WEEKLY REVIEW

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
28
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 11, 2010
Sequence Number: 
25
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 23, 1975
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2.pdf1.71 MB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Top Secret Weekly Review Top Secret 25X1 May 23, 1975 Copy N9 656 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : The WEEI . Y REVIEW, 's ,ucJ every Friday morning by the Office of Current Inteaig Inc , reports and analyzes significant developments of the weak through noon on Thursday. It fre- ouently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the, Office of Strategic P~-~suarch, the Office of Geographic and Cartocr~"hjc research, and the Uireciorato of Science and Technology. Topic; recuiririg more comprohen ivo treatment and therefore publishrad separately as Special Rei'crts are listed in the contents. CONTENTS 1May 23, 1975) 1 Vietnam: Slow Road to Reunificaticn 2 Thailand: Mayaguez Implications 3 Laos: Communists Consolidate Contro 5 Cambodia- Peking Has an Early 25X1 MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 7 Arab Troop Movements 8 Egypt: Promoting Solidarity 9 Spanish Sahara: UN Visitors 10 Lehanon: Prime Minister Resigns 25X1 11 Geneva: NPT Conference Continues 12 Portugal: Military Challenged 13 Hungary: New Premier 14 Western Alliance Week 16 F-104 Replacement Still Muddled 17 Greece-Turkey: Foreign Ministers Meet 18 Soviet Military: Land, Sea, and Air 20 US-Poland Fishing Talks WESTERN HEMISPHERE 21 Argentina: Power Plait in the Army 22 Cuba: Regional Party Conclave 23 Chile: Thinking Ahead 23 Bolivia: Gulf Oi! 25X1 Comments and queries on the contents of this pub,icatIon ar^ welcome. They may be air I the editor of (t;e w 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 Vietnam With the end of the war in Vietnam, atten- tion quickly shifted to the question of Hanoi's future political strategy in the South and whether it would opt for a rapid integration of the two Vietnams or for a more gradual reunifi- cation process. The Vietnamese communists themselves have carefully avoided any precise or definitive announcements regarding the nature or likely duration of the current communist administration in the South. During the past week, however, celebrations in Saigon and Hanoi honoring the communist victory in South Vietnam and He Chi Minh's birthday appeared to shed some light on Hanoi's general approach to the South's future political course. Tne celebrations for example, made it fairly clear that, at least for the time being, many of the top personalities involver in t'ie wartime communist administration in the South will continue to play leading roles in the new political process. Pham Hung was listed first among the Southern dignitaries welcoming a North 'Jiet- narnese delegation to the ceremonies, and he apparently is to be Hanoi's senior man in South Vietnam. A member of the North Vietnamese Politburo, he has been Hanoi's senior official managing the communists' complex political and military organizations in the South since he assumed command of the Central Office for South Vietnam in 1967. He was identified as a member of the Central Committee of the Viet- Military Management Committee members nam Workers' Party, "secretary of the South Vietnam Party organization," and "political commissar of the South Vietnam PLAF Com- mand." This is the first time in several years that Hung has been identified publicly. Indeed, there had been some speculation that he had either been killed or had Callen out of favor with the Hanoi regime. His appearance as the party's Southern chieftain, however, indicates that Hanoi intends to exert direct control over the Southern party, government, and military apparatus. Behind Hung, Nguyen Huu Tho emerges as the next man in the lineup as head of the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet- nam. A man of lesser stature in the communist power structure, Tho apparently will continue to head the Front- or something closely resembling it-and probably will be in charge of forming the administrative apparatus. Huynh Tan Phat, president of the Provi sional Revolutionary Government, delivered a major address at the victory celebrations, sug- gesting that the PRG will remain in business for the time being as the formal entity with which foreign governments are to establish diplomatic relations. Communist spokesmen at the celebra- tions invited immediate recognition of the PRG by foreign capitals-including the US, providing Washington fulfills its "obligations under the Paris Agreement." Such a formulation probably means that the communists would demand Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 certain tough conditions, such as the provision of US economic assistance. Communist statements continue to affirm reuni`ication as a fundamental objective and make it ciear that the question is one of "when" rather than "if." Prior to reunification, however, Hanoi appears to be thinking in terms of an interim period during which the communists will secure firm administrative and political con- trol in the South. Such an approach seemed to be outlined by the party's theoretician, Truong Chinh, when he listed "advancing toward reunification" last in a lengthy sr.; ies of steps that had to be taken by the South in order to "strengthen solidarity" and achieve "national reconciliation." In a similar vein, North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan has called on the South to de- velop "a sound and progressive national culture." Implying that reunification would be accomplished gradually, he told cadre in the North that they should "step up socialist con- struction" while people in the South should "unite and build a splendid democratic national regime." A decision to adopt a gradual approach to reunification might be dictated in large part by the huge task of setting up a communist administration in the South. While little evidence is available to gauge how these efforts are progressing in the countryside, press reports from Saigon point up the problems that the new administration is confronting. Crime is appar- ently increasing, caused by the large number of unemployed and of armed former government military and civilian cadre living in the city. Since the city was liberated, the gover.iing mili- tary commission has been forced to concentrate principally :;n registering former government cadre and organizing various youth, women, and labor groups to provide essential services for a city of nearly three million. The commission chairman, Tran Van Tra, has publicly conceded that it will be some time before Saigon is " properly administered.' THAILAND: MAYAGUEZ IMPLICATIONS The Khukrit Pramot government has weathered fairly well its first serious political test, which was provoked by the Mayaguez affair. The unexpected arrival of U5 Marines at Utapao Air Base last week touched off strong anti-US protests, which leftist politicians unsuccessfully attempted to turn against the Khukrit coalition. Khukrit's strong criticism of the mi.nner in hich the US handled the incident served to deflect public anger away from his government. Although it did strain US-Thai relations, Bangkok's decision to acknowledge a US diplomatic note as an official apology defused tension in Thailand, where anti-US demonstrations had threatened to turn vio!pnt. The week's events demonstrated clearly that the Khukrit government was not prepared to let the Mayaguez incident stand in the way of continued good relations with the US. While the episode will certainly strengthen the argument of those in the Foreign Ministry and the cabinet who favor a faster withdrawal u,r US forces from Thailand, Khukrit left no doubt during his May 16 press conference that his government would not be stampeded into taking precipitate action against US interests in Thailand. He did say, however, that existing US-Thai agreements would be reviewed and that the Thai gov- ernment would have to give consideration to strengthening its control over US activities at Thai air bases. The Mayaguez incident could scarcely have come at a worse time for the Khukrit gov- ernment, which strongly desires to get off on the right foot with the new communist regime in Cambodia. Prior to the arrival of the US Marines, the Thai were already embroiled in several minor disputes with the Cambodians, including the seizure of a Thai fishing vessel-v,'+ich was subsequently released along with the Mayaguez-and the demarcation of one Page 2 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 LAOS: COMMUNISTS CONSOLIDATE CONTROL The Pathet Lao are moving rapidly to es- tablish control over non-communist areas of the country, despite their apparent willingness to maintain-at least for the time being-the trappings of a center-left coalition government in Vientiane. They are also orchestrating large- scale demonstrations against the US presence in Laos. Pathet Lao combat troops have now oc- cupied virtually every important former rightist stronghold in central and southern Laos. No resistance from non-communist forces has been reported. A North Vietnamese infantry battalion has also been ordered to shift from the western highlands of South Vietnam to eastern Laos, but there is no evidence so far that this unit or any other North Vietnamese combat forces will be committed in support of the Pathet Lao. Indeed, the absence of any non-communist re- sistance to the Pathet Lao moves suggests that such support will not be required. In the un- likely event, however, that some form of or- ganized resistance eventually develops that the Pathet Lao are incapable of handling, Hanoi probably will not hesitate to throw some com- bat units into the fray. Elsewhere in the Savannakhet area, Pathet Lao battalions have reportedly moved into the towns of Seno, Keng Kok, and Dong Hene. L ,o communist forces are also said to have occupied the city of Thakhek, some 60 miles north of Savannakhet. 25X1 In northern Laos, Pathet Lao and pro- comr?-inist neutralist forces 7-re consolidating their control over virtually all of the key posi- tions defended until recently by General Vana communist forces have entered and seized yang ao's headquarters complex at Long Tieng as well as Sam Thong, Phou Long Mat, and his enclave at Bouam Long northeast of the Plaine des Jarres. 25X1 Communist-inspired demonstrations against the US era ted in Vientiane again week. At least 1,000 Pathet Lao soldiers, ac- companied by tanks and artillery, have re- portedly moved into the city of Pakse. Farther north along the Mekong, an estimated three to four Pathet Lao battaiions stave occupied Savan- nakhet. Activist students and other communist- 'nspired demonstrators, who have been rabble- rousing in the city f r over a week, managed to marshal a large crowd to cheer the Pathet Lao's "trit'mphant" entry. Communist coalition offi- cials in Vientiane dispatched reporters and camera crews to dutifully record the event. The 12 Americans-including three senior US AID officials-who had been placed under "volun- tary" house arrest by the Savannakhet demon- strators on May 14 were finally released on May 22 after a coalition cabinet-level delegation gave in to the protestors demands that Savannakhet and other non-communist areas in central Laos be "neutralized." Predominantly. communist controlled area, February 1973 ceasefire Page 3 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 1 The demonstrators also broke into e near y commissary and American com- munity center; considerable looting and some property damage was reported. Units of the capital's joint police force-consisting mostly of Pathet Lao-were outside the compound but made no effort to restore order. 25X1 the US agrees to these terms, a small number or American aid "specialists" will be permitted to remain in Laos as "advisers" to the various coali- tion ministries responsible for dispensing the aid. Demonstrators also seized the AID ware- house just outside the capital, and a small num- ber of Pathet Lao troops-members of Vien- tiane's joint military security force-stationed themselves at the entrance to a nearby housing compound where some 143 American families reside. At last report, Americans were being permitted to enter but not to leave the com- pound, and all vehicles were being searched. In addition to carrying signs denouncing AID and CIA, the Vientiane demonstrators have issued several communiques demanding: ? abrogation of all "unequal U -L .3o agreements, particularly the 1951 aid agree- ment"; ? dissolution of the AID organization; ? immediate removal of all AID and CIA personnel from the country; ? transfer of all AID facilities and equip- ment to the coalition government. Pathet Lao coalition officials have taken essentially the same line in private conversations with senior US embassy and AID officials. They obviously look upon the demonstrations as means of bringing additional "popular" pressure on the US to capitulate to communist demanr'?s. Pathet Lao Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi Vongvichit told the US charge and the acting AID director this week that the coalition gov- ernment wanted US assistance to Laos to con- tinue, and he seemed to envisage a long-term requirement for such aid. Phoumi added, how- ever, that USAID as a separate organization must be abolished and that all future assistance must be given directly to the coalition government which, in turn, would administer the program. If Prime Minister Souvanna convened an emergency meeting of the coalition cabinet earlier this week to select replacements for re- cently ousted rightist ministers and secretaries of state. In a surprise announcement, Souvanna named neutralist Interior Minister Pheng Phong- savan to replace Sisoul- na Champassak as minis- ter of defense. This presumably means that "act- ing" Pathet Lao Defense Minister Khammouane Boupha will return to his old number-two posi- tion at the ministry. Uncontroversial non-communists were also ndmed to replace Pheng at interior and to fill t. raining vacancies at finance, foreign affairs, and public works. Souvanna has, in addition, selected his nephew and personal physician as a tentative replacement for rightist Healch Minis- ter Khamphay Abhay, in the likely event that Khamphay decides not to return to Laos from his present mission to Geneva. Communist Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi Vongvichit, who Souvanna claims approved all of his selections, apparently made no effort to have Pathet Lao officials fill the vacant posts -all of which were allocated to the noncom- munists under the terms of the 1973 peace accords. This would appear to be another indica- tion that the Pathet Lao are prepared, for the moment at least, to maintain the coalition facade. Souvanna also announced at the cabinet meeting that he had reached agreement with his Pathet Lao deputy Phoumi to expand the membership of the coalition's Joint National Political Council from 42 to 72 delegates and to convert that body into a legislative replacement 25X1 25X1 25X1 Page 4 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 , for the recently dissolved, rightist-dominated National Assembly. The additional delegates, ac- cording to the Prime Minister, will be evenly divided between the non-communists, the Pathet Lao, and the so-called "qualified neu- tralists." Transformation of the political counci!, which is chaired and dominated by communist leader Souphanouvong, into a legislative assem- bly has been a major goal of the Pathet Lao ever since they joined the coalition. With Sou- phanouvong riding herd over all of its delegates, the council will almost certainly become ber stamn Pathet Lao law-makinn hnr1 ' Their presence overshadowed first by the widely publicized deportation of foreigners from Phnom Penh and then by the Mayaguez incident, the Chinese have been quietly getting in on the ground floor with the new Cambodian regime. Chinese representatives have been in the Cambodian capital since late April,F_ (Chinese techni- cians have been visiting Cambodian factories, and Chinese merchant ships have begun calling at the port of Kompong Som. Propaganda statements from Phnom Fenh have stressed the need for self-sufficiency', but the new leadership will need rapid short-term assistance merely to overcome supply shortages and will be completely dependent on outside technical advice in getting Camhodia's small in- dustries on their feet. The early arrival of Chi- nese technicians and ships indicates that Peking will play a substantial role in both areas and for the near term, in fact, may have a monopoly in proviaing assistance to the Cambodians. Phnom Penh radio has praised China for its "sincere support and mutual r^spect," noting that Cambodian solidarity with Chi-,a is "strong, developing, and flourishing." In contrast, the Vietnamese have been lumped with the Laotians and Koreans as "other" close comrades in arms. The Soviet Union has not been mentioned at all. Hanoi probably foresaw problems with the nationalistic and independent Khmer com- muoists once the fighting ended and the Cam- bodians had less need for Vietnamese military assistance. It must be taken aback, however, by the suddenness with which the new regime is asserting itself. Public Khmer communist pro- hibitions against military bases in Cambodia and Phnom Penh's pointed references to the coun- try's "territo. ial integrity" are obviously aimed at serving nonce that Vietnamese communist freedom of mo/ement in eastern Cambodia is a 'hing of the past. Although Hanoi's need to transit Cambodian soil ended with the fall of Saigon, the Vietnamese must be deeply dis- turbed over recent angressive Cambodian actions along the border and by KF mer occupation of disputed islands in the Gulf of Thailand. Given their considerable investment in the insurgency, the Vietnamese undoubtedly find the situation frustrating. At the moment, how- ever, Hanoi must adjust to political realities and rely on its supporters in the Cambodian lead- ership to maintain a degree or influence. Peking-concerned over the possible ex- tension of Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina and the growth of Soviet influence in the re- gion-is surely gratified by developments in Cambodia. During the war, China hedged its bets by continuing to support Prince Sihanouk while strengthening ties with communist leaders in Cambodia. Given the apparent receptiveness of the new leaders in Phnom Penh to Chinese overtures, this approach seems to be oavina off handsomely. 25X1 25X1 7cyl 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Page 5 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 In a move to strengthen defenses against a possible Israeli attempt in any new conflict to outflank Syria's southern defense line by an attack through northern Jordan, Syria and Jor- dan have recently moved military forces to cover their common border area with Israel. The moves appear to have been taken as a result of closer military cooperation between the two countries. The Syri,?ns, also concerned about the possible threat from Iraq as a result of the dispute over Euphrates River waters, have moved some military forces closer to the Iraqi border. Along the Israeli Border To bolster its defenses opposite Israel, Syria may have shifted its 1st Armored Division to the area just north r` the Jordanian border from its reserve po-? on south of Damascus. Last weekend, the Lamascus-Dara road report- edly was closed to civilian traffic for at least 24 hours to permit troops to move s'uthward. A large military convoy, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and mobile rockets, was seen heading south from the area where the 1st Armored Division normally is stationed. The US defense attache saw no Syrian combat units at the 1st Division's armor camp at Al Kiswah on May 20. Amman has reoriented its military forces toward Israel and away from Syria. Along the Iraqi Border Syria also has taken steps to strengthen its forces facing Iraq. Qualified Western observers saw nearly 200 Syrian tank transporters- carrying mostly tanks but also some surface-to- air missile equipment-heading eastward on the Hims-Palmyra road on May 19. They also saw what may have been 200 other combat vehicles Page 7 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85TOO875RO01000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Sadat's tour included a stop in Kuwait, visits to Iraq and Jordan-the first ever by an Egyptian president-and a brief stopover in Syria. During press conferences in each country, Sadat gave unusual vent to his frustration with the Palestine Liberation Organization. He in- dicated that he has still not succeeded in work- ing out a unified Arab strategy-or in getting the PLO itself to announce a position on whether and under what representational formula it would agree to attend the Geneva conference. Asked at a Kuwait press conference how he would resolve the issue of PLO representation, Sadat replied peevishly that the question might better be asked of the Palestinians, who, he implied, had not yet decided even whether to go to Geneva. 25X1 He repeated this theme, in somewhat softer tones, at his other stops, including Damascus, where he had just completed an hour-long con- sultation with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. This suggests that Sadat received little satisfaction from Arafat--and probably little support from the Syrians for Egypt's views on the Palestinian issue. heading eastward in the same area three days earlier. The equipment may have been from the Syrian 3rd Armored Division, normally stationed north and east of Damascus. A shift of large elements of this division to the north would significantly reduce Syria's remaining armored reserve along the front with Israel. Sadat in- dicated at a press conference in Baghdad that tho mediation was not going well. After giving an optimistic answer to a question on mediation of the Kuwait-Iraq border problem, he evaded a similar question on Syria and Iraq by noting that the problem had been disscussed, but that Egyptian intervention "has to be within limits." An Egyptian official told the US embassy in Cairo that the Iraqis expressed "unreserved readiness" to accept any Egyptian suggestion for resolving the dispute, indicating that the con- tinued reluctance to negotiate Syria. EGYPT: PROMOTING SOLIDARITY President Sadat's recent week-long swing through four Arab states ended with the appear- ance of restored Arab solidarity but did little to move the Arabs closer to a unified approach to the Geneva peace conference. By consulting with some of his fellow Arab leaders in advance of his meeting with President Ford on June 1, the Egyptian President may at least have partia!ly disarmed his Arab critics who have long felt he acts too independen iy. Sadat also implicitly criticized the Pales- tinians for refusing to recognize Israel and thus impeding progress toward reconvening the Geneva conference. At the Kuwait press confer- ence, he said that Israel is "an existing reality" whose 1967 borders cannot be touched. He labeled demands For Israel's destruction as "one- upmanship in which I am not prepared to get involved." statement among the Palestinian community in Kuwait has been a mixture of dismay and bellig- erence. The PLO office there has reportedly been inundated with demands that the PLO dissociate itself from Sadat. Such a step is un- likely, but the PLO leadership is undoubtedly not happy. Sadat has never before so explicitly stated Egypt's recd nition of Israel before an Arab audience. 25X1 25X1 Page 8 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85TOO875RO01000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 I The visit to Spanish Sahara and Morocco this week by an investigating team of the UN Committee or Decolonization has stirred up the parties contesting the territory's future. The UN team, which has already been to Madrid, will go on to Algeria and Mauritania. Two of the contestants, Morocco and Algeria, clashed during a meeting in Cairo late last month. The day after the meeting, King Hassan warned that, while Morocco would prefer to negotiate the issue, it might use force to prevent "self-determination in the Sahara." Algeria, which is determined to block Moroccan annexation of the area, supports a referendum in the belief Saharans will opt for independence and be susceptible to Algeria;i influence. roccan irregular troops posing as Saharans in small-scale guerrilla operations in the Spanish The Moroccan press is giving heavy play to recent hit-and-run strikes against Spanish forces in the Sahara, portraying the attacks as the work of a 'vioroccan-backed Saharan insurgent r'; oup. The coverage suggests that Rabat is usir:g Mo- Last week, a Moroccan unit in southern Morocco fired a surface-to-air missile-probably an SA-7-at two ;ntruding Spanish helicopters; the helicopters were not hit. The firing probably was the act of an individual soldier or local commander, but it could also have resulted from a decision by Rabat to challenge the fairly frequent Spanish overflights of the area. The Moroccans' pressure tactics are prob- ably intended to demonstrate to the LIN team that there are pro-Moroccan Saharans and also to induce Madrid to resume negotiations. Rabat might be willing to include Mauritania in a future dialogue with Spain inasmuch as it has accepted Nouakchott-but not Algiers-as an interested party to the dispute. Madrid J Rabat Meanwhile, recent allegations in th; Spanish press about secret conversations in. volving Spain, Morocco, and Mauritan;i: led For- eign Minister Cortina to announce that Spain continues to support a UN-supervised referen- dum on self-determination for the Sahara. Ac- cording to a Spanish Foreign Ministry official, the press stories came from Spanish officials who favor a negotiated settlement v ith Mo- rocco. The arguments of these officials have been weakened by King Hassan's renewed claim to Spain's enclaves in ,,orthern Morocco-Ceuta and Melilla-territories that Madrid says it will not give up. Madrid appears to believe that a referendum would result in a vote for an inde- pendent state, which the Spaniards could hope to control. The Spaniards postponed plans for a refer- endum after the UN General Assembly last fall adopted a Moroccan-initiated resolution sending the dispute to the International Court of Jus- tice. Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania have sub- mitted written briefs to the court, which began hearing the case last week. Algeria has made an oral presentation of its views as an interested party. A court opinior. is expected in time for the next General Assembly session in Septem- ber. 25X1 25X1 Page 9 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 ssified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 GJ/~ I Prime Minister Rashid Sulh resigned late last week after leaders of the country's two largest Christian political parties withdrew their support to protest his handling of the disturb- ances in Beirut last month. It could take Presi- dent Franjiyah several weeks to come up with a new prime minister, since he must be acceptable not only to the President but to the country's main political and religious blocs. Lebanese leftists and the fedayeen made a last-minute effort to drum up support for Sulh's government. Although they opposed him on many issues, they valued the freedom provided by his weak leadership and were eager to deny the right-wing Phalanges Party the credit for bringing down the government. By custom, the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim. In recent years, leaders of that sizable community have been reluctant to serve under Franjiyah, who dislikes sharing power with anyone. Over the past two years, however, Franjiyah has been ill-served by three weak prime ministers, and he mdy now be ready to make the concessions necessary to recruit a more assertive and politically powerful candi- date. The next prime minister's primary chal- lenge will be the. country's deteriorating security situation. Militia of the Phalanges Party and the fedayeen clashed in Beirut again this week, leaving at least 5 persons dead and 40 injured. This was the first significant violation of the April 16 cease-fire that ended four days of fight- ing between the two groups. Government se- curity forces, ineffective last month. this time rnov"d quickly to set up roadblocks to contain the violence. There is no evidence thai the Lebanese army or the major fedayeen groups were involved ;n the fighting this week, whici was limited primarily to mortar and small-arms fire. Parliamentarian tries to pull Prime Minister Sulh back into parliament At the piesent time, however, repeated clashes between the Phalangists and the radical feda- yeen could lead to widespread calls for changes in the couiltry's delicately balanced system of government. Sulh, who is serving as caretaker prime minister, has already called for such changes and has open!y sided with the Pales- tinians against the Phalangists. 25X1 25X1 Page 10 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 (Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : ICIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 1 1 During almost three weeks of meetings in Geneva, the delegates at the conference to re- view the Non-Proliferation Treaty have focused on the standard complaints about the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations and the need for money for nuclear power development. The lack of confidence in current non-prolifera- tion efforts may explain why less than half of the treaty's 118 signatories have thus far sent representatives to the session. On May 30, the conference plans to publish a declaration out- lining its accomplishments and recommending future disarmament actions. The nuclear powers have, as expected, corne under fire by allies and enemies alike for their failure to achieve the complete nuclear disarmament called for by the NPT. In the opinion of many countries, moreover, the dis- armament pacts already negotiated have not ful- filled the treaty's aims; they believe it is now time to impose qualitative and quantitative curbs on nuclear weapons development. The argument has also been made that progress in the seismological field with respect to verifica- tion procedures has made a comprehensive test ban treaty technically possible. Some of the nonaligned states are calling for a timetable for concluding a test ban, but such a resolution has little chance of passage by the necessary two thirds of the participants. The demand nevertheless serves to bring together those who reject the claims of the nuclear powers that the NPT system has worked and should be preserved in its present form. Financing their nuclear development is another sore point for many NPT parties, the developing countries in particular. Because they have foreclosed their option to develop nuclear weapons by adhering to the treaty, the de- veloping countries want compensation in the form of increased technical assistance or dona- tions of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology from the nuclear states. Although not required by the treaty to limit their nuclear assistance to NPT members, the nuclear states have previously stated that they would give preferential treatment to states that have adhered to the treaty. The developing states argue that promises are not sufficient and that preferential provision of nuclear supplies should be made definite. The Nigerians have proposed the creation of a fund under the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide technical assistance in the field of peaceful uses cf nuclear energy. The UK, US, and USSR would be required to finance the bulk of the fund's operations. Many developing states are also demanding that nuclear exporters who are parties to the treaty should require IAEA safeguards on all the nuclear facilities of any country receiving nu- clear supplies. Only NPT parties are now re- quired to submit to such comprehensive safe- guards and they argue that this is not only expensive but also makes it easier for non-treaty countries to acquire nuclear supplies. Whatever the conference recommends, non-treaty nuclear exporters such as France would be unlikely to abide by new export guidelines. The conference has also discussed the perennial topic of peaceful nuclear explosions. Actual demands for such services from the nuclear states have not been particularly strong, even though a political issue is still made of the failure of the nuclear powers to make progress on providing services. To some extent, US arguments that peaceful explosions technology has not yet reached the stage of commercial application are being heeded. On the issue of security assurances, most states have not been as amenable to nuclear power arguments and are pressing for meaningful defense commitments by the UK, US, and USSR in case of nuclear threats. Such proposals are likely to meet with little support from the nuclear states, who aryuc that previous assurances-in the form of a UN Secu rity Council resolution-are suf- ficient. Page 11 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Recent events in Portugal may lead to key leadership changes in the Armed Forces Move- ment as well as neutralization of the political parties. The growing friction between the politi- cal parties and the military, the possibility of civil war in Angola, and the rapid deterioration of the economy are giving rise to unce-tainty about the ability of the present leaders t,3 deal with the country's problems. The 240-member armed forces general assembly mct on May 19 to consider a number of serious foreign and domestic problems, in- cluding the possibility of renewed fighting in Angola. Radical officers reportedly were prepared to use the meeting to exert further pressure on military moderates, but President Costa Gomes apparently was able to steer dis- cussion away from issues on which the mod- erates are vulnerable. In the reorganization following the March 11 coup attempt, the assembly was assigned several key functions, but it now appears to be used primarily as a sound- ing board for policies drawn up by the power ful Revolutionary Council. One of the reports taken up by the as- sembly called for a more direct relationship between the Armed Forces Movement tend the people through the organization of worker councils and neighborhood committees- presumably at the expense of the political parties. Although there was no decision calling for early implementation of the proposal, it is widely rumored that the military is now con- templating some decisive action against the parties, including their dissolution. Following the assembly meeting, the Movement issued a statement attacking all the parties, including the Communists, for their partisan politics and urging their unequivocal support of Movement policies. In a speech on May 19, Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal for the first time openly criticized the Movement's attitude toward his party. Voicin his fear that the mil tary was moving tow rd the abolition of all parties, Cunhal insisted that the military should not tar ;,ll parties with the same brush and that those supporting the revolution should receive dif- ferent treatment. Up to now, the Communists have enjoyed a special relationship with radical leaders of the Movement, but this may now be cooling. Cunhal has stated previously that his party will go underground again if its present role is curtailed. The situation was further complicated this week when Communist printers seized control of the Socialist Party newspaper Republica, one of the few remaining newspapers still willing to criticize the Movement. Armed paratroopers prevented Socialist demonstrators from regain- ing control of the newspaper's premises. On May 20, the government announced the newspaper would remain closed until the matter is ad- judicated, which could take three months. The Socialists apparently are convinced that they are in a struggle for survival and have taken to the streets in protest. Another disaffected group, the ..ftlawed extreme-leftist Reorganizing Movement of the Proletariat Party, claimed to have discovered a rightist plot and-with the assistance of a radical Page 12 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 armed forces -snit-proceeded to arrest some 20 "fascists." While initially accepting the plot thesis and detaining those arrested, the military leadership branded the action counter-revolu- tionary. By midweek, the party's demonstrators had taken to the streets in opposition to the Movement. The leadership of the Movement is prob- ably under greater strain now than at any time since the military took power last year. The moderate parties' victory in the constituent assembly election and the disastrous slide of the economy have badly shaken the confidence of the present ruling group. A failure of the de- colonization policy in Angola or a prolongation of the present struggle with the political parties could lead to changes in key leadership positions in the very near future. While the military has no serious rival for power at the moment, its continued failure to solve Portugal's urgent problems could lead to the ouster of President Costa Gomes, or Prima Minister Gonca!.'cs, or both. Admiral Rosa Coutinho, or possibly Brigadier Otelo de Carvalho, who controls the military's internal security force, could assume one of the top posts. Rosa Coutinho, who is capable and ex- tremely ambitious, has recently been selected for a number of key positions in the Movement and enjoys a reputation for getting things done. Otelo, while not known as a creative political thinker, also is a contender because he controls ry. The "resignation" last week of Premier Jeno Fock-officially for health reasons-and his replacement by former deputy premier Gyorgy Lazar appear to be part of party leader Kadar's efforts to project a fresh image for Budapest's domestic economic policy. Fock's eight-year tenure as premier was closely linked with tie relatively liberal Hun- garian program of economic reform. As head of government, he was responsible not only for administering the program, but also for ensuring that decentralization did not get out of hand. In March, however, Fock candidly admitted that the government had failed to control the econ- omy satisfactorily. Although Fock has had some past differences with the Soviets, there are no signs that these frictions played a role in his dismissal. The new premier, Gyorgy Lazar, appears well qualified to upgrade the central govern- ment's economic role. Although the 51-year-old Lazar is politically inexperienced, he is con- sidered a competent economist and has had lengthy experience in investment and labor planning. or some time, Kadar has been trimming back the economic reform-even the term is no longer used publicly. Earlier, ;ie had dismissed other high-level economic decision makers and had put tighter restrictions on factory managers. Hungary's difficult economic problems have also encouraged more centralized decision- making. The country has been hard hit by West- ern inflation and recession, as well as by price increases for Soviet raw materials. Budapest had a substantial trade deficit with the West last year, and the current deficit is running at an even higher rate. As a result, the Hungarians have significantly tightened controls on invest- ment and resource allocations. Budapest has not yet dismantled its reform structure, however, and continues to avoid the detailed central plan- ning practiced in other Communist countries. Debate within the leadership over how to meet these economic challenges may have played a part in Fock's departure. In a recent article, Lazar was critical of the management of the economy, saying that Hungary had failed to adapt quickly enough to changing conditions in the West. The Hungarian media have suggested there is also some contention over whether stricter imp;; t controls are necessary. I Page 13 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : Ministerial meetings of the International Energy Agency and of the Organization for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development next week in Paris cap a year of efforts to increase the importance of these institutions to Atlantic unity. The session will also mark the beginning of concrete efforts to address the demands of the Third World. British Foreign Secretary Cal- laghan's view that the ministerials are part of a "Western Alliance Week" culminating with the NATO summit in Brussels on May 29-30 reflex is the satisfaction of most European leaders with the increasingly important role of the two organizations. In the last year, the OECD's 24 members: ? overcame serious differences to form the International Energy Agency; ? agreed to a $25 billion fund for states with oil-related balance of payments prob- lems; ? initiated their most far-reaching review to date on a coordinated policy on raw materials and relations with poor states. The energy agency ministerial will be the first since the agency was established last November to implement a US-inspired plan for oil sharing in the event of another embargo. The agency has also begun research on development of alternative energy sources and is reviewing a US proposal to establish minimum prices for oil to help guarantee investment in alternative energy sources. In the face of threats by oil producers to boost oil prices even higher, Page 14 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 however, r?ost members may not feel under pressure to move quickly on this proposal. The members are nevertheless pleased with their solidarity at the abortive preparatory meet- ing of oil producers and consumers in Paris last month. Although the consumers continue to be interested in resuming talks with the oil pro- ducers, most have shifted their priority to the larger issues of trade in all raw materials and relations with the Third World. These topics will dominate the OECD ministers meetings. The oil crisis has sharpened ii.he recognition of the OECD states-particularly the Europeans and Japanese-of their dependency on raw materials. The industrialized states have been looking for ways to assure themselves of long- range supplies and of steady prices. They are confronted by the rising expectations of de- veloping states that export raw materials and look to the OPEC cartel as a model for their uwn behavior. Some of the OECD states, in particular the EC Nine, have shown an increased willingness to give in to the developing states on rhetorical issues, such as the insistence on canonizing the "Declaration for a New International Economic Order" and the "Charter of Ecoromic Rights and Duties of States." This shift left the US isolated in its opposition to the fine I declaration of the UN Industrial Development Organiza- tion's conferrnce in Lima last March. The OECD states nevertheless are not prepared to captitu- late to all the demands of the developing states. At the Paris energy talks, for example, where concrete rather than rhetorical concessions were sought by the developing states, the other in- dustrialized countries did not break ranks with the US. SCHEDULED MEETINGS May 26 EC foreign ministers in Dublin May 27 IEA ministers in Paris May 28-29 OECD ministers in Paris May 29-30 NATO summit in Brussels May 29-30 Regular US-EC bilateral con- sultations in Brussels before the ministerial meeting. Nevertheless, most Europeans and the Japanese believe that the final shape of an OECD policy must reflect a willingness to negotiate some basic issues with the developing states. The ministers' meeting in Par is will probably have to thrash out the guide- lines for a common policy as well as instructions for a special high-level group that will develop formal specific proposals on raw materials dur- ing the summer. The OECD ministers will also look toward strei.gthening the internal cohesion developed during the last year. They will reaffirm their pledge not to resort to new import restrictions or export subsidies "for balance of payments purposes." The pledge, designed to curb beggar- thy-neighbor policies in the face of world re- cession, has not been kept by Australia and Finland. The UK and France have also acted against the spirit of the agreement, but it has otherwise been rather successful. The UK in particular is anxious that this year's pledge refer specifically to the special responsibilities of Policy reviews on these issues in many of the OECD countries will not be completed states, such as West Germany and the US, that Page 15 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 25X1 LDAI Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 The four-nation European consortium seeking an F-104 replacement aircraft has still not reached a consensus on whether to purchase the F-16 or the Mirage F-1. Belgian efforts to promote the French F1/E, headed by Defense Minister Vanden Boeynants, continue to keep the other countries from announcing the F-16 as the consortium's choice. The Danish, Dutch, and Norwegian defense ministers have pointed out to Brussels that the Belgians will have to bear the responsibility if the consortium breaks up. Around mid-May, the French again in- tensified their efforts to push the F1/E by dropping the price to match that of the F-16. Paris also hinted that it might react favorably to Belgian efforts to promote a joint European aircraft industry, and that France was interested in exploring future cooperation in defense projects with the EC Nine. The French continue to underscore their position that the consortium countries could best launch a "Buy Europe" program by choosing the F1/E now. Short-term French strategy reportedly was based on delaying a consortium decision until after May 15, the date the US price offer was scheduled to run out. Although the deadline has been extended through the end o May, the French are likely to continue this strategy. Paris reportedly assumes that any renegotiation of the F-16 offer will resul~. in a sharp price increase. Spokesmen for the various defense minis- tries now indicate that Belgium, the Nether- lands, and Denmark have agreed to announce which of the competing aircraft each has chosen before the end of the month. Norway has al- ready announced it has chosen the F-16, pro- vided its three partners opt for the same aircraft. Spokesmen for the other three indicated a simi- lar provision-that all four countries make the same choice. If the four cannot reach a common decision by the end of the month, it is possible that the consortium could break up. Brussels apparently will use the time to make another effort to "pin the French down." A high-ranking Belgian admitted to US officials that the French offer to think seriously about European defense cooperation was vague and non-bind;ag. Nevertheless, Brussels reportedly is intrigued by Giscard's offer to consider defense cooperation with the Nine, especially the French President's pledge to give serious consid- eration to French participation in such West European programs as the multirole combat aircraft. The other three countries apparently have not reacted as positively to the new French proposals. Defense Minister Vredeling and his Danish and Nor- wegian colleagues remain firm in their intention to keep future discussions limited to the ques- tion of whether or not to accept the American aircraft. Nevertheless, there are some con- sortium members who are increasingly worried that Belgium will drop out of the consortium and select the F1/E. Vredeling has indicated that, under these circumstances, lie would no longer be able to recommend to the Dutch cabi- net that it give final approval for the F-16 pur- chase. He anticipates that if this happens the Dutch government would want to throve the whole replacement fighter question back into Page 16 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 The Greek and Turkish foreign minister= met in Rome this week for their first talks since the Cyprus crisis last summer. Although the joint communique issued at the end of the meet- ings was noncommittal, the overall atmosphere was cordial and the stage was set for further ta! ks. The Turks appeared more satisfied with the talks than the Greeks. Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Stravopoulos told the US embas,y in Athens that the initial stages of the talks did not go well. He said the Turks had staked out a maximum position on both Cyprus and the Aegean. The Greeks could not tell if this was a bargaining tactic or whether the Turks planoed to hold to their opening position in the beliet that they are negotiating from strength and have the option of military action to attain their objectives. On the Aegean. the Turks insisted upon discussing the substance of the continental shelf issue rather than its referral to the World Court, as previously agreed upon. The Turks agreed to a sentence in the communique mentioning the referral but they clearly wish to avoid taking the matter to the World Court, if it can be avoided. Ankara prefers a bilateral solution, possibly in- volving joint exploration and development of the mineral resources of the area. The Turks claimed to be optimistic about prospects for a compromise on Cyprus, although Foreign Minister Caglayangil believes that no solution is possible as long as Archbishop Ma- karios remains in power. Despite the lack of real progress in the talks, the Greeks say the Turks argued for an foreign Ministers Bitsios of Greece and Caglayangil of Turkey Page 17 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 optimistic communique. The Greeks took this to be an attempt to influence the US Senate, which was then debating the Turkish military aid cutoff. The cordial atmosphere of the talks was marred by the publication of an interview with Turkish Prime Minister Dernirel in Le Monde on May 19. The Turks tried to explain away the hard line on Cyprus taken by Demirel, claiming that the article was some two weeks' old and did not accurately represent Camirel's current views. Greek officials maintain, however, that the scheduled meeting between Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Turkish Prime Minister Demirel at the NATO summit in Brussels later this month is SOVIET MILITARY: LAND, SEA, AND AIR Submarine Construction The Soviets are building two versions- standard and lengthened--of their D-class bal- listic-missile submarine. Photography taken earlier this month shows two of the lengthened, 500-foot D-class submarines fitting out at the Severodvinsk ship- yard. One of these units-the first to be identi- fied-was seen on photography in February. On Although the Severodvinsk shipyard has switched over to production of the lengthened D-class, standard 12-missile boats are still being built at the Komsomolsk shipyard in the Soviet Far East. The second standard D-class to be built there was seen in photography of the launch basin in late April. The Soviets have now launched twelve standard D-class submarines- ten at Severodv;nsk and two at Komsomolsk. At least six more are expected to be built at Komsomolsk. New Aircraft to China Border The Soviet i.lnion recently began assigning its newest fighter-bomber aircraft, the SU-19 Fencer A, to a tactical aviation unit near the Sino-Soviet border. Only one other operational unit-at Chernyakhovsk in the western USSR- has previously received this aircraft, although Fencers have been seen at several tactical avia- tion training bases and test facilities. With its range and penetration capabilities, the SU-19 represents a threat to targets deep inside north- eastern China. 25X1 r fling-wing Fencers at Domna air- fie!d, which is less than 200 miles from the Sino-Soviet border. The supersonic Fencers apparently will replace subsonic IL-28 Beagle light bombers currently stationed there, al- though probably not on a one-for-one basis. The Fencer A, which is similar to the US F-1 i 1, can fly at up to Mach 1.2 at low altitudes and at more than twice that speed at higher altitudes. The aircraft can carry nuclear or con- ventional bombs, rockets, or air-to-surface mis- siles-including the new AS-X-9 r'r-to-surface missile. Depending on its armament and flight profile, the SU-19 can have a combat range o~~X1 almost 950 nautical miles. 2;25X1 Backfires Operational ac ire bomber, which has been operational with Soviet naval aviation since last year, is also operational with the Soviet Lono in- tion force. 25X1 Page 18 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 1 1 showed nine of the swing-wing Backfire bombers at Poltava-an operational Long Range Aviation base in southwestern USSR-and an- other nine aircraft at the Oktyabrskoye naval air base on the Black Sea. From these bases in the western USSR, the Backfire could attack targets anywhere in Europe or the Middle East. Two Backfires were first seen at Poltava last July, but no more than two aircraft had been observed there until this month F_ ack- fires were first photographed at Oktyabrskoye in November 1974. They were active in Okean- 75, the Soviet naval exercise held earlier this spring. The first new Soviet bomber in mire than a decade, the Backfire has flown at speeds of more than Mach 2 and at altitudes of 55,000 feet. The aircraft can carry either bombs, air- to-surface missiles, or both. Because of its im- proved ability to penetrate at low altitudes, it has a better chance of delivering these weapons than the older TU-16 and TU-22 intermediate- range bombers. 25X1 25X1 The Backfire is now in series production. We estimate that the USSR will produce about 400 aircraft by the mid-1980s and that more than half of these will go to Long Range Avia- tion units, the rest to naval aviation. 25X1 Page 19 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Poland and the US began negotiations on a new bilateral fishing agreement this week. The talks have focused on the protection of fishing resources near the US east coast and expansion of port call privileges for the Polish fishing fleet at east coast ports, but Warsaw will also seek a similar agreement for the US west coast. The existing agreement, signcd in 1973, calls for voluntary protection of US Atlantic fish stocks and provides for limited Polish access to east coast ports. A similar accord, with ex- panded port call rights, is likely to be signed, but an agreement on west coast fishing will face strong resistance from US fishermen. Until 1968, Polish fishing activity outside the Baltic was concentrated ir the North and Norwegian seas. Since then, Poland has grectly expanded its fishing operations off Newfound- land and Long Island, and its heaviest catches are now from the northwestern Atlantic. In 1972, units of the fleet began fishing off the west coast of Africa, and others moved during 1973 to the Pacific for the first time-off the west coast of South America and the US. The Polish fishing fleet caught an estimated 630,000 tons in 1974, exceeding the five-year plan's goal of 590,000 tons by 1975. This largely resulted from new technology, more ships, and centralization of the fishing industry's management. As of mid-1974, the Polish fishing fleet was the fifth largest in the world, with 265 ships totaling 271,000 tons. Poland's share of total world tonnage was only 2.5 percent, how- ever, slightly less than that of the US; two thirds of world fishing tonnage is concentrated in the Soviet and Japanese fleets. Most ships in Poland's fleet are modern- two thirds of its ocean-going units are less than ten years old. Large factory trawlers equipped to process fish on board make up more than half of total tonnage. Their predominance in the fleet raises the average size of Polish fishing vessels to 1,020 tons, second only to the Soviet fleet. Poland belongs to only 3 of the 20 inter- national regulatory commissions having jurisdic- tion over fishing in specific geographic regions or species of fish; all 3 are concerned with Atlantic fishing. Warsaw also participates in the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, but is not a party to any conservation agreements. The Poles do have bilateral fisheries agreements- largely for joint deep sea fishing ventures and research-with eight countries, six of which are developing nations. Warsaw has promised assist- ance in building port and processing facilities in several developing countries but is seeking financial contributions from other countries or international organizations. Under any circum- stances, Poland's financial commitment to these projects will be modest. African shelf, the western Indian Ocean, and Antarctica. Other goals include extensive inter- s -itional cooperation with countries near rich fishing grounds, participation in joint fishing companies, and increased fish exports. Polish fishing goals call for an increase in the annual catch to 1 million tons during 1976-1980. To meet this goal, Warsaw will con- tinue to exp,'nd its fleet and seek new fish species. The fleet will extend its fishing activities to the eastern Pacific as well as to the South Page 20 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 ARGENTINA: POWER PLAY IN THE ARMY A showdown between the newly appointed Argentine army commander, General Laplane, and President Maria Estela Peron's government has been narrowly averted. Interference in army affairs by presidential adviser Lopez Rega, however, has angered many officers and will probably lead them to step up talk about the desirability of a coup. The forced resignation of Argentina's army commander, Lieutenant General Anaya, and hi- replacement by Major General Alberto Numa Laplane was Lopez Rega's opening move in a drive to extend his influence over the army. This incident was followed up recently by an order from Defense Minister Savi io for the retirement of two brigadier generals who are anathema to Lopez Rega. General Laplane refused to carry out the order and offered to resign. Granted an audience with the President, he apparently won some concessions permitting him to name his own men to key army positions. LOPEZ REGA'S PERSON, IL CHOICE HAS STRONGER LOYALTIES FOR THE A R11I Y AND 6UOP.i PRESIDENTIAL AP- PROVAL TO APPOINT HIS Q VN MLN. Laplane, who reportedly was chosen by Lopez Rega for his pro-Peronist sentiments, may have increased his prestige within the army by demonstrating that his first loyalty was to the army rather than to the Peronists. Laplane's strong stand was doubtless a reflection of wide- spread military sentiment. Army officers were already incensed over the manner in which Lopez Rega had engineered the abrupt dismissal of Anaya. Lopez Rega and President Peron The armed forces remain the only obstacle blocking Lopez Rega's quest for absolute power. Any further attempt by him to expand his political influence will produce another open challenge from the army, whose new com- mander has shown that he does not want to be tagged as a tool of Lopez Rega. He will be under strong pressure from his officers to resist the social welfare minister's attempts to put a tight leash on the army. Even without a new move by Lopez Rega, military leaders, who still prefer to retain President Peron, are likely to renew their efforts to remove her nrinrinal arl viser. 7-age 21 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CUBA: REGIONAL PARTY CONCLAVE Havana is preparing for the first conference of Latin American Communist parties since 1964. Attempts reportedly had been made to convene such a meeting on several occasions in recent years, but a series of policy differences between Havana and Moscow-for example, on the efficacy of violent revolution-had appar- ently proved to be an insurmountable obstacle. Now, however, Cuba's policy is much more in line with that of the USSR, and the way has been cleared for the conclave to be held- probably next month. conference will be a prelude to a world Com- munist party conference or a Havana-engineered meeting to serve Cuban partisan interests, Castro reportedly informed all the invited parties that the meeting will have nothing to do with the USSR, will be strictly a regional affair, will review the status of the Latin American parties, and will formulate a joint plan of activity for the future. The Cubans probably began preparations for the conference last fall. At that time, a high party official-Political Bureau member Armando Hart-returned to Havana from Moscow and, in a speech honoring a fallen Chil- ean revolutionary, offered Cuba's support for a meeting "to draft and implement the points of a long-range revolutionary strategy" aimed at eliminating US influence in Latin America and destroying "fascist" governments such as the Pinochet regime in Chile. Hart, who has been close to Castro for more than twenty years, described a policy that more closely paralleled the Soviet's "via pacifica" than the Cuban vio- lent line, presumably as a signal that Havana, at least temporarily, was ready to merge its Latin American policy with that of the USSR. There have since occurred a series of visits to Havana by Latin American Communist party officials -Rodney Arismendi of Uruguay, for example-- apparently for preparatory talks to iron out differences that might interfere with the success of the conference. Castro's alleged contention that the con- ference will have nothing to do with the USSR cannot, of course. be taken at face value. Moscow will surely Lave observers o.; hand, as will many of the Communist parties outside Latin America. Moreover, the Cubans have apparently given in to Soviet demands that only Communist parties be invited. Ha% ana would prefer to include a broad spectrum of revolutionary movements so long as they profess their dedication to Marxism-Leninism. 25X1 POLICY S7 11'fi,1JEN1S SIG,\TAL THAT C UB.-1 'S LATIN ;1 1l/l: R IC.-1N I'IG It'S All RGE It'll'H THOSE OF 7'I1E USSR. The Castro regime probably views the meeting as a chance to add significantly to its influence among the Latin American com- munists. The upper ranks of many of the part;es are suffering from either the ravages of old a,.te or repression by local security forces, and the Cubans presumably want to be in a position to take advantage of the leadership vacuum they see developing over the next few years. They are therefore willing to suppress their distaste for many of the region's top communists and to replace the antagonism of the 1960s with a more pragmatic attitude of making the best of a poor relationship. Moreover, they realize that if their efforts to create a broad-based "anti- fascist" organization to bring pressure on rightist governments are to succeed the will have to include the communi 25X1 25X1 Page 22 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 X1 President Pinochet is considering making some basic changes in the military governirrent, either before or ill conjunction with the second anniversary of the -military take-over in Septem- ber. Reportedly, he is thinking of carrying the recent trend toward greater use of apolitical civilian expertise to its lor,ical cnrulesion -an all-civilian cabinet. The President apparently also is interested in civilian participation in a rrvampod irseudo-legislative structure that presumably would fulfill the functions now performed by the all-miiitary Advisory Com- Some of the President's ideas have not been enthusiastically received in the armed forces. Negative reaction probably is strongest in the navy and air force, where there already is some discontent over Pinochet's expanding pres- idential prerogatives. Navy officers have been especially distressed over i.%hat they believe has been a far too passive performance by their junta representative, Admiral Merino. They will be suspicious of any changes that appear to have the potential for further reducing the navy's influence in the government. Considerable maneuvering within and among the services is likely as Pit ochet's plans take shape over the President 13anzer is trying to cash in on growing nationalistic sentirm nt against Gulf Oil by pushing a lough -rmpaign against the cnm- parry. On May 20, the guverrrment arrested Gulf's representative in La Paz and "criminal r oceed- ings" were begun against hirn, the company, and its US chairman. La Paz also has asked the OAS permanent council to condemn the crrnrl),iny's "sordid activities" in developing countries. Earlier, the Bolivian aniha,ssador in Washington iegnwsled State Department cooperation in eliciting full details on the company's admission that in the 1960s it had made "political con- hibutions" to supporters of former president Rene Barrienlos. 2.5X1 25X1 tamer's aides are telling US officials that serious" poli'ical repercussions ".'ill result from the Gulf Oil disclosures unless the names of those involved are revealed and legal proceedings 25X1 Page 23 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 ' against them begun. There were initial indica- tions that students, junior officers, and opposi- tion leaders might seize upon the controversy as a means of attacking Banzer on the broader issue of corruption in government. More re- cently, however, this threat has been superseded by an outpouring of public indignation against the oil company-particularly its implication of the late General Barrientos, one of the cot:ntry's few national heroes. Banzer, with no durable political ease, has repeatedly had to quash conspiracies and coup attempts against his regime. He now sees an opportunity to undercut his opponents and gain popular support by defending "national dignity" and attacking one of the favorite targets in Latin America-the multinational corporation. The Bolivian government still owes Gulf Oil over $E0 million as indemnification for oil installations nationalizesd, in 1969. La Paz, al- legedly because of growing public pressure, is threatening to suspend indemnity payments until the company fully clarifies its allegations. Since the payments are actually made by Argen- tine purchasers of Bolivian oil and gas and go directly into a Now York bank trust account, Banzer's threats may be empty although effec- tive for domestic consumption. Page 24 WEEKLY REVIEW May 23, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080025-2