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April 19, 1974
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Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 U~o MML U PY 25X1 -l? Secret RETURN TO IN-1107 Weekly Review State Dept. review completed. Top Secret 19 April 1974 Copy 25X1 N2 421 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 The WEEKLY REVIEW issued every Friday morning by th9 Office of Current lntellig&i:_e, reports and analyzes significant developments of the v,eUk, through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or Fx_-pared,by the Office of Economic Research, the Office, of= Strategic: Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology: Topics_requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published', separately as Special Reports are listed In the contents. 1 Syria-Israel: A sad in Moscow 6 Laos: The Pathet Lao Hold Forth 7 Cambodia: Some Unwelcome Fireworks 8 China: Restoring the Old 9 Taiwan Stands Firm on Air P--f 25X6 13 China-USSR: More Trouble 14 Yugoslavia: Finishing Touches 15 USSR: Sakharov's Rejoinder 25X1 25X6 20 UN: Resources and Development 21 International Money 25X1 22 Colombia To Elect a President 22 Prazil: Restless Students 23 Peron and the Terrorists Nigeria: Slow Motion Niger: The Military Take Over Ethiopia: Turmoil Continues Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 25X1 Syria-Israel MAKING ASAD HAPPY IN MOSCOW The Soviets rolled out the red carpet for Syrian President Asad and opened the Kremlin's coffers a little wider in a less than subtle attempt to cement bilateral relations at a time when Mos- cow is having trouble elsewhere in the Arab world. Asad's five-day' Stay in the USSR coincided with the arrival in Washington of the Syrian del- egation to discuss disengagement and with strong anti-Soviet remarks by Egyptian President Sadat. With this backdrop, the Soviets had more reason than ever to use the visit to reiterate that Moscow President Asad and Soviet leaders at airport must be a party to any negotiations leading to a viable Middle East settlement. Moscow also went out of its way, apparently with some success, to keep Asad from following Sadat's path away from the USSR and toward the US. The final communique expressed the resolve of both sides to "rebuff" any attempts to damage Soviet-Syrian friendship. This was probably a muted warning to the US, but more importantly it implied that Syria will not follow Egypt's ex- ample of improving relations with the US at the USSR's expense. The Soviets were somewhat less reticent than before in publicly criticizing US-Egyptian Page 1 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 bilateral negotiations. Brezhnev referred to "ersatz-plans," concocted by "the aggressor and its patrons," to substitute partial agreements for an over-all settlement. He again stressed that the Geneva conference, where Moscow has a voice, is the authoritative international forum where a settlement must be worked out. The USSR has repeatedly failed to persuade Asad to by-pass or at least de-emphasize the Washington bilateral negotiations in favor of Geneva, and it seems to have had no better luck this time. Asad's comment that "our points of view on the main questions coincide" suggests that there were areas of disagreement, probably including the disengagement talks. The final com- munique fails to mention Geneva arid merely repeats the language used in the one issued fol- lowing Gromyko's trip to Damascus last month- that disengagement is a partial step that must be tied to an over-all settlement, and that Moscow's participation in all the stages and spheres of a settlement is important. Asad, who probably viewed the visit as necessary to assuage Soviet ensitivities over being excluded from the disengagement talks, was very generous throunhout in his praise of Soviet sup- port for Syria. He characterized the Moscow talks in general as having consolidated ties of friendship and cooperation, but he was very bland and non- committal concerning Soviet warnings against dealing with "imperialist and reactionary" forces. In light of Moscow's recent set-back in its relations with Cairo, Asad may have sensed an opportunity to obtain generous aid commitments from the Soviets. Details are not yet available on the economic, scientific, and cultural agreements that Asad signed in Moscow, but it seems likely that they are indeed favorable to the Syrians. The communique did not mention any agreement on military aid, but did say that the two sides had "outlined steps" for the further strengthening of the Syrian armed forces. It seems likely that the Soviets will be generous in this area as well. The communique reiterated an earlier formula that Syria has the right to use all "effec- Page 2 tive means" for the liberation of its occupied lands, but it did not use the Golan fighting as an occasion for sabre rattling. Syrian hopes for an early disengagement agreement seem to have been dampened by the Israeli cabinet crisis. The Syrian Foreign Ministry reportedly believes the crisis will delay, if not prevent altogether, the conclusion of an accord. Strong suspicions have been aroused in Damascus that the Israelis are, in fact, deliberately trying to put off and possibly sabotage negotiations. Presi- dent Asad, hcwever, is likely to await the out- come of Secretary Kissinger's current efforts to bring about an agreement before deciding whether to increase or relax military tensions on the Golan Heights. ?Baniyas S'ar~at! errjcna~ l ; A. . ll j, Qunayurah ISRIA LI ? /i- GOLAN .'-IEIGHTS Lake ribcrias iI V JORDAN 0 10 20 Kilo r- / o 10 to 1 55700 Odd CIA We, WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Shaykh ? Miskin Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Several high-level Syrian Foreign Ministry of- ficials are said to believe that if Tel Aviv had really wanted to conclude a disengagement accord, it would have delayed publication of the Agranat report and thereby avoided a domestic crisis at this time. These officials are said to fear that, if Israeli leaders are unable to put together a new government quickly, th' disengagement talks will be postponed until after elections are held, ,probably next fall. In that case, they fear, US pressure on Tel Aviv to sign an accord will have lessened because of congressional elections in the US. Despite this somber assessment, the Syrian Government reportedly does not want to touch off a full-scale war. Syrian leaders are said to have ordered the recent intensification of the fighting around Mount Hermon primarily to keep up the pressure on Tel Aviv to sign a disengagement accord and for "internal purposes." Over the weekend of April 13-14, Israeli and Syrian forces fought their sharpest battles since the war last October. The level of fighting generally decreased early this week, but on April 17 and 18 Israeli aircraft again struck at Syrian ground targets in the Mount Hermon area. suitably for military operations. using bulldozers tc build roads on the western slope where the terrain is less rugged and more side of Mount Hermon inside Lebanese territory. The number of Syrian tanks there is not known, but the Israelis are said to have 40 British-built Centurions. Both sides are also reported to be both the Page 3 Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Vietnam marked for the central and southern portions of South Vietnam are sufficient to replace losses and to maintain most Communist forces for several months at the low level of fighting that has characterized the post-cease-fire period. Only 2,000 troops have gone to northern South Viet- nam, where there has been little fighting, but Hanoi could quickly augment its forces in this area. The remainder, more than 22,000 men, were sent to reinforce combat and logistic units along the infiltration corridor. After two days of heavy fighting in the central highlands, the Communists on April 16 forced government Rangers to withdraw from a fire support base about 25 miles southwest of Pleiku City. The South Vietnamese have moved two regiments from elsewhere in the highlands to nanoi nas aireaay sent more than /8,000 the area and are maneuvering them into position I'? ! ~?~~wrti 4yg:4~ la`frx'.J : , yM..: 1# sC > Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 25X1 the border areas of Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, and Tay Ninh provinces. A recent shifting of North Vietnamese main force elements in Military Re- gion 3 has put the Communists in position to protect major infiltration corridors leading to Sai- gon and the delta. Some senior government offi- cials also see the pressure as an attempt to isolate Tay Ninh Province. To counter the Communists, the government has reinforced its units northwest of Saigon, and the outlook is for more shay fi htin in this sector. In Military Region 3 the governmert's Ranger base at Tonle Cham on the border of Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces finally fell to the Communists late last week after being under siege for over a year. The base was the last government outpost within a major infiltration route north- west of Saigon. The impact of its loss has been primarily political, however, as the South Viet- namese announced on April 16 that they were indefinitely suspending the Paris talks with the Viet Cong. They cited the fall of Tonle Cham, continuing Communist pressure against other gov- ernment positions northwest of Saigon, and new attacks in the central highlands as reasons for the suspension. As a military retaliation for the fall of Tonle Cham, the government directed air strikes against the Communist administration center at Logy Ninh in southern .South Vietnam and against other nearby targets. Meanwhile, almost all troops of the base's former garrison have managed to with- draw safely to An Loc. The ease with which the Rangers withdrew supports speculation that the base commander, in apparent violation of orders, abandoned the base in return for a Communist guarantee of safe passage. Communist pressure in the area northwest of Saigon is aimed at strengthening their p',sition i;i Page 5 Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 LJ/\ LAOS: THE PA CHET LAO HOLD FORTH The Lao Communists, wasting little time in establishing their political and military priorities, have struck a note of reasonableness within the new coalition structure. During the inaugural meeting of the new cabinet, Deputy Prime Minis- ter and Foreign Minister Phoumi Vongvichit-the senior Pathet Lao official in the cabinet-empha- sized that there must be strict coordination be- tween the cabinet, the advisory political council, and the Joint Commission to Implement the Agreement. Phoumi also noted that the Joint Commission should set up the modalities for the withdrawal of foreign troops, the dissolution of "special forces," and the return of refugees. At the same time, he agreed that the Joint Commis- sion should investigate cease-fire violations similar to those that occurred in central Laos on April 7 and 8 when Communist forces captured several Lao Army positions. On the question of foreign relations, Phoumi stated that the new government must define principles governing Lao foreign policy and foreign aid to Laos. Phoumi also dwelled on the Pathet Lao's interests in a frank and highly cordial meeting with the US ambassador, who assessed Phoumi as an individual willing to discuss serious matters in a non-polemical manner. Besides indicating that the Communists want to maintain good relations with the US, Phoumi tried play down appre- hensions of a Pathet Lao take-over in Laos by stressing that the two sides should work calmly and amicabl*' toward reconciling their opposing political viewpoints. Phoumi also stated again that it was essential for all foreign soldiers to leave Laos, and he hinted that the Pathet Lao may request aid for refugee resettlement. Other Lao Communist members of the new coalition government have also been working hard to project an image of cooperation and cordiality. Minister of Economy and Plans Soth Pethrasy, for example, has told his subordinates that he has no plans to make any personnel changes soon be- cause this would "frighten" the ministry's direc? tors and rightist elements in Vientiane. In addi- tion, Soth admitted that he has much to learn about his new -esponsibilities and that he there- fore would depend on his secretary of state from the Vientiane side to organize the ministry. Soth evidently has some clear ideas about the minis- try's orientation, however. He complained that Laos is too dependent or Thai rice and petroleum products and noted that he would like to see more imports from socialist countries. The Lao Communist officials' relatively dis- arming performance may help to dispel some of the gloom that has settled over various non- Communist elements upset by the presence of large numbers of well-armed Pathet Lao security forces on the streets of Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Sume Lac Army officers and rightist politicians have been concerned over the Com- munists' high-profile and have complained that Prime Minister Souvanna has "sold out" to the Pathet Lao. INN Phoumi: Vongvichit Page 6 Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 I I CAMBODIA Some Unwelcome Fireworks The Khmer Communists dampened Buddhist New Year celebrations in Phnom Penh this week with their first sustained rocket attacks in over a month. Fifteen rockets fell on the capital be- tween April 13 and 15-most of them near the presidential residence-killing and wounding over 30 civilians. At the same time, a flurry of Com- munist ground attacks forced government troops to abandon outposts along Route 5 some ten miles north of the city and along the Bassac River just below Phrom Penh Skirmishing continued in both areas late in the week as Cambodian Army units tried to retake the lost positions. In the countryside, the Communists are still block ding Kampot's outlet to the sea and are shelling the southwestern coastal city sporad- ically. Ground prr.,sure has slackened, however, and government reinforcements are having little trouble working their way overland from the coast. The Communists have kept Kampot under siege for over a mcnth, and they may soon begin to experience shortages of ammunition and other supplies. Moreove-, many insurgent units pres- ently at Kampot jaw action on other fronts ear- lier in the dry season and may be tiring. Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Some Welcome Attention Prince Sihanouk, who recently has been tak- 'ng a bark seat to his touring "defense minister," Khieu Samphan, began his annual visit to Pyong- yang late last week. In his major address in North Korea, Sihanouk acknowledged Samphan's growing political prominence by describing him as the "authentic representative of our people." Although Sihanouk was pessimistic about the prospects for a Khmer Commurist military vic- tory this dry season, he again ruled out any nego- tiations with the Lon Nol government or with any third force. He did not mention the possibility of direct talks with Washington-a theme he revived last month during his visit to Laos. 25X1 Samphan, meanwhile, is touring China's provinces, evidently killing time while arrange- ments are being made to expand his foreign itin- erar . Samphi n apparent!, ' believes that the propaganda mileage from suc, visits outweighs his continued absence from Cambodia riiirinn +ho dry-season fighting. Cambodian mortar crew takes a hit Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 I I CHINA: RESTORING THvS OLD The rehabilitation of veteran civilians who were ousted during the Cultural Revolution has long been a sensitive political issue in China. The struggle between those who favor bringing back former leaders and those who oppose the idea has been complicated by the related question of re- placing military men in top party and government posts with civilians. It appears to be easier for feuding central leaders to agree on removing sol- diers than on whc should rep%ce them, bi:t the recent appointment of a new provincial leader demonstrates that progress is being made. On April 15, e Peking broadcast describing the c7ening of the Spring Canton Trade Fair identified Chao Tzu-yang as the new party and government leader in Kwangtung Province. Chao headed the Kwangturg party committee prior to the Cultural Revolution, but was ousted after attacks by lefti3t Red Guards in 1967. His tortuous return to power has been typi- cal of others who have been rehabilitated. Chao's initial post - Cultural Revolution provincial ap- pointment was in Inner Mongolia. He then reap- peared in Kwangtung in April 1972, but was not named a secretary until January 1973. When the late-December rotation of military region com- manders vacated the top Kwangtung party and government posts, there were several candidates for the positions, including politburo member Hsu Shih-yu, the new Canton Military Region commander. Chao was elevated over two other Kwangtung secretaries who outranked him. Chao is the first appointee to a top provin- cial party post previously held by one of the rotated regional comrr:anders. The displacement of provincial military men has inc.eased markedly in the last few months, and many sol(+.i ;rs are now targets of critical wall posters. It seems clear that civilians will fill most of the slots vacated by military men. lution, was restored to the Politburo. Teng's ele- vation apparently took place in the face of sl.rong opposition, as did his return to public view in April 1973. Several other high-ranking cadres who were purged or demoted during the Cultural Rev- olution have also returned to official favor, but reports suggest that others who were candidates for rehabilitation, such as former Central South Bureau leader Tao Chu, have been successfully blocked. The rehabilitation question is clearly part of the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign, and the issue appears to have been addressed by both sides. Depending on the context in which they are presented, media articles criticizing Confucius for wishing to "restore t,-~e old" can be read as thinly veiled attacks on either: pre - Cultural Rev-'? on civilian officials, such as Teng or Cnao, any ?.ose who wish to rehabilitate them; or those who wish to bring back people brought down in the later stages of the Cultural Revolution, most of whom were leftists. The trend in favor of the rehabili- tated veterans is a favorable sign for Premier Chou, who has led the eff g there back. I '')r_V-I The rehabilitation controversy continues to be hard-fought at both the central and provincial levels. Last December, Teng Hsiao-ping, the sec- and highest ranking victim of the Cultural Revo- Chao Tzu-yang Page 8 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Taipei last week underscored its tough stand on the impending China-Japan civil air agreement and put muscle into its threat to close Taiwan's airspace to Japanese planes by putting the Na- tionalist Air Force on alert. A few days before the alert, Foreign Minister Shen publicly repeated Taiwan's demand that the present civil air agreement between Taipei and Tokyo be maintained. He warned that Taiwan would give up air links to Japan and refuse per- mission for Japanese aircraft to enter the Taipei Flight Information Region and Air Defense Zone if the Japanese unilaterally altered the existing agreement ;n order to secure a civil air pact with Peking. Premier Chiang Ching-kuo is hoping that by cooperating on the air issue with the right-wing Seirankai group of Japan's ruling Liberal Demo- cratic Party, he can help damage politically Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira. Chiang long ago wrote off both men as too pro- Peking and would prefer a more conservative cabi- net in Tokyo. Chiang's estimate of the situation within the party clearly overstates the strength of Seirankai as well as his own influence on events in Tokyo. A by-prc uct of Chiang's course of action has been an increase in anti-Japanesr feeling on Taiwan. This atmosphere, which stems from the Nationalists' sense of grievance against Japan- se "perfidy," makes eventual comprorrise more difficult. The Nationalist Air Force has been in- structed to he prepared to intercept intruding Japanese aircraft, but the high command is aware of the potential of a Taiwan-created air incident. Orders for an interception would have to come from the highest level of the government. The Nationalists apparently are assuming that the Japanese wilt not attempt to enter Taiwan's iir- space once Taipei ae.nounces it is closed, not completely closed the door to negotiation, nor has he specified the exact conditions that would trigger a rupture in air service. The points at issue in retaining air links with Japan have been reduced to two: the presence of Nationalist air- line personnel in Japan and the conditions for maintaining necessary ground and business serv- ices there for Taiwan's airline; and .Japanese handling of the name of Taiwan's airline. On the face of it, both points would appear open to discussion. In the present turbulent atmosphere, how- ever, Taipei may lose sight of the Iona-run neces- sity of maintaining good political and economic relations with Japan. It might precipitate a rup- ture that will embitter Nationalist-Japanese rela- tions in general, and make future working ar- rangements more difficult. Prime Minister Tanaka, for his part, is com- mitted to an air agreement with Peking and is unlikely to change course as a result of Taipei's tough stand. It is now planned to sign the agree- ment un April 20. Tanaka will then promptly submit it to the Dict for early ratification, which seems assured. Taipei's new tactics have nade it harder for Tanaka to se,ore rapid approval of an agreement in the councils of his own party and in the cabi- net. While there is good evidence that key fac- tional leaders, notably Finance Minister Fukuda, have decided against using the issue in an overt challenge to Tanaka's leadership, the Seirankai hopes to use the issue to force Ohira's resignation. The antagonistic Nationalist attitude will, nonetheless, encourage the ruling party's more ext ?eme ri_'ht-wing and pro-Taiwan elements to make sharp attacks on Tanaka and Foreign Minis- ter Ohira, who has staked his personal prestige on achieving the agreement with Peking. If the right wing makes a case that Ohira has failed diplomat- ically by his inability to preserve air link, with Taiwan, he may be compelled to assume the Despite his adamant public stand, which has aroused misgivings among his advisers, Chiang has blame and resign. Page 9 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Iq Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Peking may bring charges of espionage against the Soviet helicopter crew that was cap- tured in northwestern China last month. The tria; would heat up the Sino-Soviet polemic. Chi- nese exploitation of the incident has thus far been measured, and Moscow's reaction has been mainly low key. There have been hints that the Soviets pressed Peking to release the crew. Soviet heli- copters apparently overflew Sinkiang in early April, 25X1 25X1 strong anoviet stand is is po politically important in China at this juncture, however, and there is no sign the Chinese plan to give up the crew soon. Rallies in Sinkiang, where the helicopter landed, have linked the incident with the anti-Confucius, anti-Lin campaign. Peking also has tied the heli- copter to an alleged Soviet espionage case last January, in order to develop a pattern of Soviet misbehavior regarding China. Should a trial be held, it is likely that the Chinese will give heavy publicity to this addi- tional "indication" of Soviet meddling in Chinese affairs. There were a number of indications that Peking contemplated linking important indi- viduals in China with Soviet espionage even be- fore the helicopter incident. It is uncertain, how- ever, whether Peking would jail or repatriate the crew following a trial. were the first to publicize the helicopter 25X1 incident in an apparent effort to pre-empt a massive Chinese publicity campaign. Now they seem resigned to the prospect of a trial, but intent on limiting the damage such a trial might have on the Western-primarily US-appreciation of Sino- Soviet relations. Page 13 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Moscow w-,',t probably he restrained in its treatment of any trial unless Peking forces its hand by staging massive public demonstrations. This would be in line with current efforts to keep Sino-Soviet affairs in a low key. YUGOSLAVIA: FINISHING TOUCHES Tito's program to re-establish the Commu- nist Party as the country's most powerful unify- ing force will take a giant step toward completion at the tenth party congress next month. The party's authority to make national policy and to exercise closer institutional control over the rank- and-file will be sharply increased. The last touches are now being applied to the report that will guide party policy fo; the next four years, and proposed changes in the party statutes are also under final scrutiny. Much of this was probably accomplished last week when party secretary Stane Dolanc, who is chair- man of the congress' preparatory commission, and Edvard Kardelj, the country's top ideologist, held sever-! days of discussions with Tito. Kardelj subsequently indicated that substantial changes in the central party machinery are in the works. One of the key changes would abolish the largely advisory Permanent Conference and re- establish a fuii-fledged central committee-which was dissolved in 1969-as the main repository of party authority between congresses. In the ab- sence of a central committee, Tito has sometimes found the presidium, the party's top policy- making body, to be insufficiently responsive to changing poiicy needs. Re-establishment of the central committee, which will probably have around 165 members selected from regional parties and the military, appears mainly intended to bolster the party's control, stability, and con- fidence. There also is a proposal to enlarge the nine- man executive bureau, which has strongly sup- ported Tito's plans to recentralize the party. With increased staffi:ig, the bureau will be in an even better position to oversee and direct the activities of the party rank-and-file. In addition, the new party statutes enhance prospects for increased party controi by abandoning the efforts, initiated in 1969, to create autonomous parties in Yugo- slavia's constituent republics. Regional party congresses-now almost over-have already re- organized local party units to dovetail more closely with the functional subdivisions of the central party apparatus. The party remains very tight-lipped on the subject of personnel "rotation," which normally accompanies congresses. The key question centers on Stane Dolanc, the current head of the party's executive bureau, who by statute cannot succeed himself. This theoretical obstacle can easily be circumvented, of course, but the way this prob- lem is worked out could provide valuable clues to Tito's wishes r,:garding the still-unsettled question of party succession. Tito's reassertion of party dominance and Sc 'iet-Yugoslav rapprochement have, in fact, helped to strengthen his pet*ntial successors against . oth foreign and domestic pressures. Un- derlying Tito's effc,is is also a strong national rededication to Yugoslavia's unique form of so- cialisin and independent foreign policy. This in itself speaks against any major shifts in the coun- Page 14 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 USSR: SAKHAROV'S REJOINDER Academician Andrey Sakharov, in a retort on April 3 to exiled novelist Aleksandr Solzhenit- syn, moved away from total confrontation with the regime. He now supports Soviet detente policy while still dissenting on the lack of democratization of the Soviet Union. His new position provides a badly needed focal point for reformist forces in Soviet society and finds partial common ground with the "modernizers" in the regime itself. The full text of Sakharov's statement, issued in response to Solzhenitsyn's September "letter to the Soviet leaders," is not yet available in Washington. Excerpts, however, show it to be an elaboration of the dialogue developinq in dissi- dent ranks, which differentiates the inward- looking orthodox nationalists (Solzhenitsyn) from the outward-looking modernists (Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, et al). This dialogue reflects the divergence in Soviet society between the West- ward-looking modernizers at one end of the spec- trum, and the conservative, isolationist national- ists at the other end. These two strains of thought can also be found in the different attitudes of Soviet leaders and in the contradictions of Soviet policy. Thus, the regime is encouraging Western-style modern- ization through detente, while trying to maintain all barriers against democratization. Sakharov adopted a very dangerous strategy last year when he divorced himself from all aspects of the re- gime's policy by arguing against trade with the West unless it was accompanied by democ- ratization. Now, in supporting detente-albeit ultimately for reasons of democ- ratization-Sakharov moves back closer to official opinion, z rid his words gain added weight. Sakharov has provided a strong and balanced counter-argument to Solzhenitsyn's views on the future development of Soviet-and, for Solzhenit- syn, principally Russian-society. While Solzhenit- syn disdains scientific progress and favors a simple authoritarian society based on Russian national- ism and the Russian Orthodox Church, Sakharov rejects mysticism and overemphasis on id?ology. He argues in practical terms for :he harnessing of science to serve arid better the lot of mankind and Sakliarov for the expansion of contacts between the Soviet Union and the West. SakharGv sees no absolute good in Russian traditional values, in contrast to Solzhenitsyn's mystical belief in them, and argues that Soviet democratic activists should be equally concerned about the suppression of non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union. He takes Solzhenitsyn to task for his view that an authoritarian system based on the benevolent patriarchy of the church would be most suitable and healthy for the country. Sakh- arov states his belief that only in a democratic system can national and human character be fully developed. He sees no insurmountable barriers to the possibilities for democratic c avelopment, either in Russian history or in the Russian character. Sakharov is particularly hard on Solzhenit- syn for arguing that Russia needs to pull away from the evil influence of the West and to develop itself in "splendid and simple" isolation. He rea- sons that the world's problems are so immense that one nation cannot solve them alone. He mentions a variety of issues, ranging from disarrna- ment to environmental protection, in which in- ternational cooperation is essential. Sakharov makes a strong case, in this re- spect, for expanded trade, scientific and cultural exchanges, free travel into and outside the coun- try, and the free movement of people and ideas across national boundaries. He relates this to the development of a more democratic system in the Soviet Union, and brings in his theory of conver- c,ence ti argue that both voluntary measures and outside pressures can act as catalysts for henAfi- Page 15 WEEKL'.' REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005`7 K1 I I NIGERIA: SLOW MOTION With only two years still to go before the target date it set in 1970 for returning Nigeria to civilian rule, General Gowon's military govern- ment has made little headway in laying the groundwork for a transfer of power. The key to more rapid progress is the availability in the near future of census figures, and Gowon's handling of this politically sensitive matter wily shed light on how serious the military is about returning to the barracks. The preliminary results of the census that was completed last December have not yet been released, although in January Gowon promised the figures would be ready by the end of March. If the delay is due mainly to tardy processing, the results probably will be released shortly. If, how- ever, the figures are in fact available but, as some suspect, are regarded by key lez;uvrs as unaccept- able because they are disadvantageous to one or another of Nigeria's three major ethnic groups, the delay will continue until a consensus solu- tion-such as a time-consuming recount-is thrashed out. Controversy over the results of the 1963 census heightened ethnic tensions and was a major factor in the political breakdown that pro- duced two military coups in 1966 and a civil war a year later. The census is one part of a nine-point pro- gram of political and economic changes that Gowon outlined four years ago for the military' to accomplish by 1976. So far, Gowon has moved forward on only two other points: launching a development plan, and reorganizing the military. Some of the remaining six tasks can be glossed over, but three of them-writing a constitution, establishing national political parties, and holding elections-must be completed before power can be transferred. Final census figures are essential to proceeding with these critical items. Meanwhile, public debate over the shape of future political institutions is growing. It is apparent that Gowon and his colleagues have not yet decided on what actions they will take to fulfill their program. The military has generally insisted that it intends to step aside for civilians, and some spokesmen have stressed the need to honor the target date. Others, however, President Gowon seem to hedge by emphasizing the importance of first putting the nine points fully into effect. For his part, Gowon appears to be striving to get a major military re-equipment program-including purchases from both Communist and Western sources-well under way in advance of 1976. The regime may soon give closer attention to the matter of restoring civilian rule. Gowon re- portedly )ians to hold monthly meetings, starting in late April, with key senior officers to discuss outstanding political questions and to float pro- posals before the civilian Federal Executive Coun- cil, which performs some cabinet functions. Many Nigerians suspect Gowon will not complete his program by 1976 and will use this as an excuse for delaying a full return to civilian rule. They speculate that Gowon may mark the occasion by putting on civilian garb as head of an interim government of soldiers and civilians, thereby stretching out the process of transferring Page 17 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Lieutenant Colonel Kountche, Niger's armed forces commander and leader of the coup on April 15 that ousted President Harnani Diori, has formed a new government composed entirely of army officers. Kountche, who heads a 12-man Provisional Supreme Military Council, has stated that he is not considering changing Niger's close relations with France. Kountche's decision to move against L iori, who had led the country since it became inde- pendent in 1960. was probably motivated in large part by dissatisfaction with the government's in- ability to overcome impoverished Niger's chronic economic stagnation. The country's plight has been compounded in recent years by the serious drought that has spread throughout mulch of western Africa. The new regime, however, does not appear at this time to be any more capable of coming to grips with Niger's serious economic problems than was Diori's government. CHAD r SUDAN ZAIRE ` rTnu NOI , AN2AM'., I ZAM81A 90UTIlr, noun.. ?ooE9 role. There is no sign of any internal opposition to the new regime. A number of student groups, which had long been critical of Diori's leadership, have staged marches to demonstrate their support for the military leaders. Some of Niger's neighbors in west Africa may be slow to accept the new regime. Nigeria's General Gowon and Ivory Coast President Hou- phouet-Boigny both had close ties with the de- posed leader. Widespread unrest continues among the mili- tary and other groups despite the government's promise of far-reaching social, economic, and po- litical reforms. So far, there is no concerted effort to force out the Endalkatchew cabinet, but the unrest is straining government administration. In a policy statement issued on April 8, the government addressed many of the demands of dissident groups, particularly the crucial issues of land reform and corruption. The government pro- poses to prohibit any one person from holding more land than he can reasonably be expected to develop and to abolish public land grants to people who do not work on the land. New laws are promised to regulate, on an equitable basis," the relationship between tenants and landlords. These proposals, if carried out, will disrupt Ethiopia's traditional land-tenure system and ulti- mately change the fabric of society. The measures will require the break-up of the estates that have provided the base of the economic and political position of the nobles and landlords, who have been powerful conservative forces. The Coptic Page 18 Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Church and the imperial family, two of the larger landowners, probably command enough prestige to ensure their continuing influence. Abolishinn public land grants, however, will deny Haile Selas- sie one of his most valuable methods of rewarding loyal followers. Local noblemen and landlords are likely to use all the influence they can muster to delay and deflect the reforms. Their anger at what amounts to a revolution in their relations with the peasants will probably be matched by the pe,;ants' im- patience to have their own farms. The government proposes to deal with cor- ruption by requiring officials to declare their property holdings, including land acquired while in office. Ministers' personal finances will also be subject to scrutiny. Meanwhile, demands for the prosecution of officials already charged with cor- ruption and for the dismissal of additional senior officials continue to pcse a problem for the gov- ernment. The policy statement also provides for re- forms in government administration, education, development, wages and prices, and taxes. So far, however, it has had no perceptible effect on wide- spread labor unrest. Municipal employees in Addis Ababa went on strike for several days, forcing the resignation of the capital's mayor, whom they accused of corruption. A strike by railway workers has virtually ended traffic on the link between Addis Ababa and the Red Sea port of Djibouti, Ethiopia's life-line for vital exports to world markets. Customs and Finance Ministry employees conducted a four-day strike and forced the removal of three senior ministry officials. Bus and taxi drivers are also on strike in Addis Ababa; workers in four provincial capitals have con- ducted short strikes. The strikers, encouraged by government con- cessions to other workers last month, mainly want higher wages or the redress of other par- ticular grievances, such as the right to form their own union or the removal of unpopular admin- istrators. Few of the groups say they have lost confidence in the government's willingness to fulfill promises to improve workers' economic conditions, They are simply impatient to gain as many concrete benefits as possible while the gov- ernment's bargaining position is weak. Reformist military elements, meanwhile, are keeping up pressure on the government. Junior and nor.-commissioned officers of the Tenth Mechanized Br;.;;ade, thn army's most prestigious unit, took over the city of Jijiga in eastern Ethi- opia for four days Iasi. week. They arrested several senior officers and some customs officials for alleged corruption. The troops returned to their barracks after the government reportedly prom- ised to curb rising grain prices. A few days earlier, troops of the Third Division succeeded in forcing the removal of the deputy chief of staff of the Ethiopian Aimy. Police units in several areas, having grievances similar to those of the soldiers, also registered their complaints by jailing their officers until their demands were met. Haile Selassie stated on April 14 that his 21-year-old grandson, Tara Yacob, was in the line of succession, which n- ay take some of the heat out of at least one potentially divisive issue. It reduces the chances of a struggle-and possible civil strife-among other claimants who might have stepped forward if Haile Selassie became incapacitated and Crown Prince Asfa Wossen were unable to assume the emperor's duties. Asfa Wossen suffered a stroke a little over a year ago, and cabinet officials and military leaders doubt if he could perform effectively. The added legiti- macy given Zara Yacob's position has set the stage for Asfa Wossen to be eased completely out of the line of succession on the grounds of pcor Page 19 Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 25X1 The first phase of the UN's General Assem- bly on raw materials and development, which opened on April 9, will end on April 23 after the last addresses to plenary meetings of the assem- bly. The second, working phase, however, has already begun with the establishment earlier this week o', an open-ended, ad hoc committee and a working group to review drafts of a declaration of principles and an action program prepared by the nonal;gned and developing states. These states, under Algerian leadership, have been the driving force behind the UN session. Work in both the ad hoc committee and its working group has been slow, and there is some doubt that the committee will complete its work by April 29 when the special session is expected to adjourn. The paragraph-hy-paragraph examination of the draft declaration has revealed several difficult issues, the most contentious being "permanent soverei,- ty over natural resources." This call for the right of states to nationalize their natural resources and be the sole judges of compensation, which has been a central theme of the developing states' program, is opposed by the developed states. To date, most differences in negotiating the declaration have occurred between the devel- oped states--including the USSR-and the devel- oping states-to which China claims membership. This split is reflected even on those points of the declaration on which some progress has been made: ? improving terms of trade for developing states; ? reform of the international monetary system to favor developing states; and ? granting developing states preferential access for their goods to the markets of devel- oped states without reciprocal preferences for the developed states. Real differences, however, also exist among the developing states. The poor oil-importing states have been the most adversely affected by the increase in oil prices and have looked to the oil producers for relief. The solidarity of the nonaligned and deve'iopitig group could well de- pend on resolution (f this issue. As many as ten different proposals have ;peen made-ranging from multi-tier oil pricing to oi' right grants and low- interest, long-term lowrs from oil earnir:;s re- cycled through the Inter,iational M,iiietary Fund-but few commitments have been received on funding. The oil-importing states, perhaps still hopeful of receiving direct bilalar,~! aid from Arab oil producers if multilateral aid is not forth- coming, have generally refrained from sharp criti- cism of the oil producers. Many of their speeches have noted the example set for suppliers of oth.;r raw materials by the oil producers with their embargo and price increase. They could, however, still break the ranks of the nonaligned and de- veloping group if they see no support coming from their more fortunate brethren. While the proposal of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to establish an aid fund has not caught fire, support may be in- creasing for an internationally administered aid program to be financed, in part, by excess Arab oil revenues. The managing director of the Inter- national Monetary Fund expressed qualified opti- mism about this approach after his recent tour of several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. The UN session itself will clearly riot resolve the very peal conflicts of interest inherent in trade in raw materials and its relation to the larger and longer term question of economic development. The generally restrained tone of the session and the raising of several proposals for global ap- proaches to the development problem may never- theless serve as a springboard for future examina- tion of specific issues in forums more suited to the particular problem. Moreover, although the nonaligned - devel- oping country group commands enough votes in the UN to force a resolution endorsing its pro- gram, the possibility of a confrontation is miti- gated somewhat by awareness that the industrial- ized states might retaliate by withholding aid to the least developed of the poor countries. Page 20 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 The complex political and economic cross- currents were, of course, reflected in the -- creches to thEl session. Algerian President Bou, ~diene, who called for the UN meeting last Januar /, set a more business-like tone for the session than many observers had expected. While he avoided iii;1am- matory and provocative rhetoric, Bou-nediene nevertheless was uncompromising in his call frr a new world economic order and his condemnation of existing economic disparities between develop- ing and developed states. Soviet Foreit_~, Minister Gromyko expressed solidarity with the developing states and rejected attempts 4.o polarize the world into camps of rich and poor countries-where the socialist states would be lumped together with the 'est's devel- oped economies. Chinese Vice , iemier Teng Hsiao-ping, on the other hand, called for the third world to overthrow super power control and viciously attacked the Soviet Union as being an especially exploitative, neo-colonialist plunderer. Secretary Kissinger's speech was generally well received, with most countries expressing sat- isfaction with his call for recognition of world- wide interdependence and endorsing the US pro- posals for liberalized trade, sharing of food-pro- ducing technology, and increased aid for the poorest developing states. Iran, however, criti- cized the speech as a "gross mis.?epresentation" of the causes of high oil prices, repeating Tehran's standard argument that the main reasons for high retail prices are excessive oil company profits and high taxes levied by consumer countries. Tehran alleged that the Secretary was calling for con- sumer nations to band together to prevent further action by producer cartels-an idea Iran labeled a INTERNATIONAL MONEY Central bankers are increasingly uneasy about international money market prospects. A': a closed meeting last week in Basel, centrai bank governors expressed concern that growing politi- cal and economic uncertainties in Italy and France will lead to massive speculative move- ments of capital from these countries. Such out- flows, the governors believe, would complicate the market's task of recycling surplus oil-producer revenue to consuming countries. Bank of Italy officals were optimistic that capital outflows from their country can be con- trolled, but this view was not shared by the other bankers. Administrative measures aimed at curb- ing these outflows have not be'n effective in the past. In addition, the central bankers feel that Rome will have to end its costly defense of the lira, even though a decline in its value probably would provoke further speculative outflows of funds. The Bank of Italy has used the proceeds of recent massive Eurodollar loans to support the lira. Market intervention in the first quarter cost about $3 billion, or twice the present foreign- exchange reserves. Because indebtladness now ex- ceeds $10 billion, Italy will find further borrow- ing more difficult and expensive. The franc is much stronger than the lira because of France's relatively healthier balance of payments, but it is weaker than the mark and vulnerable to speculative capital movements. The central bankers apparen-ily believe that fears of an election victory by Socialist candidate Francois Mitterrand could lead to sizable capital move- ments ,rom France. Similar fears during the last presidential election intensified market pressure on the franc. 25X1 Investors already are seeking safer havens for their funds, and large capital outflows to London and Switzerland have been reported. If the trend continues, Paris will have only two major options: to accept a weaker franc, at least until after the election; or to intervene in the foreign-exch_ age market, which would further deplete France's for- eign-exchange reserves. Page 21 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 COLOMBIA TO ELECT A PRESIDENT Colombia's first authentic presidential elec- tion in 24 years will take place on April 21, with Liberal Party candidate Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, a slightly left-of-(enter reformer, the overwhelm- ing favorite. The new president will be inaugu- rated on August 7, For the past 16 years, Colombian politics have been dominated by the National Front, an artificial coalition of Liberal and Conservative parties that is now ertiing. It was established as a means of assuring political peace after th D ouster of dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1957. The last presidential election before Rojas' take-over was in 1950. Lopez' principal opponent is Alvaro Gomez Hurtado, a moderate Conservative whose efforts to divorce himself from the image of his extremist father, the monumentally unpopular president who was deposed by Rojas, have been unsuccess- ful. Gomez is likely to win about 35 percent of the vote, to Lopez' 45 - 50 percent. Also in the running is Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, Rcjas' daughter and hopeful recipient of the populist vote among the millions of poor who once supported her father and the party he founded, The National Popular Alliance (ANAPO). Changing times, the advanced age and ill health of her father, the slow but sure collapse of ANAPO, and resistance to the idea of voting for a woman have conspired against Mrs. Moreno's political ambitions. She is not likely to receive more than 12 or 13 percent of the vote. Two minor candidates can be expected to share less than 6 percent. The campaigning candidates have empha- sized economic issues, in general refraining from personal attacks. Lopez has assailed the inflation, food shortages, and budget deficits that have plagued tthe incumbent Conservative adminis- tration of President Pastrara. Gomez has been vague and defensive, championing generalized economic develo?)ment. Mrs. Moreno has pro- moted herself as an alternative to the Liberal- Conservative establishment and has appealed to the lower classes with a promise of "Colombian socialism." Scattered acts of violence have marred the campaign, but this has come as no surprise in a country which experienced open political warfare between Liberals and Conservatives during the 1940s and early 1950s. President Pastrana, whose assiduous aloofness from the campaign has out- raged some of his Conservative colleagues, can be expected to control this s oradi electoral vio- lence. 25x1 BRAZIL: RESTLESS STUDENTS Student unrest has led to large demonstra- tions and other forms of political activity, which, Page 22 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 - Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 if they continue or intensify, could lead the administration to reinstitute repressive measures against the dissidents. For some time, University of Sao Paulo stu- dernts have been dissatisfied with a number of administrative policies at the school. The latest outLreak, however, was sparked by the arrest of some 30 of their colleagues suspected of trying to organize a subversive student movement. Security officials charge that some of those arrested have links with outlawed revolutionary groups. Another cause of the increased student ac- tivism may have been the arrest of seven Sao Paulo union leaders whose activities had aroused government suspicions, The seven were accused of being subversives, or at least of being under the influence of alleged subversive elements within a church-connected social organization working with them. The university students have organized a "Committee for the Defense of Political Pris- oners," whose purpose is to aid those detained by the government. The committee also calls for freedom of assembly and speech, and other forms of liberalization. Other student groups are seeking the support of workers, churchmen, and opposi- tion politicians in their quest for a variety of political aims. Throughout the ten-year history of the mili- tiiry regime, significant opposition-to the extent that there has been any-has come from students, liberal clergy, and some labor groups. The admin- istration is undoubtedly concerned that these groups may have misinterpreted its intentik i to seek a limited easing of politicai controls and are taking liberties. That possibility is likely to give weight to the argument of security officials that firm action is needed now to prevent the spread 25X1 PERON AND THE TERRORISTS The shooting and kidnaping of a USIS repre- sentative in Cordoba by Marxist terrorists apparent;,, signals a shift in tactics to include atf-?icks on US Government officials in Argentina. The Peron government, viewing the accelerating tempo of violence with a mounting sense of alarm, is urgently seeking a dramatic break- through in its campaign to stamp out terrorism. As the level of confrontation edges r:p a notch, however, a fresh wave of violence seems in- evitable. The ubiquitous terrorists have been un- daunted by the government's proclaimed in- tention to crack down on them. The best organ- ized of the groups, the Marxist People's Revolu- tionary Army, has shown little inclination to let up its pressure, and its hand is evident in many of the bombings, kidnapings, and political assassina- tions that have become a part of everyday life in the country. The Marxist group, which has now targeted members of the US mission in Argentina, was probably responsible for recent telephone threats afgairist military officers assigned to the US Eml?assy in Buenos Air^s. Although these terror- ists are not likely to eschew attacks against for- eign businessmen, their change of focus is prob- ably attributable to the swelling exodus of alien executives and the staggering success of their ear- lier ransom and extortion efforts. By taking a new tack, the Marxist gr'iup may hope to obtain additional publicity fc r its an- nounced aim of attacking "imperia;lsm." More- over, abductions of US officials cov?ld be used in attempts to force the release of imprisoned terror- ists or to create a further source of embarrass- ment for the Peron government. 25X1 By generating an atmosphere of political confusion and uncer- tainty, the left-wing extremists hope to ft;,., the groundwork for chaos after Peron's death. The reasoning appears to be that if civil war can be provoked, the left might have a chance to rise to power. While this prospect seems remote, the Marxist group nevertheless has shown a remark- able ability to operate virtually unchecked. Page 23 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000050005-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7 Meanwhile, Peron is atternptiroy to inject now blood into the government's counterterrorist program and is urging more aggressive action. Another shuffle was made in the federal police hierarchy after it became clear that the President was dissatisfied with its failure to produce results. Ironically, these frequent command changes, to- gether with internal dissension and poor morale, seem to be contributing to police ineffectiveness. As a result, a drarnatic victory against the ex- tremists continues to elude the security forces. While Feron is taking steps to eliminate extremist influence from government ministries dnd the universities, there are still no signs that he will be able to reverse the tide of terrorism in the near future. Page 24 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 19, 74 Approved For Release 2009/04/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01000050005-7