WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080022-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: May 2, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Weekly Review
Top Secret
May 2, 1975
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Copy N2 658
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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
dovelopme its of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quel.fly includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and
therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed
in the contents.
CONTENTS (Mar 2, 1975)
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
2 Laos: Courting the King
3 Cambodia: Gf Princes and Puzzles
4 USSR: Cultural Policy
5 USSR - Middle East: Taking the Initiative
6 Romania-Yugoslavia: JUROM Fighter
7 EC-China: Developing Ties
7 NPT Review Conference Convenes
9 UK: The EC Referendum Bill
10 Portugal: Moderates Win
12 Finland: New Elections rossible
13 Cyprus: Talks Construeti,-
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor,
14 South Africa: Nuclear Program
16 Ethiopia: Rifts in the Junta
18 Rhodesia: Stili Stalled
19 Iraq-Syria: Euphrates Dispute
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
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,~ rrrrts
South Vie'nainese troops run for cover as the Communists move on Saigon
VIETNAM
SAIGON FALLS the Joint General Staff and Military Region 3
command had virtually ceased to function.
By mid-day on April 30 the communists'
Provisional Revolutionary Government flag flew On April 26, the North Vietnamese, with
over the presidential palace in central Saigon, their overwhelmingly superior forces in position
now renamed Ho Chi Minh City. North Viet- around the capita!, resumed the attack-against
namese troops and tanks had entered the heart several major centers near Saigon rather than
of the capital less than two hours after newly Saigon itself. The most important of these was
installed President Duong Van Minh announced the nearby major base area at Bien Hoa, north-
the unc.,nditional surrender of his government. easi of the capital. They also drove through Cu
Minh's brief address to the nation was followed Chi northwest of Saigon and Tan An southwest
by an order from the Joint General Staff to all of the city, and they cap+ured the port of Vung
members of the armed forces to lay down their Tau. Against hopeless odds and in many cases
arms and carry out a "bloodless cease-fire." virtually without senior command leadership,
most of the government's regiments put up only
brief resistance.
Lingering hopes that the neN Minh govern-
ment sworn in on Monday would meet com- As though to leave the door open for de-
munist specifications and make possible some parting Americans and anti-communist Viet-
sort of negotiated transfer of power had been Siamese, North Vietnamese forces withheld their
dashed two days earlier. The communists im- fire around Tan Son Nhut airfield until Monday,
mediately rejected President Minh's inaugural April 28, when they closed the field co further
pleas for a cease-fire and quick implementation evacuation flights. Although they continued
of the Paris agreement. Instead Hanoi and the mop-up operations around the outskirts of
PRG reiterated their series of constantly Saigon on the 29th, they spared the city a direct
escalating demands, including the complete attack, preferring to destroy remaining govern-
dismantling o` the South Vietnamese govern- ment forces outside the capital. This has enabled
ment's administrative structure and armed them to take over power stations, transportation
forces-it was clear that President Minh had no facilities, and productive plants in relatively
choice but to quickly accept these surrender good condition. It also allowed the evacuation
terms, given the rapid crumbling of Saigon's to continue from points within the periphery of
military position. the capital through Tuesday, the 29th.
South Vietnamese troops offered little last-
The communists had closed the ring minute resistance. Large numbers of soldiers
around Saigon during the last week in April. waved white flags and officers waited at the
North Vietnamese commanders clearly wanted entrances to military compounds for the arrival
to bring their superior numbers and firepower to of the North Vietnamese. Outside Saigon,
bear close to the capital to o%erwhelm the pockets of South Vietnamese continued to fight
defenders and bring a quick end to the fighting. a few more hours, while those in possession of
On the South Vietnamese side, senior com- aircraft flew to Thailand, and those with naval
manders understood that the end was near, and boats headed for islands offshore. F -1
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tional reception ceremony, Prince SoupharoL'-
vong reportedly struck a strongly nationalistic
and conciliatory tone and refrained from any
polemical tirades against non-communist politi-
cians and military leaders.
LAOS: COURTING THE KING
King Savang this week is paying his first
official visit to Pathet Lao headquarters at Sam
Neua in remote northeastern Laos. The visit
began Monday, will last six days, and will almost
certainly be interpreted as a major step toward
national reconciliation and reunification. It
could also have an important bearing on Lao
communist leader Souphanouvong's accept-
ability as a future prime minister.
The King's 22-member party, which in-
cludes the Queen, other members of the royal
family, and a number of ser:ior coalition govern-
ment ministers, traveled from Luang Prabang to
Sam Neua via three Soviet-piloted Pathet Lao
helicopters. Deputy Prime Minister Leuam In-
sisiengmay and Interior Minister Pheng Phong-
savan were the only high-ranking non-commu-
nist officials to accompany the royal entourage.
The press was not invited.
The US embassy in Vientiane reports that
the Pathet Lao are according red carpet treat-
ment to the King and his party. The most im-
portant power-brokers in the Lao communist
movement, including shadowy Central Com-
mittee chairman Kaysone Phomvihan and his
deputy, Nouhak Phoumsavan, were on hand to
welcome the King to Sam Neua. Moreover, in
his keynote address that highlighted the emo-
Souphanouvong extended th? invitation
for the visit on behalf of the Lao Communist
Party Central Committee and is in overall charge
of festivities at Sam Neua and other areas in the
communist-controlled zone that are on the
King's itinerary. Souphanouvong is also handling
arrangements for the King's coronation, which is
expected to take place sometime next year.
Souphanouvong's efforts to identity him-
self closely with the King, who is held in awe
and respect by all Lao groups and factions,
could trap important pulitical dividends for the
Pathet Lao. The Prince's reputation as a national
leader is likely to be enhanced considerably, and
his claim as Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's
successor significantly strengthened.
These is no firm evidence that Souvanna,
who is believed to have played a major role in
the negotiations which led to the King's decision
to visit Sam Neua, is actively promoting his
half-brother Souphanouvong as a successor.
Souvanna, however, has consistently maintained
tha* Souphanouvong is more of a Lao national-
ist than a communist and that if Laos' latest
coalition experiment is to have any chance of
success, risks must be taken and compromises
made to bring the communist prince and other
so-called Pathet Lao moderates back into the
nation's political mainstream. Moreover, recent
developments in Cambodia and South Vietnam
have almost certainly reinforced Souvanna's
conviction that a policy of political accommoda-
tion with the Pathet Lao is the only alternative
to a communist military take-over.
The King's decision to visit Sam Neua will
give him the opportunity to demonstrate good
will toward Peking as well w the Pathet Lao.
during his return
trip to Luang Prabang, the King is scheduled to
travel along part of the Chinese road network in
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CAMBODIA: OF PRINCES AND PUZZLES
The Khmer Communists this week con-
firmed their intention to keep Prince Sihanouk
on as nominal chief of state. In a communique
broadcast by Phnom Penh radio to mark the
comp'^tion of a "special national congress,"
deputy prime minister Khieu Samphan an-
nounced that the congress had "decided" that
Sihanouk would stay on and that Penn Nouth
would be "allowed" to remain as prime minis-
ter.
The announcement left little doubt that
Sihanouk and Penn Nouth will play a severely
circumscribed role. Samphan's reference to a
"thorough review and debate" suggests that the
decision to allow the two any role whatsoever
was a bitter pill for some communist leaders to
swallow. Samphan hinted that other non-com-
munist figures-such as foreign minister Sarin
Chak may be on their way out, saying that
they would be "rewarded accordirm to their
contributions and abilities."
Aside from this announcement, there is no
sign that Cambodia's new rules s are in any hurry
to give their regime more visible form. The ab-
sence of any formally invested government is
creating a perplexing situation for the many
countries that are eager to establish diplomatic
relations. The situation became even more con-
fusing at week's end as the communists moved
to deport all remaining foreigners from the
capital, including official and quasi-official
representatives f om France, East German j, and
the Soviet Union-countries that Cambodia's
new rulers might have been expected to culti-
vate.
Prince Sihanouk-who will apparently re-
main in Peking at least until his mother's funeral
next week-offered some explanation for this
puzzling policy by announcing that "diplomatic
missions and consulates accredited" to the
former government "cannot be considered as
accredited to" the new government. All this
strongly suggests that the new leadership is not
about to make it easy for any government that
waited until the eleventh hour to sever ties with
the former rulers in Phnom Penh.
Prince Sihanouk(r) chats with leng Sary
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USSR: CULTURAL POLICY
The unsettied atmosphere in cultural af-
fairs evident during the past several months is
persisting. The party Central Committee at a
plenum on April 16 failed to fill the vacant post
of party secretary for propaganda and culture.
Last December the Central Committee had re-
lieved Politburo candidate-member Petr Demi-
chev of his long-time responsibilities for culture
on the party secretariat without appointing a
successor. Earlier, Demichev had been minister
of culture, normally a lesser post, so far as
policy-making is concerned.
In December there were signs of indeci-
sion-and possibly even deadlock-not only on
whom to choose for the cultural post on the
secretariat, but also on the future course of
cultural policy in an era of detente. Now that
another plenum has passed without resolution
of these questions, it seems likely that they will
remain to become important issues in the politi-
cal maneuvering within the party hierarchy as it
prepares for the CPSU congress scheduled for
February 1976.
The leadership's stopgap solution has been
to parcel out Demichev's former party responsi-
bilities among several incumbent secretaries, and
also to act collectively at times when the inter-
Demichev
vention of the party secretary for culture is
normally called for. In terms of policy, a prag-
matic carrot-and-stick approach has been evi-
dent in some sectors, and immobility and drift
in others. The public drumbeat on cultural is-
sues, however, has tended to be a replay of
generally hard, doctrinaire positions. In the area
of dissent, a crackdown of as yet unclear pro-
portions is under way. The latest targets have
been several prominent dissidents associated
with the international human rights organiza-
tion, Amnesty International.
A recent example of collective responsi-
bility in cultural affairs and of orthodoxy in
public: policy was the joint m _ting in Moscow
of Soviet "creative" unions or. 1pril 15. It was
attended by seven of the nine party secretaries-
only Brezhnev and party secretary for agricul-
ture Kulakov were absent. Although Demichev,
who also attended the meeting, was legitimately
present in his capacity as minister of culture and
candidate Politburo member, l:e was con-
spicuous as the only leader press nt who was not
also a party secretary. This may strengthen spec-
ulation among some Soviet intellec`.uals that the
vacuum in the party's cultural po!thasenabled
Demichev to exercise more of a spy in cultural
affairs than is customary for a minister of
culture.
The joint meeting of the cultural unions,
devoted to preparations for the 30th anniversary
of the end of World War I I in Europe, took the
opportunity to restate the commitment of the
Soviet cultural establishment to the party and
its program by "praising the heroism of the
Soviet people during the war and philosophi-
cally assessing its result." The main speaker,
head of the writers' union Georgy Markov, never
strayed from standard, orthodox positions.
None of the party leaders present delivered a
speech. The forum may have been considered
inappropriate for a statement on cultural policy,
but the leaders' silence could indicate an unwill-
ingness to take a public stand on unresolved
issues.
Markov, who is also a full member of the
Central Committee, was among the speakers at
the CPSU plenum the following day. None of
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the speeches at the plenum has been published,
but Markov's role evidently was to reassure the
political leadership that present controls ove-
culture are adequate to maintain: the status quo,
at least until the leadership decides on where to
go from here.
USSR - Middle East
TAKING THE INITIATIVE
During the past week, Moscow continued
its "thorough preparations" for reconvening the
Geneva conference, playing host to both Syrian
Foreign Minister Khaddam and a Palestine Lib-
eration Organization delegation headed by Yasir
Aratat. The question of how and when the
Palestinians should be represented at the confer-
ence has apparently been at the center of
discussion.
Khaddam's visit was important to the
Soviets because Damascus has threatened to
boycctt the conference unless an independent
Palestinian delegation participates from the be-
ginning. Moscow, aware that forcing th;. Pales-
tiniar, issue would raise a major obstacle to
Israeli participation, apparently would prefer to
put off any discussion of Palestinian participa-
tion until later in the conference.
The Soviets tried to bring Damascus along
by reiterating their intention to strengthen
Syria's military capability. Apparently to drive
this point home, Soviet chief of staff Kulikov
visited Damascus to discuss military affairs at
the same time Khdddam was in Moscow.
The Syrians, however, still seem uneasy
about the Soviet approach to the Geneva confer-
ence. Khaddam did not mention the conference
in a speech made during his visit, and the com-
munique contained nothing but shopworn and
ambiguous statements regarding the conference.
Furthermore, the leader of the Syrian-controlled
fedayeen group, Zuhayr Muhsin, announced a
few days after Khaddam's visit that he would
not join the PLO delegation in Moscow, pri-
vately criticized the Soviets, and publicly ques-
Khadda',i
tioned whe',:ier anyt: "nn could be accomplished
at Geneva. Muhsin would probably not have
taken such action without the approval of
Damascus.
The PLO delegation arrived ir, M )scow
amid ind'cations that both Arafat and his Soviet
hosts expected difficult talks. Prior to the visit,
Arafat took pains to form a delegation that
would support his personal views in negotiations
with the Soviets. Moscow greeted Arafat some-
what coolly, suggesting that the USSR is con-
cerned about raising undue expectations.
While courting the Arabs, Moscow has
again signale,-i its interest in developing contacts
with Israel. During Khaddam's visit, Gromyko
publicly stated that the USSR was willing to
give Israel the "strictest possible guarantees" as
part of a settlement. Although Moscow has fre-
quently indicated its willingness to guarantee a
Middle East settlement and has often asserted
support for Israel's continued existence, Gro-
myko's explicit reference to these points in
front of an Arab audience was a new twist.
Gromyko's statement came c.nly a tew
weeks after Soviet emissaries reportedly dis-
cussed the Geneva conference with high Israeli
officials. Moscow seems to be trying to project a
more evenhanded policy in order to encourage
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ROMANIA-YUGOSLAVIA: JUROM FIGHTER
Romania and Yugoslavia have publicly
announced the joint development and produc-
tion of the prototype for a new combat aircraft.
This aircraft, known as the JUROM, made a
demonstratio,i flight on April 15 near Belgrade.
Photography taken in February of the
Bacau aircraft repair facility in northeastern
Romania showed an unidentified fighter-type jet
aircraft. This aircraft, which does not equate to
any known Soviet-produced fighter in either size
or configuration, is probably the Romanian
prototype cf the JUROM.
The JUROM, a swept-wing, subsonic, jet
aircraft powered by two Rolls-Royce Viper
engines, has been under development for about
three years. It will probably be produced in
both trainer and ground-attack versions. The
program originally called for about 200 aircraft
to be produced for each country, but recent
information indicates that each country will
initially receive 100 aircraft, with an option for
ar, additional 100 if the plane's performance and
cc-t prove satisfactory.
Tito's regime has a long-range goal of end-
ing dependence on foreign arms suppliers by the
end of the century. Domestic production of a
jet fighter is one important step in this direc-
tion. The Yugoslavs in 1970 apparently
broached to the Romanians the idea of co-
financing the research, development, and
production of a new jet fighter, and the Roma-
nians agreed to participate.
Romanian interest in the project is multi-
faceted. Bucharest wants to continue the devel-
opment of its aircraft industry, and it needs new
military equipment-especially aircraft-and
spare parts for existing equipment. Bucharest,
anxious to lessen its dependence on the Soviets
for arms, has sought to diversify its sources of
arms through various approaches, such as the
JUROM program, and attempts to secure some
Western military equipment.
The JUROM project called for the two
countries to design and produce only the air-
frame. The engines, electronics and other
sub-components were to be imported from
Britain, France, and Sweden. Romania and
Vugos'avia apparently constructed separate
prototypes designed to meet each country's
specific requirements. Despite some develop-
mental problems the program appears to have
progressed fairly rapidly. The first flight of the
Yugoslav prototype probably took place in mid-
1974, with the Romanian test following in late
1974.
Both countries have expressed some dis-
satisfaction with the engines obtained from
Britain. These engines, each of which can
develop only about 4,000 pounds thrust, are
considered by, the Romanians to be technolog-
ically dated and not very efficient. The Roma-
nians probably envision the JUROM as a re-
placement for their aging MIG-15 and MIG-17
fighters. Equipped with these engines, however,
the JUROM's performance may not be signif-
icantly better than these older aircraft. The
addition of after-burners could improve the
thrust of the Viper engines, but neither country
is believed to have the technology necessary for
such a modification. They have expressed some
interest in acquiring larger engines but, thus far,
have been stymied by Western trade restrictions
that prohibit the export to Warsaw Pact coun-
tries of jet aircraft engines capable of dr:veloping
more than 5,000 pounds thrust.
The Jt.UROM program has been surrounded
by considerable secrecy from the outset and has
been the subject of deliberately misleading stcte-
ments that have kept both Western and commu-
nist observers relatively uninformed about the
program. Despite the problems encountered, the
joint development of a jet fighter-type aircraft
by the two countries is a notable accomplish-
ment. Although still dependent on considerable
Western technology and components, the suc-
cess of this venture points to a degree of inde-
pendence for both the Romanians and Yugo-25X1
slays in their future weapons procurement pro-
grams. Nevertheless, both countries will prob-
ably continue to be dependent for some time on 25X1
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The EC's commissioner for external rela-
tions, Sir Christopher Soames, travels to Peking
May 4-10 to discuss the future development of
EC-China ties.
The community's moves toward China re-
flect the EC Nine's growing interest in strength-
ening ties to Asia and the developing world in
general. Both the EC and China regard closer
ties as a desirable goal because of the greater
leverage this would provide in their relations
with the Soviet Union.
mans on his trip to Peking last week-the latest
in a series of meetings between Chinese and
European leaders over the past six months. In
conversations with Tindemans, Chairman Mao
Tse-tung and ailing Premier Chou En-lai reit-
erated their views on the need for a militarily
strong and united Western Europe. Chinese
leaders are likely to stress these issues a ain in
their exploratory talks with Soames.
Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua recently
stated that China is seriously considering the
appointment of an ambassador to the EC. Pe-
king has apparently considered this move several
times in the past few years, L' ;i has never
initia'ad action toward forma.. - ng relations
with the community. Soames' visit could en-
courage movement in this di'ection. I,,,- EC is
also seeking to op,,n negotiations on an EC-
China trade ag.eemen .
Unlike the Soviet Union, the Chinese have
welcomed the EC's development and have ac-
cepted the competency of the EC Commission
to speak on behalf of the Nine EC states regard-
ing a common commercial policy. The commis-
sion probably hopes that progress toward a
trade agreement with China will induce the East
European states similarly to deal with the EC.
The USSR tried to head off any such bilateral
moves by initiating talks-now stall,,-between
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA) and the EC.
Under ?, trade agreement with the EC,
China would export primarily agricultural
products and light manufactured goods in ex-
change for industrial products and machinery.
In recent years, trade between the EC and China
has been on the rise, totaling $2.2 billion dollars
in 1974-about 15 percent of China's total
trade. Both view a trade agreement primarily as
a means of consolidating political ties.
Prior to his departure, Soames received a
report from Belgian Prime Minister I-eo Tinde-
The first conference to review the opera-
tion of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which entered into force five years ago, opens
Monday in Geneva. Participants are unlikely to
limit their discussions to a mere reaffirmation of
the purposes and provisions of the treaty. In-
stead, many countries are likely to question the
commitment of the US, UK, and USSR-the
treaty's depository states-to non-proliferation
and disarmament and to challenge the validity
of the premises on which the treaty was based in
1968.
The conference itself is required by an
article of the treaty and is open to attendance
by any country. Only the 91 countries that are
null parties to the NPT (those states that have
deposited their ratification instrument), now.-
ever, can vote on conference resolutions. The 17
countries that have only signed the treaty can
address ?!! plenary and committee sessions and
submit documents, they cannot vote or join in a
conference consensus. States that are neither
signatories nor full parties-which includes some
of the major near-nuclear countries, Argentina,
Brazil, India, Spain, and Pakistan-can be ac-
corded observer status by decision of the con-
ference.
Elaborate procedural rules have been
drawn up to avoid attempts to approve by con-
sensus resolutions unacceptable to major partici-
pants. A vote on any substantive matter that is
in dispute must be delayed for 48 hours so
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efforts can be made to reach a compromise;
when such a vote is finally taken, it requires a
two-thirds majority to pass.
The conference will probably focus on
political questions and on the peaceful uses
issue. India's detonation of a nuclear device last
May and its attempts to justify the test as a
peaceful nuclear explosion magnified inter-
national interest in the issue of peaceful uses.
Many countries-the nonaligned developing
countries in particular-feel that too little atten-
tion has been given this question. They argue
that the US, UK, and USSR have not faithfully
implemented the NPT article that requires the
depository powers to make available the bene-
fits of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) to
non-nuclear states. Some of these states may
press for the establishment of an international
body-probably under the auspices of the !nt.er-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-that
could serve as a broker between themselves and
the nuclear powers in providing such PNE
services.
Such a proposal is unlikely to have smooth
sailing, however, because the UK, US, and USSR
are themselves split over the issue. The Soviets
conduct an extensive peaceful nuclear explosion
development program and, although they have
not yet contracted to provide PNE services to
any state, they have indicated that they would
seriously consider such a request. The US now
has only a minimal peaceful nuclear testing
program while the UK has none. The US main-
tains that this country has not yet realized any
substantial economic benefits from PNE and
that PNE technology has not yet reached the
stage of commercial application.
The one point on which the depository
powers do agree, however, is that Article 5 of
the treaty does not necessarily preclude making
such services available to non-NPT parties-a
position that they hope will eliminate the ex-
cuse for NPT or non-NPT parties to develop
indigenous peaceful nuclear explosions. Such an
interpretation, however, is unlikely to be re-
ceived favorably by those NPT parties who feel
that their adherence to the treaty gives the-i a
special status and assures them an exclusive right
to such benefits.
The nuclear Dowers are also likely to be
criticized for their failure to achieve the com-
plete nuclear disarmament called for in Article
6. Mexico is already circulating a draft protocol
that would establish a deadline for toial disarm-
ament, and Sweden and Canada may see', a role
for additional countries in the verifica';~,n of
those disarmament agreements-such as last
year's Threshold Test Ban-which have already
been negotiated. To head off such moves, the
British may reintroduce their proposal for a test
ban quota that would establish limits for
weapons tests. Britain's nuclear partners, how-
ever, do not support this move.
When the NPT was negotiated in 1968, the
Security Council passed a resolution that as-
sured that the Council-and particularly those
members who are nuclear powers-would act
immediately should a non-nuclear state be at-
tacked or threatened by attack with nuclear
weapons. The People's Republic of China was
not then, however, a permanent member of the
Security Council, and some states now fear that
the assurance wot!ld be rendered worthless by
the possibility of a Chinese veto in the Security
Council. In addition to bolstering their own
security by strengthened commitments from the
nuclear powers, there may be a push by Mexico,
Japan, and Nigeria, among others, to obtain
assurances from the UK, US, and USSR that
they would not use nuclear weapons against a
non-nuclear state. The depository powers are
likely to resist such proposals.
Gi,-ier impoi'.ant nuclear topics-safe-
guards, physical security of nuclear materials
and facilities, and the development of regional
reprocessing plants-are also likely to be con-
sidered during the four weeks of the conference.
While the purpose of the conference is not to
amend the treaty, the discussions at these meet-
ings and the actions resulting from them may
well determine whether the tre :ty-in any
form-can in the future contribute to the non-
proliferation gcais it was intended to en-
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Portuguese moderate parties, led by the
Socialists, proved decisively in the national con-
stituent assembly election last Friday that they,
not the Communists, represent the views of
most Portuguese. Althour" the victors can ex-
ercise political power only as permitted by tl?e
Armed Forces Movement, their demonstrated
popular support may have a moderating effect
on the Movement and offset the Commuoists'
influence.
Unofficial results gave the three moderate
parties more than 70 percent of the vote: the
Socialists received 38 percent; the center-left
Popular Democrats, 26 percent; and the mod-
erate right-wing Social Democratic Center, 8
percent. The Communists and their allies took a
total of 20 percent, 13 percent of it by the
Portuguese Communist Party. Over 90 percent
of the registered voters turned out, most exer-
cising the right to vote for the first time.
Movement leaders are pleasad that the elec-
tion was unmarred by violence and that it pro-
vided a boost for Portugal's international image.
They are playing down the victory by the
moderates, however, and claim that the vote is a
popular endorsement for the "socialist" policies
of the Armed Forces Movement. Although sensi-
tive that their campaign to persuade the voters
to cast blank ballots netted only 7 percent of
the vote, Movement leaders continue to assert
that they do not intend to modify their pro-
gram.
The Communist Party, smarting over its
poor showing, complains that "antidemocratic
forces" sabotaged its campaign. Lisbon news-
papers, under strong Communist influence, have
not stressed the moderates' victory as has the
Western press, but instead have lumped the
Socialists with the Communists and declared a
landslide victory for the "left."
The Socialists' impressive tally, higher than 25X1
the party had dared hope, provides them with a 25X1
nur^ber of options to increase their political
power. Socialist Party leader Soares hopes with
this psycholoyical victory to press his advantage
in governmental affairs and in dealing with the
all-military Revolutionary Council. His party
will control nearly half of the constituent as-
sembly, which is required to convene within 15
days of the election. The general terms of the
constitution to be approved by the assembly
have already been established by the Moveme'it,
but deliberations in the assembly could have an
impact on the policies of the military govern-
ment.
Immediately after the election, Soares ap-
parently decided that the best way to gain the
Movement's favor was to describe the vote as a
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victory for progressive forces and not to pursue
a clear anti-Communist line. Earlier this week,
however, he appeared to switch his tactics. He
emphasized the "immense defeat" the Commu-
nists had suffered and implied that the outcome
might give the civilian parties more leverage with
the Armed Forces Movement.
How the Movement reacts to the moder-
ates' victory will largely depend on which fac-
tion within the Revolutionary Council emerges
with the greatest strength. Prime Minister Gon-
calves may suffer politically because of his open
support for the Portuguese Democratic Move-
ment-the election ally of the Communist Party.
His radical faction is attempting to head off
possible anti-Communist moves within the mili-
tary by conjuring up the threat of new attacks
from the right. President Costa Gomes and mod-
erate officers are pleased with the vote and may
be able to use the Socialist victory to gain an
advantage over the more radical officers.
The military officer with the best chance
of taking advantage of the situation is Admiral
Rosa Coutinho, a rising power since his return
from Angola last January. Coutinho favors the
development of an indigenous variety of social-
ism and appears to stand between the moderates
and the radicals. Coutinho has emphasized the
need for a "civilian Armed Forces Movement,"
and there is speculation that he may try to gain
control of the Socialist Party and develop it into
a base of support.
At the moment, Soares' efforts to gain the
Movement's favor are likely to lead him to work
more closely with moderate officers and Ad-
miral Rosa Coutinho, while at the same time
refraining from antagonizing the radicals by
pushing too hard.
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A controversy between Finland's two
major coalition partners-the Social Democrats
and the farmer-oriented Center Party-threatens
to force the government to resign and may
necessitate calling new elections in August or
September.
The dispute began on April 3 when Presi-
dent Kekkonen's Center Party announced it
would not support the government's regional
development package. An exasperated Kek-
konen then sent a letter-later published in the
Social Democratic Party newspaper-to senior
government ministers criticizing the bickering
over the government's program. Kekkonen later
threatened to dissolve parliament and call new
elections unless a compromise was reached.
Neither major coalition partner was willing
to compromise, partly because opinion polls
indicated that both would stand to strengthen
their pai!iamentary representation in a new elec-
tion. A Gallup poll published last February
indica+,-,d that the Center Party would increase
its representation from 35 to 45 seats in the
200-seat parliament, while the Social Democrats
would gain as many as 7 new seats over their
current 56.
As election fever mounted, Kekkonen
offered a compromise solution that called for
passage of the regional development laws in
their original form, but with a review after six
months. Kekkonen also proposed that the gov-
ernment get back to work and pass several key
bills before the summer recess or the dissolution
of parliament. The Social Democrats immedi-
ately accepted the Kekkonen proposal, and the
Center Party is expected to agree by next week.
Despite the show of cooperation, both
parties are already gearing up for an election.
The question now is when rather than whether
there will be an election. Kekkonen clearly
wants a new parliament, and coalition leaders
will probably meet with him soon to work out
the timing of the government's resignation.
5-8. Because of these considerations elections
would probably be set for August or September.
Kekkonen is expected to call on Helsinki Mayor
Aura to head a non-political caretaker gov-
Kekkonen may decide to wait until late
May or June to dissolve parliament because
Prime Minister Sorsa may visit the Soviet Union
in mid-May. In addition, he probably wants to
give the current government time to pass several
key bills and to avoid interfering with the Social
Democratic Party congress scheduled for June
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UN Secretary General Waldheim (c) at talks with Denktash (I) and Clerides
CYPRUS: TALKS CONSTRUCTIVE
The intercommunal talks in Vienna
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have
gone smoothly, but major issues will probably
not be considered before early June.
UN Secretary General Waldheim, who is
participating in the talks, has described them as
relaxed and constructive. Greek Cypriot nego-
tiator Clerides and Turkish Cypriot negotiator
Denktash have agreed to set up a joint com-
mittee to examine the powers and functions of
the central government of the proposed federa-
tion. The committee will meet under the aus-
pices of the UN special envoy to Cyprus and is
expected to complete its examination and re-
ports for the next round of talks in June.
Denktash suggested forming the committee,
apparently in response to Clerides' proposal that
they examine the subject in detail this week.
The negotiators also considered the geo-
graphical aspects of a possible future settlement,
but Denktash appears to have parried Clerides'
inquiry on how much territory the Turkish side
would be willing to concede in exchange for the
Greeks accepting a bi-regional federation.
Denktash's hesitancy to deal with major issues
at this time is doubtless due to the unsettled
political situation in Ankara, where the new
coalition government has yet to make a fire
decision on Cyprus.
Before the current round concludes, how-
ever, the negotiators may well reach agreement
on lesser issues, such as displaced persons and
the reopening of Nicosia airport, initially for UN
use.
The Turkish Cypriots, meanwhile, have
indicated they intend to go ahead with a ref-
erendum on the recently completed draft
constitution for the Turkish Cypriot sector,
which could complicate the negotiations.
Ankara may direct Denktash to postpone the
referendum or at least to play .town its signifi-
cance.
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Sout;i Africa expects to be a world supplier
of enriched uranium as well as uranium ore by
the late 1980s. Officials announced earlier this
month that their uranium enrichment pilot
plant had gone into operation, although prob-
ably only part of the plant is actually operating.
The South Africans are confident that their new
aerodynamic enrichment process will be com-
petitive on the world market.
The first commercial enrichment plant
using this aerodynamic process is scheduled to
begin operations in South Africa in 1984 and to
reach full capacity two years later. The plant is
to have an annual production of 5,000 units of
separative work, which could provide core
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loadings for about 15 electric power reactors of The South Africans could technologically
1,000-megawatt size each, and the plant could adapt their enrichment process is produce
be expanded to double this production. weapons-grade material. The government claims
it can build nuclear weapons but says its policy
The South Africans are anticipating a sell- is to use the enriched uranium for peaceful
ing price of $74 per kilogram unit of separative purposes. Pretoria, however, has not signed the
work in 1986, which appears to be competitive Non-Proliferation Treaty and could assist other
when compared to projected fees from enrich- potential nuclear-weapons states.
ment plants of other nations. The South African
selling price equates to about $27 million for Details about the South African enrich-
enrichment of uranium for one core loading for ment process remain closely 25X1
a 1,000-megawatt electric power reactor. 2bAI
re oria, however, could be will- 25X1
ing to export its technoloC y as well as its
To meet this price, the South Africans uranium to countries seeking an independent
must keep to a minimum the amount of uranium-enrichment capability.
electricity used in the process and the cost of
that electricity. The South Africans have in- 25X1
dicated that the amount needed has been
reduced below original estimates. Relatively
cheap electric power is available in South Africa
today because the country has considerable
amounts of inexpensive coal. Pretoria plans to
supplement its own electric power supply with
power from the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric
project in neighboring Mozambique that is
scheduled to begin operation this fall.
.?y Uranium enrichment plant at Pelindaba
?
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ETHIOP!A: RIFTS IN THE JUNTA
The ruling military council arrested two of
its members on April 22 foi allegedly plotting a
coup. The arrests have strained the already
shaky unity of the 110-man council, which in
recent weeks has also encountered increasing
discontent from within the ranks of the armed
forces.
Lieutenant Colonel Negussie Haile and
Captain Debessu Beyne-both members of the
council's intelligence committee-were arrested
with at least three officers serving on the intel-
ligence staff. Sixteen other council members
were de`ained for a time and then released
because hard evidence against thern was lacking.
The plotters reportedly intended to disband the
council, restore Haile Selassie, and adopt more
moderate policies in place of the radical socialist
measures instituted by the council. Negussie
allegedly had documents in his possession show-
Asfa Wossen
ing that he was collaborating with former crown
prince Asfa Wossen, now in exile in London.
The arrests have brought to a head the
personal rivalries and policy differences that
have troubled the council for some time, and a
s rious rift may be developing within its ranks.
The council has been in almost constant session
since the alleged plot was uncovered, and its
members have engaged in stormy debate over
the direction and pace of the Ethiopian revolu-
tion. They are also divided on whether to
execute more officials of the old regime;
approximately 130 are still being held.
The council's most pressing concern is
increasing opposition within the army to the
radical land reform program announce' in early
March. Spokesmen for at least two of the army's
four divisions have strongly protested the ban
on private ownership of land, which would
deprive military personnel of the land grants
promised them undo, th,: Haile Selassie regime
in lieu of retirement pensions. Many members of
other units are known to be unhappy with the
program.
The council has resisted repeated demands
that the military be exempt from the land
reform decrees, but some members reportedly
are siding with the dissidents. The council and
armed forces units are also siuabbling over pay
and allowances, the living conditions of some
garrisons, and the council's failure to consult the
units on important issues.
A new wave of student unrest is providing
another challenge to the council's leadership.
Secondary students in Addis Ababa and in two
large cities in eastern Ethiopia went on strike
this week to protest the council's authoritar-
ianism. Four students reportedly were killed in
the capital during clashes with police.
Other students who were sent into the
countryside several months ago as agents of the
national rural development program have
instigated violent incidents by encouraging
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of the insurgent movement, left Khartoum after
a ten-day visit to discuss President Numayri's
mediatory proposal for an immediate cease-fire
and direct unconditional negotiations between
the council and the rebels. There has been no
public announcement regarding the results of
the visit, but Sabbe continued to demand that
Addis Ababa must first recognize Eritrea's right
to self-determination before talks can begin.
During his stay in Khartoum, Sabbe is said
to have also met with representatives of the rival
Eritrean Liberation Front to discuss the forma-
tion of a united Eritrean front. The two groups
are coordinating t;,eir military operations, but
they do not fully age on political goals. The
government has cited the lack of a common
Eritrean negotiatin position im ediment to talks.
Recent demonstration in Addis Ahaha
Page . 7 WEEKLY REVIEW May 2, 75
peasants to seize land from landlords. The stu-
dents claim to be acting in accord w vith the
terms of the land reform decrees. Clashes
involving peasaits, landlords, and security forces
have resulted in several deaths. On April 29,
many students were arrested in Jimma, a
provincial capital about 150 miles southwest of
Addis Ababa, because local authorities believed
the students were preparing to take over the
city.
Meanwhile, firefights with rebels occur al-
most daily in Eritrea Province, where govern-
ment forces continue to expand their opera-
tions. In recent days they have become much
more active in western Eritrea, along the Suda-
nese border. The rebels are avoiding offensive
actions, presumably to replenish supplies.
Early this week, Osmar, Saleh Sabbe, the
leader of the Popular Liberation Forces faction
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RHODESIA: TALKS STILL STALLED
Black Rhodesian leaders of the African
National Council are pressing Prime Minister Ian
Smith to fulfill all the terns they claim he
accepted as part of their truce agreement with
him last December, before they will resume
settlement talks with him.
The outcome of the special conference of
the Organization of African Unity in Dar es
Salaam earlier this month strengthened the
nationalists' position by backing their strategy
for bringing about an early transfer of power to
Rhodesia's black majority. The conference
voted to support the African National Council
in settlement negotiations with Smith and also
to help the council prepare for armed struggle if
negotiations fail. At this time, the council
leaders seem to be preparing for prolonged hard
bargaining rather than an early renewal of guer-
rilla warfare.
The council's executive committee met in
Salisbury on April 27 and announced it would
not accept the invitation Smith extended after
the OAU meeting to resume settlement talks
that have been suspended since early March. The
council's statement particularly demanded that
Smith cease executions of convicted terrorists
and release all political prisoners.
Smith has denied that he promised to
release several hundred political prisoners prior
to a final peace with the nationalists. Hence, the
council's latest statement suggests a strategy of
putting off settlement talks until the national-
ists' bargaining position is stronger. The state-
ment does not threaten to renew guerrilla war-
fare if Smith refuses the council's conditions for
resuming negotiations.
The council's moderate leader, Bishop
Muzorewa, seems confident that international
pressures will sooner or later bring the white
Rhodesians around to accepting a negotiated
transition to majority rule. At the OAU meet-
ing, the representative of Zambia, whose presi-
dent has been working in tandem with South
African Prime Minister Vorster to bring about a
Rhodesian settlement, claimed that Vorster had
promised that the South African police who had
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At the conference of Commonwealth
leaders in Jamaica this week, British Foreign
Secretary Callaghan reportedly said that Britain
would establish a special fund to help Mozam-
bique participate in the boycott and also tighten
its own sanctions against the Smith regime.
Muzorewa and other leaders of the African
National Council are attending the Cnmmnn-
supported Smith's counterinsurgency operations
will be totally withdrawn by late May. Vorster's
subsequer.f statements in the South African
parliament have implied that the police may
indeed be home soon. Vorster also indicated
that Pretoria wants a compromise settlement in
Rhodesia, although he Prime Minis~er con-
tinued to deny South African interference in
Rhodesian internal affairs.
Muzorewa also hopes that Mozambique
will enforr'e UN economic sanctions against the
Smith regime shortly after it becomes inde-
pendent from Portugal on June 25. Samora
Machel, head of the Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique, which will take over full control
in Mozambique, has told Muzorewa that after
independence his country will enforce sanctions,
provided foreign financial backing for the move
is forthcoming. Mozambican seaports handle the
bulk of Rhodesia's overseas trade, and Mozam-
bique can ill afford to forfeit rail and port
earnings derived from Rhodesian traffic.
Page 19 WEEKLY REVIEW May 2, 75
wealth conference
The Iraqis, impatient with the failure of
the Arab foreign ministers to accept-at their
meeting in Cairo last week-Baghdad's charge
that Syri? is withholding water from the
. phrates :fiver, have persuaded Saudi Arabia
to mediate. The Syrians acknowledge privately
that, sometime in March, they began diverting
Euphrates water from Iraq in retaliation for
Baghdad's involvement in an attempt to weaken
or overthrow President Asad.
Any significant decrease in the flow of the
Euphrates through Iraq becomes an immediate
matter of concern to any regime in Baghdad,
because many of the country's peasants depend
on the river for irrigation. According to some
experts, between 2 and 3 million people have
been affected by the Syrian action.
Saudi Oil Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani
agreed to be mediator after discussions last
weekend in Baghdad and Damascus. Yamani
opened tasks in Riyadh on April 30 with the
Iraqi minister of irrigation and the Syrian min-
ister of the Euphrates Dam.
The technical committee assigned last week
by the Arab foreign ministers to study the prob-
lem is apparently continuing its investigation.
This effort seems destined to fail, however, be-
cause of Syria's withdrawal from the committee
on April 30. Damascus justified its action by
referring to Baghdad's "continuing propaganda
campaign" against Syria.
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OAS MEETING OPENS NEXT WEEK
The mood of the delegates arriving in
Washington for the opening of the OAS General
Assembly on May 8 contradicts Fidel Castro's
notion that the OAS is an organizational slave to
the US. Increasingly active participation over
the past year in the many international confer-
ences, especially those devoted to economic
relations with the US, has provided the Latin
American and Caribbean governments ex-
perience in formulating and expressing their
positions on complex issues. They have seen
that putting aside other differences to unite on a
common concern offers more chance for success
in pressuring the industrialized world.
Latin America's heightened sense of self-
esteem is currently enhanced by the loss of US
stature in their eyes-a loss due not only to
events in Southeast Asia but also to the US
failure to follow through on the "new dialogue"
within the Western Hemisphere. The Latins'
enlarged view of the world and their diminished
expectations of the US make them value the
OAS as their particular contribution to the
mosaic of international forums and as a place
where they individually can meet the US as
equals; all are subject to the same rules, and no
one has veto power.
Most governments regard this as the time
to bring to fruition the prolonged efforts to
"reform" the OAS, which they see as too
bureaucratic and formal. If this can be
accomplished, the OAS may be able to attract a
more inspiring candidate for the secretary
generalship than those now in the field.
The hottest issues on the agenda now are
the Trade Reform Act, the effect of oil prices,
and the concept of collective economic security.
Also, there is some hint that a few governments
are working behind the scenes to prepare some
"surpritos" for the conference. Panama, for one,
will probably try for a statement on the
meaning of the canal issue to all of Latin
America. The question of relations with Cuba
will be raised, and this could be the subject that
will break down the consensus the deleaates are
workin
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