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January 18, 1974
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Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 C/i9Oc_/ C/WR EETU,tji TD i -1101 Weekly Review Top Secret y eu~ ~Q,SI p s3 Top Secret COPY NO 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 State Dept. review completed. Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif. (rant developments of the week through noon on Thurtsday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there- fore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents. EAST ASIA PACIFIC CONTENTS (January 18, 1974) 5 USSR: Solzhenitsyn; Brezhnev to Cuba r25X1 Equipment Purchases 7 Communist Propagandists Meet 8 Yugoslavia: University Defiance MIDDLE EAST AFRICA WESTERN HEMISPHERE 14 Vietnam: Tot; Amending the Constitution 15 Cambodia: Military Balance Sheet 16 Thailand: Student Protests 19 Tunisia-Libya: Merger Collapse!. 1 P t f I 2 or uguese A rica: nsurgents 22 Turkey: Finally a Government 23 Chile: Making Haste Slowly 23 Guatemala: Election Prospects 24 Venezuela: Oil and Nationalization 24 Argentina: Labor Problems Brewing 25 Brazil: Geisel Elected Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 %. Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 THE MIDDLE EAST In Egypt Throughout Secretary Kissinger's week of negotiations, the Cairo press has sounded an optimistic note about prospects for a satisfactory disengagement agreement. The agreement an- nounced on January 17 will now allow the re- sumption of domestic and diplomatic activity that had been held in abeyance while the ex- tended negotiations proceeded. President Sadat, for instance, has apparently been awaiting the conclusion of this round of negotiations before moving aliead with an impending cabinet reorgan- ization, and Foreign Minister Fahmi has had to postpone a trip to Moscow originally scheduled to begin last weekend. Sadat may now also visit several neighboring states in an effort to bring other Arab leaders up to date on the status of negotiations and, more importantly, to coordinate the next round with Syria. Press sources have indicated that Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait will be on Sadat's itinerary, and President Bourguiba has told the US Embassy that Tunisia will be included as well. In Syria Syria threatened to sever diplomatic rela- tions with Cairo on Thursday after the announce- ment of the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agree- ment, according to a press report from Damascus. If the report is true, it indicates President Asad was pulled up short by hard-liners in the military and Baath partywho strongly oppose negotiations with Israel. Asad's own position may have been seriously weakened by this turn of events. Only a few days ago, the Syrian President seemed ready to enter negotiations. Asad was said to have told a special conclave of Syrian political party leaders that Syria would attend the Geneva conference. To underscore the decision, he reportedly named the delegation and said he intended to reshuffle the cabinet. Most prominent among those who had been rumored for replacement was Foreign Min- ister Khaddam, a hard-liner who reportedly had threatened to resign rather than represent Syria at the peace talks. Pcye 1 Jan 18, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 As Egypt and Israel this week pursued a breakthrough on the disengagement problem, and Israelis halt supply convoys to the Third Army, because of cease-fire violations Page 3 Jan 18, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 cease-fire violations continued on both fronts. On one occasion, sporadic firing on the Golan Heights escalated into an artillery duel in which one Israeli soldier was killed. The Israelis also at least once shelled fedayeen positions inside Lebanon. On the Suez front, UN observers reported violations along the entire length of the canal. Limited tank and artillery exchanges were re- ported in both the northern and central sectors. In response to Egyptian cease-fire violations, Israeli troops halted several of the daily supply convoys to Suez and the encircled Egyptian Third Army. Defense Minister Dayan had publicly warned on January 14 that Israel might stop the convoys if the cease-fire violations continued. Israel has suffered over 150 casualties in the fight- ing on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts since the October cease-fire went into effect. Page 4 25X1 Algerian Troops to Leave Algeria may have contributed as many :-,s four squadrons of interceptors and gruund-attack aircraft to Egypt and one fighter squadron to Syria. Some of these aircraft were sent prior to the October war, and others arrived during the conflict. At least one Algerian fighter squadron also was moved to Libya to supplement Libyan air defenses. The decision to withdraw them apparently stems from President Boumediene's desire not to have Algerian military units at the front during a prolonged period of negotiation. Boumediene recognizes that Algeria will have little influence on the Arab-Israeli talks. He also is annoyed that he was not consulted by Egypt or Syria on plans to start the war or to agree to a cease-fire. More- over, he probably believes that Algerian efforts to gain the support of nonaligned nations for Arab demands is now more important than keephig forces at the front. Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 VV MORE ATTACKS ON SOLZHENITSYN The official campaign against dissident author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn gained impetus last week. The central press finally took up the cudgels against him, more than two weeks after the publication in Paris of Gulag .1 rehipe/ago, On January 13, franca became the first major newspaper to weigh in, printing a lengthy signed article attacking Solzhenitsyn as a "slanderer." Later in the week, I.itemtuinava f;rr_rrcr, the juurnal of the Writer's Union, which expelled Solzhenitsyn in 19G9, featured a similar major attack. These charges were echoed by other newspapers and the broadcast media. Perhaps in an effort to counter the widely heard Western radio broadcasts, which have given heavy coverage to Solzhenitsyn and his latest book, the Soviet campaign focused on charges likely to arouse domestic sentiment against him. He was accused of harboring pro-Nazi and pro- collaborationist views, of denigrating the wartime sacrifices of the Soviet people, of "consciously" aiding the enemies of detente, and of harboring a "pathological hatred" of all things Soviet. Despite the increasing venom of the attacks, the Soviets have yet to take, or even threaten, direct action against Solzhenitsyn. There have been no specific indications that he will be held criminally liable, under the provisions of the new Soviet copyright legislation, even though he has been accused of sending his books out of the country illegally. i\Ieksaudr Solzhenitsyn curl l'runily The Soviets probably are restrained from taking any such action by fear that a trial or imprisonment of the prestigious author could have an adverse impact on detente. The media have indirectly hinted as much, and a Pm 'dlu deputy editor made the point openly in a conver- sation with US Embassy officers last week. Moscow probably sees the best solution to its dilemma in Solzhonitsyn's departure into for- eign exile. This was the view of the Pm mile deputy editor, who claimed that Solzhenitsyn would soon lose his political significance once out of the Soviet Union. Another Soviet official publicly asserted that Solzhenitsyn need not fear being held back if he were to try to settle abroad. Solzhenitsyn, however, may not cooperate. He has adamantly refused to leave the USSR for any reason. The Soviet authorities might never- theicas attempt to induce him to do so by covert threats and intimidation, perhaps directed against his wife and children. According to Western press reports, Solzhenitsyn's wife has already received innumerable calls from an indignant "public." Solzhenitsyn is not permitted the right of per- manent residence with his family in Moscow, a fact that might amplify his fea:s for their safety. General Secretary Brezhnev will soon arrive in Havana on his first visit. Plans for the visit were announced not long after Lrezhnev returned from the US last summer, a ,ign that lie saw the trip as a way to demonstrate that l' is not neglecting his Communist allies. The occasion will call for some revolutionary rhetoric, but Brezhnev's private comments to the Cubans will probably focus on the benefits of peaceful coexistence. This will not sit well with Castro, who sees dangers for his regime in Soviet- US detente. Despite the generally good state of its rela- tions with the USSR, Havana is not enthusiastic about Moscow's pursuit of detente with the US. The Cuban leader continues to believe lie cannot afford to case his own anti-US stance. Castro still Page 5 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Page 6 Equipment for the chemical industry ac- counted for two thirds of the increase from 1972 to 1973. Orders for metallurgical and consumer goods equipment also rose steeply. Much of the automotive equipment (second in total value) will be installed in the giant Kama truck plant. Since most equipment imports are connected with major plans for capital expansion, deliveries will stretch out over several years. To finance the machinery and equipment, the USSR has insisted on long-term credits at low interest rates, guaranteed by Western govern- ments. Italy extended a $600-million line of credit early in 1973 and France $350 million in July. By the end of 1973, the US Export-Import Bank had given preliminary or final approval for loans totaling more than $300 million. An equal amount is to be loaned by private US banks. Several major projects remain in the discus- sion stage, including another truck plant, several chemical plants, appliance factories, tire plants, and a commercial aircraft plant. Moscow's pur- chases of foreign ~?quipment thus will continue at Soviet Machinery and Equipment Orders, by Type Million US $ Type 1972 197:'3 Chemical 250 875 Motor vehicle manufacturing 285 485 Metallurgy and metalworking 55 330 Consumer goods manufacturing 10 190 f etroleuni refining and pipeline 220 160 Timber and wood processing 110 135 Ships and marine 110 95 Electronics 50 50 Textiles 45 35 Food processing 15 J Mining and : onstnretion 110 5 Ollie; 320 1 60 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 points to the "threat" of US aggression in order to mobilize Cubans in support of regime policies, and he has used the economic "blockade" to explain away many of his failures. Despite this, Brezhnev may take the line that Cuba would profit from a less intransigent atti- tude toward the US. The JSSR, which still under- writes the Cuban economy to the tune of more than $1 million a day, would benefit from any shift in Cuban political attitudes that brought an improvement in the island's economic position. Brezhnev, however, is not likely to press this point so strongly as to alienate the Cuban leader. The Soviets will be eager to obtain Castro's support for another world communist conference. Preparations are already under way for a series of regional meetings of Communist parties, and there are reports that representatives of several Latin American parties will meet in Havana dur- ing Brezhnev's visit. Economic and military aid will certainly be discussed during Brezhnev's visit. Moscow's extensive use of Cuban military facilities could give Castro leverage in seeking more Soviet arms, but there has been no sign yet that major new agreements will be made. The USSR ordered a record $2.5 billion worth of machinery and equipment from the West in 1973-60 percent more than in 1972. This level of orders in the face of an all-time high currency deficit reflected the strength of Soviet demand for advanced Western equipment as well as Moscow's better access to new sources of credit-notably in the US. US firms received orders for $435 million worth of machinery and equipment, excluding several large orders awarded to US subsidiaries in Europe. Italian sales increased the most, thanks to a $500-million contract for chemical plants. West Germany and France remained close competitors with the US for Soviet business, while Japan, Sweden, and the UK lagged well behind. Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 COMMUNIST PROPAGANDISTS MEET Moscow used the meeting of party propagan- dists in Prague last week to take another step toward convening a world "onference of Commu- nist parties. The Kremlin's interest in seizing the propaganda initiative is shown by the effort it put forth to persuade representatives of 67 Commu- nist Gnd workers' parties-minus Yugoslavia and the ruling Asian parties-to come to Prague as well as by the fact that the meeting closely fol- lows last month's session of top ideologists in Moscow. Soviet speakers, as is often the case, left it to their loyal allies to call for another world confer- ence and to criticize the Chinese party. Soviet party secretary Ponomarev, the highest ranking delegate at the meeting, limited himself to assert- ing that he "struggle" for detente and the "crisis of capitalism"-which he claimed has been made much more acute by the economic and social dislocations arising from the energy crisis-create new opportunities to propagandize "real" social- ism. These remarks echo Brezhnev's recent em- phasis on countering the influence of Western ideas on the Soviet and East European peoples. Ponomarev, who is responsible for relations with non-ruling Communist and workers' parties, ex- horted the delegates to join in the effort. He lauded the Moscow conference of Communist parties in 1969, but he only hinted that another world meeting would be appropriate by alleging an increasing interest in multilateral meetings of Communist parties and by citing a need for closer coordination of policies. By contrast, Czechoslovak party secretary Vasil Bilak, a hide-bound conservative, pointedly called on the delegates to prepare for a future meeting. H call, the first by any member of the Czechoslovak hierarchy, is the third such sum- mons to come out of an East European party in recent weeks. The Hungarian and Bulgarian party chiefs urged a similar course last month. Wenceslas Square in Prague Bilak's speech further differed from Pono- marev's in its harsh condemnation of Peking, the strongest such declaration recently heard from Eastern Europe. Bilak claimed that "the oIti a- leftist Maoist leadership has departed for good from Marxist-Leninist positions and stands on an anti-Soviet and anti-socialist platform." The communique summarizing the Prague talks failed, however, to mention either a future world meeting or the problem posed by Peking. Omission of these contentious points probably reflects Moscow's desire to avoid antagonizing some parties. Romanian participants, either alone or together with other conferees, almost certainly opposed any reference to China in the com ,- nique. Page 7 Jan 18. 74 ti. Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA=RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 ~ ... .; Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 YUGOSLAVIA: UNIVERSITY DEFIANCE The Yugoslav leadership is moving to rein in assigning all students to military training camps Belgrade University professors, who are among for three weeks each year; previously students in the few remaining outspoken critics of regime higher education were issued blanket defer- policies. If mishandled, however, the party's de- ment. termined effort to tighten control over the aca- demic community could heighten unrest at the universities. The issue at hand is Tito's two-year-old de- mand for the firing of ultra-liberal professors at Belgrade University. Previous party efforts to oust the professors resulted in a stalemate, as the university has a tradition of autonomy and the Serb party has been reluctant to use its muscle on campus. At the end of 1973, however, the federal party prodded local officials to begin an all-out drive to purge eight liberal philosophy professors. The local party is now on the verge of ousting the professors, but preparations for the purge have generated unrest among some stu- dents, whose displeasure cannot be taken lightly. In 1968, for example, student riots seriously embarrassed the regime, and any recurrence this year would be particularly damaging in view of scheduled national elections and a party congress. As in 1968, economic difficulties coupled with the party's heavy-handed tactics could anger and unify the students. According to the US Consulate in Zagreb, the Belgrade affair is threatening to spread to students in the Croat capital. On January 9, stu- dents at Zagreb University expressed their sup- port for the eight Belgrade professors. Zagreb authorities called for a show of police strength that apparently succeeded in cowing the students. Later in the week, party officials at the city's university charged the dissident students with links to nationalists whose extremism in 1971 brought on wholesale purges of popular Croat leaders. Students all over the country began a month-long semester break this week, thereby reducing the likelihood of disturbances in the near future. When they return to school, however, the students may have a new cause for dissatisfac- tion. The regime this week announced a plan for Page 8 WEEKLY REVIEW Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003_2 .;~.,a_t.., .,... .: 1 ... rr?~r, r P/rrpi, r..v.'r ,T, ,. i,r,.a y,.-i. ia: rh7~ . Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 25X1 EC Council meetings in Brussels this week focused on discussion of attitudes toward the oil users' conference in Washingtor next month. The topic played role in the political consultations of the Nine in Bonn on January 10-11 as well. The council agreed that Commission Presi- dent Ortoli and West German Foreign Minister Scheel, in his role as council president, would represent the community at the conference. The member countries, with the possible exception of France, will also send representatives. Foreign Minister Jobert said Paris still had reservations; he may be seeking to enhance French bargaining strength in the negotiations prior to the next council consideration of a common EC energy position on February 4-5. Paris is concerned that the Washington con- ference will confer too important a role on the US and also lead to a climate of opinion that 25X6 would be unfavorable to the bilateral deals now being worked out between France-as well as other consumer states-and the Arab producers. In constantly warning that the energy action group could set the consumer countries against the producers, Paris hopes to gain as much credit as possible with the latter. The French want to move international energy consultations into the OECD-or even the UN-as quickly as possible and to limit such talks to long-term goals. In Bonn, the EC political directors had al- ready agreed that President Nixon's invit?tion was an important and major initiative. The Nine also discussed the community's own future relation- ship with the Arab countries. In the wake of a political settlement in the area, the Nine foresee possible aid and cooperative arrangements, as well as a role :r, guaranteeing the peace. In Brussels, the council spent long hours discussing the amount and allocation of a fund for the development of poor regions in the com- munity, but agreement remained elusive. At the earlier Bonr meeting, Paris had made clear that it objected to the West German proposal, which would reduce the over-all amount involved, cut the French share of the payout sharply, and in- crease the percentage of the fund going to the three poorest EC countries-Italy, Ireland, and the UK. At a parallel meeting of the EC Council of Agricultural Ministers on January 14-15, the French demanded-and staged a minor "walkout" when they were voted down-an immediate EC price hike for beef and an embargo on beef im- ports in order to help French producers. The West Germans had suggested before the meeting that France's refusal to go along with their proposal for regional aid would cau'e the council to delay action that the French wanted in the agricultural area. Consultations among the Nine are becoming wider in scope, both at council meetings and within the political framework. The meetings alto promise to be increasingly frequent, although the lack of a secretariat will hamper the effectiveness of political consultations. 25X1. Page 9 WEEKLY REV i EW Jan 18, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2~,a` Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 It is almost certain that the long-postponed national referendum to cancel the divorce law will be held this spring. If no way is found to avoid the referendum, the accompanying political cam- paign could destroy the fragile unity of Prime Minister Rumor's center-left coalition, polarize political parties, and reverse the "soft" opposition policy followed for the last six months by the powerful Communist Party. The issue has been a contentious one since 1970, when a Socialist-sponsored bill legalizing divorce was pushed through parliament over the strong opposition of Italy's largest party, the Christian Democrats, and the bitter protests of the Catholic Church. The next year, however, anti-divorce groups collected enough signatures to schedule a national referendum on the bill. Poli- ticians on both sides of the question are unen- thusiastic about the referendum, and most have welcomed various postponements that have put off the vote. The la.t ;hance of avoiding the issue was ended late last year when the Constitutional Court upheld the law, thus keeping the referen- dum on the docket. Many political leaders fear that the referen- Jum will force the governing parties into public battle over an issue that has little bearing on the country's pressing economic and social problams. Debate over how to handle the referendum has already shattered the show of unity that has char- acterized relations among the parties since Rumor took office last summer. In recent days, the So- cialists sharply attacked the Christian Democrats for their rejection of a Socialist proposal that would have canceled the referendum by nego- tiating a substantial change in the law. By refusing to compromise on the divorce issue, the Christian Democrats are pitting them- selves against all three of their coalition partners. They will also find themselves in the uncom- fortable position of being on the same side of the issue as the Neo-Fascists. The Communists and Socialists will seize on this aspect of the campaign to transform it into an anti-fascist crusade. The Neo-Fascists are the only ones eager for the contest, primarily because it will return there to the spotlight and allow Them to pose as de- fenders of the church at a time when their move- ment appears to be losing momentum. The Communist Party fears that it will lose more than it will gain from a divisive battle over the divorce question. Since the revival of the center-left coalition formula last July, the Com- munists have followed a policy carefully tailored to demonstrate that the country's problems can- not be solved without their help. Most Italians realize, for example, that the Communists have used their influence with organized labor to aid the government's economic recovery program. A key elemert of recent Communist strategy has been to emphasize the goals they share with Italy's governing parties. They have gone so far as to propose a "historic compromise" between their party and the political establishment-as clear a pitch as the party has ever made to par- ticipate in the national government. At the same time, the party has stepped up its efforts to improve relations with the Catholic Church. The divorce referendum would reverse these initiatives by dividing the parties along left-right lines and accentuating the distance that remains between the Cowmunists and their major opponents. Although a portion of the Christian Demo- cratic rank-and-file is opposed to the referendum, the party leadership claimed this week that "only a miracle" could avert the confrontation. A sharp and sudden deterioration of the economic situ- ation is one circumstance that could compel the parties to iron out their differences or at least wage a more subdued campaign. Page 10 WEEKLY REVIEW Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 le Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 The Year of the Tiger begins next week and it may tome in like a lamb. Both Communist and government furces have been placed on alert for the three-day Tot holiday that begins on January 23. but thee are few signs of significant militar There are some low-level reports of Commu? nist plans for major action at TeL but this prob. abiy it*.fit'cli only an eftoft to eris+}io Comba readiness. Most of the evidence points to a holi? day marred only by the usual rash of mino. incidents--local commanders taking advantage of a tactical sit ration or actions by enemy units that never got the official word to stand down. After Tot. the pace of military action will probably pick up. COSVN guidelines for 1974 Page 14 WEEKLY REVILW Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 call for a "strategic raid campaign" to expand territory. Immediately after Tet, however, the action may amount to 'iothing more than co;:iitering South Vietnamese operations and keeping up Communist pressure in areas whr!o the fighting has beets heavy for months. This week's action in Pleiku Provincq is typical oi the sort that may well continue. (early !n the waek, elements of the South Vietnamese 22nd Division recaptured Piai Djereng, the bonier outpost overrun by the North Vietnamese late la! t SAptember. Communist resistance was light at first, but heavy fighting is now going on over Cot'ttrgl of bail) the outpost arid the liiijliw.ay Fading to it. The Cor,.munisls also attacked mn Konl urn Province during the week, probably in an effort to draw off government troops from western Pleiku, Local units in Pleikt have also begun cutting key highways in t:ie province inter. mittenily. Amending The Constitution P.e*:ient Thieu is moving ahead with a series of co'tstitutional amendments designed to strengtl en the presidency. The National Assam' Illy is now considering three: one puU off any popular election of province chiefs unt'! after Ilia current presidential term: another changes the method of selecting Supreme Court justices, and the third permits him to run for a third term in 1 15. 1fis supporters believe they have the neces, sary votes and expect al; rhtee amendments to be approved on January 19, 1hieu reportedly had I! At planned to move until late this year, but lie apparently fehls he is in a strung enough potition to go ahead now. lie may b-linve this is a good 'time to act because any oppos!b! -)n maneuvering is likely to be over- chaaovtd by the tot holiday, He may also tear that if military and ecc:nomic conditions tleterio? rate later in the year, it would lessen his ability to push the changes through, Thief, remains concerned about a posoible adverse reaction in the US, Partly to head off critvcism from this ouratter, he is moving to help at$ opposition party meet stiff re jistration re quirements, The party, the Social Democratic Alliance, was gr en provisional status for one year last March, L. has been hampered by serious internal rivalry, and there were signs that it might CAMBODIA: MILITARY BALANCC SHEET P'ghting centered in the Phnom Pcnh -tea again this weak, The Cambodian Army's P,-gr. 15 WLCKLY RCViLV: Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2>------------------ .._~.. Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 r ', counterattack northwest of the capital's airport faltered in the face of stiff resistance, despite cuncentratjbd government artillery and air strike . Khmer Communist troops still hold several vil. lages within five miles of the airport; Army and insurgent troops fought to a standoff on Route !i just above the government oil storage facility five miles north of Phnom Penh. Cambodian Army commanders are preparing for renewrtd Communist action and have sent in additional unit . Over 5,000 government troops, blacked by artillery and armor, are now in place. With mostly all of the army's general reserve force tied down either northwest or southwest of Phnom Penh, however. army commanders will be hard pressed to come up with additional rain- forcaments if they are needed. The Communist dry season campaign, which is only in its sixth week. has produced mixed results elsewhere, The insurgents have maintained control over sections of Routes 4 and 5. They have not made a serious effort to interdict vital Mekong resupply convoys, however, and have allowed Phrrom Penh to build up its reserves of rice and military POL supplies, Aside from putting pressure on ilia southern provincial cap- ital of Takeo. the Communists have yet to launch any strong attacks on major government strong- holds in the countryside. As long as they con- centrate on the Phnon. Penh region, the Commu- nists probably will be unable to mount any of. fensives against such important cities as Battam- bang and Kompong Cham. The Communists' performance thus far in the dry season indicates that, among other things. they have not yet been able to offset fully last Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 year's heavy losses of experienced personnel, Nevertheless, the Communists still appear deter- mined to intensify militniy pressure on Phnorn THAILAND: STUDENT PROTI,`STS CONTINUE Lvents of the past week indicate anew that the student protest movement wl'I remain a fea. lure of Thai politics for tha foreseeable future, 'the arrival of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in Bangkok on January 9 prompted over 10,000 students to demonstrate against Japanese eco- nomic "imperialism." The student activists also used the occasion to criticize the US. claiming the recent CIA incident to be an example of US interference in Thai domestic affairs, Some 3,000 students broke away from the main body of demonstrators to stage an orderly protest in front of the US Lmbassy. The students disbanded after being assurer that their views would be heard by Prime Minister Sanya, but they are continuing to demand that the government issue a formal protest to the US. Anti-US feelings are not confined to Bangkok, In the provincial capital of Udorn, the site of a major US air base, some 500 students marched on the US Consulate to demand the shutdown of all US Bases in Thailand. Student activists have long harbored anti-US sentiments, but until iast week, their preoccupa- tion with domestic affairs had kept these feelings from surfacing, Unless the government now makes some gesture to mollify the students, the honeymoon may be over. Army chief Krit Sivara and Prime Minister Sanya have privately ekpifi:~d concern uvvr the instability caused by the student demonstrators, and Krit has said he is ready to use his troops if the King and the Prime Minister ask hin* to do so. Unless the demonstrations escalate well beyond current levels, however, the government will prob. ably confine itself to public hints of possible military intervention and hope that this will keep the students off the streets. Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 CHINA: A NEW OLD FACE AT THE TOP Until lie was topplc-d in 1966. Iotrner party secretary gr.neral Teng Hsiao?pinq was one of the most powerful men in China, His return last April made him the highest ranking official to be to- ,-habilitated since the Cultural Revolution. but he was given only the limited duties of a vice pre- mier. At the party congresF last August. long was named to the party's Central committee. but he v as riot to hiiy po;illburo position, 'J001 is step had the potential for dissension. and leaders i:_,-% --s Mao and Chou probably gave higher prior- ity to moves aimed at reducing the power of entrenched regional military commanders. post-Mao leadership, Meng, who is in his ;.f'ventirs, is toughly the sime age as the test of China's aging leaders, fie and Chou Ln.lai were rivals for power in the past. but it is likely that thr?y are now essentially in agreement on policy matters. Chou i, anxious to get China on the road to nioderni;ation before Mao's, and his own. demise, tie ti "d,, the help of a nian like T eng, who i; known for his ability to get things done, Teng, for his part. owes his political life to Mao and Chou. and he is likely to be an important asset to the premier once Mao is gong, Although Teng's elevation does not alter the SUCCession picture over the long term. he is likely to play an important role in the immediate Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 r 1 TUNI ;IA.LIlIYA: Mr-14 Ell COLLAPSES it-ni;ian Pt. irtenl Itiutguiha and Libyan t're;ident (aadhafi announced a surpri;o merger agtc font is;t weokpnd, but by January It.), luni; was bar k-pe(laling tat)irlly. Utgpd by hi; arlvi;or;, irtt.ludrftg Prima Mini;ter Nouita, 13o t= guiha ha; set pto?cr'nditirn1; that prw.Iudo itnplo' menI'll ion of tile aqtPelopill ill flip fututo. lloutguiba, Ionq a ;uppotlot of /''tab unity, obviously had not tht,ughl through) tile mptopt ;robes he ;ignr=d flip agteemont with (?arlllafi at a meeting ill Tunisia, tlourguiha was evidently ;vray'd by (?a(ihafi and by his own foreign mini;= t't, Mohamed Mastnouili, who has long pushed fit closer tie; vvi! i Libya. Uuutguiba was ex- ttomely fitecl whin ho met Qadhafi, a condition that in flip pa;t ha; ;hottr:notf I outguiba's span of attention and rtladp hittn tnotp susceptible to sug? g0;tioll from those around hire. Moteovet, ihtee key advi;ct; Ili; wife, ;on. and the Prime Mini;, tat, all of whore would have adviserl against the rnptrjpr ? fete absent "', lien flip agreetllent was cirft)cn(l ()orn he had little tot ;4'cond thought; and con;ullation; vorilh Nouita and othets, (Jourguiba rnovr(I (fuickI to -.holy' the union. He replacer) I.Ia,oloudi will) hi; cabinet ditectot and moved hi; fit;l collcitl an(1 Sit I loyal minister to the ;.rn;+tivo post of dofon;o minister. In rapid Vic. coc;iur,, flip rnorgnr rpfn?endutn was {tia;t;:i)nett pmndinq t(-vision of tuni;ia's cootiltilion. file merger was publicly chatacferi,rerf a; only a (IpcIatation of ptincipln, and the govevnrnent an. fountor.f that Tunisia will never unite with Libya a; fonrJ a; Motocco or Algeria opposes such a union, Anticipating adverse reaction to the ro er;al both at home and '. r.n Libya. the Tunisian Gov. l:.. . ;Multi; ??. i?, .-:ut:ty ?"o :sure; throughout the country and has closed the border with Libya despite protests from Tripoli. On Jan? ua-y 15. local police broke up a rally at Tunis University that had anti?I3outguiba overtones. The students and young professionals believe a rnerger would offer new job opportunities and a greater role for Tunisia in Arab affairs. By contrast, tniddlo r1 J;; Tuni;ian; and probably rho military rtisttii;t (JarlhL,c and thotpfore oppose the ;inion. tlotitquiha'; handling of the union affair will weak on his prestige in Tltni;ia and acc.eletate po- litical ttlatpuveting by ptesitlentiat hopeful; around Thin. Ihi; behind-!he-scene; activity will be increasingly important a; preparation; (.oil, Untie lot the ninth roogre;; of the ruling Des- tou-ian socialist Patty next CJctohet, which is to be followpd by national plection; in November. Tunisia's effort; to back out of the union have not drawl an official reaction from ttipoli. 1-or the moment, 1'ro;ident Qadhafi apparently is trying to mininlile hi; political emhart, meal by porrnit1inq only low-key pte;; coverage of the union. According to one media account. Libya will proceed with a nationwide referendum on Januaty 18-,'; originally ;r_hedulerl--despite tunisia'c announcprnent that its teletendutot ha; been po;tpune(l indotinitely, Till 1-1 ;\7 I IN pair t 11''11J r-\V (I it V liftM'F 1Yr.'siltl F ,tl Is!~ ,1I IM"Ill r11,1 rPV lt',VIS itl'is/lt)'t,\'UI:Utr,\'s7it:11 ( I'i1rr%,I'1111 11 r-\' i 1,\'!`:1111' 1. Irr (if ci lNl Ntrlll)1 h' ts'liii I t 1 The srlen p (torn Lihya reflect; the thlr+mma now facing Qa(ihafi. the Libyan leader had orig. ir.,111:y restore hi; prettige, which was badly Jatna(tnrf by the collapse of the Libyan'Lrlyptian union last Seplemtact. 1 he fia;co surrounding his overture to Tunisia has instearl only increased hr; r;olation from the Arab mainstream and t'ndetscored hi; reputation a; a di;tuplive maverick. This failure, coupled with the exceedingly bad press Qadhafi has received as a result of his t Nl~~ f:L3:i to the Gcne .'r talk; ands ii:; ;?~S j.j, ~.: for Arab terrorists. will have a strong personal impact on the Libyan leader, possibly leading to another round of resignation threats. At this point, however. Qadhafi apparently intends to accept Tunisia's rebuff passively while he struq? gtes to regain his footing 25X1 Page 19 WEEKLY REVIEW . _ Approved JFor Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Page 20 WEEKLY RCVILW Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 P. yc 21 tucivpw tail link;, including recent attack; on tail line; into Malawi and Nhnde;ia that heretofore !tail bee;l left untouched. In contrast, the level of ul;utgpncy in Angola ha; been (hint;cule_ for more than a year, Heber force; based in Zambia have been ineffectual bp- cati of ;ariou; internal frictions that have vir? Wally patalyzer! their military operation;. A rival m;rlrgrht gto;Jll based in Zaire also ha; had in= tetrlal di;pule;, but Ila; tteen held together largely by faire President Mobiitu'; Support and occa? signal intervention, At the wine little, however. Mobutu has been re;training file group'; military operations into Angola because of his dppendence on Portuguew- facilities to Iran;part Lair%an copper. Blatt:I, I tot(J.'S MAV It 1-11; MANAGE '!r) I. r:RI;,1.s1: I'/tl .s,tit 711: f r,V T'NI I I I I (:t.1,.SI:. I11'I` I'Itr-11:4I1L1' Vi)'I' 1 ,( ) I'I I RI. ITI ,N 'i IRIr1I'SI>%' I.I'SItfA'S I"M 'UP I'Itl Sl:fit li Is 'i r R 1( 1:4, The Arab oil tfmbaoj., i; further com- plicating Lisbon's problems in Africa, where much non-esst-ntial military travel has had to be curtailed. A broad upsutge in guerrilla activity could seriously strain Portuguese stocks. This has led Lisbon to fear an insurgent strike against the Angolan exclave of Cabinda. vhich accounts for a large share of Portugal's petroleum produc- tion. Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000020003-2 f'ortuyua;e Africa CIiTTCfl f'ISOSPECTS FOR INSURGENTS flip ('ottlrque;e are gtowiriq unea;, over what 1914 will bring in the long-;t~'-Ina ted in? ;urgencies in their throe African tcttitorie;. I r fact, rebel force; play well n+anage to increase ptes;ore on the t'