WEEKLY REVIEW

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CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0
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RIPPUB
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T
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30
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December 21, 2016
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April 21, 2009
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4
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Publication Date: 
February 22, 1974
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 C/Ado1 C/ )p DSB FILE COPY RETURN TO 111-1107 Weekly Review State Dept. review completed Top Secret 25X1 Top Secret 22 February 1974 Copy No 426 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Ilip: \VI I KI..Y Fl I: V11:.W, i',sued every I ridgy morning by the (.rllir.u of Current Irtlotligt;nce, mports and analyzes signif- u: utl drwVlopnicnt" of the week thrr_rugh noun on l hur.day. It Iroclur.ntly include, nralprial coordinated wills or prep.'rect by the Office fit I.cunornic Resecuch, the Office of Str..Itogic 16-,uarch, anr.l Me I)rrec:Ior,rle of Science and Technology. I opic,. rptiuii in1J more comprehensive lreatnrcnt inct thole- low puhli"Iled ,vpar.IInly w, Special Report; are lislod in the ccnrlr,nls. CONTENTS (February 22, 1974) EAST ASIA PACIFIC 6 Cambodia: The Government's Round 7 Laos: Pushing for a Coalition 25X1 8 Indonesia: Message In the Stars 15X1 9 South China Sea: Island Dispute 10 European Security: Inching Forward 11 Iceland: Wrangling Over the Base 13 Soviets Play Up Diego Garcia 14 Ceausescu's Middle East Gambit 15 Poland: Hierarchical Repairs MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 17 Oman?Iran: Mutual ...icurity 19 Islamic Leaders Meet in Lahore WESTERN HEMISPHERE 20 Cuba: Looking to Mexico City 20 Bolivia: More Cabinet Changes 21 Ecuador: Military Anniversary SPECIAL REPORT (Published separately) Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 KOREA: Incident at Sea The sinking of a South Korean fishing boat off the west coast last week added a new clement to the already tense relationship between the two Koreas. Although the circumstances of the Feb- ruary 15 incident remain somewhat obscure, it is clear that the boat sank after being rammed and possibly fired on by a North Korean patrol boat in an area north of the Northern Limit Line but--even by North Korea's tacit admission--in international waters. Despite the loss of the boat and all but one of the 12-man crew, the incident is likely to prove a propaganda boon to the Pak government and will complicate Pyongyang's effort to portray the 'Jouth as the aggressive party in their current propaganda exchanges. The North Korean action was probably not a deliberate pre' ocation but rather an effort to discourage foreign--Japanese as well as South Korean--fishing boats from operating so far north in these contested waters. Like many other nations, North Korea is turning increasingly to the sea for protein; a Central Committee letter issued in Pyongyang only the day before the incident stressed the importance of the Yellow Sea fisheries. There is also come evidence that the North Koreans were initially uncertain of the nationality of the sunken fishing craft, and their subsequent actions indicate a desire to keep the situation from escalating militarily. But the naval incident has resulted in the most heated propa- ganda exchange between the two Koreas since the North-South negotiations began in 1971. Seoul has condemned the sinking, while Pyongyang claims that the South Korean craft were engaged in espionage. Both sides are likely to stick to these lines when the Military Armistice as already broadcast an alleged spying confes- sion by the captain of a second boat captured in the incident. For their part, the South Koreans are using the incident to bolster their current anti- Communist campaign; rallies on the issue have been conducted in major cities and more are planned. The government is trying to divert at- tention from its own problems--particularly its unpopular authoritarian policies--and apparently is succeeding to some extent. Like Pyongyang, Seoul probably wants to keep the fishing incident within manageable bounds, but the incident may well icinforce the government's resolve to strengthen its military position in the contested area. Seoul is already planning to reinforce some of the islands it occupies south of the Northern Limit Line and has begun construction work. The present plan calls for a buildup in men and material--including large-caliber artillery and naval guns-to be com- pleted by next autumn. Pyongyang is certain to take a dim view of such South Korean moves. Since December, the North has been warning Seoul against bringing military craft or equipment through the waters surrounding the islands, which it claims are within its 12-mile territorial limit. The North has not protested this South Korean activity so far, possibly because it is waiting to determine its full extent, possibly because a verbal response would be ineffective in any case. Pyongyang continues to monitor Seoul's actions closely- how- Page Feb 22, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied le Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 The government changes announced this week reflect a decision by President Thiou to upgrade the status of Prime Minister Khiom and to put greater momentum behind economic pol- icies. The changes do not significantly alter the government's political make-up, but Thiou hopes they will improve the efficiency of the adminis- tration, Certain responsibilities have been transferred from the president's office to that of the prime minister, although Th;eu will remain the ultimate authority for all major decisions. The naming of controversial presidential aide Hoang Duc Nha as information minister enables Thiou to formalize Nha's recent authority over information activities while moving him, at least ostensibly, under Khiem. The latter has been unhappy over Nha's extensive influence, but it remains to be seen whether the change will weaken Nha's clout. Two new deputy prime ministers have been appointed to oversee welfare and development activities. Pham Quang Dan, a cabinet holdover, and Tran Van Don, a retired general and Lower House deputy, are activists, who presumably are expected to bring stronger direction to the eco- nomic ministries, which are now headed by able technicians and bureaucrats. A third deputy prime minister, Nguyen Luu Vien, retains his post and apparently will continue to serve as Saigon's chief negotiator in Paris. The cabinet shuffle offered Thiou an oppor- tunity to drop a handful of ministers whose per- formances he considers unsatisfactory. The chief casualty was Pham Kim Ngoc, who has been re- placed as commissioner of planning by Nguyen Tien Hung. Nyoc had been retained last October when other economic and financial officials were changed, probably because of his good rapport with Americans. Thiou's unhappiness with eco- nomic polirv apparently centered on Ngoc, Inas- 25X1 much as the ministers appointed in October con- tinue in the new cabinet. Khmer Communist military pressure against Phnom Penh slackened this week as the insurgents continued to prepare for a heavier offensive against the capital's defenses. Cambodian Army units took advantage of the lull by moving out on several battle fronts around the city. Government troops scored their biggest success northwest of Phnom Penh, where infantry and armor units- supported by artillery and air strike!-forced in- surgents from an area within four miles of Pochentong airport. Local government com- manders repot Led capturing significant numbers of weapons, and prisiner reports indicate that the Communists have taken sizable losses in this sector. In the southwest, government troops near Route 3 mounted a drive to erpand their holdings on the south bank of the Prek Thnaat River. The Communists are fighting to pevcnt the envelop- ment of some of their units, inclirling the artil- lery that has been shelling Phnom Penh. The only major Communist initiative of the week came in the Mekong River corridor, where insurgent gunners carried out the heaviest shelling of the dry season against resupply convoy. Ir. the count 'yside, government units from the isolated provint ial capital of Kompong Thom, some 75 miles north of Phnom Penh, have re- cently completed so-viral highly successful forays into Communist territoi-,. Over 22,000 villagers- resentful of oppressive (-t.rnmunist administra- tion-have come out with the government troops to resettle around Kompong Thom. The Commu- nists have stripped their military forces in the province as part of the buildup around Phnom Page 6 Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 % Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 2, the entire membership of the new government. Souvanna's offer to appoint one incumbent assembly deputy from each province to the Joint National Political Council, the principle dd"iso?y body to the new coalition cabinet, may also have enhanced the prospects for compromise. In addi- tion, recent threats by student activists to make the assembly a prima target of future largo-scale demonstrations may also have helped reduce legislative opposition to Souvanna's plans to form the now govornment by direct royal investiture. On February 20 the Sananikono clan, which dominates the rightist-oriented assembly, publicly endorsed Souvanna's efforts to form the now coalition. The Prime Minister has informed the US ambassador that the last major impediment to establishment of a coalition government has now disappeared. Souvanna this week convened the government's Council of Ministers, a high-levol policy-making group of senior cabinet officers that has long been inactive. The council was tasked with making final selections of government candidates for positions in the new coalition cabi- net and the Joint National Political Council. LAOS: PUSHING FOR A COALITION Prime Minister Souvanna faiied to meet his self-imposed deadline for forming a now coalition government by the first anniversary of the Laos peace agreement on February 21, but he appears to be on the verge of at least naming its member- ship. He has achieved significant progress in re- solving the differing viewpoints of the King, the National Assembly, and the Communists over the proper p,oceduro for the coalition's investiture- the last significant sticking point in the protracted negotiations. Souvanna claims that tie has the King's agreement to formally invest the new government even if the assembly has taken no legislative action. The King previously had maintained that the constitution required assembly approval of the new cabinet prior to royal investiture. The King has indicated to Souvanna that he was willing to dissolve the assembly pending now legislative elections. The threat of such a move may in part explain an apparent willingness by the assembly to soften its earlier insistence that it must approve Souvanna also met with chief Pathet Lao negotiator Phoun Siprasouth this week to inform him of the King's now position on investiture. which is in line with the Communists' view that the coalition represents a "special" government requiring only royal approval. Whether this will be enough to satisfy another important Pathet Lao precondition for forming the new govern- ment remains to be seen. The Communists have steadfastly held that effective neutralization of Vientiane and Luang Praban5 must precede the now coalition's forma- tion. While neutralization of the twin capitals is proceeding smoothly, it will be some weeks before the process is completed. The Lao Com- munist leadership sn Sam Neua may therefore be reluctant to send its ministers to the two cities until their safety is assured. Page 7 Feb 22, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 INDONESIA: MESSAGE IN THE STARS One tenet of Indonesian political philosophy holds that the fall of a dynasty is foretold by such signs as divisions within the ruling elite, decline in public morality, rising social discord, and the ap- pearance of now prophets. President Suharto, who in times of national stress consults his spiritual teachers more often than his cabinet, doubtless interpreted the up- heaval in Jakarta last month as an ill omen in- deed. His reaction has been to project a new public image of firmness and authority in order to restore confidence in his government's durability. Suharto's new leadership style may also sig- nify a shift in the power balance within the gov- ernment. His position among the military elite has long been characterized as that of primus inter pares, but he is now behaving like a man who believes he has supreme authority. I-le has re- shuffled security and intelligence personnel, put- ting men considered personally loyal to him in key positions and removing those believed either too independent-minded or too close to General Sumitro, Suharto's most powerful subordinate. Thi,; new presidential firmness is also being exercised with the public at large. Reversing a long-standing policy that allowed relatively free expression, the government now intends to take a hard line against critics because Suharto believes that the former pcrm.~siveness contributed to social and political instability. Under the new policy, five newspapers and three weekly periodi- cals have been closed, the;- publishers banned from future publications, and their staffs provi- sionally blacklisted. Officials have promised that new papers will eventually be permitted, possibly with government participation. All publications must now conform to strict government guide- lines designed to eliminate articles that could "foment conflict between races, religions and social forces" or "discredit national leadership.' This new assertion of presidential authority has already caused some grumbling within the Suharto and wife A new presideuriul stale military establishment because Suharto failed to consult them in advance. Although the defense department has an ex officio representative on the newly established political and security stabil- ization council that ratified Suharto's measures, the council is largely a rubber stamp. Since taking over in 1966, Suharto has fostered greater cent.al- izat ion of authority in the Jakarta bureaucracies. His latest actions suggest he now wants to go one step further and absorb all power into the presi- dential palace, a move that could cause some complications with his military colleagues Page 8 Feb 22, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 SOUTH CHINA SEA: ISLAND DISPUTES The offshore island disputes received verbal attention during the past week, but military ac- tion was limited to patrolling in the Spratly Island waters by warships of some of the countries con- cerned and to Chinese overflights of the Paracel Islands. South Vietnam, Nationalist China, and the Philippines all restated their various claims in public statements but avoided any suggestion that they were ready for a military confrontation. Saigon softened its earlier statement, which had promised to defend claims to both the Spratlys and the Paracels, by noting that it is "disposed" to settle territorial disputes by nego- tiation. A South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that Saigon approves "in rinciple" a Philippine proposal to discuss the question of sovereignty over the Spratlys, but he was careful not to commit South Vietnam to consider any "pie splitting" arrangement with Manila, much less with Peking. For its part, in an apparent gesture toward defusing tension over the islands, Peking on February 17 released all of the remaining South Vietnamese prisoners ;c had captured last month in th, Paracels. Spratly Island Page 9 Feb 22, 74 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Representatives from the 35 states partici- pating in the Conference on Security and Coop- eration in Europe held their breath as the drama of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was played out last week. When Solzhenitsyn arrived in the West, they breathed a collective sigh of relief and resumed their work. Most delegates from the Western and neutral states believe that, in the long run, the Solzhenitsyn affair could harden both Eastern and Western positions. It app?ars likely, for example, that the Western representatives will press the Soviets harder than ever for an agree- ment on freer movement of people and commu- nication of ideas between East and West. The Soviet delegates, also relieved that the dissident author was expelled, reaffirmei; the USSR's interest in detente. Although they have suggested that Moscow might be willing to make some compromises, the Soviets will continue to probe the Western side for weaknesses and will not make concessions until absolutely forced to do so. Resolution of ~,;.abstantive differences prob- ably is still several months off. In the meantime, the conferees will continue the slow process of drafting the final conference documents. The problems to be resolved have not changed. The Soviets hope to obtain multilateral recognition of the permanence of Euro;. 2's post- war borders, while the West hopes to gain ac- ceptance of the possibility of peaceful changes of existing frontiers. Despite some earlier hints that they might be flexible on this matter, the Soviets and their allies last week stubbornly resisted West- ern formulas that would permit peaceful changes. The Western delegates, especially the EC Nine, have made it clear that they will not compromise on this issue unless the Soviets make concessions on the proposals for freer movement between East and West. In discussions of freer movement, however, the Soviets and their allies continue to insist that the Western allies agree to a declaration of rrin- ciples that would serve as a preamble to any specific agreements on humanitarian cooperation. These principles of sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for national laws and customs would have the effect Solzhenitsyn A collective sigh of relief of emasculating the specific measures designed to bring about freer movement. Discussions of the military asp?cts of secu- rity are now focused on a British draft resolution on confidence-building measures-steps designed to limit military activity. The British propose that the participating states accept a non-binding agreement to give prior notification of major mili- tary maneuvers and movements in Europe and to invite other states to send observers to maneuvers. A Soviet delegate has suggested that Moscow might be prepared to compromise on some aspects of the proposal. This hint of flexibility has intrigued Western delegates-and could cause some problems for the US, which is opposed to discussing military movements at the Security Conference because this would make it harder to obtain a binding agreement on the subject at the force reduction talks. Another of Moscow's major goals is to institutionalize the Soviet voice in European Page 10 WEEKLY REVIEW Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 developments through the adoption of some type of post-conference political machinery. Acting at Moscow's behest, the Czechoslovaks have pro- posed creating a co, sultative committee that would meet regularly, ostensibly to implement the work of the conference. The EC Nine recently agreed not to accept this proposal, however, and will suggest instead that appropriate officials meet after several years to determine whether the agreements signed at the conference have been carried out. The Soviets and their allies will doubtless oppose this suggestion. The Soviets continue to insist that the final stage of the .,onference take place early this sum- mer and at the summit. Party boss Brezhnev made these points in recent letters to Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou. The Western representa- tives maintain that the timing and level of'the concluding stage deoends on the results of the ICELAND: WRANGLING OVER THE BASE Although differences still exir;, all three of Iceland's governing parties, includi the Commu- nist People's Alliance, are publicly backing away from the coalition's previously expressed aim of achieving total withdrawal of US forces from the NATO base at Keflavik during the government's current term. Youth groups in these parties, how- ever, are criticizing their leaders and resisting this shift in policy. The government's temporizing attitude to- ward the base issue probably is attributable to the success of a pro-base signature campaign, which reached the 46,000 mark earlier this week. Politicians apparently view the drive's early success as a good indication that a majority of the people support the base. Even Communist opposition is flagging. Party chairman Ragnar Arnalds was forced to stop a speech he was giving to a Communist-front youth organization when the audience jeered his rationalization of the party's new approach to the base issue. The dissidents, the self-styled Military Station's Opponents, then passed a resolution criticizing the People's Alliance for "favoring a continued NATO presenck.e in Iceland." The Com- munist leadership faces a dilemma in dealing with the base issue. As the architects of the agreement among the governing parties that calls for troop vv:thdrawal, the Communists are under extreme pressure to uphold that line but, by doing so, they risk toppling the coalitioii and being ex- cluded from the successor government. Young members of the Progressive Party, the main component of the coalition, attacked their leaders for violating the "will of the majority" by calling for only a reduction in base personnel rather than for complete troop withdrawal. Their charge probably resulted from recent remarks by party chairman and Prime Minister Olafur Johannesson, who claimed that the coalition platform agreement never specified that the defense force must leave during the present electoral period. The third coalition partner, Hannibal Valdimarsson's Liberal Left Organization, also is split over the base issue. The party's Reykjavik branch rejected Valdimarsson's recent comment that it would be in Iceland's interest to retain the base. The "generation gap" also extends to the opposition Social Democratic Party, which has generally supported the base. The party's youth organization takes the position that party leaders should be striving to rid Iceland of the defense force, not supporting its retention. After postponing the next round of base negotiations three times, Foreign Minister Agustsson recently told the US Embassy he has no specific date in mind but would give seven days' notice when the government was ready to reopen the talks. The government, as well as the political parties, currently is preoccupied with efforts to avert a general strike and is unlikely to address the base issue again until a wage settle- ment is achieved and the strike threat has passed. Page 11 WEEKLY 'REVIEW Feb 22, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 25X1;; Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 SOVIETS PLAY UP DIEGO GARCIA Soviet propaganda has been highlighting the danger to the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean stemming from the US-UK agreement to expand the naval base at Diego Garcia. Pravda, for example, charged on February 10 that the con- struction of another US base in the area was proof that the Pentagon plans to intimidate Afri- can liberation movements and countries striving for their political and economic independence. Moscow has also warmed up to the Ceylon- ese proposal that the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace and has pointed to the contrast between Soviet support for the idea and the al- leged bellicosity of the US move at Diego Garcia. Moreover, the Soviets are getting one of their front groups, the World Council of Peace, to play host for a meeting on Madagascar in June, in hopes of highlighting the littoral countries' oppo- sition to foreign-i.e., Western-military activity in the area. There will be more along these lines. The Soviets may, for example, revive Brezhnev's 1971 proposal to limit great power naval deployments far from their own shores. The Soviets never really followed up on Brezhnev's suggesti,n, but they have kept the idea alive in various journals and alluded to it in the central press last Novem- ber when the US deployed a carrier task force into the Indian Ocean after the Middle East war. At a minimum, the Soviets will exploit the oppo- sition of many littoral states to great power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean, hoping to increase the political costs for the US of the decision to make greater use of Diego Garcia. The USSR may increase its efforts to per- sua& India to grant the Soviet Navy privileged Feb 22, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 access to Indian ports, although it is unll,,oly that Now Delhi will change its present ',von-handed policy. The Soviets will probably also make new attempts to got naval reconnaissance facilities in the area. They are building an airfield for the Somalis near Mogadiscio, fair example, which could ultimately support Soviet naval reconnais- sance aircraft. Moscow is genuinely concerned that the US decision presages a larger US naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets are afraid that the US eventually intends to move at least some of the naval forces now off Vietnam to a permarent station in the Indian Ocean, where they \.~ould impinge more directly on Soviet interests. Ir all likelihood, Moscow will increase the size of its own naval forces in the area. It would have taken this step no matter what the US did since the Soviet force in the Indian Ocean is still not as large as that of the Western riavios, but the recent US announcement probably means that Moscow will have to act sooner than it had planned. Any permanent increase in the near future will require the USSR to draw down forces elsewhere. In sum, Moscow's military optio.,s are not attractive. Realization of this could cause the USSR to givt serious attention to the various Indian Ocean disarmament schemes rather than simply trying to exploit them for propaganda President Ceausescu's nine-day whirlwind tour of Libya, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq drama- tized the flexibility of Romanian foreign policy, but the tour was essentially a triumph of image over substance. Nevertheless, the result is impor- tant to Bucharest, which probably recognized from the outset that Ceausescu's talks with some of the Arab world's more immoderate leaders would not produce significant results. Ceausescu's firs( slop, in "f ripoli, brought the most hospitable reception of the lour. Anxious to improve his tarnished international image, Pre-,i- dent Qadhafi overlooked Ceausescu's synipalhi,?s toward Israel and warmly welcomed the Roma- nian leader as the first Last European hand of state to visit Libya. Six bilateraI cooperation agree- ments were signed, and the establishment of dip- r rrnatic ties was approved in principle. Rumors in Bucharest also suggest that Ceausescu may have engineered a substantial oil purchase. In the other Arab capitals, Ceausescu re- ceived more guarded treatment: Romania's diplo- matic ties with Israel were clearly the sticking point. In every in,tance, however, communirtue~ summarizing the talks managed to paper over contentious issues and to call for increased eco- nomic and political cooperation. The sensitive matter of a threatened Arab boycott of Roma- nian goods was studiously avoided in public, but it doubtless came up during private talks. Throughout the tour, Ceausesct, emphasized that Romania stood behind the "just cause" of the Arabs. Without showing any willingness to alter his country's attitude toward Israel, he im- plied a readiness to use his influence in let Aviv in support of Arab interests. Romania's capability to influence the Israelis is evidently quite limited. A Foreign Ministry official in Tel Aviv recently compar. d Ceausescu to Tito by rioting that each had caught the "Bal- kan megalomania bug." He added, however, that Israel feels it necessary to be politely attentive to Bucharest, because Romania is the only Commu- nist state to ma'ntain diplomati- ties with Israel. Yasir Arafat may have been similarly polite, but he apparently declined Ceausescu's offer to set up an office of the Palestinian Liberation Organiza- tion in Bucharest. On balance, the tour underscored Romania's determination to continue to seek a constructive, activist role in Middle East peace efforts. In that context, the trip may help salve the bruism, pride Romania suffered from the reiection last fall of its efforts to participate in the UN's peace- keeping force. Page 14 WEEKLY REVIEW Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 POLAND: HIERARCHICAL REPAIRS The changes in Poland's par :y and govern. mont on -abruary 15 aru part -` ;,.,rty ct:ief Gierek's continuing effort to improve administra? live efficiency and tighten control over key sectors of Polish life, In the most significant moves, Katimiorz Barcikowski replaced Join( Okuniewski as mirn- istor of agricultuin, and Jozof Tejchma took over from Stanislaw Wronski as minister of culture and art. Both now ministers are 46 years old and belong to the postwar generation of Polish of- ficialdom -well-educated and ambitious-that carne into its own under Gierok. Both men have served as party experts in their fields --ind appear well suited for posts that are destined to take on added importance. Gierok has recently been stressing that in. r,oased agricultural production is the key to oco- nomic success. In Barcikowski the party boss has 4 top-flight, experienced, and loyal administrator, i ;ierok is also well aware of Moscow's push for bloc unity on ideological matters- especially in light of Solihenitsyn's exile and has apparently given Tajchrna, a recognized liberal, the task of tightening up Poland's pragmatic and flexible cultural policy. Tolchma could be the man to introduce low-key restraints without causing and is alarm among Polish intellcIctualk. These changes were accompanied by shifts in the party designed to increase flexibility and ex? pertiso. Tajchrna and Barcikowski remained on the powerful Politburo, as full and candidate members, respectively. Because of his ministerial appointment, Barcikowski had to give up his post as party secretary. Three newly appointed socro- tarios, however, increased Gierek's pool of readily available talent, Jotef Pinkowski is qualified to carry some of the heavy burden in economic planning, while Andrzoj Worblan is a veteran theoretician adept at adjusting idcology to the needs of the moment and to Soviet desires. Also well grounded in ideology, Wincenty Krasko sup- plies an added dimension as an expert in Western Page 15 WEEKLY REVIEW Feb 22. 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 visits to military units, I hisayn has hecorne aware of same of the enlisted men's legitimate yriev once; and also that several officers have been guilty of nrgligence. In some btstances, he has already issuer) orders to rectify prohlemc and is tepurledl; planning to take additional ',fells to improve troop morale, dent Bedouin soldiers severely for ,iirintl their ifusayn reportedly intends simply to dis? charge the train participants in the mutiny as quickly and quietly as possible. fie may also rep riming sc?nie negligent officers. This wotil.i' have a salutary effect GO the array as .1 whale and would please some important disaffected tribal "eaters who fear that the King plans to punish the dissi? JORDAN: i4USAYN IN CHARGE King ilucayn consulted wilh parliamentary aril Tribal leade.s this week ,and visited army units throughout the country in under to demonstrate that he ;s in full control in the wake of Iii(. recent mutiny. Although t:)ete is still some yrumhling and uneasiness among the ranks, the army appears to have -aln.ed (town. The. King is still being urged to dismiss Prime Minister fUifai and army chief of staff fain Shakir. who became the focus of much of the discontent that surfaced dc;iwng the mutiny. 1-lusayn. how. ever, s unlikely to replace either man soon tot ,e?r of giving the impression that he is giving in to t:ie mutineers. OMAN-IRAN: MUTUAL SECURITY I allowing Several postponements, Sultan Qabus of Oman and his foreign minister are scheduled to; ? -A Tehran on March I to discuss, among other things. an agreement for defense of the eoliance to the Persian Gulf. The Shah wants to conclude a security pact with Oman to ensure that the Strait of Hormuz-- through which all on exporlerl from Iran mu>t pass remains in friendly hands. Since August, the two countries have been holding Intermittent secret talks in Geneva on questions of a median line, territorial waters, and the continental shell. Decisions on these -subjects could have signify-ant implicatio is for defenmt of the strait as well as for oil exploration. The King no lonyar seems to believe-if he over really did-that the army dissidence was the work of disloyal conspirators or foreign agents. As a result of the official inquiry and his own Qabus is likely to be receptive to Iranian. proposals. Last fall, the Shah authorized ) sub? stantial increase in Iranian military assista,,ca for Page 17 WEEKLY REVIEW Feb 22, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 rt OATAQ j ,MINI 1 uNITAD ,f1AM \'. AMI~'~"y~~~r r ~ - TM11ilArTE! YEMEN (Aden) ~MrtwN the Sultan's continuing fight against leftist guer- rillas in Ohofar Province. By the end of Decrm? ben, the promised 1.?00-man Iranian force had arrived in Oman to augment The 150.200 Iranians who have served there since January 1973. The dilemma Qabus will face in Tehran is how to be cooperative with the Shah without alienating the Arab states bordering the gulf. Some Arab states-arid not just radical ones-have already noted the large Iranian manpower corn- mitrtnent and are ;uspiciiii, of the Shah'; irtten- tions. I here have been , unions dernind by Oman that, in nxchatnge for rt-ilitary a si;lance, the 5111.. tan has agrencl to cede to Iran several ;mall islands, thereby ensuring Tehran'; c.nnI of rrf access to the Gulf, In t)hofar, rtteanwhile, fighting continuo'; between government force; and guerrilla hark of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf. In late Decertnher, :he newly arrived Iranian airborne brigade succeeded in opening the only road frond the interior of the province to the important coastal town of Sal- alah. Although still subject to occasional attack, military and supply vehicles can now move on the road for the first time since 1970. Because of Or"an's deltenclence on aircraft for moving troops and supplies to isolated posts in the mountain-, and for conducting strikes against Popular Ftont units, the government is moving to augment its helicopter fleet in 1974, In recent weeks only two of Oman's seven heli? copter s have been in operation; the 10-12 Iranian helicopters in the country are used primarily to support the 'ran ran aithotne brigade. In late January, live Bell 205 A. I helicopie.rs and spares valued at $3 6 million were Ordered from the US. These helicopters, along with seven A13.205 purchased from Italy in 1973, were originally scheduled for shipment in 1975. but will now be delivered later this year. Page 18 WEEKLY REVIEW Feb 22, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 liepresentaIive; ftorn almost all Muslim I, oilrltries, including many chiefs of state, will convene on I ebruary 22 in Lahore, Pakistan. A preliminary meeting of foreign ministers began on Iu';day. Largely a; a rr,sult of the efforts of King 1 aysal of Saudi Arabia, the chief promotyr of Islamic coliclarity, annual foreign ministers' meet, iog; have been held sioc.e 19 /0. 1 he only previous surninit w.)-. at IL;,bat in 1969. The Lahore conference was proposed by Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto shortly after the latest Arab-Israeli war. Because of the reluc'ance of some leaders to attend, it has been postponed several tunes. President Suharto of Indonesia. the Shah of Iran, and King Hassan of Morocco still have doubts about the usefulness of a rneetinq at this time and will not attend, although their coun. tries will b(' represented. The main points on the agend'r will be the status of Jerusalem, a settlement in the Middle feast, and several proposed joint projec is. such as a development bank to be financed by the oil? producing nations. King Faysal who is footing much of the bill for the meeting is particularly concerned about Jerusalem. He feels he has a ?.porial rmponcihiGly to con 111.11 the area of the Dome of the Rock. the third holiest shrine in Islarn, is returned to Arab control. Saudi Arabian Minister of State Saqqaf has flown directly from the US to Lahore, pro- sum,ibly to report to Faysal and other Arab leaders on his talks in Washington. Leaders of the four countries that met in Algiers last week- Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Algeria--may use the occasion for informal consultations on the results of the mission undertaken by Saqqaf and Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi. The delegates to the summit will probably make. an effort to avoid disagreement, at least in public, and the final communique of the meeting is likely to be little rnorca than a pro. or:~ra state. inset. In ,;,:vale, however, there are a number of issues that could prove divisive. Oil could hn nor, such troublesome issue, Although the continuation of the enlhargcs a;ainst the US and other countries will probably came up, the emphasis is more ;ikely to he on the damage (tone to Muslim c:ountrin; that do not produce oil by the sharp rise in thr price of crude. These countries will be seeking an arrangement to cushion the effects of their higher costs. President Qadhafi of Libya had been ex- pecled to lead the Arabs who oppose negotiations with Israel. His recent reconciliation with Sadat and his reported fence mending with F,lysal, how. ever, suggest that he has become worried about his isolation from the Arab mainstream, He may, as a result, adopt a less radical stance. Moreover, Sadat is probably right in expecting that : moderate posito)n on negotiations will receive the hacking of most non-Arab Muslims, Page 19 WEEKLY REVIEW Feb 22, 74 i Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 CUBA: LOOKING TO MEXICO CITY thr-n at ;ign; that ilavana is acutely in. Iere;terl in the rneeting of foreign minister; now takioq 1-larr0 in Mexic_c,, In light of time significant pr ogre;, made recently by flee US toward solving 1 cog ;landing prol-Inrms with both Peru and Pan. ,)Ina, the Cast o) regirr-e is apparent pt,' wandering if Washington may be willing to rnak" r tnt.essic-ns at the meeting in order to maintain the momen. turn of the present favorable trend In UJS - Latin Attwtit an r"lation', I eat till of rnissinq an c.;-;-orIunity to benefit from that rnornentum of even worse, of being bypassed by events, fill? Cubarr, have indicated that they may be ready to respond in a positive manner to any US initiative aimed at overcoming the impasse. There is no evidence, however, Vat i lav.;na has retreated on any of ill(! demands it s.ly, must be satisfied before formal relations can i-e tesIored. In fact, Havana has repeatedly emphasized that the US must make the first move and roust unilaterally terminate the so-called eco- nomic: block.,tie before any negotiations. During a monthly luncheon of the diplo- matic club to Mexico City earlier this month, a relatively obscure Cuban diplomat tpersistently queried a LIS Embassy official on the Mexico meeting. He repeatedly emphasized that Secretary Kissinger's remarks at the conference would be a key factor in determining the Cuban attitude toward the US. The Cuban diplomat was appa- rently will to Mexico specifically to cover the foreign ministers meeting, and, in view of the Castro regime's extreme sensitivity on the subject of rapprochement with the US, it is likely that he was speaking with Havana's authorization. accnsrnodatiorr," t.ut then acknowledged that this would plate the Cuban Government in the dilemtmnn of having to r,aercome its conteotinn that Cuba was illegally expeller) from the OAS. Although Ibis may lip a serious Cohan initia- live to bring about a thaw in relations with the US, several other motives could al,o be involved, 1he Cubans may feel that thy are being left in the backwash of event, and must give some evi- dent.e of a willingness to negotiat.c in order to avoid being ,ens. doted irrelevant in the ccxmtoxt of US . Latin American diplomacy, they may also hope to encourage speculation among other nations in the hemisphere that a major change in the Cuban-US relationship is irmrninent and thous precipitate a rush of diplomatic activity by coun- tries anxious to avoid the eobatrassrsent of being the last to restore formal ties with Havana. Or the Cubans may merely hope to raisa expectations so high that when they are not realized, the meeting will be considered a failure and the US can hu made the scapegoat. By adding fuel to the rumors of an im- pending change in the US position, Havana Intly be trying to encourage the foreign rinisters to urge Secretary Kissinger to effect just such a chcnge. In Cuba's eyes, a US refusal :-)uld antag- onize many Latin Americans and would put the US on the dofensivu. An acceptance, on the other hand, could (u- portrayed by Havana as a victory over "imperialism." Despite receiving no encouragement to con- tinue the conversation, the Cuban probed for a reaction to US industrialist Cyrus L,itun's remarks on the need for a change in US policy. He said he thought the comments of the Cuban ambassador to Mexico at a press conference last me nth -and a subsequent clarification by Cuba's foreign minister-were meant to signal the US that the Castro government is interested in seeking some kind of accommodation. He surmised that even- tual reintegration into the Organization of Ameri- can States "might perhaps be the ideal path to Page 20 WEEKLY REVIEW Feb 22, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 BOLIVIA: MORE CABINET CHANGES Last week, President Banzr, reorganized his administration in an attempt to shore up his position and improve government efficiency. Although Banzer has requently reshuffled his cabinet, past shifts have involved individual posts rather than structural change. This time, four cabinet posts have been combined into two, and have been filled by technocrats who can ac' as buffers betweer. President and critics. Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 ( Inn of Ili , II nv+ Ili ,,f 11) 1111-.Ir r , ,Iorttinalr,r trl the presider,, y, ha', Irr,tn fr'Ind by ltol)'rto t;alrriln;, tine (if liar,znr'; aI' i~-nt I In aI>(ra -(Inlly will he it) r I,arga ',f 'lay-toMday operation:, thus finning (tamer t'r r onr''ntraln on major polit- ical and military deveIol)rn?, t;. II)n President also expanded flit, author ity III Minister of Agrir ultutn Nato;( h Mosel by g,vin~t him ( onbol over canlpn. sift() affairs. Ihis is .1 pat ticularly sensitive post in light of peasant pretest;, which ten nutty posed this most serious threat to Itanzer's regime so far. ECUADOR: MILITARY ANNIVERSARY The Rodriguez administration has quietly celebrated its secant anniversary, bolylnq early pessimistic forecasts by local observers of its lon- gevity. Indeed, the military government has become sufficiently Institutionalized to permit a surprising degree of generalized criticism, al- though criticism of individual members of the administration remains tacitly proscribed. In an anniversary Speech last weekend, the President asserted the irreversibility of the military revolu- tion and scorned any thought of a return to democratic government. The military coup of February 1972 coin- cided with th' beginning of the country's petro? leun) ,production, which has since brought income arxt a certain amount of international leverage to the government. Substantial economic agreements nave been concluded or are in the offing with the Soviet Union, Poland. Romania, North Korea, Spain, Japan, and the EC. In addition, Ecuador has managed to secure a preferential position in the Andean Pact. The country's stance in the Organization of American States and at the foreign ministers' r',nnlinq in Mexico this week has been generally Meetly to the US. One longstanding problem in US relations is (of) the verge of being settled with I_clrador's agreement to pay its ottIslanding debt for 1)S military sales. At the same Iirtiv, I oreign Minister Lucia Parettes hill shown settle interest in a n golialpd settlement of Ill.! pererwlial tuna fish rug dispute, a11hough hit has implied that what (.cuadm view, as restrictive US legislation- such as the I isherrnen's Prsotective Act roust first hn repealed. Meanwhile. US tuna loaf: fishing inside Lcuador's claimed 200-mile territorial water; remain liable to seizure and fines. The ahsence of ;ucii incidents this season can be credited largely to the poor tuna run rather than to any major change of policy. the unfolding of the third year of military rule. vi ill see a continuation of n,ltionalisrn, par? Iic:ula,ly in iegard to oil. The governmer'. is likely to rnaintail) its indapvnderx.e within OPEC, retaining the option to disregard any future policy of the group tha; rtti;ht be inconsistent with Ecuador's desire to sell as much oil as pus. Able at the highest price. As oil replaces tun,,?boat seizures as a source of nationalistic pride, the government's future interest in seizing boats is likely to decline. Domestically, there is more uncertainty. Las' week, the almost routine character of stu- dent dernonstiations suddenly altered with the fatal shootiny of a respected professor. Also last week, the government issued an order for the arrest of the Socialist Party Ic ider for "injurious expressions" favoring renewe,, political activity. These two acts are likely to spark additional protests. A more positive government re- sponse-this one dealing with labor-was a recent decree law closing a loophole in the Labor Code by which m,,ri gement had been able to reopen settled disputes arbitp irily. The question for Rodriguez' third year in office 's whether he will be able to translate to the domestic scene some of the forward movement his government is eniovinn in the area of foreign li F 71 Page 21 WEEKLY REVIEW Feb 22, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 ~/rlGc / (I t '/~ Secret OSB FILE COPY RETI1"11 TO 111-1101 Weekly review Special Report ti c,,&,wla: Prarpccu Under Per z Secret N! 426 February 22, 1974 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 VENEZUELA Prospects Under Perez 1 uiiu-neulecIea farm copulation, hoping to make agriculture an ''engine of de- velopment." Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 The landslide proportions of Carlos Andres Perez' victory in the presidential election and the unprecedented majority his Democratic Action Party won in Congress give his government the potential to be the strongest Venezuela has had since that of Romulo be;1ncourt (1958-63). In contrast to President Caldera, who was short on both public support and congressional backing throughout his term, Perez will begin with a secure position of leadership and a generally free hand as president. His chances to sustain this strength appear good. Despite his background as a controversial po- litical figure over the years, the vigor and de- cisiveness he displayed in his bid for the presidency clearly appealed to the electorate. During the pre- inaugural period, he has worked to nurture the new spirit of dynamism by conducting an intense round of press conferences, TV appearances, newspaper interviews, aid consultations with advisers and experts. He means to give substance to his cam- paign motto, "Democracy with Energy," through- out the five-year term that begins on March 12. He in+ ds to focus on domestic matters, where his philosophy is mildly leftist and reformist. Venezuela's oil boom and high per capita income have created a picture of pros- perity that is still unavailable to large segments of the population. The con- spicuous consumption of the privileged has created severe social tensions, which the new government is intent on easing. Perez intends to build on the industrial development programs launched by his predecessors and to as- sist Vene711e1A'e Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 r ,'' SECRET Special Report Verur,uela's oil boons nul Itiglt per capita income hate created a picture of prosperity that is still unarailable to larqe segments of the population. SECRET February 22, 1974 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 SECRET Oil: A Tool and a Symbol Perez feels that the domestic programs he envisions can be realized only by better manage- ment of the country's oil resources. He believes that Venezuela's oil treasure represents a power- ful tool from which he can extract both the funds and concessions needed to implement his pro- grams. His determination to make oil work more effectively for Venezuela's needs is reinforced not only by the heavy world demand fo petroleum, but also by the political necessity to respond to the nationalist mood in Venezuela. For the Venezuelan public, the foreign- operated oil industry has the same symbolism as did copper in Chile. Besides their deep resentment of the very visible role of foreigners in economic and cultural affairs, Venezuelans at all levels of society feel the need to express their new-found sense of national identity, and are increasingly protective of their national assets. The rising spirit of nationalism has also fed Venezuela's desire for a leadership role in the hemisphere, and oil serves that ambition as well. Perez has already put his prestige on the line by annou icing that he will use his oil policy to break dowr ' e "totalitarian" trade policies the indus- trialized nations adopt in dealings with the devel- oping countries. Perez told visiting economic min- isters from oil-short Central America that his ad- ministration plans to use its increased oil revenues to help the less-developed countries. He ruled out any special price on oil for these countries, but indicated that he.. would consider providing long- term, low-interest financing for petroleum sales at market prices. He also guaranteed that Vene- zuelan oil would be available to the Central American states. In protecting the country's independence, particularly in oil matters, Perez must be even bolder than his predecessor, who was able to provide for government exploitation of gas re- serves and to decree a host of minor controls over foreign oil interests-despite their vigorous pro- tests. In fact, because of accusations that he and other Democratic Action administrations have been friendly toward US business interests, Perez may lean over backwards to avoid seeming to favor US corporations operating in the country. Caldera will not give Perez an easy starting point. In his few weeks left as president, Caldera has already expropriated two almost-defunct por- tions of Creole oil concessions and plans other nationalist measures, such as converting foreign- owned milk and electric power concerns into mixed enterprises with Venezuelan Government participation. Party leaders are preparing a draft bill calling for immediate nationalization of the oil industry when the new congress convenes on March 2. Complete nationalization at this time is a highly unlikely possibility, yet an idea worth plenty of political capital. In an action designed in part to counter the opposition's political gam- bit, Perez told a number of journalists recently that present foreign oil holdings will revert to the state within two years after his government takes office. In the new congress, Caldera's Social Chris- tians, as the major op;-)osition party, will beat the drums of nationalism whenever the new govern- ment exhibits apparent weakness in its dealing with the oil companies or the US. The party's courses of action are somewhat circumscribed by the fact that it is still in considerable disarray following the elections. A party congress, report- edly scheduled for June, has been put off until later in the summer, presumably to give Caldera time to orchestrate the conclave. This may avoid a fractious session marked with recriminations over the recent election and divisive debate over the tactics and policies that the party should espouse during Perez' administration. Venezuela's Market: The US It is with this set of convictions and pres- sures that Perez will launch his effort to secure a better deal from the US, Venezuela's traditional and still-favored market. But his approach and 3- February 22, 1974 SECRET Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 Venezuela caraw^ Nordn blmaa 011 All. EI Pallto \Punrla Culplto , Special Report Mene Grande NalaRn El Encoglradaa La Sal U ?na ? LeEl Oilfield Selected crude oil pipeline Refinery Petrochemical complex SECRET SECRET February 22, 1974 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 SECRET style will be those of a pragmatic businessman, not those of a demagogue or ideologue. Perez is unencumbered with the ideological baggage of his Social Christian predecessor, and lie senses no practical or political advantage in joining the ranks of Yankeo-baito,s. He has gone along with Caldora''s decision to take a percentage of oil royalties in kind, but has passed up opportunities to threaten a forced lowering of production during the oil crisis. In essence, Perez has no basic disposition to be an adversary in relations with the US, with which Venezuela-and his party par- ticularly-has enjoyed cordial ties for a long time. Yet Perez has expressed dissatisfaction over what he sees as disequilibrium in US-Venezuelan relations. Venezuela, he believes, should receive more from the US in exchange for being a de- pendable supplier of oil-more, that is, than high prices and an assured o iarket. Specifically, Perez hopes to achieve: ? the removal of trade barriers to non- traditional exports that he hopes to develop, such as metal products, chemicals, and petro- chemicals; ? assured adequate supplies of industrial raw materials and agricultural products (cot- ton, black beans, wheat, soybeans, pulp and newsprint, synthetic fibers, stainless steel, fer- rous scrap, and equipment such as farm machinery-all of which are in short supply world-wide) ; ? technical and managerial assistance for development projects at reasonable prices. Perez will probably be most interested in negotiating the general terms of an over-all eco- nomic agreement that includes oil, trade, tariffs, and other pertinent fields. He will be hesitant to .iegotiate a gc:"ernment-to-government agreement based strictly %n oil, having already expressed his concern about the pitfalls of such an agreement. Special Report He will want to keep fairly open the range of options he has in such matters as the nationaliza- tion of the oil industry, a goal Venezuelans in general want to achieve during the new presiden- tial term rather than in 1983, as now officially scheduled to begin. As a first step, Perez report- edly plans to set up an autonomous government organization that will he responsible for planning and managing the early reversion to Venezuela of foreign-owned oil companies. The organization would be ;. cabinet-level office separate from the Ministry of Minos and Hydrocarbons, which would concern itself only with the day-to-day short range management of petroleum matters other than reversion. Perez is likely to be a tough but not intract- able bargainer. His hand is strong because he has both alternative markets for oil and other sources of investment as well as a huge budgetary leeway for absorbing the initial losses that would prob- ably follow any reorientation of Venezuela's mar- kets and trade relationships. if, despite his prefer- once for good relations, he eventually arrived at an adversary relationship with the US, he could, with Venezuela's resources, break past ties with the US without risking an economic crisis. Perez is confident, however, that the US urterest in continuing good relations with an important neighbor and in maintaining access to Venezuelan oil will lead to eventual accommodaticn to Vene- zuela's needs. Venezuela has had oil development and mar- ket offers from Japan, Romania, Western Europe, and Brazil, but the US remains Venezuela's most attractive economic partner. This partnership is natural from a geographical standpoint and be- cause of the history of a long political friendship during which abundant and varied lines of contact have developed. Because the great bulk of tech- nical equipment throughout Venezuela's modern sector is made in the US, it will be much easier and less expensive for Venezuela to maintain its ties with the US than to break them. The fre? quent consonance of views in international a.fairs reinforces the comfortable relationship. SECRET February 22, 1974 Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000030004-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 SECRET 25X1 25X1 Current oil production, around 3.2 mil- lion barrels a day, is about 3 percent above 1972 levels but is very near c.apacily. 14". Coolly lightened conservalinn restritlion% could reduce 1914 production about 200.000 b/d, Production potential has declined be- cause of limiter) ekploration, proved reserves have declined and ate now equal to about 1 1 yriars' production at current rates. The con. cession agreements call for reversion of con- cessions to the state beginning by 1983 with- out compensation. The net book value of US investment in the Venezuelan petroleum sec? tot declined from almost $2 billion in 1960 to about $1.5 billion in 1972, Drilling activity was down from 632 wells in 1970 to 490 in 1972, and of these only 64 were exploratory, Petroleum generates about one fifth of GNP, two thirds of government revenues, and 90 percent of export earnings. Revenues from oil have risen from $1.8 billion in 1972 to an estimated $2.8 billion in 1973. for the cur- rent year, revenues could reach $8.11 billion. In 1973, the government's budget amounted to only $3.4 billion. and to acquire complex new technology. Development of the Orinoco Tar Belt, which contains an estimated 700 billion bar- rels of heavy oil (of which about 10 percent is recoverable under current technology) will re- quire estimated outlays of $4-6 billion to de- velop production of one million barrels daily Special Report .6- February 22, 1974 SECRET Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 we c Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0 SECRET US nil conlpanip; are gpnp-ally opbrnistir. about flip new p!la;e in relation; that they believe is at hand. None realistically expert; a return to the "good old days" of the eatly 19E%(.s when Vp te;upla was content to play a secondary role in reaping flip twnefit; from the exploitation of its own basic natural -esourcgs Oil company official; are convirlcprl that foreign firth; have a definite role to play in the future of Venezuelan oil lint riot to the Sarno extent as now, Venezuela, they feel, rasp; not have the .:! ility to handle the enhrp oil httlu;lry, including the development of the Orinoco Tat Tat, by itself and will need foreign know-how. All company official-, accept flip irirvitabilily of change in government-industry relation s, are alive to the opportunities they helieve can lie ahead, and have been seeking useful discussions with prospective officials of the incoming govern. ment. Different positions, scale of operations and corporate philosophies have giver, rise to clrfferinn tactical approaches. Although there are some (dif? ferences of opinion as to the exact norm the new cornpany?governrnent relations will assume, most US companies believe the Perez administration might promote a series of regional consortia, pus. sibly with already established companies given 1 lead role, that would assimilate the existing patch. work of roncessions. There is general belief the the next atlnunistrafion will probably move tu? ward some Iranian type arrangement whereby Venezuela will assume full ownership of produc? trig areas with private companies providing set- Vices in exchange for assured punch ise rights. Although Venezuelan national- ism is worrisome, and tax and price conditions can change overnight, several companies are pre- pared to invest in a joint venture with the govern- ment to exploit oil reserves in eastern Venezuela. flip US Lmba;;y regards as a particutarlh enr_ cluraging asfwct the widespread tendern.y among the oil I otlipaoies to emphasize flexibility in dealing with the emerging pptrolpurn ;iteiation Therp is little of the pp;;ioli;oI and hat-, 14, to, flip! wall philosophy that was prevalent only last year. Whether the present optilthisrn is merely a lingering) afterglow front the eleclion results, or a realistic asap;;merit of their position vl;.a.vi; flip new gnvprnment, is yet to be determined, fhp first few months of the new atlrnin;tration will set the tone. If the Venezuelans perceive a genuine willingne;; on flip part of both the oil companies and the US to establish a dialogue will, them on nil polit y, then an important first step will have been taken to settle an issue that has come to cloud relations with the US. The Generally auspicious outlook for US. Venezuelan relations would probably change only it Perez carne to believe that the US was unwilling to crrl;rder and try to meet Venezuela's minimum needs. Meeting Venezuelan demands will riot he easy for a variety of reasons, including legislative or treaty inhibitions on g1 sating certain privileges and the scarcity of some i ,f the go`uls Venezuela wants. Perez will probabl;, argue, as Venezuelans have in the past, that "special relahunchil-s" like those they believe the US has with Mexico and Canada can be worked out. Because of the highly charged environment of the oil crisis and Venezuelan antipathy toward the oil companies, frictions in bilateral relations are inevitable, These probably will not pose a serious obstacle to a working arrangement that assures delivery of oil to the US, however, so Iona as Perez and his negotiators believe tha US is responsive to what thev see I% economic and political necessities. Special Report SECRET February 22, 1974 Approved For Release 2009/04/21: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000030004-0