Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 1, 2009
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 8, 1974
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1.pdf1.84 MB
Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 C//& OL/ C141R 686 FILE COPY RETURN TO 111- 11 01 Top Secret Weekly Review State Dept. review completed. Top Secret 8 March 1974 Copy N9 426 DIA review completed. Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week Through noon on Thursday. I t frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents. 1 Israel: Syrian Intentions; New Governmer 2 USSR: Gromyko's Middle East Travels 3 Ethiopia: The Emperor's New Politics CONTENTS (March 8, 1974) EAST ASIA PACIFIC 6 Vietnam: A Spate of Spats; Delta 7 Indonesia: Stockholders Report 9 Cambodia: The Lull Goes On 10 Korea: Problems Persist MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 12 I ran-Iraq: Border Situation 13 Iran: Expanding Naval Forces 14 North Yemen: A New Cabinet 15 India: Election Returns 16 Tunisia: Propping Up Bourguiba 19 CSCE: Air of Optimism 19 EC: Attitude on Energy Coordination 20 Norway's Blue-Eyed Arabs 22 USSR-France: Patching Things Up 22 French Cabinet Streamlined 23 Italy: Putting It Back Together 24 Portugal: Clash Over African Policy WESTERN HEMISPHERE 25 Belgium: A House Divided 27 Argentina: Cordoba Situation 28 Guatemala: A Stolen Election Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 ISRAEL Concern Over Syrian Intentions Israeli reconnaissance flights over the Golan Heights have had heavy fighter protection for the past few days. On March 7, the Israelis refused to permit a UN mail truck to pass through their lines, suggesting that they may be making prep- arations of their own. The Israeli press reported on March 6 that Israeli units in the Golan Heights are on alert. National Religious Party's decision to participate in the coalition, the new government emerged with a majority in the Knesset. Mrs. Meir told President Katzir on March 6, just hours before her extended mandate was due to expire, that she had formed a government. The key development that opened the way was the agreement, announced the night before, of Dayan and his Rafi faction colleague, Transport and Communications Minister Peres, to serve in the new cabinet. They attributed their change of heart to the new military situation on the Syrian front, which they said necessitated the formation of a cabinet as soon as possible. Similarly citing the "serious situation" on the Syrian front, the National Religious Party reconsider, - its stand and voted to join the gov- ernment. Some additional negotiations with the Prime Minister are apparently planned, however. Party leaders had been inclined all along to enter the coalition on the basis of the compromise worked out earlier on the disputed religious issue. Until now, however, they had hesitated to over- ride the objections of the party's orthodox youth wing and the advice of Israel's High Rabbinical Council. Earlier in the week, Mrs. Meir angrily walked out of an emotion-charged Alignment caucus Prime Minister Meir finally succeeded in forming a new government this week, more than two months after general elections that reduced the parliamentary strength of her Labor Align- ment. With Defense Minister Dayan's last-minute decision to join the new cabinet and with the Israel and Egypt on March 4 successfully concluded their disengagement agreement, 24 hours ahead of schedule. Israeli forces have pulled back to a line 15-20 kilometers from the Suez Canal, where they retain control of strategic Mitla and Gidi passes. Egypt now has control of the canal for the first time in almost seven years. A UN buffer force pres- ently numbering 2,000 men is stationed in a narrow strip separating the two sides on the Page 1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 called to discuss her cabinet nominees. Upset over the continued wrangling displayed at the meeting, Mrs. Meir announced she was giving up her efforts to form a government. Only repeated personal appeals by other Alignment leaders persuaded her to reverse her decision. ernment will call for new elections before signin No significant change in Israel's peace nego- tiating position is likely to result from the forma- tion of the new cabinet. Barring new fighting, Mrs. Meir remains prepared to enter the projected disengagement negotiations with Syria, but she apparently believes that her mandate to conclude far-reaching agreements is limited. She has already 25X1 publicly promised, for instance, that on issues such as a Jordan West Bank settlement, the gov- USSR: Gromyko's Middle East Travels Foreign Minister Gromyko arrived in Syria and Egypt hard on the heels of Secretary Kis- singer. A major purpose of the Russian's travels was to give the appearance that, in contrast to Kissinger's previous round of personal Middle East diplomacy in January, this time Moscow was in the thick of things. In both Damascus and Cairo, Gromyko stressed that the Soviets expect to be closely involved in future Middle East peace negotiations and urged that the talks be returned to Geneva, where the Soviets could play a major role. Gromyko's admonishments did not appear to move Cairo. As they did after Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit to Moscow in January, the Egyp- tians made a bow in the joint communique to the "importance and necessity" of Soviet participa- tion in all stages of the Middle East peace talks, but they did not appear to make any new com- mitments. Gromyko sought to stir Egyptian suspicions of US intentions, warning that the Arabs should be wary of those who want to substitute "partial solutions" for a real settlement and who want to drive a wedge between the Arabs and their "allies." These sentiments were not echoed in the communique, indicating that Cairo does not want to set back its budding relationship with the US or upset prospects for peace. Gromyko sought to check the deterioration in Moscow's relations with Cairo, but apparently without success. He emphasized that a "drifting apart must not be permitted" but implied that the Egyptians should take the initiative to im- prove relations. The communique made no mention of bilateral economic or military matters, suggesting that these questions remain unresolved. The Soviets did pledge to assist with opening the Suez Canal, but only "in principle." Page 2 Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 In Cairo, Gromyko also met with Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. This is the first meeting be- tween a top Soviet leader and a fedayeen to be acknowledged by the Soviets. It represents a small step toward formal recognition of Arafat as representative of the Palestinians. Information is scant on Gromyko's discus- sions in Syria, but they were sufficiently difficult as to require his return to Damascus for another round of talks after his Cairo visit. Press reports from Damascus state that Gromyko has been urging the Syrians to go to Geneva rather than Washington to conduct indirect disengagement negotiations with Israel. Such a demarche would be consistent with Soviet intentions to break the US monopoly of the peace talks, and play a more Ethiopia THE EMPEROR'S NEW POLITICS Ethiopian politics are undergoing a major transformation as the regime attempts to cope with continuing civilian and military unrest. Emperor Haile Selassie on March 6 announced plans to introduce far reaching constitutional changes, including curbs on his own authority. With the exception of a few scattered units, rebellious troops have returned to their barracks after forcing he appointment of a new govern- ment of younger and more progressive members of the Ethiopian hierarchy. The country remains restless as rifferent groups, emboldened by the military's success in gaining pay raises, press for satisfaction of their special demands. Should this Page 3 situation continue, the new administration's ability to govern will be seriously challenged. On March 7, 85,000 members of Ethiopia's normally docile labor confederation began a gen- eral strike in support of a 16-point list of de- mands including a sizable wage increase and greater protection for labor's right to strike and organize. Labor leaders do not appear to be trying to bring down the government and reportedly have told strikers to stay off the streets. Militant students, however, are taking advantage of the strike to demonstrate against the government, and their protests could easily lead to violence. Striking teachers, meanwhile, continue to press demands for salary increases and new educational policies. Haile Selassie, in a nationwide address on March 6, said he had directed Prime Minister Endalkatchcw to call a constitutional conference to draw up new arrangements that will make the prime minister responsible to Parliament, guar- antee civil rights, streamline court procedures, and clarify relations among the branches of gov- ernment. The promised constitutional changes would curtail the virtually unlimited authority of the Emperor and place Ethiopia on the way to becoming a constitutional monarchy. The Emperor and his closest associates have rec- ognized that political change is necessary, but hope to control its pace and general direction. The writing of a new constitution will take time, and the new arrangements may be resisted by powerful nobles who fear a threat to their priv- ileged position. Dissident groups will become impatient if the process becomes protracted, and iio3y will be sensitive to any signs that the regime is not committed to establishing a more demo- cratic form of government. A majority of military dissidents still seems willing to give the new government a chance. Endalkatchew secured their support by appoint- ing a cabinet of experienced, well educated min- isters who are sympathetic toward the reforms sought by the military. The new ministers have held a variety of government and diplomatic Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 posts. With few exceptions, they are not closely identified with the discredited former govern- ment. Two of the most prominent representatives of the progressive movement among the Ethio- pian aristocracy received important posts at the insistence of the military. Mikael Imru, Ethiopia's representative to the European UN office, was named minister of commerce and industry. Zawde Gebre Selassie, Ethiopia's UN ambassador, was appointed interior minister. Both have fre- quently advocated reforms similar to those I The Emperor Addressing the troops demanded by the dissident troops, and as a result have been at odds with Haile Selassie. Dissident military leaders reportedly also in- sisted on the appointment of Lieutenant General Assefa, the former armed forces chief of staff, to the post of minister of civil aviation and tourism. The military wanted Assefa, a capable and respected officer, to be in a position to monitor cabinet activities. He and Lieutenant General Abiye, the new defense minister, are the only military men in the cabinet. In an effort to main- tain some continuity, Endalkatchew reappointed Minassie Haile as foreign minister. The constitutional changes and the composi- tion of the cabinet represent a serious effort by the regime to begin dealing with the underlying causes of the disorders. Many civilians, however, are skeptical of the regime's intent to follow through on its promises. Some junijr officers are still dissatisfied with Endalkatchew's appoint- ment. Some troops have also called for freedom of the press, the right to form political parties, and better labor laws. A list of demands presented to Haile Selassie by military leaders last week re- flects the common interests of dissident groups. The demands include: complete reorganization of the educational system; realistic land reform; ef- fective price controls; a cost of living allowance; equitable salary scales for all government, mili- tary, and industrial workers; and removal and prosecution of all corrupt officials. The new government must cope with several immediate problems. Because of limited financial resources, it is unable to meet economic demands by workers and teachers, a constraint that was instrumental in the regime's decision that it must instead make political concessions. The pay in- creases granted dissident troops to end their revolt have already seriously strained the budget and at the same time encouraged civilians to assert claims for an improvement in their eco- nomic condition. 25X1 Page Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85TO0875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 North Vietnam's relations with China and the Soviet Union continue to be marred periodi- cally by irritating incidents that reinforce Hanoi's skepticism over the long-term reliability of its Communist allies. Perhaps the most serious problem arose when China drove the South Vietnamese out of the Paracel Islands. North Vietnam has never clearly claimed the Paracels as Vietnamese terri- tory, but Peking's action placed Hanoi in an em- barrassing position: it could not openly condemn an ally, but neither could it acquiesce in the seizure of what many Vietnamese think of as their territory. In the end, the North Vietnamese merely urged goodwill on all sides and called for negotiated settlements of all such territorial disputes. There have been other signs of friction with Peking. China failed to send delegations to North Vietnam's recent ? trade union and women's con- gresses, though virtually every other Communist state, including the Soviet Union and Albania, Nor has the North appeared to fare any better recently with Moscow. Soviet representa- tives, for example, have tried to discourage the convening of an anti-US Vietnam conference in Stockholm, which Hanoi would like to exploit for propaganda purposes. Hanoi is unhappy both with Peking and Mos- cow because of their positions on the conflict in South Vietnam. On the first anniversary of the International Conference on Vietnam on March 2, North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry sent a note to the conference members calling upon each by name-including the Soviet Union and China-to condemn US and South Vietnamese Government actions in South Vietnam. On the same day Hanoi's authoritative newspaper Nhan Dan edi- torially demanded that "a nL,mber of countries that are signatories to the act that have not yet correctly implemented their obligations change their attitude. ..to prevent the US-Thieu clique from sabotaging the Paris agreement." f nth the Foreign Ministry note and the more pointed editorial seemed aimed at Hanoi's principal Communist allies, the Soviet Union and China. Both countries have muted their support of Hanoi's propaganda campaign against the US in favor of their own broader interest in detente. Hanoi's Foreign Minister Trinh has aiso recently voiced North Vietnam's dissatisfaction with the lukewarm support from Moscow and Peking. Such incidents, irritating as they are, do not portend any fundamental near-term change in the relationship Hanoi has with each of its principal sponsors. Both the Chinese and Soviets appear willing to continue to provide large quantities of economic aid, though probably less than Hanoi wants. Both still provide some diplomatic sup- port. But these incidents do keep the North Viet- There has been a marked step-up in Commu- nist-initiated incidents in the delta provinces south of Saigon, partly aimed at countering gov- ernment efforts to establish a new district in an area long under Viet Cong influence. The pro- posed new district infringes on a Communist base area in the tri-border area of Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuong, and Kien Phong provinces. Fighting there has been intense for the past two weeks. Commu- nist losses appear to have been heavy, and a need for reinforcements has caused the North Viet- namese 5th Division north of Saigon once again to move some elements back into the northern delta. In recent weeks, Communist support units have been crossing into the western delta from Cambodia and in some cases traveling farther south to the U Minh Forest. A number of skir- mishes with government troops have occurred near known Communist infiltration routes in the 25X1 25X1 Page 6 Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 INDONESIA: STOCKHOLDERS REPORT President Suharto will have an opportunity at a conference of the top 250 military officers this week to determine how the military, and particularly the army, rate his stewardship. The meeting is especially important because of recent displays of rivalry among Suharto's military sub- ordinates and increasing signs of social discontent. The officers, who gather periodically, will also discuss the role of the military in the second Five-Year Plan beginning in April. Suharto seeks and needs assurance of firm military support before he takes additional stops to deal with student activists or to stop rivalry among military leaders. He will also be trying to patch up military unity to prevent the disagree- ments that have recently appeared within the Jakarta ruling group from extending further into the ranks. Growing speculation among the public about military disunity is ominous for Suharto because it may lead to doubts about the long- term stability of his government and encourage dissenters. Officers from the three Java divisions fill most important government positions, and their intradivisional rivalry has traditionally provided the dynamics of army politics. Since assuming power, President Suharto has sponsored several military reorganizations aimed at dissolving these Patrolling a delta river delta, and several government outposts have been attacked. Such incidents probably represent an effort to screen the moves of the infiltrating rear service units. The flare-up in the delta has coincided with a lull in activity in the central highlands. In Pleiku and Kontum provinces, where heavy fighting con- tinued from January through mid-February, both Page Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 The Khmer Communists may not be able to mount another major offensive against Phnom Penh's defenses in the near future. The insurgents evidently are having difficulty replacing personnel they lost in the first two months of the present dry season. Although more reinforcements ap parently are being earmarked for the sector north- west of Phnom Penh, their numbers may not be adequate to offset steady casualties, sickness, and desertions. Communist losses south of the city have not been so extensive, but many units in that area saw heavy combat elsewhere last fall. The need to stockpile new munitions near the front lines and to ovrrcome difficulties in tactical coordination may also be affecting offen- sive plans. In addition, the Communists may soon have to divert some of the forces from the Phnom Penh region to other areas where they have been losing territory and population to aggressive forays by local government units. The Cambodian Army has sustained clearing operations north and south of the capital against spotty resistance. Government forces near the center of Phnom Penh's southern defense line received a brief barrage of insurgent 105-mm. howitzer fire on March 4, but most of the shells fell short on Communist-controlled territory. On March 6, the Communists interdicted a section of Route 1 some 15 miles southeast of the capital. Twenty miles west of Phnom Penh, a multibat- A Cambodian grenade launcher One in the breach, one in reserve talion government force continued its effort to rt open a stretch of Route 4. The sharpest fighting of the week occurred around the isolated southwestern provincial capi- tal of Kampot, where the insurgents launched their most serious thrust against that city to date. Before their advance was halted on March 3 by government air strikes and fire from Cambodian Navy patrol boats, the Communists moved to within two miles of Kampot and its airport. The military high command in Phnom Penh reacted quickly to this new threat by airlifting a substantial number of reinforcements to Kampot from the capital and from the navy base at Ream. By midweek, the situation at Kampot appeared to be stabilizing as government troops becan trying to extend the city's defensive perimeters. Page 9 SPeu l'rrk. ?%l end ?i V6,1 0, long .... r ~ ,~ Vihear Suor hnorn ~Knm~ong Penh-,~ I (ry Roa ? ~ cut (201 Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Attacks on South Korean fishing boats by Pyongyang last month have helped intensify polemics between the two Koreas, illustrating their persistent antagonism and the formidable obstacles to improving relations despite more than two years of bilateral negotiations. South Korea has gained the most politically from the fishing incident so far. posture in the North-South talks could also hurt its standing in the UN as it begins the annual campaign for support against Northern demands. In recent years, the South has sought such sup- port on the basis of its commitment to unifi- cation through negotiations between North and South. The loss of the boats-one sunk and one captured-has given Seoul a striking example for its nationwide campaign about the increased North Korean threat. The Pak government has also been quick to make the incident the central issue in recent talks with North Korean repre- sentatives at Panmunjom, where-by employing tough and uncompromising language-it was able publicly to demonstrate firmness with Pyong- yang. This was pay :icularly evident at the February 27 meeting of vice co-chairmen of the South- North Coordinating Committee. Seoul's spokes- man laid down a five-point demand for satisfac- tion regarding the incident. He warned that Pyongyang's failure to comply would signal that the North does not intend to continue the talks in this forum. The South Korean also used this oc- casion to reveal publicly that North Korean leader Kim II-sung had admitted privately to certain top South Korean officials in 1972 that Pyongyang had indeed dispatched the commando team that tried to kill President Pak Chong-hui in January 1968. Seoul's actions appear to have had a favor- able impact on the domestic situation from the government's viewpoint, contributing to a re- duction of overt political opposition and, thus, to a better chance of avoiding serious unrest this spring. Nonetheless, the South's hard anti- Pyongyang line is not without pitfalls. By de- liberately raising tension:, vis-a-vis the North, Seoul runs a risk of scaring off foreign investment at a time when South Korea is pressing its search for new western capital. Seoul's toughened Pyongyang Responds Pyongyang's response to the South's tactics has been guarded, suggesting an awareness that the naval action was a political mistake. It has predictably sought to divert attention from its own involvement and to place the blame on Seoul by alleging that the South Korean fishing boats were actually on a spying mission. Pyongyang has published confessions of crew members to sup- port this claim and otherwise stepped up its pub- lic criticism of South Korean domestic affairs. Pyongyang has also recognized that Seoul's effort to exploit the situation in the bilateral negotiations could be turned to some advantage. It has charged the South Koreans with provoking the incident in order to frustrate progress in talks. At the vice co-chairriien's meeting-as well as at a February 25 session of North-South Red Cross officials-Northern spokesmen tried to ignore the naval incident, stressing instead Pyongyang's com- mitment to unification. They offered proposals for moving both sets of talks forward. Though hardly concessionary, these were somewhat more flexible than proposals tabled in previous meet- ings of these groups. Premier Kim II-sung, in a major statement on March 4, appeared to endorse this approach. The forth undoubtedly anticipates that the South will reject its latest proposals, and that this can be used as additional "proof" of Seoul's determination to block progress in the negotia- tions and perpetuate "two Koreas." The North leans on this argument in propaganda efforts to encourage disaffection in he South and will press Page 10 WEEKLY REVIEW Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 this line in support of its strategy at the UN later this year. Despite the new tensions, both North and South will continue to exploit their talks for political and propagandistic advantage. Each has offered proposals for additional meetings this month. These are unlikely to be {productive, par- ticularly as long as Seoul feels the need to focus domestic attention on the Northern threat and Pyongyang, to openly encourage unrest in the South. The talks could take on more substance, however, as UN consideration of the Korean issue nears and each party feels a greater need to stress to other nations its adherence to the concepts of peace and national unification in the Korean Pen- insula. Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01. CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 25X1; Page 11 WEEKLY REVIEW Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Sporadic fighting again broke out On the Iranian-Iraqi border this week, and forces oro both sides remain in a high state of military readiness. Tehran and Baghdad, however, are still endeavo- ring to avoid serious clashes. Iran has played the border problem in low key but has sent letters of protest to Baghdad and the UN. Iraq, for its part, has become increasingly preoccupied with the Kurdish problem inside its own borders. The scheduled arrival of UN Secretary General Wald- heim's special investigator, whose name has been sent to Baghdad and Tehran for approval, was expected to help ease tensions somewhat. Early this week, fighting erupted near Mehran and Qasr-e Shirin, about 75 miles to the north. Tehran claims the clashes were precipitated by Iraqi forces who fired on a number of Iranian border posts. Military spokesmen in Baghdad, however, contend that Iranian troops started the fighting by using artillery against Iraqi troops. The fighting apparently became more inten- sive by mid-week, and some casualties were in- curred by both sides. A source of the US defense attache in Tehran claims that the Shah has ordered his troops to increase the level of their fire and not to confine themselves merely to suppressive fire. Radio Iran claims that several Iraqi infantry attacks across the border were re- pulsed and that "heavy losses" were inflicted on the Iraqis. These claims have not been con- firmed. Page 12 WEEKLY REVIEW ;, ,s t; Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 IRAN: EXPANDING NAVAL FORCES Iran's five-year plan (1972-1977) designed to modernize and enlarge its navy is moving ahead. Purchases this year of two destroyers from the US and six large guided-missile patrol boats from France at a cost of over $600 million indicate the seriousness of the Shah's intention to improve his navy vastly. Since the British withdrawal from the Per- sian Gulf in 1971, the Imperial Iranian Navy has become the dominant naval force in the area. The acquisition of modern war ships, additional per- sonnel. and improved training, have enabled the navy to extend its function from defending coastal areas to providing protection for Iran's expanding sea communications through the Per- sian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The Shah envisions a further broadening of Iran's defensive frontier into the Indian Ocean to protect Iran's vital oil lifeline. Until the mid-1960s, nearly all of the ships in Iran's modest navy were supplied by the US. The buildup and modernization of the navy began in 1966 when Iran ordered four British MK-5 destroyer escorts fitted with Seakiller surface-to- sur face missiles and Seacat surface-to-air missiles, and 12 hovercraft. Ten of the hovercraft have Year Supplier Ships Ordered Status of Delivery 1966 United 4 Mark-5 guided-missile Arrived in 1973 Kingdom destroyer escorts 12 Hovercraft 10 arrived in late 1960s 1967 United 1 Battle-class destroyer Arrived in 1970 Kingdom 1972 United 4 Hovercraft Scheduled to begin Kingdom in 1974 1972 West 2 Cargo/Tankers Germany 1972 United 2 Multi-purpose support Scheduled for 1974- Kingdom ships 1976 1973 United 2 used guided-missile Scheduled for fall States destroyers 1974 1973 United May have ordered a Scheduled for 1979- Kingdom Through-Deck Cruiser 1980 1974 United 2 Spruance-class destroyers Scheduled for 1978 States 1974 France 6 La Combattante I Is Page 13 Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 implernontation of modern personnel manage. mont systrr-is, increased in-country training pro- grams, and the increased use of computers, how- ever, are brightening long-term pros poets for a 25X1 technical) competent nav . arrived and are in service, giving Iran the largest operational hovercraft fleet in the world. In 1967, a British destroyer, armed with Seacat missiles, was purchased. In order to handle increasing logistic support problems, contracts were signed with the UK and West Germany in 1972 for support and resupply ships. These ships will give Iran its first seagoing supply capability for naval units stationed on several Pe sign Gulf islands arid for the ports on the Gulf that lack adequate road or rail connec- tions. In 1972, Iran began a five year naval buildup program designed to quadruple the fleet by 1978. Four more British hovercraft, each equipped with guided missiles, were ordered. In addition, Lon- don reportedly agreed to build a through-deck cruiser, configured with a flight deck capable of landing V/STOL aircraft and helicopters. Two small guided-missile destroyers are being refur- bished by the US for delivery to Iran this year, and a contract was signed in January calling for the delivery of two more destroyers in 1978; the contract also provides for the training of 2,000 Most recently, the Shah ordered six French built La Combattante II missile-armed large patrol boats from France. The contract, valued in excess of $100 million, calls for France to incorporate several modifications, including the installation of the US STAND, RD/HARPO ,N missile svstem, Italian OTO MELARA gun-mountings and a Dutch fire-control system. Once i i service, the La Combattante Its will more than offset the thr' at of Iraq's GSA-class guided-missile patrol boats and provide added protection for Ir, n's offshore oil facilities. Although the Shah is sproding lavishly on the navy, as well as on the other military branches, problems still persist. Naval personnel strength, which rose from 4,400 in 1967 to 13,000 last year, is scheduled to increase to 20,300 by 1976. The navy is having difficulty assimilating the new equipment and the addi- tional personnel. Selective recruiting programs, NORTH YEMEN: A NEW CABINET President Iryani appointed a new cabinet on March 3 headed by Prime Minister - designate Hasan Makki, a political moderate who has been in charge of a caretaker government since the remnoval of Saudi-backed prime minister i-fajri three weeks ago. Although about half of the min- isters are new appointees, the shuffle probably does not foreshadow significant policy changes. Makki has no personal following, and his appointment caused little reaction in Sana. All of North Yemen's important interest groups are rep- resented in the nov. cabinet, probably ensuring early confirmation by the legislative assembly. More important, the Saudis, whose financial dole helps to keep the North Yemeni economy afloat, are not expected to oppose Makki. King Fay al had vetoed Iryani's preferred choice, former prime minister al-Ayni; a final effort by Iryani in late February to get the King to agree to al-Ayni's return was unsuccessful. The appointment of I Makki downgrades the prime minister's post. Iryani is also said to be planning structural refoims that would give the foul-man ruling Republican Cr.un- cil greatly expanded iuthorky over the ministries. Former prime minister Hajri retains his post in the Republican Council, with new supervisory responsibilities over financial and development affa;:s. In this capacity, he will oversee the gov- ernment's allocation of Riyadh's subsidy. Page 14 WEEKLY REVIEW Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 % Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 INDIA: ELECTION RETURNS Plinio Minister Gandhi's Puling Congress arty managod to secure narrow Illdjorilies in the two nl-1St important of five off-year slate elec- tions held last month. The results are more a reflection of the continuing al)serlce of a viable political alternative than all endorsement of Mrs, Gamlhi's patty or policies. The present depresso(J stillo of the economy and the government's forcco!,t of still worse oc:cl- nomic: conditions slid riot permit Mrs. Gandhi to woo the electorate with convincing promises of early improvement. In fact, the opposition parties had a field clay attempting to capitalize on discon- tent over inflation, scarcities, and corruption in government. Unclcr these circumstances, Puling Congress leaders could not risk relying primarily on Mrs. Gandhi's charisma, as they had during the height of her popularity in 1971 and 1972. Page 15 In Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state, the party !,pent lingo suite,, Carefully selec- ted candidates with broad caste, community, and nlinorily .1ppeal, and promised suhslanlial federal vXpenditure!, that would benefit all segments of the population. With a high turnout of GO percent of the electorate and peaceful v'o0nq, the. f2uling Congress gained a thin majority of 215 in the 425-seat assembly; defections from the opposi- tion could add to this tot,11. I-Ile party is thus riot dependent on :,upport by 'ho pio-Moscow Conl- rnuklist Party of India, with which it had made m, electoral alliance. Ili Orissa, i1 much smaller state on the vast coast, the Holing Congress eked out -. plurality and is forming a govermnenI with support bolo Communists and independents. This marks a per- sonal victory for Mrs. Gandhi and the local Approved For Release 2009/05/01 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Congress leader, Mrs. Nandini Satpathy. A former chief minister, Mrs. Satpathy has now been given a second chance, to hold together the factional- ized Ruling Congress Party in Orissa. The results in the throe other elections, less favorable to Mrs. Gandhi, will have little impact on the government in Now Delhi. Regional parties won in tiny Pondicherry and in the northeastern slate of Manipur. In Nagaland, bordering on Mani- pur, a pro-Congress tribal party lost control to another tribal party. Inasmuch as the new state government will be less closely associated with the government in New Delhi, it may have a better chance of eventually ending the long- simmering tribal unrest in Nagaland. During the difficult economic period ahead, political instability in the states is likely to in- crease as the population faces continuing food shortages and high prices. The fall of the govern- ment in Gujarat last month proved that even Congress governments with solid legislative ma- jorities are vulnerable. For the moment, however, Mrs. Gandhi's confidence has been boosted as she turns her immediate attention to food deficits, serious petroleum and fertilizer shortages, and the selection of a new president of India in August. She does not have to face national elections until 1976. Prime Minister Nouira and o-ier key advisers of ailing President Bourguiba are apparently at- tempting to relegate hint to figLI.ehe. d status. Bourguiba led Tunisia to independence in 1956 and has been the country's only president, ruling in a highly personal style. The succession question, as it becomes more urgent, conse- quently is having a highly unsettling effect on political life. Existing constitutional provisions call for the prime minister to fill out any unex- pired portion of a presidential term, but various plans to modify this system have been discussed from time to time. Nourra has a number of rivals for the succession, and the matter could come to a head at the party congress scheduled for next fall. Cuurgiriba some time ago announced his in- tention to run again in the December 1974 presi- dential election. Bourguiba's latest hospitalization came amid the furor touched off by his signature on January 12, while Nouira was away, of an agreement with Libyan President Qadhafi to merge the two coun- tries. Nouira and others quickly succeeded in backing the Tunisian Government away from the proposed union and also in bringing about the ouster of a leading rival for the succession who, ds forcign minister, had helped arrange the merger. There are a significant number of Tunisians, par- ticularly among the intellectuals, who still believe that Tunisia would benefit from joining with its backward but richer neighbor. The short-range prospect is for continued behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the presidential aspirants under a relatively calm surface. This could change if Bourguiba's condition is adversely affected by a strenuous schedule of public ap- pearances, or if the general public becomes aware page 16 WEEKLY REVIEW Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 25X1 25X1 The pace has quickened at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with most delegates hoping they can have a "skeleton" of the final documents ready before the Easter recess. The US mission, however, has termed these hopes somewh,rt over-optimistic. There has been no evidence of substantial movement toward agreement on the major issues facing the conference. The Western and Eastern delegations still disagree on such significant issues as the possibility of future peaceful change of Europe's postwar frontiers, freer movement of persons and information between states, and constraints on military activity to strengthen security. Some optimism may have been generated by apparent progress in the sub-group studying de- velopment of conference follow-up measures, a goal sought by the East. Widespread support has now been expressed in the sub-group for im- plementing some kind of undefined follow-up procedures to the conference, despite the argu- ment that any Western concessions on this ques- tion should be held in reserve. The Danes broke ranks with their EC colleagues to support pro- posals for follow-up measures even though the Nine had agreed earlier to remain silent for the present or, such proposals. The Danes were careful, however, not to support specific procedures. Agreement on an over-all skeleton draft is possible by Easter, but most major substantive statements are likely to be bracketed to indicate disagreement. Resolution of these differences will remain a difficult process. If a final draft agree- ment is to be reached by Moscow's self-imposed deadline of mid-summer, it would have to be a very general document, designed to allow: the signatories to interpret its major provisions to suit their own political purposes. EC: ATTITUDE ON ENERGY COORDINATION European preparations for the scheduled meeting of th, 12-nation Energy Coordinating Group in Brussels on March 13-14 are clouded by concern over U:, -;iticisnr of the recently an- nounced EC plan to explore wide-ranging coop- erative projects with the Arab states. The Euro- peans in general are likely to view with caution their role in the US-sponsored Coordinating Group; if this participation seems likely to become politicized and is presented i s an alternative to European moves for EC-Arab cooperation. The Europeans have some reservations about the scope of the energy discussions and the proper forum for taking up particular issues. Nevertheless, there has been little to indicate that the Europeans regard the EC Nine's plan to sound out the Arab states on economic and cultural cooperation as a substitute for the br-lder US- initiated proposals for cooperation among the oil-consuming nations. The London i 'inancial Times pointed out in an editorial on March 5 that the community's endorsement of the French desire for a special EC relationship with the Arab world has not infringed on the energy problems being tackled in the wider forum. Th% community recognizes that it cannot, by itself, hope to deal effectively with the world-wide problems of energy. Although the French decided some time ago not to take part in the deliberations of the Coord- inating Group, the other Europeans have been hoping Paris might be brought along eventually. The French have said publicly, however, that they would participate in energy discussions if they are open to all the 24 industrialized countries that are members of the Organiza+ion of Economic Coop- e;d`.ion and Development. They do not want discussions restricted to the five larger EC members, Canada, Norway, Japan, and the US, as suggested for some topics in the terms of ref- erence for the Coordinating Group. Out of self- interest, the smaller EC members :,iso favor en- largement of these discussioii gruuos. Page 19 WEEKLY REVIEW Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 The Norwegians will soon become the only net oil exporters in Western Europe. Eventually, Norway might be able to supply nearly all the petroleum needs of the Scandinavian nations, if current production estimates are valid. Although Oslo ha:, offered to share its abund,inco with its neighbors, it is taking steps to ensure Norwegian control of its off-shor^ petroleum and natural gas resources. Norway began developing its portion of the North Sea fields in the late 1960s. It recovered some 300,000 tons of oil in 1971, and nearly six times that amount in 1972. The Norwegians expect to produce five million tons in 1974, and to level off annual North Sea production at 50 million tons of oil and 45 billion cubic meters of gas in 1980. By holding to a production limit, Oslo hopes to avoid the undesirable economic and ecological consequences of hasty or uncontrolled exploitation of energy resources. Norway's ultimate recoverable North Sea reserves are estimated at between one and two billion tons of oil and between one and two trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Norway's oil consumption is currently running about nine mil- lion tons annually. It does not use natural gas. Petroleum consumpticn in the five Nordic states totaled 73.6 million tons in 1972. If consumption remains relatively stable, Norway's estimated North Sea production, coupled with additional planned exploitation of the Norwegian con- tinental shelf north of 62 degrees, might satisfy Scandinavian demands. Furthermore, at the planned production levels, the Norwegian fields might continue to yield well into the next century. Norway initially welcomed foreign invest- ment, and numerous foreign companies are now involved in oil exploitation. Most of these com- panies have offices in Stavanger, on Norway's southwest coast, which now has a sizable colony of English-speaking oil company employees and their families. In line with Norway':, pl)Iicy of naintaining maximum control over exploitation of its re- sources, the Norwegian Government recently proposed that parliament adopt stringent meas- ures for the North Sea devclopment ar'a and the region along the northern continental shelf. The proposals, which would strengthen government control and restrict private dons' stic and foreign investment, are certain to generate considerable domestic controversy. Private oil companies are bitter over the small role assigned to thorn, and the Conservative Party has called the move a challenge to the non-Socialist majority. 5lockholm AAl Tlr U.K. SEA Notwecien fields DENMARK ' Ljopennagen NORTH SEA }''^' l' ? ' POLAND Page 20 WEEKLY REVIEW Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 SWELtN Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 The governrnr nt also proposes to ban the granting of additional concessions to private cons, panics south of the 62nd ,arallol. Instead, the Norwegian State Oil Company would become the Instrument for implementing the country's oil policy. The continental shelf north of 62 degrees would be opened to exploration, presumably under stringent Norwegian regulations, but not until certain international questions are resolved. The demarcation line between the Soviet and Norwegian portions of the shelf in the far north- near the USSR's large naval base at Murmansk- curr(,ntly is being negotiated. In addition, the Law )f the Sea Conference may establish distance and db th regulations for shelf exploitation. The continental shelf may extend sev(,ril hundred miles out to sea along the northern rur- tion of Norway's coast. The Svalbard Archipelago is on the northern edge of the European undersea massif. It is not clear whether this area can be claimed by Norway, along with the closer and shallower areas of the shelf. Norway has sover- eignty over the archipelago, however, by virtue of the Svalbard treaty of 1920. The USSR and the US are tv,o of the more than 40 signatories, but only Norway and the USSR have maintained per- manent settlements and installations on Svalbard. Norway has constructed an all-weather air- field near Longyearbyen, the archipelago's main settlement, and the Norwegians have agreed to allow the Soviets to station five or six permanent aircraft maintenance personnel at the facility. Perhaps to prevent further exploitation in certain areas, Oslo recently set aside portions of the arch- ipelago as wildlife sanctuaries and national parks. The undersea area around Svalbard may have oil- ',earing potential and the islands could provide the most convenient staging area for off-shore operations. In addition to its recommendations govern- i~ng oil exploitation, the government also suggests that Norway play an expanded role in interna- tional energy policy. Norway may eventually seek affiliation with oil-producing countries, pre- sumably through OPEC. In the early stages of the NORDIC PETROLCUM STATISTICS (In millions of tons for 1972) country U)(~ tlon consumption refining ca )ecit Ihnun.n1. 02 1119 11.0 I nrl.nrcl 1;30 9.3 Iculancl O 'r' 5wcvlen :17.0 17. 1 Ncrrwiiy 1.7 0.2 (1.6 'tonal Arno 1 73.6 41.0 ?A rr/rn rx fans!e oil crisis, Norway' offered to mediate, believ;ng that its unique position as both a consumer and producer provided special leverage. Oslo recently offered to permit other Scan- dinavian countries to share in the benefits of its oil development. At a Nordic Council meeting in Stockholm last month, Prime Minister Bratteli suggested that Sweden exchange its industrial know-how fo?, Norwegian oil. Oslo hopes that the Swedes will help ;--xpand Norway's steel industry as well as its ref;r#inq capacity. If North Sea oil eventually is brought ashore in Norway, Oslo also will want to develop a petro-chemical industry, probably with the help of its Scandinavian neighbors. The oil-hungry Swedes have responded eagerly to the Norwegian offer, but at the present rate of development it seems unlikely any Nor- wegian oil will reach Sweden before 1980. The Norwegian offer is also good news for Finland and Iceland; both import the bulk of their oil from the Soviet Union. Despite Denmark's grow- ing off-shore oil exploration and development in the North Sea, the Danes must import vast quan- tities of oil and welcomed Norway's ges- Page 21 WEEKLY REVIEW Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01 CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 .~ Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 President Pompidou will rneot with General Secretary Brezhnev at a Black Sea resort next week. The two leaders apparently intended to meet earlier, but Middle Eas; developments and strains in Soviet-French relations led to postpone- merits. It was only during Foreign Minister Gre- myko's visit to France late last month that final arrangements for the trip were made. Brezhnev and Pompidou will have a variety of problems to discuss, but their main purpose will be to revive the once-vaunted "special rela- tionship" which has become somewhat frayed over the :ast few months. Whatever private differ- ences emerge, the two leaders will try to present a public image of harmony. The French believe the USSR failed to con- sult adequately during the Middle East war, while the Soviets have serious reservations about French statements last year expressing interest in West European defense cooperation. The Soviets have a;:o been disturbed by France's unwillingness to participate in MBFR, and may feel that this atti- tude is spreading to other Wesi. EL..-opean county ies. On the Middle East, the Soviets may attempt to dissuade Pompidou from using arms sales as a lever fcr French influence in the area. This is a touchy subject, however, and is an area where the Soviets are not likely to have much impact. It seems likely, therefore, that whatever representa- tions they make will be low key. In his prelimi- nary talks in Paris, Gromyko seems to have steered clear of any specifics, although his defense of US policy in the Middle East might have been meant as a way of indicating that French involve- ment in the area would not be helpful. The Soviets will try to get the French to urge Wes; Germany to refrain from establishing a federal environmental office in West Berlin. This is not likely to work because Paris' position is that Bonn cannot back down now that the office has become an issue with the Soviets. By pressing the matter, however, Moscow may :strengthen the French view that the Western allies should re- strain future initiatives by Bonn in West Berlin. European security issues have generated an- other set of irritants to bilateral relations. The French are unenthusiastic about Moscow's pri- mary goal of obtaining an unambiguous declara- tion on the inviolability of frontiers, and are disturbed by the Soviet drive to cripple the "freer movement" ..incept by appending restrictive clauses. Paris also h.s been unrespon.,ive to Mos- cow's overtures on a summit-level finale for CSCE. Pompidou, in particular, is reluctant to attend an international gathering that he fears would be dominated by the superpowers. On the positive side, Moscow has applauded France's stand at the Washington energy confer- ence. The ill-will and distance between the French and their European allies that emerged during the conference must have given Moscow some addi- tional reassurance that a French-promoted Euro- pean defense arrangement is not going to reach a serious stage in the near future. President Pompidou reshuffled his cabir.et last week in an effort to form a more cohesive government capable of dealing with the myriad problems facing France and to reassert his own authority in an atmosphere of continuing uncer- tainty over his health. There are no new faces in the cabinet, but the manner in which Pompidou handled the deliberations leading to the reshuffle suggests that he used the occasion to patch up his differences with the orthodox Gaullists. The new cabinet, smaller by one third than its predecessur, combines several technical func- tions and eliminates other less important ones. The major portfolios did not change, and Justice Minister Taittinger, Finance Minister Giscard, and Housing Minister Guichard were accorded the additional prestige title of minister of state. Page 22 WEEKLY REVIEW .u_ Approved For Release 2009/05/01 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Both Jean Royer and Jacques Chirac, who have been accused of exploiting their positions as commerce and agricultural ministers to gain popu- larity with the workers and farmers, have been shifted to other posts. Former interior mini Ater Marcellin, who was tarred by the Le Canard bug- ging scandal, was shifted to another ministry, and former industry minister Charbonnel, who or:,,;ly clashed with Prime Minister Messmer, was dropped. By reappointing Messmer as Prime Minister, Pompidou has probably muted, at least tem- porarily, the speculation over his successor. The colorless Messmer is not considered to be a seri- ous presidential contender. Had any of the major presidential hopefuls been appointed, it would have been immediately construed as the nomina- tion of the ailing Pompidou's successor, and Pom- pidou would have assumed a lame-duck status. Instead, Pompidou has kept all his options open and has recaptured control over the timing of events in French political life. Pompidou has, in effect, reminded French politicians of the supremacy of the presidency in :;ie Fifth Re- public. The President and Messmer consulted only three advisers prior to announcing the reshuffle. One of these officials, Pierre Juillet, has beer trying to arrange a reconciliation between Pompi- dou and the Gaullist "barons," and his inclusion in these discussions implies that the cabinet changes-unlike the previous changes of govern- ment-were coordinated with party leaders. In addition, Pompidou has recently had con- ferences with Michel Debre, Jacques Chaban- Delmas, and Roger Frey. The appointment of Frey to a prestigious consultative office is another sign that the barons and Pompidou have drawn closer. The depth of the reconciliation is suspect, however, and there is no evidence that it includes a commitment by Pompidou to support Chaban- Delmas as the governing coalition's candidate in ITALY: PUTTING IT BACK TOGETHER Mariano Rumor's eight-month-old govern- ment collapsed last week after the small but influ ential Republican Party withdrew over an economic policy dispute with the Socialists. Rumor was asked almost immediately by President Leone to make the first try at putting together the country's 36th postwar government, but any gov- ernment formed now is likely to be an expedient, contrived to get the country through its conten- tious referendum on divorce, now scheduled for May 12. Early indications are that Rumor will aim for another center-left grouping among the same parties-Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republicans. Rumor will face the nettlesome task of reconciling the opposing views of the Socialists and Republicans over economic priorities. Successive governments have been im- mobilized by disagreement between the Socialists, who have demanded immediate action on costly social and economic programs, and the Republi- cans, who have insisted on budgetary austerity. The issue came to a head last week when Socialist Budget Minister Giolitti accused Republican Treasury Minister La Malfa of trying to force his policies on the country indirectly through the terms of a loan he had negotiated with the IMF. If the Republicans cannot be persuaded to rejoin the coalition, Rumor or some other pre- mier-designate may ask them to support in parlia- ment a government composed of the remaining three parties. The three parties have enough votes in parliament to go on without the Fepublicans. The Republican Party, however, enjoys influence out of proportion to its size-it is the smallest coalition member-because of its internal unity and La Malfa's prestige as an economist. The Christian Democrats may have to set up a temporary one-party caretaker government if these alternatives fail. This is an established way of letting the dust settle, but there is not much enthusiasm for the idea now. The other coalition parties all favor the existing divorce law, and they do not want the Christian Democrats, who oppose divorce, in the driver's teat during the referendum campaign. Page 23 Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 The Communist Party was caught off-guard by the government's collapse. While Rumor was in office, the party supported his efforts to deal with economic problems and adopted a construc- tive stance in parliament. At the same time, the communists accelerated their campaign for an open role in the government by pointing out that the ruling parties were already accepting indirect communist support. Although the communists are making a rit- ual bid for inclusion in the next government, they know that they cannot make a good case with the divorce referendum pending. The communists are at odds with the dominant Christian Democrats on the divorce issue and would have prcierred to avoid a government crisis until at least after the referendum. The dissolution of parliament followed by new elections is still considered a last resort, even though it would automatically postpone the troublesome divorce referendum. The center-left parties probably will resist this temptation, be- cause they fear that the communists and neo- fascists might benefit from voter resentment over inflation, energy-related austerity measures, and the recent oil payoff scandal. The government's recent effor'Ls to explore the possibility of loosening Portugal's tight grip on its African territories has led to a confronta- tion between rightist stand-patters and those who believe changes are necessary. As a result of bitter opposition from the right, Prime Minister Caetano appears to have backed off from any change ;)- 'L-the present time. Last month the govern ment-presurrwbly with Caetano's acquiescence-permitted the piisbli- cation of a book calling for self-determination for the Portuguese African territories. The aui:hor, General Antonio de Spinola, is the former com- mander in chief and governor of Portuguese Guinea, and now vice chief of staff of the armed forces. Page 24 The publication of Spinola's book has led to considerable political infighting over demands from the right, led by President Thomaz, for Spinola's dismissal, and Caetano himself is also under attack for allowing the book to be pub- lished. Spinola will be difficult to oust. He has wide support in the armed forces, including the backing of his boss, General Costa Gomes. There are other signs that the government was considering softening its policy toward its overseas territories. During a recent visit to Mo- zambique, the overseas minister mentioned the possibility of granting increased autonomy to the African territories. Lisbon also permitted the for- mation of a multi-racial organ zation in Mozam- bique led by a former insurgent. Although the new group has been described in the foreign press as a "third force" that could provide an "African solution" to Portugal's colonial problems, Lisbon has been careful to limit its scope. Pressure on Caetano against a policy change was recently intensified following stepped-up in- surgent activity in Mozambique. In an attempt to placate white settlers who havs protested alleged lack of army protection there, the government agreed to provide them with arms and a radio network. Lisbon is concerned that they might seek a "Rhodesian solution." The conflicting pressures on Caetano were evident in his speech last month at his party's annual conwress. He stressed that Portugal cannot accept a policy that would mean abandonment of the whites. At the same time, he referred to his own past support for a federation or community of Portuguese territories. Caetano has tried to appease both sides. He apparently has refused to fire Spinola, but in a speech this week to the National Assembly, the prime minister reaffirmed Portugal's determina- tion to remain in Africa and to build a multi- racial society there. He scorned any vote of self- determination as "inappropriate for the African mentality," thus repudiating one of Spinola's principal points. Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 The elections on March 10 will set the stage for the formation of Belgium's 22nd government since World War II. The elections are not ex- pected to lead to a settlement of Belgium's long- standing problem-how to get the French- speakers of Wallonia and the Flemish-speakers of Flanders to live together. There are signs that the election process will only divide the country further into rival groups. Page 25 WEEKLY REVIEW Mar 8, 74 Cc r~ y}^~, * r =m:: .CL'ae'a Approved For Release 2009/05/01 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 For the first time, the three traditional parties-Socialist, Social Christian, and Liberal- that have governed Belgium in various groupings for almost three decades have each posted two lists of candidates in Brussels, a French-speaking list and a Flemish-speaking list. In effect, the traditional parties have split. The Socialists still maintain a semblance of party discipline, but the Social Christians and the Liberals, who have sub- divided into a third group catering to the Brussels area alone, have been seriously weakened. These divisions will erode the power and authority of the traditional parties, which have already suffered by large-scale retirements of prominent legislators since 1971. In general, their replacements have been more radical and doctri- naire, making the formation of coalitions more difficult than ever. The decline of the traditional parties has been accompanied by an increase in strength of ethnic minority parties. The Volksunie in Flan- ders, thr Wallonian Rally, and the Democratic Front of Francophones have increased their share of the votes in recent national elections from insignificant percentages in 1968 to a healthy 1.0-25% in 19"171. The trend is expected to con- tinue in this election and will probably add to the instability of the central government. If the two major parties, the Social Chris- tians and the Socialists, retain enough seats to ensure implementation of the comparatively mod- erate plans for federalism now planned, they will probably forge another coalition. The Socialists, however, are increasingly dominated by their left wing ?;4hich is attempting to exploit the energy crisis and the current public distrust of the large oil companies in order to radicalize the party platform without losing votes. One of the Socialist planks demands government participa- tion in the energy sector of the economy, and other planks concern education, abortion, and government participation in the private sector. The outgoing government had reached an impasse on these issues, which are anathema to the Social Christians. Should the Socialists increase their parliamentary strength, they will drive a very hard bargain before entering into a coalition with the Social Christians who are expected to lose a few seats. Any government formed as a result of such hard bargaining woulc; be even weaker than the last one. Some of the more doctrinaire Socialists have gone so far as to say they intend to remain outside the government and to work for their reforms in opposition. Socialist co-President An- dre Cools, who is widely believed to have engi- neered the fall of the last government for political motives of his own, has invited liberal Social Christians and Communists to join the Socialists in a Progressive Front. Although such a grouping of political beclfellows at a national level is highly unlikely in the near future, the proposal lends credibility to Socialist threats to work in opposi- tion. In this case, the Social Christians perforce would have to turn to the linguistic parties in order to achieve the necessary parliamentary ma- jorities. Considering their conflicting views on sev- eral key issues, such a coalition would be highly unstable-even by Belgian standards. Belgian National Elections 1965-1971 50 Percent of total vote 1968 1971 Page 26 WEEKLY REVIEW Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Mar 8, 74 Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000040002-1 Argentina: CORDOBA SITUATION REMAINS CLOUDED The government's inept handling of the police rebellion against the left-wing provincial government in Cordoba has dimmed the prospects for early or peaceful resolution of the conflict. If Peron obtains corgressional approval for plans to invoke federal intervention of the province, re- newed and bloody clashes can be expected be- tween opposing left and right-wing forces in Cordoba-and possibly in other cities. Following an acrimonious debate, the Senate approved Peron's request for authority to re- organize the executive branch of the Cordoba government, but opposition members of the Chamber of Deputies have already raised a howl of pretest over what they regard as the govern- ment's heavy-handed and illegal action in per- mitting the removal of a democratically elected administration. The US Embassy reports that the bill may face a protracted delay in the legisla- ture-a situation that would leave the Cordoba problem dangling in limbo. Thi: hiatus, in turn, would substantially increase the chances for fur- ther conflict in the perennially troubled industrial city. There is a possibility, however, that a federal administrator might be appointed before the bill is enacted by Congress, but subject to eventual approval by that body. The atmosphere in Cordoba, meanwhile, re- mains tense following a week of strikes, ex- plosions, and street fighting that has left an unde- termined number of dead and wounded. The The national government's apparent clumsi- ness in handling the Cordoba affair is causing strain and unhappiness among moderate leftists the breach among rank-and-file Peronists, the Cordoba debacle appears to be creating some dis- sension within top levels of the Peron govern- ment. Secretary General of the Presidency Solano Lima is said to be angry over Peron's decision on intervention after being assured by Peron recently that this was not in the cards. Solano Lima has been reported in recent weeks to be or. his way out and this final ";'umiliation" may prompt his resignation. Solano Lima has ben Peron's inter- mediary with leading politicians and has also been the anchor man in attempting co iron out disputes between federal and provincial authorities-many of them the outgrowth of Peron's purge of Marxists. The volatile situation in Cordoba is further complicated by the maneuvering of Peron's ortho- dox lab( r supporters to oust leftists from control of Cordoba's powerful trade union confederation. Coinciding with the outbreak of the police revolt, the convocation of a "rump" congress to elect a new slate of labor leaders adds weight to the argument of those who claim Peron conspired to bring about the course of developments in Cor- doba. While achieving their objectives, the con- voluted tactics of Peronist labor leaders in sup- planting the leftists could cause further problems in the city. Leftist refusal to acknowledge the validity of the union elections is likely to increase the level of protest-and probably violence-be- tween rival unionists. The reopening of the uni- versity-a hotbed of leftist activity-will also in- crease the chances that students will join the fray should armed leftist labor groups decide to pro- mote disorder in the province. If civil strife be- comes widespread, it would sorely test Peron's ability to keep his fragile movement intact and bring some semblance of order to the long-suffer- Page 27 WEEKLY REVIEW In addition to widening Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000040002-1 The, /\rarla government has named the ad- ministration-backed presidential candidate, Gun- oral Kjull Laugorud, the winner of last Sunday's election despite the fact that the moderately left- ist opposition candidate, General Efrain Rios, actually won. The government delayed until March 6 be- fore announcing officially that Laugorud had won. It needed the extra time to engineer a mas- sive fraud to give Laugerud a plurality in the three-man race. The final count issued by the government gave Laugorud about 40 percent of the vote. Rios was given 36 percent, and 24 percent was won, apparently legitimately, by Colonel Paiz, the third candidate. As none of the three received a majority, the government- controlled Congress must decide. In the next two weeks, it will make its choice-and that choice will almost certainly be Laugerud. The government's belated announcement came a few hours after police used force and tear gas against supporters of Rios who were demon, strating in the capital. Earlier, Rios had accused the government of gross fraud and claimed he had won a majority of 130,000 votes. He declared that "historical responsibility and military honor" required him to reject the government's stolen election. He threatened to "paralyze the country" if he were cheated of his victory. Whether the government will be able to make the Laugerud "victory" stick will depend heavily on the attitude of the army, which ii turn will be influenced by the degree of popular dis- content created by the government's transparent fraudulence. Thus far, the army has remained on the sidelines, ~Altho!Jgh it Would pre ter to aver ecoming involved in a major conflict between pro- and anti-government ele- ments, the army may be forced to act if violence breaks out. In the absence of violence, it is likely General Kjcll Lae'erud to do nothing to upset the government's plan. In any case, the leading generals are believed to favor Laugerud, and any action on their part is likely to benefit him. The outlook for the next several days is for some degree of instability, with each side airing charges and countercharges. Outbreaks of serious violence are possible. In the longer run, the elec- tion results could mean a re$u:?gence of large-scale violence that generally has been absent during the last part of President Arana's term. The outlawed Communist Party and the Cuban-o1 iented Rebel Armed Forces will view the outcome as proof that working within the system is impossible. They may find new support for extreme measures against the government. Page 28 WEEKLY REVIEW