WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 15, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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flu: WEEKLY RE.VILW, issued every Friday morning by the
(Jllicc of Current Intelligence? reports and analyzes si(Inif-
icant devetolm ents of the week through noon on Thursday.
It frequently includes inaterial coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of E.conomic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, arid the Direc:loiato of Science and Technology.
Topics roquirin) more comprehensive treatment and there-
fore published ,eparalely as Special Reports are listed in the
contents.
CONTENTS (February 15, 1974)
24 American Foreign Ministers To Meet
25 Argentina: Peron and Youth
26 Colombia: Election and Beyond
27 Chile: Out in the Open
SPECIAL
REPORT (Published separately)
Afghanistan: President Daoud's
First Six Months
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EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
1 SALT Resumes
2 The Energy Conference
3 The Middle East
5 USSR: US Technology; Re-entry
6 EC To Discuss MBFR Issues
7 Eastern Europe - The Vatican:
9 Yugoslavia: Extremism Under Fire
10 Berlin: Back in the News
Laos: Obstacles to a New Coalition
Cambodia: Shell Shc .ked
Philippines: Muslim Backlash
Australia: Whitlam Scores
18 Jordan: Husayn Restores Order
19 Iran-Iraq: Unneighburly Neighbors
20 Cyprus: After Grivas
21 North Yemen: Out With the Old
22 South Africa: Seeking a New Mandate
23 India: Violence and Votes
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
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SALT Resumes
The US-Soviet negotiations on strategic arms
limitations have entered a crucial phase. With the
talks set to resume on February 19, both sides
have made public commitments to reach a perma-
nent agreement on offensive weapons this year. If
even a partial agreement is to be achieved by the
time of President Nixon's planned trip to Moscow
in early summer, the negotiators will be under
considerable pressure to find areas of accom-
modation at this session.
The problem facing the negotiators is both
technical and political. They must find a formula
to deal with existing strategic asymmetries in a
wiy that preserves the national security interests
of both sides. At the same time, the agreement
must also be so constructed as to enable both to
deal effectively with potential domestic critics.
Thus far, the two sines have taken sharply diver-
gent approaches to achieving their common objec-
tive.
The US wants to renegotiate the terms of
the existing five-year agreement, adding strategic
bombers to the inventory of weapons to be
limited and setting equal numerical limits on the
central strategic systems for both sides. Washing-
ton also wants to place limits on the throw-weight
of ICBMs, constrain qualitative improvements-
e.g., MIRVs-and begin a program of active reduc-
tions in strategic weapons.
The Soviets would like to retain the nu-
merical and throw-weight advantages they have
under the interim agreement, although they have
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expressed readiness to include heavy bombers in
the systems to be limited. They justify their
present advantages by arguing that what was
equitable for the near term is also equitable over
the longer haul, particularly if the US is unwilling
to count its own forward-based nuclear systems
and ;ose of its allies as strategic weapons.
The negotiations have been further com-
plicated by the vigorous pace of the Soviet arms
buildup over the past year. The Soviets have
begun testing new-generation ICBMs with greater
accuracies and demonstrated MIRV capabilities.
They have tested submarine-launched ballistic
missiles to extended ranges and have continued to
add to their submarine force. These and other less
dramatic developments are consonant with the
provisions of the interim agreement, but they
have cast doubt on Soviet intentions at SALT
nevertheless.
Meanwhile, there is growing concern over
the possibility that advances in weapons tech-
nology may overtake efforts to impose political
controls over weapons development. Whether or
not the Soviets share the US concern on this
score, they have continued, at least in public, to
voice optimism about SALT's prospects. Writing
in the latest issue of the journal USA, prominent
Soviet military theoretician G. A. Trofimenko
avowed that mutually satisfactory formulas could
be found that would ensure the security of both
sides, while taking into account existing asym-
metries in the strategic relationship.
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The Energy Conference
The outcome of the Washington energy con-
ference clearly highlighted France's isolated posi-
tion and suggests some shift in the power relation-
ships within the EC.
Many of the proposed objectives of interna-
tional cooperation that the conference endorsed
were in the position paper approved by the EC
Nine prior to the Washington meeting and were
accepted by the French. France reserved its posi-
tions on ` nancial measures, however, and refused
to accept the establishment of a coordinating
group of senior officiais to carry out energy pro-
grams within existing bodies-a move endorsed by
all other participants.
Although ostensibly a procedural matter, the
French maintained that these points raised the
broad question of Europe's future relations with
the US. They chose to stick to the view that
acceptance of a coordinating group composed of
conference participants amounted to another
European capitulation to Washington's "domina-
tion"-a charge to which many Europeans on
occasion are sympathetic. In this instance, the
French were unable to carry the other EC mem-
bers with them, due in part to the Europeans'
lack of confidence in their ability to cope with
the energy crisis without US cooperation.
The conference outcome also made clear
that, with the EC's enlargement, Paris cannot in
every instance call the tune. The Germans, who
are in a strong position because they hold the
presidency of the EC Council, would not go along
with the French, particularly since Britain and the
other EC members were not prepared to allow
Pans to frustrate the goals of the contarence.
Initial press reaction in Europe stressed con-
cern over the effect that the evident disarray of
the EC Nine would have or. European unity. A
representative story in the Italian press criti;;ized
French intransigence and noted that, one by one,
the EC countries were aligning themselves with
the Germans. One conservative paper commented
that the European countries were torn between
their desire to preserve European solidarity and
the allure-which was simultaneously a threat-of
the US invitation for cooperation. The prestigious
Frankfurter Allge>meine commented that the
meeting showed that the EC is "deeply ruptured"
and that "France was prepared to allow unifica-
tion of the Nine only on its own terms, the price
of which would be a permanent conflict between
Europe and America."
A spokesman for the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries picked up the French
theme. He accused the US of attempting "to
re-establish hegemony over Europe," adding that
this was precisely why France objected to the
US-initiated move.
The immediate problems the community
now faces are difficult. The EC governments have
postponed two foreign ministers' meetings:
? One, scheduled for February 15, was to
discuss the European-US declaration of princi-
ples; the governments had also planned to an-
riuunce after the meeting a wide-ranging offer
of cooperation with the Arab states;
? The second, scheduled for February 18,
was to have focused on regional policy.
The French team
Emphatic views
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The Middle East
Algiers Meeting
The leaders of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia,
and Algeria met in Algiers this week to discuss
Syrian-Israeli disengagement and to consider ac-
tion on the oil embargo against the US. The ruler
of Kuwait, who was invited but did not attend,
indicated he would support the conference's de-
cisions. The meeting was apparently promoted
jointly by the Egyptians and the Saudis.
Cairo press accounts noted that the con-
ferees would discuss the possible separation of
Syrian and Israeli forces, as well as "a unified
formula for a plan of Arab activity in the coming
stage." These vague formulations may, in fact,
have covered a determination to persuade Syria's
President Asad to begin disengagement negotia-
tions with Israel. Asad's reluctance to open talks
is not due to his own hesitation, however, but to
opposition within the Syrian Army and Baath
party. The other heads of state apparently hoped
that pressing Asad directly and en masse would
reinforce his own inclinations and strengthen his
hand in dealing with doubters at home.
Each of the participants has urgent reasons
for wanting movement on the Syrian front.
Egypt's President Sadat, to prove that he is not
negotiating a unilateral settlement with israel, has
publicly pledged that he will not move further
until Syria also has a disengagement agreement.
The longer Syria delays, the greater the danger
that Sadat will be faced with discontent at home
over lack of further progress.
Sadat has also been urging that the oil em-
bargo against the US be lifted, and Saudi Arabia
and Algeria-for political reasons in the first case,
economic in the other-would like to oblige. For
the same reasons that hold Sadat back on further
negotiations, however, neither King Faysal nor
President Boumediene can afford to ease oil re-
strictions until those restrictions have produced
the same benefits for Syria that they appear to
have yielded for Egypt.
Disengagement on the Egyptian front, mean-
while, is proceeding smoothly. On February 12,
Israeli forces completed stage three of their four-
stage withdrawal from the west bank of the Suez
Canal. They now retain only the northern third of
their west bank salient and are scheduled to with-
draw from that portion by February 21. Disen-
gagement is to be completed by March 5. UN
forces have already placed boundary markers
along the eastern and western limits of the UN
buffer area that will separate the two sides.
Along the Syrian front, by contrast, tension
remained high throughout the week. Beginning on
February 10, Syrian artillery shelled Israeli dosi-
tions for three consecutive days. The Israeli press
claims that the three-hour Syrian barrage along
the entire front on February 11 was the heaviest
since tha October war and that for the first time
it included Israeli civilian settlements. Two civil-
ians reportedly were killed.
The February 11 attacks, according to the
US Embassy in Tel Aviv, violated a tacit Syrian-
Israeli understanding that the Israelis would re-
frain from retaliatory air strikes so long as the
Syrians limited their attacks to military targets.
Despite this alleged violation, the Israelis are, for
the present, inclined to avoid heavy retaliation
that could upset current diplomatic efforts to
launch Israeli-Syrian negotiations. According to
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, Tel Aviv feels that
the Syrian attacks reflect Damascus' political
frustrations rather than a desire for renewed
hostilities.
Israeli forces did step up their shelling of
southern Lebanon early this week in retaliation
for two recent cross-border attacks by the feda-
yeen. One Israeli soldier and one civilian were
killed in the attacks. Lebanese Government
spokesmen have been unusually candid in
acknowledging that fedayeen initiatives have
prompted the Israeli shellings, but the Lebanese
Army has only a limited ability to control feda-
yeen activities in the border area.
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Moscow's interest in Western, especially US,
technology has flourished over the past five years
or so. In pursuing trade deals, cooperation agree-
ments, and bilateral technological contacts, the
USSR has been more aggressive than at any time
since the 1920s. Soviet leaders recognize that
rapid economic growth can be achieved once
again only by accelerating technological progress.
The USSR has been relatively inefficient in devel-
oping and applying new technology, however,
forcing Moscow to turn increasingly to the West
for assistance.
The revival of Soviet interest in US products
and technology is partly political, but it is also in
line with the traditional policy of acquiring the
most advanced technology available. In some
areas, such as oil field equipment for Arctic ex-
ploration, US firms are the only source in the
eyes of the Soviets. US companies also are the
preferred sources of automotive equipment, com-
puter hardware and software, and civilian aircraft
technology. If contracts cannot be reached with
US companies, however, the Soviets recognize
that other countries often can provide technology
that is as good or almost so. The USSR has, for
example, bought computer hardware and some
kinds of automotive equipment and machine
tools from Western Europe and Japan.
The onset of detente has lowered some of
the traditional obstacles to Soviet acquisition of
US technology. The extension of medium- and
long-term credits by the US ?fter May 1972 re-
sulted in a large increase in Soviet imports of US
equipment and technology. Relaxation of US ex-
port controls has ako contributed to the rise in
imports, although controls continue to limit ac-
cess to very specialized and sophisticated tech-
nology.
The major means of acquiring technology
from abroad is the outright purchase of machin-
erv and equipment. Other channels used by the
Soviets have included the acquisition of technical
data, contacts with Western firms and scientists,
and formal arrangements for joint research and
exchange of scientific and technical information.
None of these has lived up to Soviet expectations,
however. Western equipment frequently is not as
productive under Soviet conditions, and attempts
to exploit foreign technical data or to copy for-
eign machinery have had mixed success.
Because machinery imports-especially
"turn-key" plants-are expensive, the Soviet lead-
ership is trying to hold down the cost of acquiring
foreign technology in this manner. The most
prominent innovation is a push for cooperative
economic ventures that provide for the export to
the USSR of equipment and technology on long-
term credits, which are ?epaid by deliveries of the
goods produced by the venture.
As an alternative means of acquiring technol-
ogy, the USSR is also pressing strongly for in-
creased cooperative research with private firms.
More than 20 such agreements have already been
concluded with US firms. Most hold out the
promise of tangible technological gains for the
USSR, while Western companies hope to enhance
their sales prospects in the USSR.
There is little prospect that transferring tech-
nology from the US to the USSR will have a
substantial influence on Soviet economic devel-
opment. Although machinery imports and the
acquisition of technical data from the West will
continue, they are likely to be too small in scale
to have a substantial impact on Soviet economic
and technical development. The sum total of
technology acquired from the industrial west will
be more impressive, but the influence of such
transfers depends above all on how rapidly they
can be assimilated and duplicated. Ultimately, the
USSR must depend on its own applied research
and development sector to close the technological
gap with the West and to boost iti own Prnnnmir
growth.
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Bonn succeeded last week in securing French
agreement to participate in an EC discussion of
problems raised by proposed force reductions in
Europe. The West Germans lobbied successfully
for the establishment by the EC Political Commit-
tee of an expert working yroup that will meet
early next month to begin discussions.
The main task will be to examine in deta;l
the implications of the MBFR negotiations for
European integration, especially in the area of
defense cooperation. The working group's man-
date, however, is broadly worded to include any
relevant international negotiations or agreements.
In endorsing the working group, the French may
intend to raise issues related to SALT and the
US-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear
war. Paris has repeatedly argued that both imply a
weaker US commitment to the defense of West-
ern Europe.
The greatest obstacles confronting Bonn in
it.; efforts to establish the working group have
been the reluctance of several EC member states
to debate defense questions it the EC, and
France's strong opposition to MBFR. An informal
caucus of EC countries emerged at the end of the
last round of negotiations in Vienna, but Bonn
opposes the institutionalization of this caucus b2-
ca,ise it would pose a threat to allied unity and
omit some community members-such as France.
West German officials concede that the French,
and perhaps the British, might use the new EC
forum to speak out against the force reductions
talks in the hope of slowing their progress.
The Western participants at the negotiations
in Vienna hope to postpone consideration of West
European force reductions until a second, later
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phase of the talks. Nevertheless, West German
officials maintain that the time is ripe for the EC,
as well cis NATO, to reach a consensus on what
reductions might be compatible with Western
Europe's security. In Bonn's view, the working
group will not only serve this purpose but will
force Paris to set forth its views more fully on
issues related to MBFR.
Bonn's heightened concern about the impact
of force reductions on the defense of Western
Europe does not necessarily mean That the Ger-
mans are moving toward the generally negative
British and French view. On the contrary, Bonn is
seeking greater coordination so that the reduc-
tions in West European forces in the second stage
will not interfere with closer European defense
cooperation.
West German Disarmament Commissioner
Roth recently expressed the view that NATO
should negotiate a common ceiling or, forces and
should insist that the distribution of Western
reductions be determined by NATO with recom-
mendations from the community. Roth stressed
that the Soviet proposal for a specific ceiling on
West German forces must be rejected.
The policy outlined by Roth now appears to
have the general support of the Defense Ministry
officials who have been eager to reduce West
German forces for political and financial reasons.
These officials still seek US assurances that a
second stage will occur and that the concept of a
common ceiling will be maintained. They are also
generally opposed to singling out West German
forces in a second stage and are drawing up plans
for a mixture of allied reductions that would
meet West Germany's minimum defens
ments.
Eastern Europe - The Vatican
GESTURES TOWARD ACCOMMODATION
The enforced retirement of Jozsef Cardinal
Mindszenty as primate of Hungary and Arch-
bishop of Esztergom. together with the visit of
Vatican "foreign minister" Casaroli to Poland last
week, demonstrate the Vatican's interest in
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improved relations with Eastern Europe. In each
instance, the Vatican's actions also appear in-
tended to signal a more pragmatic approach to
church-state relations in the communist-governed
countries.
With apparent approval from Moscow, the
East European regimes with large Roman Catholic
populations are responding in kind. The Soviets
probably feel that in an era of detente, with
East-West contacts increasing, it is well to neutral-
ize a potential source of internal discord.
The 81-year-old Mindszenty, all but offi-
cially retired since his departure from the US Em-
bassy in Budapest in late 1971, has continued to
be a symbol of resistance to the Hungarian Com-
munist regime. Although his removal opens the
way for improved church-state relations in Hun-
gary, any real amelioration in the church's plight
will come slowly. In conjunction with Mind-
szenty's dismissal, the Vatican was able to fill an
archbishopric that has been vacant for two years
and to appoint a temporary administrator for
Esztergom, the archbishopric that includes Buda-
pest. A permanent successor to both of Mind-
szenty's positions will probably not be selected
until the Cardinal dies.
The removal of Mindszenty on February 5
followed by one day Casaroli's arrival in Warsaw.
The coincidence of the two events may have been
intended to remind Poland's primate, the con-
servative Cardinal Wyszynski, that he also may
eventually have to show more flexibility toward
the state in order to permit formal Vatican-Polish
ties.
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ROMANIA: MIDDLE EAST TOUR
President Ceausescu's current swing through
four Arab capitals marks a high point in his drive
to justify Romania's neutralist Middle East policy
and to head off Arab plans to boycott Romanian
exports. Ceausescu will also use the tour to nur-
ture the impression at home and abroad that
Romanian diplomacy is facilitating the Arab-
Israeli peace negotiations. Ceausescu's delegation
spent February 12-13 in Tripoli, will be in Beirut
until February 17, and will visit Damascus and
Baghdad before returning to Bucharest on Feb-
ruary 21.
The Romanian press buildup for the trip
suggests that Ceausescu will offer limited political
and economic concessions, but will not bow to
Arab demands that Romania break diplomatic
relations with Israel. The Syrian and Iraqi visits
could prove especially trying as the Romanians
will face Arab leaders who have been particularly
vociferous advocates of a boycott of Romanian
goods. A preliminary recommendation for eco-
nomic sanctions against Romania already awaits
action by the Arab League. The Romanian Presi-
dent's personal efforts to avert a boycott will
probably feature attractive offers of Romanian
oii-extraction equipment and technology as well
as selective political support for Arab goals. in
addition, Ceausescu will probably try to get more
Arab oil to continue Romania's lucrative and
growing exports of refined petroleum products.
The Zomanians endured an Arab boycott
aft-3r the 1967 Middle East war, though without
serious privations, and appear determined to do
so again rather than allow third parties to com-
promise their bilateral relations. Moreover, a re-
fusal to break ties witn Israel would probably
help, as it did during the 1967 boycott, to expand
Bucharest's profitable trade with Tel Aviv and
West European capitals. Even if Ceausescu fails to
head off economic sanctions, he hopes that his
tour will still serve Romanian national interests.
Bucharest was frustrated in its attempt to partici-
pate in the UN Emergency Force last November,
and Ceausescu can be counted on to use his
current trip to show that Romania cannot be
excluded from playing a role in the Middle East.
Bucharest will also find ways to drive home this
message in Moscow and Belgrade, which bitterly
YUGOSLAVIA: EXTREMISM UNDER FIRE
Yugoslav party leaders are stepping up prep-
arations for republic and federal party congresses
this; spring to include a drive against extremists.
These efforts to achieve ideological "purification"
have increasingly shifted away from attacks on
liberals and nationalists, however, to focus on the
threat posed by "neo-Stalinists."
The most striking example of this shift oc-
curred during a meeting last week of the Croat
party central committee, during which veteran
party leader Vladimir Bakads leveled a blast at
what he called a "centralist faction." He charged
that this faction is vigorously pressing for I-rge-
scale personnel changes, for a radical restructuring
of the party along Soviet lines, and for the total
domination of society by the party. He also
charged that the group is undermining Yugo-
slavia's own form of socialism. Other Croat lead-
ers have since joined the fray, labeling the faction
"Stalinist" , nd warning that other republics face
the same danger.
Other republic party organizations are echo-
ing these warnings. In Serbia, where there have
been strong pressures for further purges of liber-
als, party leaders are now cautioning against new
witchhunts and against ideological fanaticism that
can do more harm than good. Stane Dolanc, sec-
retary of the party's powerful executive bureau,
has also consistently pointed to the danger from
"Stalinists."
This change of focus will cause confusion in
the party, particularly among middle- and low-
level functionaries who will find it difficult to
shift their attention suddenly from liberal to con-
servative extremism. Generally, however, the
party leaders' new tack may induce zealots of all
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 gate some form of unilateral East German action
to change the status of East Berlin, but this might
weaken the Soviet rationale for a continuing four-
power administration in the Western sectors. Traf-
fic to West Berlin might be restricted-the East
Germans did, in fact, impose special traffic con-
trols on January 26, possibly as a demonstration
of what could happen. The East Germans were
careful, however, to explain that the measures
were taken in connection with a "search for
wanted criminals." Selective action against en-
vironmental office staffers, threatened earlier,
also remains a possibility.
This kind of interference, however; if carried
too far, could upset Soviet - West German re-
lations at a time when Moscow is interested in
obtaining economic assistance from Bonn. Mos-
cow may also be hesitant to take strong coun-
termeasures for fear of souring the atmosphere 25X1
for Brandt's projected trip to the USSR which
will probably take place this spring.
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stripes to lie low. As a result, intra-party faction-
alism may be muted, thus permitting the leader-
ship to claim that all deviationist elements have
Berlin has re-emerged as a problem in recent
weeks, confounding hopes that the 1971 Quadri-
partite Agreement would remove it as a source of
East-West contention. The current controversy
centers on West Germany's decision to open a
federal environmental office in West Berlin, a
move the Soviets strongly oppose.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko took a
hard line on the subject during his recent visit to
Washington. In Berlin itself, French Ambassador
Sauvagnargues came away from a meeting with
Soviet Ambassador Yefremov on January 30 im-
pressed by the latter's "firmness." Yefremov re
peatedly stated that Moscow "will not accept dri
increase in the federal presence and there will be a
corresponding reaction." Soviet radio broadcasts
to West Germany have reiterated the threat.
The seeds of the dispute over the environ-
mental office -vere planted at the time the Quad-
ripartite Agreement was negotiated, because nei-
ther side changed its fundamental approach to
Berlin matters. As a result, contradictory con-
cepts-and ample room for contrary interpreta-
tions-were incorporated in the agreement. It was
inevitable that a long process of testing and defi-
nition would take place. The Soviets have persist-
ently fought for a narrow interpretation of West
German - West Berlin ties while seeking to expand
their own presence in the Western sectors. They
apparently regard the environmental office as a
qualitative jump in Bunn's efforts to tighten its
links with West Berlin and, therefore, as a poten-
tially dangerous precedent.
Despite their vociferous objections, the So-
viets have so far taken no concrete action. In any
event, their options are limited. They could insti-
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Hanoi has apparently held two Central Com-
mittee plenums in the past few months that,
together, lay out Communist plans and strategy
for the next couple of years in both North and
South Vietnam.
The earlier of the plenums-the party's
21st-was apparently held last fall and concen-
trefed on future action in the South. The North
Vietnamese have not mentioned it publicly, but
recently begun to provide detailed information on
the resolution that resulted:
? The Communists must be ready to go on
the offensive again sometime in the future;
? such an offensive is not near at hand,
and* for now the Communists are to re-
strengthen their forces, defend their territory,
and improve their political position;
? it may be years before these efforts bear
fruit in the sense of final victory.
In contrast to the 21st plenum, the 22nd
was reported immediately by North Vietnamese
media. It apparently was concerned mainly with
the reconstruction of North Vietnam. According
to initial reports, it laid down ambitious guide-
lines for a five-year plan beginning in 1976. and
for one-year plans in the two intervening years. 25X1
the main mes-
sage of the 21st plenum is that during the next
two years the party will continue to strengthen all
facets of its struggle in the South. During this
process, the party will carry out selective military
actions along with "political violence" in order to
weaken Saigon. The implication is that the time is
not favorable for a general or major country-wide
offensive since the "base" for such an offensive is
still being built.
The party's assessment of the situation in
the South was that "revolution" at the grass roots
is in serious disarray and needs much improve-
ment before either political or military success is
feasible. The Viet Cong control few people, have
lost access to the bulk of the population, cannot
find recruits for guerrilla units, and are experienc-
ing serious economic problems. The party ac-
knowledged, moreover, that the South Viet-
namese Government has increased its influence in
the countryside, noting that it is stronger than
before "from the central level to the village and
hamlet level." Saigon is also given good marks for
its "well-trained and well-equipped" army, its ef-
fective internal security forces, and its psychologi-
cal warfare operations.
On the positive side, the resolution observes
that the Communists control vast areas of western
South Vietnam and have free access all along its
borders. In addition, the Viet Cong are to receive
considerable economic help from the "socialist"
and "independent" countries. All of these factors
are important to building up strength in the
South.
One of the more revealing aspects of the
document is an apparent credibility problem
Page 11 WEEKLY REVIEW
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between lower level Communists and the party
leadership. Local Communists are told explicitly
that, despite their confusion and puzzlement,
they must have confidence in their leaders and
follow party guidance. The resolution points out
that even during times when things looked bad,
the party leadership ultimately developed a suc-
cessful strategy. The message for local Viet Cong
advocates of a major offensive is that only the
leadership can determine the timing and propriety
of such a policy.
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25X1
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The Lao Communists do not recognize the au-
thority or legitir'acy of the National Assembly.
They would prefer to bypass it completely and
submit the new government directly to the King
for approval. The King, however, is a strict con-
stitutionalist and has consistently maintained that
assembly ratification must precede royal inves-
titure.
LAOS: OBSTACLES TO A COALITION
Prime Minister Souvanna still hopes to form,
or at least name, a new coalition government by
February 21, the first anniversary of the Laos
peace agreement, but his self-imposed deadline
may not be met. Although neutralization of the
twin capitals of Vientiane and Luang Prabang is
progressing smoothly and restive students have
for the most part returned to classes, difficult
political problems remain. Not only has the chief
Pathet Lao political negotiator, Phoun Sipraseuth,
failed to give Souvanna a promised list of Lao
Communist candidates for cabinet positions in
the new government, but a constitutional hassle
over the coalition's investiture appears to be
brewing.
Phoun, who returned to Vientiane on Feb-
ruary 9 following three weeks of "consultations"
at the Lao Communist headquarters in Sam Neua,
has reportedly only presented Souvanna with a
new letter from his half-brother, Pathet Lao
leader Prince Souphanouvong. Souvanna has in-
timated to a US Embassy official that the "letter"
deals with the procedures required to invest the
new government.
The Communists, according to Souvanna, re-
main strongly opposed to submitting the mem-
bers of the new coalition to the existing National
Assembly for approval. They apparently also
object to his scheme of merely "notifying" the
assembly of the new government's composition.
A joint police accord
But no cabinci list
Souvanna himself is reluctant to face the
assembly on this matter because it is dominated
by his rightist political opponents. They have
expressed frequent misgivings over his handling of
negotiations with the Communists, and they will
almost certainly insist on having some say in the
new government's formation.
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