WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 18, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Weekly Review
Top Secret
April 18, 1975
Copy
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N2 658
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CONTENTS (Aprd 18,1975)
'I he VV[: lsLY REVIEW, issued every F=riday morning by the
Gffic of Current Intelligence, ref--ports and analyzes significant
(cv ,opr ients c J the week through noon on Thursday. It fle-
quentlv includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office )f Strategic
Rcccercl?, the Office of Ge x;rapliic end Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and
therefore published separately as Special Rcpcrts are listed
in the c ..Rents.
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
1 Indochina
3 Lebanon: New Violence
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
4 Egypt: Diverting Attention
5 Syria-Iraq: Troubled Waters
6 Israel: Washington; New Aircraft
7 Chad: Tombalbaye Killed in Coup
8 India-Sikkim: Another Ste{.
9 Aegean: Tensions Ease
10 Turkey: A Narrow Virtnrv
roducer-Consumer Talks Collapse
Portugal: New
Nationalization Measures
Spain: Speculation about Franco
IV UbbH: Congress Plans;
Slowly on Geneva
21 China May Be Cutting
25X1 Military Manpower
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
22 Peru: Velasco Reappears
23 Argentina: Modest Victory
23 Brazil: Majority Party Problems
24 Chile: Man with a Mission
25 Cuba: A Draft Constitution
26 Honduras: Repercussions
from Neighbors
27 Colombia: State of Siege
23 Law of the Sea:
Midpoint Appraisal
SPECIAL
REPORT (Published separately)
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Review
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INDOCHINA
Vietnam: Closing on Saigon
The government's position east of Saigon
appears to be deteriorating, and there are in-
creasing signs that the communists are preparing
to intensify their attacks close to the capital
itself.
Along the central coast, a North Vietna-
mese force spearheaded by tanks broke through
government defenses this week and captured the
provincial capital of Phan Rang and its nearby
airfield. The South Vietnamese had moved re-
inforcements to the area, but they were no
match for the three communist divisions con-
centrated around the town. Only a few govern-
ment troops escaped; others are unaccounted
for. The government's remaining enclave along
the coast, Phan Thiet, is under pressure and will
fall soon.
South Vietnamese troops at Xuan Loc have
fought well for the past week, but they too
appear to be outmanned and outgunned. The
communists are known to have massed three full
divisions-together with armor, artillery, and air
defense units-at Xuan Loc, and captured docc.
ments indicate teat elements of a fourth division
may have moved into the area. The govern-
ment's one infantry division, reinforced by air-
borne and armor units, at Xuan Loc is in danger
of being isolated and destroyed.
Northeast of Saigon, the communists have
attacked the big air base at Bien Hoa, from
which the South V'etiiarnese mount tactical air
operations. Sappers have penetrated the base
and, more recently, North Vietnamese gunners
have used their heavy artillery to shell the base.
An artillery attack closed Bien Hoa for approxi-
mately six hours on April 15.
In the delta, the fighting has temporarily
eased. The government has used its firepower to
good advantage thus far to counter communist
attacks on Can Tho, the most important city in
the delta, and to keep vital Route 1 open to
Saigon. Despite ttiese setbacks, however, three
communist divisions have moved into position
for new attacks along Route 4 in the northern
delta. The two South Vietnamese divisions
assigned to keep the highway open will be hard
pressed to meet this threat.
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Fighting also is likely to intensify along the
western approaches to Saigon and close to the
capital itself over the next few days. Communist
planning calls for a major drive along Route 1
west of Saigon, and the North Vietnamese 9t:h
Division has been spotted moving into Hau
Nghia Province.
the 9th will soon launch a major assault agains
the South Vietnamese 25th Division, which is
defending this approach to Saigon. Other report-
ing also indicates the communists will attack the
fringes of Saigon, and sapper units could pene-
trate the inner defenses of the city.
The attacks along the three major ap-
proaches to Saigon will keep many of the gov-
ernment's forces tied down, leaving the capital
dangerously vulnerable to heavy attacks from
the north, a weakness that the communists will
soon be in position to exploit. At least six
communist divisions, including four reserve
units from North Vietnam, are moving toward
Military Region 3. The headquarters of a North
Vietnamese army corps is fast approaching this
Can Th
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region from the northeast, and at least one of its
four divisions is now in the area north of Saigon.
This looming communist threat is pro-
ducing a mood of deep pessimism in Saigon. A
recent sampling of opinion in the capital seems
to reflect a general consensus that ddequate US
assistance will not be available and that the
communists are too strong to hold off. Tali- of
US evacuation plans for Americans and South
Vietnamese is adding to the sense of impending
disaster.
Some middle-level government officials are
adopii:.g the attitude that the Americans are the
"only card" they have left and that evacuation
of Americans sh.juld not be permitted unless
guarantees for their own safety are made. More
directly, several government officials have
waned of reprisals and disorder if the US tries
to evacuate its personnel without taking along
friendly South Vietnamese.
A number of military personnel and some
leading government officials fled to T;-ailand
aboard military aircraft. The small-scale exodus
is likely to continue for several days as military
aircraft fly out of the few provincial enclaves
that have not yet run up the white flag.
The f!u.,,-h of victory will quickly pale for
the commun'sts aE they try to cope with the
problems they have inherited. Nearly four mil-
lion people will now become the responsibility
of the new regime, and stocks of basic com-
modities are low. To ease the situation, the
communists apparently intend to evacuate large
numbers of city-dwellers and refugees to the
countryside, but conditions there will nct be
much better. Ever. before they can start ti ink-
ing about postwar reconstruction, the new
regime will have to seek rapid and liberal outside
assistance to help sustain the pzopidation
through the coming months.
Cambodia: The Agony Ends
The string ran out for the republican gov-
ernment this week as Khmer communist forces
entered Phnom Penh and accepted the capital's
surrender. At week's end, only fragmentary re-
ports were reaching the outside, but it appeared
that the take-over was effected in a fairly
orderly fashion. Following a government order
to its troops to lay down their arms, insurgent
spokesmen met with senior government military
officers, and then the insurgents went on Phnom
Penh's radio to ask for calm. The communist
leadership is apparently waiting outside the city
while second-echelon insurgent officers oversee
the occupation. As yet, there are few clues as to
Prince Sihanouk's plans, but his eve'itual return
to Phnom Penh as a figurehead leader seems
assured.
Once in full control of the country, the
communists will begin imposing their brand of
Marxism on Cambodia as a whole. Essentially,
this means the countrywide implementation of
programs long udder way in communist-con-
trolled territory, including the socialization of
the economy and a replacement of the tradi-
tional administrative system by a centralized
goy -rnment under the leadership of the Khmer
Communist Party; such measures have not gone
down well with the land-proud and indepen-
dent-minded Cambodian peasantry and over the
years have caused almost two million peasants
to abandon their farms. Smoldering resentment
among those that have remained behind has on
occasion resulted in small-scale uprisings which
the communists have put down ruthlessly. The
Cambodian communists can probably he ex-
pected, however, to push their efforts to regi-
ment and collectivize Khmer society relent-
lessly, using force where necessary.
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Lebanon: New Violence
Radical fedayeen and militia of the right-
wing Phalanges Party engaged in armed clashes
for several days this week in Beirut. The Leba-
nese army and the major, less radical fedayeen
groups stayed mostly on the sidelines. A cease-
fire went into effect on April 16, but the
dispute left the security situation unsettled and
Prime Minister Sulh's government fundamen-
tally divided.
Leaders of the three most radical fedayeen
groups that carried on most of the fighting met
with their more moderate colleagues in Beirut
on April 16 and agreed to go along with the
'ease-fire. They presumably were persuaded to
take this step by their own heavy losses and by
doubts that the larger fedayeen organizations,
Fatah and Saiqa, would enter the fighting in
force.
The fighting-the worst in Lebanon since
the major clash between the fedayeen and the
army in early 1973-grew out of a dispute be-
tween a radical Palestinian and a policeman at a
roadblock in a Phalangist-controlled area of
Beirut. Before the cease-fire w;as declared, more
than 150 persons were killed and many more
were wounded. Sporadic firing continued after
the accord was announced, but it apparently
was the work of isolated groups on both sides.
As announced by Sulh, the cease-fire agree-
ment obliges the two groups to withdraw all
their forces from public places. The accord is to
be enforced by the Lebanese internal security
services, which are to begin patrols of the dis-
puted areas accompanied by representatives of
the Phalangists and the fedayeen. A separate
understanding had been worked out curlier to
facilitate an exchange of hostages between the
two sides.
The Phalangists accepted the cease-fire
only after suffering heavy property damage and
many casualties. President Franjiyah and other
Christian leaders apparently persuaded p, cy
leader Pierre Jumayyil that prolonged fighting
would bring in major fedayeen units, which
could quickly overwhelm the Phalangists. The
Phalangists are a strongly nationalist, Christian
political party that advocates strict control of
Palestinian refugees and fedayeen in Lebanon.
They are always ready to use their 5,000-mar
militia to defend their interests and what is, in
effect, Christian control of Lebanon's govern-
ment.
Leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation and the major fedayeen groups worked
behind the scenes to contain the fighting and to
help arrange the cease-fire. This strategy was
probably based on a conviction that a major
encounter with the Lebanese during the current
uncertainty over Middle East peace talks would
only play into the hands of Arabs who reject the
efforts to negotiate a settlement and reduce
further the likelihood that the PLO would be
invited to attend the Geneva conference when it
resumes. Actions taken by Zuhayr Muhsin, head
of the Syrian-controlled Saiqa organization, to
keep his followers out of the dispute suggest
that the Syrian government may also have
counseled restraint.
Prime Minister Sulh proved unable to con-
trol either the security situation or his own
cabinet; the cease-fire was negotiated primarily
by Lebanese political and religious leaders out-
side the government and by an official of the
Arab Leagt: Two cabinet member. sympa-
thetic to th;: Palestinians resigned during the
week, and three pro-Phalangist ministers have
threatened to follow suit. These resi,,n,ati ins, if
not withdrawn, could distort the ;eligious and
political balance of the cabinet to the point that
Sulh would be forced to step down as well. He is
already in a weak position as a result of his
handling of the disturbances that occurred last
month in the southern port city of Sidon. One
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President Sadat reshuffled the cabinet and
appointed a new prime minister this week. His
move appears to have been motivated largely by
a desire to divert popular attention from the
slow progress of peace negotiations and to reas-
sure the Egyptian people that there will be no
let-up in the government's program of economic
development.
Sadat's choice for prime minister was Inte-
rior Minister Maniduh Salim, a loyal supporter
of the President who apparently does not harbor
any personal political ambitions. Salim replaces
Abd al-Aziz Hijazi, who has been the chief tar-
get of popular criticism over continuing eco-
nomic ills. Hijazi, a competent economist, was
overburdened with specific economic duties on
top of his prime ministerial responsibilities.
At the same time, Sadat named air force
commander Husni Mubarak to be vice president,
an essentially powerless post that is no longer in
the line of succession to the presidency. Most
key cabinet posts remain in the same hands.
Both Foreign Minister Fahmi and War Minister
Gamassy have, in addition, been made deputy
prime ministers.
Open discontent over economic grievances
has traditionally risen in Egypt at times of diplo-
matic stagnation on the Arab-Israeli issue, and
signs of such discontent have been appearing in
recent months. The year began with a violent
outburst in Cairo by workers protesting Lom-
mod:Ity shortages and rising prices. Last month,
demonstrations by angry workers at a textile
plant in the Nile Delta led to serious violence
that resulted in at least ore death, scores of
arrests, and a week-lone shutdown of plan;
operations.
The appointment of Salim, who as interior
minister headed Egypt's security apparatus, will
signal malcontents that such public disturbances
will not be tolerated. Salim will be no better
able than Hijazi, however, to resolve Egypt's
basic economic problems, such as the inade-
quate system of roads and ports that impedes
the distribution of consumer goods. Moreover,
although two key economic ministries have been
President Sadat with newly appointed Prime Minister Mamduh Salim
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consolidated, the rest of the cabinet remains an
unwieldy conglomerate of 33 overlapping minis-
tries. The failure to streamline the cabinet
diminishes whatever prospects there were for
cutting through the bureaucratic maze that
hampered Hijazi and contributed to slowing eco-
nomic development.
SYRIA-IRAQ: TROUBLED WATERS
Relations between liaq and Syria, long
troubled by deep-seated hostility between their
competing wings of the pan-Arab Baath Party,
are seriously strained again. The latest flare-up
between the two regimes appears in part a
by-product of Iraq's recent rapprochement with
Iran, which made it possible for Baghdad to
wind up its struggle with its Kurdish rebels and
to pursue its differences with Syria more di-
rectly.
During the past month, the Iraqis appar-
er.~iy were involved with Syrians sympathetic to
the Baath Party of Iraq in an attempt to weaken
or overthrow the Syrian government. By April
8, some 400 Syrians reportedly were arrested
for complicity in what Syrian authorities
charged was a Baghdad-inspired conspiracy to
oust or assassinate President Asad. The Syrians
are said to have placed the Iraqi ambassador in
Damascus and his staff under surveillance and to
be harassing lower level Iraqi diplomats.
Publicly, the two sides have kept up a
steady stream of propaganda sniping and pos-
turing in recent weeks. The Syrian Baath Party's
Congress last week condemned the "suspicious
right-wing regime in Iraq, accusing it of collu-
sion with non-Arab Iran, of sabotaging Arab
solidarity, and abandoning the Palestinians. The
Iraqis, for their part, have condemned Damascus
for allegedly aiding the Kurds, for supporting
Washington's step-by-step approach to Arab-
Israeli negotiations, and for diverting the waters
of the Euphrates River.
The Syrians have denied responsibility for
the low water level in the part of the Euphrates
DAMASCUS
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rj'~orddn
that flows th; ,)ugh Iraq, claiming Turkey is to
blame. Last week, Damascus rejected Iraq's cal!
for an urgent meeting of Arab foreign ministers
to discuss Baghdad's Euphrates complaint.
Accjrding to the Egyptian press, Syria has
decided not to attend a regularly scheduled
Arab League meeting to be held early next week
for fear the Iraqis will press the Euphrates issue.
Syria could be altering the flow of the
Euphrates to retaliate for Baghdad's propaganda
attacks on Asad and the apparently increased
interference in Syrian affairs. Earlier this month,
the Syrians reportedly moved two armored regi-
ments and some paramilitary units into the envi-
rons of the Euphrates Dam as a precaution
against a possible Iraqi sabotage attempt.
Although the Syrians are clearly prepared
to take strong action against Iraqi intervention
in their domestic affairs, they will try to prevent
the dispute from growing to a point that might
affect Syria's relations with other Arabs. Da-
mascus is also apprehensive that Iraq might not
provide military support to Syria in the event of
another round of hostilities with Israel; it is
already questionable whether such assistance
would be forthcoming,
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FOCUS ON WASHINGTON
Israel celebrated its 27th anniversary this
week, but the real focus of its attention was
clearly Washington. Tel Aviv's information cam-
paign in the US, designed to explain its stand on
negotiations with the Arabs, swung into high
gear with the arrival this week of Foreign Min-
ister Allon, his predecessor Abba Eban, Prime
Minister Rabin's wife, and other prominent
Israelis. Former information minister Yariv and
ev defense minister Dayan had arrived earlier.
In the wake of the suspension of indirect
talks with Egypt a month ago, Tel Aviv's pri-
mary concern has become the future of its rela-
tions with the US. The government is obviously
concerned over Washington's open disappoint-
ment with Israel's position at the talks, and it is
apprehensive that this might adversely affect the
nature of US support for the Jewish state. Prime
Minister Rabin candidly referred to Allen's trip
this week as part of the "difficult struggle" the
government is waging to explain Israel's position
on negotiations.
Allon spoke at several large Jewish fund-
raising rallies in major US cities across the coun-
try this week. In his scheduled meeting with
Secretary Kissinger, Allon will probably press
for closer coordination of US-Israeli policy on
the Middle East. He will also be trying to obtain
a better reading on the implications for Israel of
Washington's current policy reassessment.
Prime Minister Rabin at the unveiling of the "Kfir"
Although Allon said prior to his departure
from Tel Aviv that he had no new official in-
structions, he is most likely prepared to discuss
various possibilities to revive negotiations with
Egypt. One such possibility reportedly involves
a proposal for an Israeli withdrawal from ap-
proximately half the Sinai in exchange for a
long-term assurance from Egypt that it will not
attack Israel. Tel Aviv, like Cairo, remains in-
terested in a resumption of separate Israeli-
Egyptian negotiations prior to a reopening of
the Geneva conference, but the Israelis appar-
ently prefer to await the outcome of Washing-
ton's policy reassessment before making any
specific new moves of their own.
Some Israelis have criticized the gov-
ernment for allowing the foreign minister to
visit the US soy soon after the suspension of
indirect talks with Egypt. Conservatives in
particular, including several in the cabinet,
apparently conclude that the trip could tempt
Washington into believing that Tel Aviv's resolve
to stick to its previous negotiating demands with
Egypt may be weakening. They are said to
believe that the government is unnecessarily
exposing itself directly to high-level US pressure
for Israeli concessions in order to revive the
talks with Cairo. Allon himself said just prior to
his dep,-irture that he was beginning to feel the
first signs of US pressure, but emphasized that
Israel will not be coerced into making con-
cessions.
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The Israelis apparently have begun series
production of their "super Mira e" fighter air-
cra rt.
One of these aircraft was shown tote public on
April 14, when the project was officially
unveiled in Tel Aviv.
The aircraft, which the Israelis call Kfir
(Lion Cub), has been under development for
about five years. The first of three prototypes
flew in mid-1973. The Israeli air force was
scheduled to begin receiving the aircraft in
September 1974, shortly after the Israelis were
to complete any project that involved the
assembly of 50 ' .age 5s from parts obtained
from France. The September deadline was not
met, however, probably because of the require-
ment placed on the Israeli aircraft industry to
recondition aircraft from the October war.
The Kfir, based on a modified Mirage 5
airframe, is powered by a single US J-79 en-
gine-the engine used in the F-4 Phantom. The
J-79 offers improved performance and greater
reliability than the Atar engine used in the
French Mirage III and Mirage 5 circraft. The
Kfir, which can fly at twice the speed of sound,
reportedly will have both an interceptor and
ground-attack role, and is said to have a payload
of some 10,000 p"inds-nearly twice that of
the Mirage 5.
Componeiits for the aircraft are being man-
ufactured and assembled in Israel. The J-79
engine is being built under license from the US.
The production rate was originally set at about
two aircraft per month, but this rate may not be
possible in view of the other demands on the
Israeli aircraft industry. As many as 200 of the
aircraft ultimately may be produced, but only
some 60 to 100 are expected to go to the Israeli
air force. The Israelis may hope to find a market
for the remainder, which Israeli Defense Min-
ister Peres said on Monday will cost about $4
million each. They are likely to encounter
strono competition from the French, among
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The acting commander of Chad's armed
forces, Brigadier General Odingar, ousted Pres-
ident Tombalbaye on April 13 in a coup marked
by sharp fighting and the death of Tombalbaye,
Chad's only leader since independence in 1960.
Tombalbaye had appealed for help from France,
the former colonial power and Chad's principal
source of aid, but French forces stationed in
Chad did not intervene.
Two uays after the coup, a ruling military
council, composed of Odingar and eight other
officers, was formed. The council president is
General Mallourn, the well-respected former
armed forces commander who had been de-
tained by Tomba!baye since 1973 for alleged
coup-plotting. Col-)nel Djime, the commander
of the gendarmerie and one of three top military
leaders arrested by Tombalbaye early this
month, has been installed as council vice pres-
ident. The council has established four com-
missions to run the government and has prom-
ised additional appointments soon. The consti-
tution has been suspended, the National A:-em-
bly dissolved, and all political activity has been
banned.
Odingar's decision to move was probably
motivated in part by the late president's recent
public criticism of the army's lark< of leadership
and Tombalbaye's announceme,it last week that
he intended to reorganize the army. Odingar
may also have been influenced by widespread
dissatisfaction with government corruption and
maladministration as well as by the govern-
ment's inability to overcome chronic economic
stagnation that has been aggravated by six years
of serious drought in the area.
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The small semi-autonomous kingdom of
Sikkim came closer to full incorporation with
India this week, bringing sharp attacks on New
Delhi's "expansionist" policies by both Pakistan
and China.
Sikkim's hereditary ruler, the Chogyal, was
deprived of one of the last vestiges of inde-
pendent power on April 9 when his largely cere-
monial 400-member palace guard was disarmed,
after a brief skirmish, by Indian troops stationed
in Sikkim. The Indians acted in response to a
request from the chief min :ter of Sikkim, a
long-time opponent of the Chogyal. The follow-
ing day, the Sikkimese legislature voted
unanimousiy to abolish the monarchy and to
seek full statehocd in the Indian :anion. In a
hastily arranged referendum on April 14, Sikki-
mese voters ratified the legislature's action by
overwhelming margins. The Chogyal now ap-
pears to be under palace arrest in Gangtok.
The Inoians have announced their inten-
tion to take th' necessary constitutional action
to make Sikkim the 22nd Indian state. Attempts
to rally support for the Chogyal and against
incorporation of Sikkim into India can be
handled easily by Indian police and the approx-
imately 100,000 Indian troops in the state. The
Chogyal presumably will be forced into exile.
The latest events follow several months of
increasing tension between the Chogyal and the
elected government led by the chief minister.
Each side has accused the other of instigating
attempted assassinations. The chief minister has
repeatedly called on New Delhi to intervene and
remove the Chogyal, who is accused of refusing
to abide by the constitution. The chief minister
and his followers represent the ethnic Nepalese
majority that gained effective power two years
ago. They want to abolish all remnants of the
traditional political system, which had been
dominated by the ethnic minority headed by
the Chogyal.
For the past several years, India has fol-
lowed an ambiguous course; it has been intent
on expanding its role under a 1950 treaty as
protector of Sikkim but at the same time
seemed concerned that removal of the Chogyal
could lead to increased instability in the small
but strategically important state. In 1973, New
Delhi intervened in Sikkim following disorders
in Gangtok and was instrumental in establishing
new constitutional order that relegated the
Chogyal to a figurehead role. Last September,
the Indian parliament voted to make Sikkim an
associate state.
New Delhi clairns to have tried to mediate
between the Chogyal and the chief mink er, but
it recently made clear publicly that l. sym-
pathies lay with the chief minister -.nd his
supporters. Public statements by the Chogyal,
during his attendance -it the coronation of the
Nepalese king in February, emphasizing
Sikkim's "separate identity" and his meetings
then with foreign diplomats apparently angered
officials in New Delhi.
Islamabad, which continues to fear what it
regards as India's hegemonic designs on South
Asia, issued an official statement on April 11
denouncing the events in Sikkim as an "annexa-
tion by force." The statement accused New
Delhi of again demonstrating a predilection to
use force in ordering its relations with its smaller
neighbors.
Articles in the Chinese press have con-
demned New Delhi's "expansionist" actions and
have alleged-as Peking did last September-that
th Soviets are backing the Indians in these
moves. The comments contain no threats, how-
ever, and are generally lower key than the
Chinese reaction last year.
Events in Sikkim will be of great concern
in both Nepai and Bhutan, vhere distrust of
India's intentions toward its Himalay.n neigh-
bors already existed. Both governments, aware
of their nations economic dependence on
Indian goodwill, will be %vary of ex ressin their
fears publicly. 25X1
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AEGEAN: TENSIONS EASE
The chances of a serious incident in the
Aegean have lessened for the moment, following
nearly a month of tension while Greece and
Turkey again tested each other's resolve on the
issues.
the Turks have
s seen a ei -reconnaissance flights over thr^_a
Greek islands in the eastern Aegean. These
flights had brought the two countries close to a
situation from which neither could have backed
down easily.
Greek officials have stated that Athens
would nol allow any more Turkish overflights of
the islands. This Greek resolve has not been put
to a test, however, and presumably will not be
tested anytime soon because of the Turkish
decision to halt the flights. The Turks appar-
ently decided heir information on Greek arma-
ment;, fortifications, and manpower on the
three islands is sufficient and that further over-
flights are not necessary at this time.
Turkish military leaders, nevertheless, will
begin a planning session on April 24 that v ill
include further work on contingency steps for
invading these three islands should the Greeks
take some aggressi%e action. Turkish plans re-
portedly call f-r the seizure of at least two of
the isla;rds quickly to it is not feasible to occupy
attacked after the first two had been secured
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Meanwhile, a high-level official in the
Greek Foreign Ministry hL, admitted to the US
embassy that Athens has sent troops to the
Dodecanese and other islands in contravention
of international treaties. He said the action was
necessary because Turki.,h leaders have re-
peatedly made threatening statements about the
islands. A relatively large buildup of Greek
forces on six major islands has, in fact. been
going on ..ince last summer and is continuing.
TURKISH SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS
OVER GREEK ISL'ANDS REDUCES, AT25X1
LEAST MPOR'1RILY, THE CHANCE
OF A SERIOUS INCIDENT. 25X1
Tirmia
ALBANIA 1
Chien Snmon
y a
honor'
lento
GREECE ol~ t is r, F:,+ V
c 1 stn
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TURKEY: A NARROW VICTORY
The newly installed government of Prime
Minister Suleyman Demirel won a vote of con-
fidence this week, ending a seven-month polit-
ical impasse. The narrowness of the vote-222
votes for the government and 218 against-
.illustrates the fragility of the Nationalist Front
coalition and the difficulties it will have in
getting legislation through parliament.
Demirel's four-party right-wing coalition
controls only 210 seats in the 450 member
parliament. He was able to win his narrow
victory only because of support from some
independent deputies and the absence of several
opposition members. This adds up to a very
shaky parliamentary base for a coalition that is
riddled with internzl inconsistencies. Whether all
the independent deputies will continue to sup-
port the Nationalist Front in parliament is
uncertain.
Feelings were running high during the
voting, which was interrupted by fist fights. The
speaker of the National Assembly later suffered
a mild heart attack. Party crossovers prior to the
vote created considerable bitterness, suggesting
that Demirel will have an unusually hostile
opposition, in addition to the problems involved
in holding the coalition together.
The Nationalist Front coalition partners
are united primarily by their desire to be in the
government and avoid elections. One of the
partners-the Islamic-oriented National Salva-
tion Party-is noted for its uncooperative and
obstructionist tactics; it was instrumental in
breaking up the previous government in which it
participaked along with former prime minister
Ecevit's party.
The Salvationists, who challenge Turkey's
choice of Western models for its modernization,
oppose foreign private investment and tourism
and advocate a vague, utopian economic policy.
Their hording of several important economic
portfolios-the price Demirel had to pay to get
his coalition together-does not bode well for
the economy.
Another weakness of the Demirel govern-
ment is its dependence on the small pan-Turkish
National Action Party, a group even more
extreme than the Salvationists. Led by Alpaslan
Turkes, the strong man of the 1960 military
coup, this national socialist party boasts of its
right-wing "commandos," although their num-
bers are probably nowhere near the 100,000
claimed. The "commandos," many of whom
belong to the party's youth wing, specialize in
Demirel and his government
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Current Party Lineup in Parliament
Party Seats
Justice Party* 150
National Salvation Party* 48
Republican Reliance Party* 9
National Action Party* 3
Republican People's Party 188
Democratic Party 31
Turkish Unity Party 1
Independents 16
(Unfilled) 4
450
stirring up trouble between left- and right-wing
students. Clashes between extreme rightists and
leftists have in fact been occurring at a fairly
high rate during recent weeks and can be ex-
pected to continue.
Both of the extreme right parties in the
coalition take a hard line on Cyprus and can be
expected to oppose giving up any of the ter-
ritory now held by the Turkish Cypriots. Both
also oppose Turkey's membership in NATO and
the EC. Although Demirel and his new foreign
minister are experienced and moderate figures,
they will have a difficult time keeping their
colleanues in line.
Demirel's success in forming a government
will undoubtedly postpone a much-needed elec-
tion. Although there is no guarantee that a new
election would end the current indecisive bal-
ance of strength among the parties, at least it
would offer that prospect, particularly if the
electoral law is changed. Only Ecevit-who
would benefit most-really wants new elections.
The army, which dislikes Demirel and
forced him to resign in 1971, will probably
maintain a "hands off" policy unless there is a
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dramatic rise in civil unrest or Demirel attempts
to take some form of revenge against the mili-
tary. If Demirel survives until summer, he will
be abie to use the annual military promotions,
reassignments, and retirements to try to build
support within the army and re in its -
dence. 25X1
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Prime Minister Wilson's performance in
Parliament last week brought success on two
important votes on the EC membership ques-
tion, but at the cost of increased friction be-
tween the pro- and anti-marketeers within his
own Labor Party. Wilson's next hurdle is the
special Labor Party conference, whr. e his stand
on the EC question will again come under at-
tack. The overnment has now decided that the
country-wiJe referendum on EC membership
will be held on June 5, earlier than expected,
because it fears that a lengthy and heated cam-
paign will alienate the voters.
The House of Commons voted 396 to 170
in support of the government's recommendation
that the UK continue its EC membership, a
more lop-sided tally than expected. The major-
i,y was more than twice as large as in the vote in
October 1971, when Parliament opted to join
the EC. Wilson, however, fell eight votes short
of carrying his own party in Parliament on this
vcte. The related referendum bill also sailed
through its second reading in Commons by a
margin of 64 votes, largely because the govern-
ment made some concessions on the method of
tailying the vote. Both major parties are allow-
ing their members of Parliament to disregard
party discipline on the question.
The government now must push the refer-
endum bill to final enactment before June 5.
The principal difficulty appears to be the likely
p!ethora of proposed amendments. The govern-
ment hopes to finish in time to recess Parlia-
ment about May 24 tc allow members to partici-
pate in the pre-referendum campaign.
Confrontations between the pro- and anti-
marketeers within the Labor Party have been
highly publicized in recent weeks. Three "confi-
dential" party documents published in a leading
London newspaper revealed fundamental dis-
agreements within the party in embarrassing
detail. Following his announcement of the code
of conduct for government ministers during the
EC debate, Wilson was defied by a non-cab;net
minister who spoke against the government's
position. Wilson promptly fired him, enraging
left-wing, anti-market militants. In addition, the
press reported threats to resign by Prime Min-
ister Wilson and two anti-market cabinet mem-
bers during a stormy cabinet meeting about the
code of conduct. Wilson also threatened to walk
out of the session.
During this period of internal party fric-
tion, Employment Secretary Foot, an anti-
marketeer, and Jack Jones, head of Britain's
largest trade union and also an anti-marketeer,
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have emerged as peacemakers. Only the reported
intervention oy Foot kept Wilson from bolting
the cabinet meeting. For his part, Jones tried to
persuade the junior minister not to defy
Wilson's code of conduct. Concerned about
party unity, Jones felt that the minister's ac-
tion; would place other anti-EC government of-
ficials in the awkward position of appearing not
to stand up for their own convictions.
Wilson's government next faces the special
Labor Party conference on April 26. Although
this meeting is expected to disapprove continu-
ing EC member.,hip, several unions may break
ranks with the Trades Union Congress and make
the vote closer than earlier expected, giving a
boost to the pro-marketeers.
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Talks between oil-producing and oil-
consuming states collapsed this week after fail-
ure to reach agreement on an agenda for a
proposed international conference to be held
this summer. Both sides agreed to remain in
contact, but there is little hope an early com-
promise will be reached over the major issue-
how raw materials would be treated at the
proposed conference.
The developed countries-represented by
the US, the EC, and Japan-argued for an
agenda focusing on energy and energy-related
issues. They were willing to discuss raw material
issues as they related to energy, but opposed
any efforts to link the price of oil with the price
of imports from the industrialized countries.
The oil-producing states-represented by
Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela-and
the developing states-represented by Brazil,
India, and Zaire-demanded that equal impor-
tance be given to the economic problems of the
Third World. Algeria, self-appointed spokesman
for the seven, insisted that the full conference
give equal emphasis to both raw materials and
development aid as well as energy, and that the
conference address the problems of export-earn-
ings stability and inflation. Participants were
also sharply divided over demands by the devel-
oped states to grant observer status to the Inter-
national Energy Agency. Algeria branded the
energy agency an organization designed for
confrontation.
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I I
The French, who originally called for the
conference and had the most prestige to gain
from its success, made strenuous efforts to find
common ground. Early this week, the partici-
pants hoped that French President Giscard's
visit to Algiers would produce a compromise,
but it did not. The developed countries and the
seven remained united throughout the ten clays
of negotiation.;. The US, the EC, and Japan met
daily to coordinate the position of the de-
veloped countries with the member states of the
International Energy Agency. The representa-
tives of the developing states and the less radical
o:1-producing states consistently supported
Algeria's determination to establish the inclu-
sion of raw materials as a sine qua non f
Portugal
NEW NATIONALIZATION MEASUHES
In ar' ^ffort to get a grip on the faltering
economy and to establish firmly their own
radical economic program, Portuguese leaders
this week announced further broad national-
ization measures. The Portuguese church hier-
archy, meanwhile, has thrown its support
behind moderate parties in the coming election
in an effort to slow the country's precipitate
move to the left.
Following up on its nationalization of
banks and insurance companies last month, the
government announced on April 16 that it ha:,
now extended its control in many key indus-
tries, including transportation. Fourteen firms
producing electric power, four petroleum com-
panies, and one steel company, as well as the
main rail, maritime, and air transport services,
have been nationalized. In addition, the petro-
chemical, pharmaceutical, heavy machinery,
tobacco, concrete, beer, fertilizer, and cellulose
industries, as well as shipyards, are slated for
government intervention. A seizure of large land
holdings in the south was also announced.
The nationalization Measures follow guide-
lines issued last week by the Revolutionary
Council to combat Portugal's economic ills--
underutilized production capacity, reduced in-
vestment levels, a soaring balance of payments
deficit, and rampant inflation. The government
also announced a national employment program
to deal with growing numbers of unemployed,
as well as price controls on food staples. The
guidelines further call for wage controls and
greater worker "control" of production.
Portugal's deepening economic crisis is
largely a result of the revolutionary regime's
own mismanagement. Its policies have fostered
industrial anarchy--with workers seizing fac-
tories-given rise to phenomenal wage increases,
and generally discouraged foreign investment.
Repeated attempts ~,y Western countries to lend
economic assistance have been frustrated by the
new leaders' inability to identify worthwhile
projects. The Movement, failing to admit its
own shortcomings, continues to hide behind rev-
olutionary jargon and to blame the inherited
capitalist economic structure for its problems.
Meanwhile, Portuguese bishops have urged
Catholics to vote against parties participating in
the constituent assembly elections on April 25
whose principles violate Christian precepts.
Although the Portuguese Communist f ?nty and
the ultra-left parties are not mentioned specifi-
cally, local parish priests are expected to take
the bishops' statement as a signal to get out the
vote for the moderate parties. The bishops also
said that casting blank ballots was unacceptable.
Armed Forces Movement pnrsnnnel reportedly
have been urging undecided voters to leave their
ballots unmarke: , apparently in an effort to
reduce the margin of the expected moderate
majority.
The church appears to have decided to take
a stand now, after months of reticence on politi-
cal matters, in order to contribute to the moder-
ate parties' efforts to make a good election
showing, which they hope will demonstrate to
Movement leaders that there is little annular
support for their rarlirai policies.
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SPAIN: SPECULATION ABOUT FRANCO
Attention in Spain is increasingly being
focused on the prospects for the post-Franco
period, which many believe has already begun.
Extensive press coverage is being given to Prince
Juan Carlos and his role as the futu; e head of
state. These articles have reinforced recent
i umors that Franco may indeed be considering
relinquishing power, wholly or partially, some-
time this year.
At a meeting with editors late last month,
the minister of the National Movement re-
portedly explained that it is increasingly neces-
sary to prepare the public for the eventual tran-
sition of power. He said that the Spanish press
should begin such a campaign by building up the
public image of the Prince and by stressing the
political maturity of the people and their ability
to make the transition smoothly. Most of the
eoitors were reported to have left the meeting
with the impression that the succession is rap-
idly approaching and that a green light had been
given to write on it. A number of articles have
since been published, some of which have gone
so far as to suggest that a partial transfer of
power should take place in the near future.
The argument advanced by those favoring a
changeover now is that the monarchy should be
given an opportunity to function while Franco
is still alive and in a position to ensure a smooth
transfer of power. Possible elates mentioned are
July-the anniversary of the Nationalist uprisinq
that began the civil war--anL early fall--when a
new legislature will have been seated and a new
political year begun. One recent report alleges
that the changeover "will he a fact by June."
Press discussion of immediate succession
appears to stem -,ore from a desire that this
should take pla, than from solid indications
that Franco is contemplating stepping down.
Indeed, two regime figures have discounted such
a possibility. Second Deputy Prime Minister
Cabello de Alba, in a recent interview, was
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reported to have said that there was no aced to
speed up the succession because Franco is in
excellent health. Even more pointed was col-
umnist Emilio Romero, director of the National
Movement's daily Arrihu, who quoted "a crys-
tal-ciear source at the t,,p" to the offect that no
early transfer of power is contemplated.
The unprecedented public discussion of the
succession issue has been accompanied by in-
creasing evidence of political awareness among
junior and middle-grade officers.
the 25X1
feeling is growing among the younger officers
that recent developments in Portugal, increasing
anti-government leftist activity in Spain, and
growing social problems caused by economic
difficulties have made it imperative that genuine
political parties be organized and democratic
reforms initiated promptly but in
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Aii
The fifth round -)f the force reduction
talks in Vienna ended on April 17; the talks
will resume in mid-May. Both East and West
marked time during this round. The Soviets
and their allies offered a revised scenario for
negotiating their proposal of last October
that called for initial reductions of 20,000
men by both sides in 1975. They also of-
fered to an,end slightly their basic proposal
of November 1973. Eastern representatives
commented informally that they did not
expect the West to take these proposals
seriously, and were not surprised when the
Western delegations rejected them.
Neither East nor West have shown signs
during the round that they are overly dis-
turbed by the lack of progress. For their
part, the Soviets have never appeared to be
under the pressure of time during the talks.
Various Soviet officials have implied that
there would be no movement in Vienna
until the European security conference in
Geneva concludes in a satisfz -.,:pry manner.
In addition, there have been some indica-
tions that Moscow is aware that the West
might substantially modify its basic pro.
posals, and the Soviets apparently are con-
tent to await such an initiative.
The West Europeans, who have ex-
pressed some concern about the stalemate in
the past, apparently are also willing to wait
until the US formally proposes that the West
modify its position.
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Kosygin
USSR
PLANNING THE CONGRESS
The Soviet party Central Committee meet-
ing on April 16 signaled the start of preparations
for the 25th party congress and eliminated one
of the runners in the long-term race to succeed
General Secretary Brezhnev. The removal of
trade unions chief Aleksandr Shelepin from the
Politburo does little to clarify the succession
question, however, and additional moves within
the leadership could well occur before the con-
grkiss convenes.
Brezhnev was clearly in charge at the
plenum, delivering a report on plans for the next
congress, now set for February 24, 1976. For-
eign Minister Gromyko gave a report on foreign
affairs, which is usually given by Brezhnev. This
continues the show of greater colk,z'l"ity in the
leadership evident since the General Secretary's
illness this winter. Brezhnev has been limiting
his activities, thus allowing greater public ex?
posure for his colleagues.
Shelepin has long been regarded warily by
some of his colleagues as a dangerous combina-
tion of ability and ambition, and his departure
from the Kremlin removes a potential elem3nt
of instability in the leadership. In 1965, he
mounted a serious but unsuccessful challenge to
Brezhnev's leadership. When that failed, his
career took a precipitous slide. In 1967 he was
removed from the party Secretariat and given
the trade unions post-traditionally a powerless,
figurehead position. Shelepin's visit to England
and Scotland last month was greeted by a
tremendous outcry in the British press against
him personally as a former chief of the Soviet
secret police (KGB) and clearly hurt his pros-
pects for the future.
The decision setting the date for the con-
gress was made earlier and more smoothly than
was the case for the 24th party congress. Then,
it was not decided until mid-July 1970 that the
congress, originally promised for that year,
would open in late March 1971. The present
pattern suggests the leaders' satisfaction with
the present political situation and their confi-
dence that they can set the country's course
over the next five years. The plenum resolution
called for continued vigilance, but reconfirmed
the policy of detente, including the value of
summit meetings.
Academic studies in preparation for the
congress seem to be under wayj
scholars at several institutes are engaged in
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an effort similar to that undertaken before the
last congress, with the Institute of World
Economy and International Relations taking the
lead in the work. The study addresses the de-
velopments over the past five years in the
scientific-technological revolution" and its
effect on the capitalist and socialist systems.
Soviet academics
earlier about the problems of their own system
and are convinced that the policy of detente has
proven its worth. Their confidence apparently
stems in part from difficulties being experienced
in the West, but they still attribute great
strength and r' iliency to the capitalist system.
In fact, thr it study of the impact of tech-
nological trznsfer from the West is lea Mo them
to conclude, that
some funds re orms will s r be required
in the Soviet Union if it is to close the tech-
nological gap.
Now that the Soviets have a chance of
gaining some of the diplomi tic spotlight in the
Middle East, Moscow has come down with a
touch of stage fright. While still voicing support
for an early resumption of the Geneva confer-
ence, Soviet officials are also saying that careful
preparations must be made to ensure its success.
The Soviet hesitancy is partly attributable
to concern that the US will employ the confer-
ence as a cover to continue step-by-step nego-
tiations. Furthermore, tlie Soviets have invested
substantial capital in the idea that Geneva
provides th-, only solution to the Arab-Israeli
problem. A failure would not only damage their
prestige but would also increase the prospect of
war.
In an attempt to smooth the way toward
Geneva, the Soviets reportedly have been talking
to Israel. The Israeli press-basing its stories on
government "backgrounders"-reported that
two Soviet emissaries had recently discussed
Geneva with Prime Minister Ra5in and Foreign
Minister Allon. The Soviets were said to have
urged Israel to attend the conference in return
for Soviet guarantees of Israel's pre-1967 bound-
aries, and held out the prospect of an eventual
resumption of diplomatic ties.
The Soviet show of evenhandedness
apparently was designed to convince Tel Aviv
that Moscow did not intend to turn Geneva into
a propaganda show. The Soviets also probably
wanted to suggest that they-as well as Wash-
ington-could bargain with both sides. Tel Aviv
probably had an interest in leaking the story to
impress Washington that it could develop al-
ternate channels to the Arabs.
The USSR's interest in promoting a facade
of Arab unity was apparent during a visit to
Moscow this week by Iraqi strong man Saddam
hlusayn. Premier Kosygin laid heavy stress on
the importance of cooperation between Syria,
Egypt, and Iraq. Although Moscow would like
to enlist Iraq in the Middle East negotiations-if
only to further complicate Egypt's ability to
pursue independent initiatives-the Soviets once
again appear to have failed to moderate
Baghdad's rigid opposition to talking with Israel.
The Soviets will try again to reach a
common position with Cairo on the conference
when Foreign Minister Fahmi is in Moscow on
April 19-20. The Soviets were hardly pleased by
President Sadat's pronouncement that Geneva is
not the only negotiating avenue open to Cairo,
by Egypt's suggestion that the Geneva con-
ference be expanded to include Britain, France,
India, and Yugoslavia. The latter arrangement
will be viewed as an effort to reduce Soviet
influence at Geneva. The problem of Palestinian
representation at the conference is sure to come
up in the discussions with Fahmi. Comments by
Soviet officials indicate that Moscow is search-
ing for a way to get around this issue and is
willing to defer it until the talk; arp ;irtl, y
under way.
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CHINA: CUTTING MILITARY MANPOWER?
Peking reportedly plans a significant reduc-
tion in military manpower this year, primarily
because of a need to reduce spending on the
armed forces
a decision to demobilize one million men in
1975 was announced at a recent conference
presided over by Politburo member Chu T e, a
veteran military leader. It is not yet possible,
however, to make a precise estimate of the size
of any resulting net reduction.
China is believed to demobilize routinely
between 500,000 and one million men every
year and to take in an equal number. The
Chinese armed services ostensibly have fixed
terms of service, but some troops are held
beyond the regular tours.
China's army, navy, and air force are row
estimated to have we,l over 4 million men. The
bulk of a reduction would have to be taken by
the army, which has over 3.5 million men in
main force units, local forces, and support
troops. Military leaders probably would try to
minimize the effect of demobilization by
reducing manning Ic rels rather than eliminating
units and by taking as few men as possible from
the more important main forces.
Perception o! Threats
I f a large-scale reduction were to occur, it
would be further evidence that the Chinese
believe the threat of imminent hostilities with
the USSR or the US has dec;ined. Although
Poking almost certainly will continue to main-
tain ;arge numbers of troops in its four northern
military regions, it would have fewer troop,
immediately available for reinforcement. 25X1
Peking did not call up additional recruits
following the Sino-Soviet border- incidents of
1.969, but it did extend the term of service of all
the troops then under arms. Because this served
to swell the ranks of the army, the reported
demobilization this year may be designed in part
to offset that increase. In recent years, demo-
bilization of men whose terms of service were
completed and induction of replacements
appear to have taken place in normal fashion.
25X1 25X1
During the past several years, Pekin ig has
been making strong efforts to reduce the mili-
tary's role in politics. These efforts-which have
included the transfer of military region com-
manders, withdrawal of personnel on nonmili-
tary assignment, and reversion of units of the
paramilitary Production Construction Corps to
civilian control-are all indicative of Peking's
desire to focus its military establishment on
purely military matters.
Peking may have determined that it now
has more troops than can be economically and
effectively used. There have been recent indica-
tions of debates over questions of budgetary
allocations, particularly with respect to the
armed forces. 25X1
A significant reduction of forces probably
could not be accomplished without incident.
For instance, administrative and logistic diffi-
culties could arise in trying to transport pc?rson-
nel to areas throughout China if demobilization
came quickly. Moreover, many soldiers probably
saw the army as a steppingstone to employment
in major population centers and would resent
being sent back to the countryside. A number of
recent incidents have invclved demobilized serv-
icemen demonstrating against Uiie leadership's
failure to give them the benefits they expected.
A flurry of domestic propaganda broadcasts ex-
tolling demobilized soldiers who are going to the
countryside
satisfaction.
Page: 21 WEEKLY REVIEW Apr 18, 75
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080018-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080018-0
PEPU: VELASCO REAPPEARS
In an obvious effort to reasb,:-+ himself in
the public eye, President Velasco prFiued over a
heavily publicized cabinet mea+ing on April 11.
The session was held at a bNoch resort south of
Lima, where the Presidp.-.i ha, been recuperating
from a strc'