WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080024-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: May 16, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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meekly Review
Top Secret
Top Secret
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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intellicence, reports end an^.lyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, tree Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science end Technology.
. or,ics requiring mor.o comprehensive treatment and
therefore puiaiished aeparatoly a,, Special Reports are listed
In the contents.
CONTENTS (Mat' 16, 1975)
1
2
4
5
6
7
Cambodia: The Mayaguez Incident
Laos: Rightists Routed
Italy: Pro-election Politics
EC-China: S games Succeeds
CSCE: The Crunch Is On
Romania and the Nonaligned
10
11
V-E Day Celebration
. Warsaw Pact Anniversary
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
12
South Korea- Cracking Down Again
13
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
Philippines-China:
Establishing Relations
14
USSR-Libya: Some Mutual enefits
yrla- raq: recau ionary Moves
17
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
Oman: Rebels on the Run
19
Colombia: Shaki',j Up the Military
20
Dominican Repuulic:
President Strengthens Hand
21
Cuba: Inching Toward Detente
22
Peru-US: A Long, Hot Summer
23
Brazil: European Trade
24
UN: Special Session Preparations
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the
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Cambodia: The Mayaguez Incident
The Cambodian communist se;zure of the
US merchantman Mayaguez has resulted in the
first serious foreign policy reversal for the new
Cambodian government since it came to power
in mid-April.
The Cambodians had stopped a Pana-
manian vessel on May 9 and had harassed several
other, mostly smaller, craft. On May 12, their
patrol boats fired on the Mayaguez, bringing the
ship to a halt as it was moving on the regular
shipping route from Hong Kong to the Thai port
of Sattahip. This route passes within about eight
miles of Poulo Wai Island, some (.0 miles from
the mainland. The day after boarding the Maya-
guez, the Cambodians forced it to sail to Koh
Tang Island, only 30 miles from the mainland.
At Koh Tang, the ship anchored, and the crew
was taken to ': he island and kept there until the
14th, when t;iey were transported to the main-
land. This at least indicated that the Cam-
bodians appreciated the value of the crew's lives,
if only as hostages for possible bargaining.
Five Cambodian communist patrol boats
guarded the Mayaguez soon after it arrived at
Koh Tang, and they were soon exchanging fire
with US aircraft sent to help in securing the
return of the ship and crew. Three of the patrol
beats were sunk in the ensuing action.
Carn~odian communist motivation
throughout the incident remains unclear. There
are a number of islands off the coast that have
been claimed for a long time by both the Viet-
namese and the Cambodians, and it appears that
the latter have been using their newly captured
patrol boats to establish a presence on the is-
lands on behalf of the new regime. It appears
that the Cambodians, who only recently had
expelled virtually the whole foreign community
from Phnom Penh and emptied the city of its
population, decided that harassing international
shipping in adjacent waters would he a good
way to reinforce their claims to the islands,
although the new government has yet to de-
scribe its claims with any precision. It is riot
clear whether the new central authorities had
any forewarning that the Mayaguez was being
boarded and the crew seized.
The Cambodians' announcement on May
15 that the Mayaguez would be released ap-
parently was prompted by a real zation that
their territory and installations would be vulner-
able to punitive attacks if they failed to respond
On May 15, following a quick transfer of
US forces to the area, US Marines landed on the
Mayaguez and took control. Other marines
landed on Kc;i Tang Island and engaged the
Cambodians there while air strikes hit Cam-
bodian installations on the mainland. At vir?
tually the same time, the Cambodian gov-
ernment radio announced that the ship would
be returned. Within hours, a Thai fishing vessel
captured earlier sailed under a white flag to the
USS Wilson and returned the crew in good
health.
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to US demands. Moreover, the new regime pre-
sumably recognized that the capture of the ship
had not been supported by Peking, Hanoi, or
any other sympathetic foreign governments.
Chinese leader Teng Hsiao-,ring's comment
in Paris that china would not be jble to help if
the US responded with force was not replayed
from Peking, but neither was it modified or
supplanted by statements more encouraging to
Cambodia. The Yugoslavs' subsequent reference
to the "kidnaped" ship and the French press
comment that President Ford had little choice
but to respond firmly reflected the trend of
foreign opinion against the Cambodians.
criticism of the US attacks came quickly from
Bangkok. The Thai do not disapprove of the
forceful recapture of the Mayaguez, but they
believe that US actions Lave compromised their
efforts to establish a good re!ationship with the
new communist regime in Cambodia. Prime
Minister Khukrit has asked his Foreign Ministry
to recommend ways to make a very strong
response to convey Bangkok's displeasure. Thai
newspapers, within hours of the attacks, were
recommending that the government refuse the
credentials of Ambassador Whitehouse, who has
just arrived in Bangkok, recall the Thai ambdds-
sador from Washington, and shut down all US
bases forthwith.
The Cambodian announcement was care-
fully worded and deft.rive in tone, although
much of its rhetoric was designed to justify the
seizure as a reasonable p,ecaution against the
possibility that the ship was engaged in es-
pionage.
Despite broad recognition that the Cam-
bodians had provoked the US to act, the first
Althonngh the Chinese had issued no state-
ments from Peking before the US action, Via
Premier Li Hsien-nien has told a banquet audi-
ence that Cambodia's measu-es against the
Mayaguez were a legitima?e safeguard of state
sovereignty, and he claimed that world opinion
should consider the recapture of the vessel as an
"outright act of piracy."
Leos: Rightists Roved
The rightist faction of the 13-month-old
coalition government has collapsed, and the
Pathet Lao now represent the only effective
bloc power in the country.
Totally demoralized by communist vic-
tories in South Vietnam and Cambodia, by the
virtual impotence of the Royal Lao Army in the
face of limited Pathet Lao attacks in northern
Laos, and by the erupticn of communist-
inspired civil disorder in every major city in
their zone of control as well as in the "neu-
tralized" twin capitals of Vientiane and Luang
Prabang, almost all leading rightist political and
military loaders have fled the country or re-
signed their positions. The neutralist faction of
the tripartite coalition remains intact, but along
with its leader-Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma-appears essentially powerless.
Communist Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi
Vongvichit has repeatedly stated that the Pathet
Lao will continue to work within the framework
of the 1973 Lao peace accords, which pre-
sumably means that they might be prepared-for
the time being, at least-to retain the i,:cade of a
coalition. Indeed, they are probably anxious to
have Souvanna stay on as prime minister if only
to give their political take-over a strong sense of
legitimacy. Moreover, their recent gala reception
of Lao King Savang in Sam Neua suggests that
the monarchy may also be retained.
An acid test of the Pathet Lao's attitude
toward preservation of the coalition will come
when replacements for recently ousted rightist
cabinet ministers are selected. Under the terms
of the 1973 accords, the various coalition
parties are entitled to fill vacancies in ministries
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have now shifted their attention to the US
presence in Laos. Over the past week, increas-
ingly hostile communist-inspired demonstrations
have been mounted against the US embassy in
Vientiane and against USAID installations and
personnel in Savannakhet and Luang Prabang.
The minimum communist objective ap-
pear: to be the elimination of USAID and other
i-\mciican organizations from provincial areas. If
Phoumi's statements are any criteria, the Pathet
Lao may be willing to tolerate, for the moment
at least, a reduced US official representation in
Vientiane. The communists also appear willing,
and in some cases even anxious, to receive
unconditional US assistance, providing the aid is
channeled directly to the coalition government.
Phoumi Vongvichit
under their control with personnel from among
their own ranks. Pathet Lao Deputy Defense
Minister Khammouane Boupha, however, has
already been named "acting" defense minister
in place of rightist Sisouk na Champassak. and
this could set a precedent for communist per-
sonnel to replace all of the ousted rightist
ministers. Indeed, se~,eral days prior to Boupha's
appointment, Souvanna asked his deputy,
Phoumi, to determine whom the Pathet Lao
high command in Sam Neua wanted to fill the
vacuum created by the departed conservative .
In any case, it seems certain that whatever
personalities are eventually chosen will be to-
tally subservient to Sam Neua's wishes.
Having successfully stripped the rightists of
political and military power, the Pathet Lao
Sam Noun.
.Luang Probang
Laos
Lang Tiong'
Vientiane
Predominantly communist-controlled
area. February 1973 ceasefire
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ITALY: PRE-ELECTION POLITICS
The Italian Parliament will recess next
week in order to campaign full time for nation-
wide regional and local elections on June 15.
The last few sessions are likely to be stormy,
however, as the Moro government tries to secure
Senate approval of its proposals to deal with
rising crime and political violence.
The anti-crime package was passed last
week by the lower house but only after a divi-
sive debate that accentuated differences be-
tweer, the Soci.ilists and their coalition partners.
The proposals generally give the police a freer
hand in combating street violence. They would
be able, for example, to conduct on-the-spot
searches of suspicious persons without obtaining
the usual authorizations. In addition, the use of
"provisional liberty"-a form of bail-would be
tightened up, and persons arrested for using
weapons against the police would be prosecuted
more expeditiously.
The Socialists are divided over the pro-
posals. The majority reluctantly, accept the
package, but an influential minority on the left
maintains that the measures would threaten civil
liberties and ignore what they view as the pre-
dominantly fascist origin of most serious vio-
lence. This group went along only after the
other parties agreed to cosmetic changes that
give the proposed law an anti-fascist cast. The
fact that votes of the neo-fascists helped over-
come combined Socialist-Communist opposition
to the bill's toughest provisions probably
strengthened the Socialists' resolve to amend the
bill in the Senate. If they succeed, final action
would be difficult before Parliament recesse,
next week. In any event, the debate over law-
and-order is sure to remain a central theme of
the election campaign.
The dominant Christian Democrats have
been meeting, meanwhile, to complete their
strategy for the campaign. In addition to casting
his party as the major proponent of strict law
enforcement, Christian Democrat chief Fanfani
is continuing to emphasize his opposition to any
cooperation with the Communists at the na-
tional and local levels. Sharp differences persist
among the Christian Democrat factions, how-
ever, and these are likely to erupt into a fuil-
scale leadership struggle if the party roes poorly
in June.
The leftist factions are still opposing Fan-
fani's approach to the elections, and differences
between Fanfani and other major Christian
Democratic leaders, such as Prime Minister Moro
and Foreign Minister Rumor, seem to be
sharpening. As part of his strateav to attract
support on the right, Fanfani this week sug-
gested that his party consider alternatives to
collaboration with the Socialists, such as a
centrist government in which the Socialists
would be replaced by the small and conservative
Liberal Party. Moro, however, is striving to keep
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alive the principle of Christiar; Democrat - So-
cialist cooperation with his minority c?overn-
ment that relies on Socialist parliarnentary
support.
recognition that the EC speaks for member
states on common commercial policy, and, the
E,., hl),-s, induce East European states to deal
similar lei with the EC. Thus far, the USSR has
succeeded in heading Of bilateral talks by ini-
tiating discussions between the Communist
states' economic grouping, CEMA, and the EC.
Peking, of course, is also hopeful that its
actions strengthen the EC's hand in dealing with
Eastern Europe and that Moscow's hold in that
area can be loosened-at least marginally. The
Chinese see their new arrangements with the EC
primarily as a means of consolidating political
ties with Western Europe and giving them
greater leverage in their own dealings with the
USSR.
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EC-CHINA: SOAMES SUCCEEDS
China agreed last week to establish a
formal relationship with the European Com-
munity and to accredit a representative to EC
headquarters in Brussels. The announcement
came after EC External Affairs Commissioner
Soames visited Peking. In talks with senior
Chinese foreign affairs and trade officials,
Soames satisfied Peking that the EC had no
official relationship with Taiwan and that EC
members accepted Peking's view of Taiwan's
status. Soames was then received by Premier
Chou En-'ai, a visit which exceeded the reouire-
ments of protocol and which reflected Ch~nese
-,nthusiasm for a relationship with the EC.
The Chinese also began xploratory talks
on a trade agreement with the EC, which, if
concluded, would probably carry provision for
most-favored-nation treatment and a nonpref-
erential trade system. These talks are to con-
tinue in Brussels.
Both sides have strong political motivations
for a trade agreement. It would imply Chinese
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CSCE: THE CRUNCH IS ON
Most delegations at the European security
conference believe that the next few weeks in
Geneva will be crucial ones. If the conference is
to conclude this summer-as the Soviet and vir-
tually all other delegations hope-many issues
will have to be resolved in a relatively short
time. Activity has now increased perceptibly,
some issues have been settled, and a working
group has begun planning for a final summit-
level meeting.
Moscow is apparently counting on the
Western participants to give up trying to get
concessions on a number of issues. The Soviet
negotiators have recently shown flexibility on
some matters, but they have stalled on others
and even reopened debate on several considered
settled months ago. The West European dele-
gations are having difficulty matching the deter-
mination and resolve of the Sovi-t Union.
The Soviets recently accepted a French
compromise that ended a long deadlock on the
declaration of princip!es, which the conference
has been formulating for guiding international
relations. The Soviet acceptance opens the way
for the conferees to conclude their work on this
part of the so-called Basket I.
The conference has yet to agree, however,
on the wording in the declaration of principles
of a so-called saving clause. This is a statement
implying that the rights and responsibilities of
the US, UK, France, and the USSR in Germany
and Berlin are not affected by the conference's
decisions. Many of the neutral delegations are
trying to change the present draft, considering it
too vague and an affirmation of the "Brezhnev
doctrine." The Western powers are amenable to
change, but the Soviets may limit afterations.
The Soviet negotiators have also displayed
a certain degree of flexibility on one of the
major military-related "confidence-building
measures"-but onl'/ after the Western and
neutral delegations made an important con-
cession. The Soviets said that they could accept
the Western idea of providing advance notice
about national and multinational military
maneuvers if the notification were given on a
voluntary basis. The Western and neutral states
accepted this Soviet proposal as a "working
hypothesis," but still have to determine how
much advance notification should be given and
the size and location of the maneuvers that
would be affected. ?
In contrast to their flexibility on "prin-
ciples," the Soviets have drawn the line on
matters concerned with the freer movement of
people and ideas. The Western negotiators now
plan to present a single text covering all such
topics. They contend that this would put maxi-
mum pressure on the Soviets to come to reason-
able terms at a time Moscow may consider
optimum for working out a deal. Past behavior
suggests that the Soviets will test the West's
resolve by continuing to stall.
Another point to be settled is the type of
follow-on machinery to be established. The
Soviets formally support a Czechoslovak pro-
posal to create a post-conference consultative
committee with a broad mandate to discuss
issues affecting seL.,rity and cooperation in
Europe. The committee would have a per-
manent secretariat. This is an objectionable
feature as far as the West is concerned. The
Soviets themselves have cool&d to the idea,
perhaps out of concern that the West could use
the proposed committee to hold them 'o ac-
count on the implementation of the con-
ference's agreements.
The Western delegations formally support
'Denmark's proposal for senior officials to m?ct
three years after the cor.`erence ends in order to
assess the results and decide Nhether further
meetings are necessary The West EuropeaiiE,
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however, arc snarply split on the issue. The
Dutch, Belgians, and 1-rench advocate as little
follow-on activity -is possible, ."chile the British,
and now even the Danes, are prepared to accept
relatively frequent meetings of experts and
senior officials. On this and other issues, the
the lead.
ROMANIA AND THE NONALIGNED
Romania's relations with the USSR will be
further strained if Bucharest is successful in its
quest for observer status at a conference of
nonaligned foreign ministers in Lima later this
year. Romania had sought admission as an
observer to the fourth nonaligned summit in
Algiers in 1973 but did not succeed, partly
because of a rebuff from the Yugoslavs. Since
then, Pr--;,:-nt Ceausescu has persistently
stressed th, 'ghts of developing states and the
common interests of Romania and the non-
aligned world. He has also received and visited
scores of Third World leaders.
The Romanians now seem to have won
Yugoslav endorsement for their nonaligned bid.
The communique at the conclusion of Foreign
Minister Macovescu's visit to Belgrade from
April 28 to 30 implied Yugoslav support, and
there are indications that the Yugoslavs are
encouraging Romania to seek backing from such
nonaligned countries as Algeria, Egypt, and
Mexico. Ceausescu's sudden two-day visit to
Syria and Egypt late last month was in part
intended to pross Bucharest's case.
Romania's pariy secretary for foreign rela-
tions has privately admitted that "some" non-
aligned states are resisting Bucharest's efforts to
achieve observer status. He said these countries
fear that Romania's admission, even as an ob-
server, might open the doer for other, more
"aligned" states to intrude.
Should Romania achieve observer status,
new tensions would be added to Soviet-
Romarian relations. For instance, Bucharest
would be associating itself with such nonaligned
concepts as the division of the world into the
"haves" and "have nots." These formulations
are anathema to the men in the Kremlin, who
insist on viewing international relations in the
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To reduce the risk, the Romanians have
carefully couched much of their case in the
Kremlin's own language endorsing nonalignment
and are clearly banking once again on correctly
reading the limits of Soviet tolerance. Ceausescu
has apparently decided than if even a tenuous
link with the nonaligned movement can be
established, Bucharest will be better able to
counter future pressure to conform to the
Kremlin's policies.
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Soviets, is armed with a cornouter-Stahjli7arl
115-mm. in gun.
tine new tank has an automati
loader, making it :,ssible to eliminate on
crewman. The tank reportedly is powered by
turbine engine capable of using a variety of fuel
and has chemical-biological-rad'ation protection
and stronger armor than the 7-62, currently the
USSR's primary medium tank. The T-72
models of which Western intelligence called th
e
M-1970 when it was in the test and selection
stage, is probably already replacing older
Dur;ng the late 1960s and early 1970s,
tank were produced in substantial qua:,tity for
an unusually long test program that included
limited deployment. The T-72 version was
selected-probably in 1973--for mass produc-
tion. About 1,800 prototype tanks were
produced before the T-72 was selected, and it is
estimated that 1,000 T-72s have been produced
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V-E DAY CELEBRATION
Soviet Solemnity...
Soviet government and party leaders at Lenin s tomb for V-E Day ceremony
The Soviet buildup of the 30th anniversary
of V-E Day was months in the making, and
inevitably it got Moscow into some hot water
abroad and into some sensitive areas at home.
Last week the celebrations finally took place,
but they did not fully answer the question of
why all the bother in the first place. The answer
may rest in the emotions of an aging leadership,
and a people, for whom World War II was both
trauma ;nd triumph. It was an opportunity to
remir;; 6.9 younger generation of what the war
wa.., about and of how far the Soviets have come
since 1945.
The main event was a "solemn" meeting in
the kremlin Palace of Corgresses on May 8,
where Brezhnev gave the keynote speech, long
on rhetoric, to a large gathering of Soviet and
foreign dignitar ;es. He managed to put in a good
word for the Yugoslavs to help undo the damage
of earlier statements that slighted their contribu-
tion to the war effort.
He made no special effort to be kind to the
US, but did make a pitch for disarmament and
detente. Although Brezhnev failed to repeat
Minister of Defense Grechko's earlier formula-
tion about the "possibility of political and mili-
tary cooperation between states with differing
social systems," sorrething close to this idea 'as
included in his message to President Ford.
Brczhnev managed to avoid mentioning
Stalin at all, nor did he refer to the wartime
contribution of pclitical officers. (Brezhnev had
served in such a capacity during the war.) In
what was evidently a separate ceremony, how-
ever, Brezhnev received his marshal's sitar, sig-
nifying his promotion to the rank of general of
the army. The award once again presented
visible evidence of the special relationship be-
tween Brezhnev and the military.
...and Military Parading
During the Victory Day parade in Belgrade,
US attaches observed FROG-7 tactical rockets
with Yugoslav military personnel for the first
time. The FROGs will provide the Yugoslav
army with its longest range artillery weapon.
During rehearsals for the parade, the attaches
also saw SA-6 and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.
Yugoslavia's acquisition of these surface-to-air
missiles will provide its armed forces with a
more flexible and mobile air defense capability
against aircraft flying at low-to-medium al-
titudes.
Although US attaches in Prague reported
the initial sighting of SA-4 and SA-6 surface-
to-air missile equipment with Czechoslovak
armed forces, we suspect that the Soviets merely
loaner1 the missiles to the Czechoslovaks for the
parade. Soviet troops stationed in the cou,rtry
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WARSAW PACT ANNIVERSARY
The Warsaw Pact quietly celebrated the
twentieth anniversary of its founding on
Wednesday amid indications that the Soviet
Union has received a setback in its effort to
upgrade the political role of the seven-member
organization.
Moscow has been pushi,ig for the creation
of a permanent committee of pact foreign min-
isters and a pact secretariat headed by a strong
Soviet secretary general. These proposals have
cropped up periodi, :I'?/ during the two decades
of the pact's existenL,; and are consistent with
Brezhnev's often stated desire to make the pact
"the main center for coordinating the fraternal
countries' foreign policy." The Soviet initiative
reportedly was to be announced at a pact
summit in Moscow that would have been a
suitable culmination to the flood of self-con-
gratulatory propaganda generated by
anniversary celebrations commemorating the
end of World War II.
A Romanian diplomat recently said that
neither the proposal nor the summit was accept-
able to his government. Moscow, rather than let
this disagreement spoil the anniversary festiv-
ities, apparently chose to shift the venue to
Warsaw and lower the level of participation t
pact parliamentarians. In response to this move,
Bucharest resorted to its tactic of sending a
lower representation level to bloc meetings it
deems objectionable.
Meanwhile, the pact continues to be an
alliance of unequals wh(.se military resources,
training, and defense po;:-,y are rationalized and
coordinated in the Soviet interest. It is in-
creasingly being used by Moscow as a channel to
transmit directives to its East European allies
and organize East European support fc Soviet
policies. Although :he Soviet Union has period-
ically expressed willingness to dissolve the
Warsaw Pact in exchange for the dissolution of
NATO, it is not likely that Moscow ?,vill give up
its search for ways to make the alliance a more
Hungarian troops on parade
effective tool in maintaining Soviet I: igemony in
Eastern Europe.
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SOUTH KOREA: CRACKING DOWN AGAIN
President Pak issued a sweeping new
emergency decree this week banning any
criticism of the authoritarian 1972 constitution,
the spreading of "false rumors," all student
political activity and prc'hibiting any statement
against the decree itself. Members of parliament
are exempted if their critk sm is expressed on
the National Assembly floor, but the media
cannot publicize the statements.
Pak has long wanted to disarm his domestic
opponents, who have been challenging his
increasingly authoritarian rule, and he fears
North Korean efforts to foster "revolution" in
the South. He has apparently concluded that it
is more urgent to strengthen defenses against his
enemies at home and in the North than to
satisfy critics of his human rights policies,
including those in the US Congress.
The new decree is in line with the trend
toward tougher domestic controls by the Pak
government, but its comprehensiveness has
surprised many observers. It comes at a tirr,'
when Pak's most vocal opponents have been
closing ranks in support of the regime in order
to avoid giving a signal of internal weakness to
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the North in the wake of Indochina events and
Kim 11-song's visit to Peking.
Pak's adversaries are unlikely to move
forcefully soon to challenge the new decree.
They fear imprisonment, they need time to
regroup and assess US reactions, and they don't
want to appear irresponsible in the current
mood of uncertainty about Pyongyang's inten-
tions. The new measures are repugnant to Pak's
opponents, however, and they appear certain to
political warfare in Seoul.
Philippines-Chira
MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM
President Marcos may get his wish to make
a state visit to Peking "when the weather is
warm" so he can wear the Philippine national
dress, wl,ich includes a sheer shirt made of
pineapple fiber. Mrs. Marcos recently told China
news agency officials in Hong Kong that her
husband hopes to visit China next month. Nego-
tiations in Tokyc between Philippine and
Chinese representatives over diplomatic recogni-
tion are apparently proceeding without a hitch.
the process of citizenship for alien Chinese
residents in the Philippines. He hopes this will
resolve the long-standing issue of the legal status
of some 150,000 local Chinese. Marcos was con-
cerned that they would become "wards" of
Peking once diplomatic relations were estab-
lish--J, and like other Southeast Asian leaders,
he wants to minimize the opportunities for
interaction between communist Chinese diplo-
mats and local Chinese.
Marcos has not yet shown any particular
concern about what effect a Peking mission in
Manila might have on the country's small but
well-organized communist insurgents. Since
martial law was instituted, Philippine security
authorities have arrested many of the urban
political cadre of both the pro-Peking and the
pro-Moscow communist parties. The Maoist-
style New People's Army insurgents in rural
Luzon Island have been relatively inactive
past two ears.
Mrs. Marcos and Madame Mao visit a commune
If negotiations proceed favorably, Marcos
will personally work out the final details during
his state visit, and presumably the official an-
nouncement would be made at that time. Mrs.
Marcos said that her brother would Co to Peking
this month to make the arrangements for the
President's visit. She has been lobbying hard for
early recognition of China and is doubtless look-
ing forward to a role as intermediary, intro-
ducing her husband to the Chinese officials she
met during her triumphal visit last September.
President Marcos has also been taking steps
to prepare the Philippine domestic scene for a
communist Chinese diplomatic presence. In
April, he issued a presidential decree that liber-
alizes naturalization requirements and speeds up
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USSR-LIBYA: SOME MUTUAL BENEFITS
The visit to Libya this week of Soviet
Premier Kosygin i odicates that despite the
ni.rtual suspicion and political differences of
Moscow and Tripoli they plan to continue eco-
nomic and military ties. The visit is the first by a
Soviet leader since the Libyan revolution, and
`both countries probably hope it will strengthen
their hands in dealing with their mutual an-
tagoriist in Cairo.
The presence of economic and military aid
specialists on Kosygin's delegation suggests that
an expansion of these programs was discussed.
On the eve of Kosygin's arrival, Moscow de-
livered the first MIG-23s purchased by Libya
under the arms deal entered into last year. A
desire to get some of Libya's oil money is
clearly one important factor behind Moscow's
new relationship with Tripoli.
Jallud (I) and Kosvgin meet in Moscow last 11.1v
Both sides went out of their way to
demonstrate that they still differ on how to
achieve a Middle East settlement. Kosygin
publicly stressed that the Geneva conference
should be reconvened and should ensure the
independence of "all" slates--a clear reference
to Israel. He lectured about the need for Arab
unity, but it is unlikely that Moscow thought it
could sway the instransigent Libyans, o, even
that Tripoli is particu;arly important in ge,ting a
Middle East settlement.
Prime Minister Jallud met with the head of
one of the most extreme Palestinian groups on
the eve of Kosygin's visit to make plain Libya's
continued support for the radical Arabs. To
drive the point home, Tripoli edited references
to Geneva from its account of Kosygin's speech.
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The Egyptian angle seems to be what has
brought the Soviets and the Libyans together.
Moscow may hope that the visit will make
Egypt uneasy about Soviet influence next door
and will demonstrate that the USSR has other
options in the Arab world. Tripoli, which had
been pressing Moscow to send a high-level visi-
tor, particularly welcomed the visit in view of
the recent intensification of strains between
Libya and Egypt.
Egyptian President Sadat's remarks suggest
that the visit was on target. He said the Kosygin
trip "poses a strange question mark" about
Soviet and Libyan intentions, particularly in
view of the "legendary dimensions" of Mos-
cow's arms commitments to Tripoli.
After Libya, Kosygin will go on to Tunisia,
but that visit wi,s laid on hastily and will prob-
ably result in I~ttle of significance. It will give
Moscow the opportunity, however, to talk
about a Middle East settlement before an audi-
ence more in tune with its views than the Lib-
yans.
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SYRIA-IRAQ: PRECAUTIONARY MOVES
Damascus has taken further military pre-
cautions against an Iraqi attack over the Eu-
phratns Piv