khmer Communists quickly sounded
the usual negative note about the new govern-
ment, predicting that it will soon be "crushed" uy
economic crises and insurgent military pressure.
In a new year's message, Sihanouk's "prime minis-
ter" Penn Nouth said the war is in its final phase
and expressed hope for victory in 1974, but then
backtracked a bit to state that the Communists
are getting ready for a "long-range struggle."
The military situation had a familiar look. In
the Phnom Penh area, the Communists remained
active on the east bank of the Mekong, firing
more rockets into Phnom Penh. Several landed
close to the US Embassy and one exploded in the
nearby presidential compound, but damage was
light. For the first time, the Communists also
used 105-mm. howitzers to shell the city.
The Communists kept Route 4 closed south-
west of Kompong Speu, although at midweek
government forces made limited gains 15 miles
from the city. North of Phnom Penh, government
units made little headway in their attempts to
clear a section of Route 5 some 15 miles from the
CAMBODIA: A FRESH START
capital.
that the Communists plan to launch a major of-
fensive in this area ain;ad at defeating the Cam-
bodian Army's 7th Division and opening the way
to attacks on Phnom Penh itself. Although Com-
munist commanders hope to be able to carry out
s'ich attacks this month, the rallier stated that the
attacks could be delayed until March if troop
reinforcements and munitions do not am' e-7'
time.
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The initial sense of relief felt by the oil
importing countries of Europe over the easing of
the Arab oil cutbacks was quickly replaced last
weak by concern over the effects of the large
increase in crude prices. The promise of more oil
did not prompt any of the EC partners to ease
consumption restrictions imposed since the begin-
ning of the cutbacks.
Of particular concern is the huge increase in
the world's oil import bill-estimated at $bO bil-
lion for the OECD countries. The Europeans fear
this will fall unevenly on the importing countries
and lead to national rather than cooperative meas-
ures to protect trade and payments balances. The
sharp Increases in oil prices and their unpredict-
able impact on payments balances will probably
further delay progress toward monetary reform.
Almost all the EC countries have boon trying
to strike bilateral deals with the Arabs to guaran-
tee a steady, long-range supply of oil. Most of the
deals, either proposed or already concluded, call
for development aid and industrial investment in
exchange for oil. France, which recently nego-
tiated an agreement with Saudi Arabia, is un-
happy over the meager quantities of oil involved
in that deal. Should other bilateral arrangements
also fall short of expectations, cooperation among
consuming countries-and then between con-
sumers and producers, as envisaged in Secretary
Kissinger's call for an energy action group-might
be encouraged.
The EC countries have still not formulated a
position on the Kissinger proposal. Although par-
ticipation in an energy action group is favored by
Henri Simonet, the EC vice president in charge of
energy matters, some members of the community
will probably want more progress toward an EC
energy policy before agreeing to a joint response.
Moreover, the Europeans are far from clear about
the extent to which the US proposal might pre-
empt an eventual European approach to the Arab
producers.
Although approval of the energy proposals
agreed to in principle at the Copenhagen summit
is still stalled, the Nine are reportedly prepared to
provide, on a voluntary basis, information con-
corning oil movements and availabilities to the EC
Commission. It is not certain, however, that the
governments will be able to produce all -ho in-
formation requested. particularly roaardina
prices.
Sharp disagreements have surfaced in the
most recent preparatory sessions for the confer-
once of West European Communist parties, sched-
uled to convene in Brussels in late January.
Some Western parties, because of domestic
political considerations, are reluctant to go along
with the suggestion of the Italian and French
Communists to issue a joint position paper on
West European problems. During meetings in
Rome in late 1973, the Italians and French sup-
ported the view that a paper that took a generally
positive view of the EC but that would also make
specific recommendations on community issues
would be an important stop toward increasing
communist influence on EC decisions.
The Italian Communists, who are the main
organizers of the Brussels parley, have encount-
ered other stumbling blocks-especially the reluct-
ance of several parties to follow the Italians to-
ward greater independence from the Soviets on
European issues. The Austrian and West German
parties insisted that the conference avoid any
issues that might sour their relations with Mos-
cow. The French Communists, though supporting
the joint position paper, have tried to restrain the
Italians from airing other issues more sensitive to
Page 12 WEEKLY REVIEW
Jan 4, 74
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INDIA: A TROUBLED ECONOMY
This year's favorable monsoon will bring roc?
ord harvests of food grains and commercial crops,
increasing national Income 5 percent or more for
the fiscal year ending March 31, 1974, Industrial
production remains low, however, and strong In.
flationary pressures persist. In addition, economic
stagnation has been encouraged by government
inaction and bureaucratic discouragement of pri?
veto investment.
The failosre of supply to keep pace with
demand pushed October prices 21 percent higher
than a year earlier, and further price increase,
seem certain. An excellent harvest should reduce
inflationary pressure on foodstuffs, but the sharp
increase in the money supply, due primarily to
government financing, is stimulating demand. In
August. the government announced a 10?porcent
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reduction In nondefense expenditures to offset
sharply increased outlays for food subsidies,
drought relief, and government salaries. Non?capl?
tat ixpanditures, huw..er, continued to rise. The
deficit of over V-00 million for the first six
month:. of the fiscal ;?ear ending in March 1974 Is
more than five limes thn deficit budgeted for the
entire year, Now Delhi remains reluctant to In.
crease revenues by taxing agricultural Incomes,
the only potentially Irrpn tax source loft.
Industrial production has increased less than
one percent so far this year compared with 7
percent it 1972. Factors hampering production
ii clude:
? tightened government restrictions on im-
ports of raw materials and spare parts;
? the slow tempo of government capital
spending;
? government hostility toward most pri-
vate foreign inve:tmont;
? chronic energy shortages.
Electric power station construction is far behind
schedule. coal production has stagnated. and pe?
trotoum imports have been curbed by sowing
world prices and the Arab production cutback.
The adverse affect of fertilizer shortages on agri?
cultural production has not Leon apparent be.
cause of the favorable weather,
Now Delhi's international financial position
has substantially improved and appears more than
adequate to meet the country's crucial shorl?torm
import requirements, essential for increasing in.
dustrial production and exports. Foreign ex?
change reserves are $1.2 billion, the equivalent of
about five months- imports; additional intirrna-
tional Monetary Fund monies availablo stand at
$1.1 billion, and unused non-project aid is about
$450 million. Moreover, prospects for foreign aid.
both from the USSR and the Western Aid Con?
sortium. are good. The govcrnment. however, is
reluctant to draw down reserves or to borrow
'tom the IMF, even though economic growth
might be stimulated by doing so.
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GREECE: ACTING IN CHARACTER
The now junta this week abolished the con-
stitutional court that had been sot up three
months ago by Papadopoulos to rule on which
political groups would be allowed to participate
In elections, Earlier, It had removed all references
to municipal and parliamentary elections from
the constitution. The government clearly does not
wish to encourage even speculation about elec.
Lions or other political expression.
The junta has eased the current ban on
public meetings of more than five people-it will
allow the executive boards of banks and other
stdte?controlled Institutions to meet, but with
police permission. This mild concession Is un-
likely to placate critics who have become more
vocal as the authoritarian character of the new
regime has become clearer. Thirty-six former
members of parliament recently issued a state.
ment to foreign news agencies calling for the
release of political prisoners and the restoration
of normal political conditions in Greece,
Some 30 individuals reportedly still are
under arrest because of their participation in the
rioting and demonstrations last November that
precipitated the latest military coup. Relatives of
the prisoners have charged that they are 1 : ilg
hold in the island prison camps that have recently
been reopened. The government has not re-
sponded to these charges, which have appeared so
far only In the English language local press and
are unlikely to have wide circulation because of
press censorship.
The government, meanwhile, has generously
rewarded the military officers who backed the
coup and on whose continued suppo?t it depends.
About 50 officers have been promoted to briga-
dier general and another 50 made colonel. Key
supporters of tho coup-such as armed forces
chief Bonanos--have received one of the country's
highest military decorations.
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Exports are increasing at a much lower rate
than Imports. In the first five months of fiscal
year 1973, exports increased 12 percent while
Imports rose 34 percent, resulting in a trade deft.
cit of $97 million, compared with the $245 mil.
lion surplus for all of fiscal year 1972. The In.
crease in imports reflects Increased food grain
purchases and higher prices for petroleum and
fertilizers rather than substantially Increased put.
chases of industrial commodities.
Government Indecision and a cumbersome
bureaucracy are fundamental problems Inhibiting
the growth of the industrial sector. New Delhi has
expanded Its role in trade and industry through
restrictive legislation, licensing, and nationaliza.
tion. Private Investment has slowed while busi-
nessmen await a clearer picture of the Indian
Government's intentions. Critics have called for
greater use of market mechanisms in all phases of
economic policy. Suggested changes include:
? reduced government spending;
? elimination of widespread price controls,
which foster a r-sassive black market and a
reduced tax and investment base;
? increased agricultural prices to farmers
and cc>tisumors;
? liberalization of licensing restrictions on
private sector Industrial production.
The government, however, has continued to
move slo,vly. The proposed fifth Five?Year Plan,
scheduled to begin on April 1. 1974, fails to
address the country's current economic problems.
A loading economist in the Planning Ministry has
resigned in protest over the plan's unrealistic
trade and production goals, and a key member of
the prestigious National Council of Applied Eco-
nomic Research has recommended Ian
be delayed ayear.
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ARGENTINA: PERON UNVEILS A "PLAN"
After much advance fanfare, President Peron
outlined the details of his government's three-
year, $10?billion development plan in a speech on
December 21. Although the program is buitio
billed as a panacea for Argentina's economic ::ird
social ills, it provides low specifics on how the
country will finance the extensive projects for
expanding social welfare and improving the eco-
nomic infrastructure.
Peron revealed no major policy innovations
in his generally moderate-if overly optimistic`
speech. Indeerd, for the most part he merely to.
iterated well-known Peronist doctrine such as
accelerating the distribution of income to work-
ers, achieving economic and political independ?
once, and promoting Latin American integration,
In addition to projecting increased economic
growth. Peron frequently cited successes already
achieved in culling inflation and unemployment,
buoying foreign-exchange reserves, and raising in.
come and retirement benefits for wage earners.
Such achievements, ai well as the lofty aims
of "Plan Trienal," may be ephemeral. Even if
political leaders remain committed to the plan. a
downturn in foreign trade accompanied by an
inability to generate necessary domestic savings
and foreign investment could force Peron to scale
down his development program. Moreover, there
are signs that union pressure for higher wages
could erode the tenuous agreement between
workers and management to hold the line on
increases. Disintegration of that agreement could
undermine even the limited economic advances
made so far.
PANAMA: AN ANNIVERSARY
The (until anniversary of this bloody protests
In January 10G4 against the US presence in the
Canal Zone is likely to pass free of violence, and
the rhetoric In observance of the anniversary may
even be muted. The atmosphere Is relatively calm,
and prospects for negotiation of a new treaty are
better than at any time since the riots. If General
Torrijos decides to speak, he can point to one
specific gain==Washington's plan to transfer to
Panama two airfields that will provide expansion
room for the growing Atlantic port of Colon,
A large factor in the improved prospects for
productive negotiations is a notable softening in
Torrijos' approach, After his tough tactics during
the UN Security Council meeting in Panama List
March provoked a US veto of Panama's resolution
on the canal, Torrijos apparently became con?
vinced that some moderation was necessary to
preserve any hope of getting a new treaty. He
took several steps to improve the negotiating
climate, including toning down anti-US ptopa.
Banda on the canal issue. He and Foreign Minister
Tack have also adopted a moderate tone in talks
with the chief US canal negotiator, Ambassador
Ellsworth Bunker.
Although the horizon is brighter for a new
canal treaty than at any other time during the
Torrilos regime, hard bargaining lies ahead. The
Panamanians have hinted at some flexibility in
their negotiating positions on the duration of US
jurisdiction in the Canal Zone and on the transit
lion of authority from the US to Panama. In
many other areas, such as the amount of compen?
seltion to be paid by the US and the possibility of
building a new sea-level canal. Panama's positions
remain almost completely undefined.
As in the past, the Panamanians are likely to
work out their positions on these issues largely in
terms of responses to US initiatives. Torrijos still
prefers to deal with broad principles that do not
entail specific commitments. He will probably
continue to leave the bargaining on details to 25X1
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Page 18 WEEKLY REVIEW
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This could be the most cruclal year for the
military government. With several key economic
and political problems likely to come to a head,
the government's response will determine the
long-range course of the revolution.
The nationalizrtion of the US?ownwi Cerro
do Pasco Corporation on January 1, 1974 will
give the regime some mut.1'nooded public sup.
port. The honeymoon may be short, however, as
the government must learn to manage the giant
mining complex and to deal with recalcitrant
unions. Foreign "Imperialists" will now no longer
be available to bear the brunt of leftist labor
demands or the blame for economic downturns.
A seriously d'sruptive strike by teachers and
another by capper minors In late 1973 were "sat.
tied," but antigovernment radical leftists remain
in control of both groups. The fishmeal Industry
Is still stagnant, and the labor situation will be
further aggravated by continuing inflationary
pressures.
President Velasco, who has been in power
since October 1968 and had serious health prob.
lams in 1973. may step down by the and of the
year. Of prime concern to him will be the preset,
vation of the leftist?natinnaliit character of the
revolution. At present, however, no single can.
didate has emerged with sufficient support from
both military "radicals" and "moderates" to
avoid a divisive struggle for the succession.
Recently announced cabinet shifts afford no
evidence o! any significant change in the relative
balance between moderates and radicals; further
changes are likely. however. Military command
reassignments appear designed primarily to solid.
ify Velasco's control. Prime Minister Mercado is
slated for retirement at the and of tine "ear but a
moderate. Genrrtl Morales Bermudez. is in line to
replace hi:n. he would than become the logical
successor to the President. The more radical gon,
orals, however. would be unlikely to welcome
Morales Bermudez. and ho apparently does not
hive the wide base of support enjoyed by Mercado.
Relations between President Velascr, and
Morcada are reported to have worsened since
Velasco's unusual public announcement In No.
vember about Mercado's pending replacement.
Mercado may try to ouat Velasco and assume the
presidency but-given the relative balance of power
between r'toderates and radicals and the consid-
arable personal support still enjoyed by Volasco-
this would be a risky move,
Peru's leaders remain acutely aware that
their government stands out as South America's
most radical since Chilean President Allendo's
downfall. The military takeover In Santiago rein.
forced long-standing Peruvian fears of Chilean
intentions. Equally persistent fears In Chile of
Paru's attitude has probably been strengthened by
the arrival of a shipment of Soviet tanks in Peru
last November, These mutual susp-"ons, however
exaggerated, will continue to influence the
Velasco regime's reaction to domestic opposition
and foreign criticism.
Peru has embarked on a program to modern.
ire and expand its navy. It has recently purchased
ships fo! its formerly US?suriplied navy from
Italy. the UK, the Netherlands. and West Ger?
many and is reportedly considering a Sc viot offer
of patrol boats.
Peru acquired three naval vessai-s during
1973. Two British destroyers were delivered. both
reconditioned and modernized with EXOCET
anti.-,hip missiles, awl the Netherlands turned
over a reconditioned cruiser that is to serve as the
Peruvian Navy's flagship. Two submarines being
built by West Germany are slated for delivery
within the next tow months.
In late 1973, Po-!u conch cied negotiations
with Italy for the purchase of four missile-armed
destroyer escorts. The $200-million sale provides
for the assembly of two of the ships at the Peru.
vian Navy yard. with Italy providing all necessary
machinery, weapons, electronics. and technical
assistance. T. eso will be the first warships built in
Peru.
Lima's decision ou whether to accept a long.
standing Soviet offer of patrol boats will be
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Influenced more by their price and quality than
politically inspired reluctance to deal with the
USSR, since Peru recently purchased tanks from
The shift away from the US as a primary
source of arms was prompted by congressikrgal
UN General Anombly
PROMISE AND PROBLEMS
The 28th General Assembly, which con.
cluded in December, had opened last fall with a
promise of improved relations among the major
powers and greater solidarity among tt,e non-
aligneri members. US-Soviet consultations on as-
sembly issues did bring about concurrence on
issues ranging Pram terrorism and Law of the Sea
to the UN budget, China continued to act with
sell restraint and finally d"mphasized the most
contentious issues, such as Cambodia and +(orea.
Both the USSR and China again competed for
third-world favor, however, and engaged in a cer.
tain amount of anti?US rhetoric. The assembly
witnessed the growing determination of the non.
aligned members to air their political and eco-
nomic grievances, a determination clearly ex-
hibited at Ihu Algiers Nonal,t'ned Conference,
which immediately preceded the opening cl! '-Ae
assembly.
Several landmark steps were taken at the
General Assembly: membership for the two Ger-
Mcnios, scheduling of both the Law of the Sea
and the World Food conferences. tinrncing for
the UN Emergency Force, and approval of the
Convention on this Protection of D:Olomati.
Many important political questions. however,
never came to a decisive vote: the UN military
command in Korea, the Cambudian representa.
Lion issue, terrorism, the Middle East. representa.
lion for Guinea-Bissau. and several disarmament
proposals either never came up for debate or were
postponer! until next year.
cutbacks In military assistance, restrictions on US
arms transfers to less-developed countries, and US
suspensions of arms sales In response to Peru's
seizure of fishing boats, Although the US has
lifted its moat recent suspension, Lima Is un?
willing to rely on the t ' as a military supplier,
Peru's recent purchases v, ill add speed, range, and
firepower to its naval inventory and lend further
The nonaligned state' were more cohesive
and better organized I d% year than previously.
Dominated by the militant Afro-Arab states, the
nonaligned states were also more aggressive id
took advantage of a growing reluctance on he
part of the Latin Americans and Western L rro.
pean. to challenge the nonaligned leadership on
ncos issues. In the face aS strong opposition from
the major powers, however, the nonaligned states
suffered setbacks on several major i;;ues. The
nonaligned caucus by a small margin failed to
prevent postponement of a resolution to seat a
Sihan,uk delegation as the legal representatives of
Cambodia. They were unable to prevent an off=
the floor agreement that put off the challenge to
a US military presence in Korea. The nonalignods
themselves concluded that they could not muster
sufficient support this year to gain recognition for
the revolutionary state of Guinea-Bissau and ac.
c'pted instead a resolution simply welcoming its
declaration of independence.
The Western states, however, were unable to
overcome nooalignod resistance to measures
against terrorism. The problem of terrorism was
never bre.'ugi;t to debate because the biocs of the
(bajor power;, and the nonaligned states were each
sufficiently strong to bock the other's proposals
but not strong enough to press their own initia.
lives. The primary question for the assembly next
year is whether the nonaligned, assisted by Al-
geria's position as president of the assembly, will
be able to unite sufficiently to attain the political
potential that their numbers alone would gest
is in their grasp.
25X1;
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