DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 4, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTI LLiGENCF
Developments in Indochina
Top Secret
LOAN Copy
WPM rM to CSN
?f! 6Q7, Ffq.
Top Secret
4 Januar-
I 25X1
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
(lutformal.i.orn air of I.)'00
SOUTH VIETNAM
There has been some increase in Communist mili-
tary activity. Big Minh is making himself
politically available again.
Sharp fighting continues along Route 3.
NORTH VIETNAM
Truong Chinh's trip to Moscow does not appear to
have been related to the negotiations.
LAOS
The Communists are keeping the pressure on gov-
ernment units along Route 13.
4 January 1973
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Qui Nhon.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
there has been some increase in Conunu
t
nes
military
activity, chiefly in the lower delta. Most of the
activity so far has consisted of light shellings
of airfields and sabotage of roads and bridges.
In the central highlands, the Communist
s continue
their week-old harassment of government strongpoints
and have closed the road between Kontum and Pleiku
cities for the first time in several weeks.
Only light fighting is reported from the northern-
most provinces.
Big Minh Speaks Out
Big Minh is once again signaling his availa-
bility as an alternative to President Thieu. In an
interview with a Western correspondent last week
arranged by his advisers, Minh asserted that he is
prepared to participate actively in politics after
a cease-fire. As he has in the past, Minh charged
that the Thieu government, lacking popular support,
will be unable to compete politically with the Com-
munists. Minh also claimed that he and his supporters
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have remained quiet because anti-government demon-
strations now would play into the hands of the Com-
munists.
He has not been active politically since e with rew
from the 1971 presidential election after charging
Thieu with rigging the contest. His reputation may
in fact have been tarnished somewhat by his ineffective
performance as a presidential candidate. Some of the
Buddhists and other opposition elements were highly
critical of his indecisiveness at the time, although
some were prepared to support him and probably still
prefer hm to Thieu.
Minh remains the best known critic of Thieu and
retains some popularity as the leader of the 1963 coup
that overthrew the Diem regime. He might serve as a
rallying point, for disaffected elements if Thieu's
hold on the reigns of power should falter, but under
the present circumstances, Minh almost certainly will
not challenge Thieu directly. He does meet regularly
with a group of supporters, some of whom apparently
are now pushing him to take a more active role. These
advisers probably hope that a peace agreement will
change the political climate in South Vietnam and give
them a shot at power. There is no evidence that any
outside influences other tha" 4-r continued prospects
of a cease-fire could cause Minh to speak out.
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The Military Situation
Sharp fighting in and around Tram Khnar on
Route 3 some 25 miles south of Phnom Penh continued
on 4 January. Although few details are available,
late press reports indicate that government forces
are holding their ground in the badly damaged
village. Communist attacks in this sector re-
portedly have caused large numbers of villagers
to flee toward Phnom Penh. Some Communist actions
were carried out in the capital area on 4 January.
A brief Communist rocket attack on Phnom Penh's
airfield resulted in no significant damage or
casualties. Communist harassing attacks against
two small government positions well to the west
of the city reportedly also caused only minor
losses.
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NORTH VIETNAM
Truong Chinh, the number two man in the North
Vietnamese hierarchy, is back in Hanoi after a two-
week trip to the Soviet Union. When he left for
Moscow on 16 December, it appeared that the North
Vietnamese were sending one of their most authorita-
tive spokesmen to weigh in with the Soviets at a
critical point in the peace talks. The pattern of
his contacts in Moscow--and also in Peking, where
he made the usual stop-overs coining and going--call
this judgment into question. It now appears that
Chinh's trip was not primarily concerned wa,th the
negotiations.
Chinh was head of Hanoi's delegation to the
ceremonies marking the anniversary of the Soviet
Union's founding. During both of his Peking stop-
overs, he had the customary meetings with Chou En-
lai. It seems unusual, however, that during his
first visit he did not see Chou in company with Le
Duc Tho, who was passing through on his way to Hanoi
and who had his own separate audience with the
Chinese premier. When he reached Moscow, Chinh met
no Soviet official of any importance during the
celebration itself. Afterwards he toured the prow--
inces briefly and talked with Suslov and D. F.
Ustinov, a candidate politburo member and the party
secretary who oversees the Soviet defense industry.
Had Chirih's trip been concerned mainly with
the negotiations, it seems likely that he would have
conferred jointly with Chou and Tho in Peking and
would have seen someone besides Suslov in Moscow.
Suslov carries considerable weight in the Soviet
hierarchy, but there is no sign that he had been
directly involved in the Vietnam problem, which is
the special concern of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and
Podgorny. Kosygin, in fact, met twice with the
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North Vietnames.. ambassador while Chinh was in town.
Moreover, if Chinh had a mandate dealing with the
talks, there probably would have been some sign
that he or someone in his delegation had checked
in with the second-echelon party and foreign min-
istry functionaries who have been intimately con-
cerned with the negotiations.
There is, of course, a chance that Chinh came
to talk about the negotiations, but received a
brushoff in Moscow. This is unlikely. Kosygin's
meetings with the North Vietnamese ambassador indi-
cate that high-ranking Soviets were not at all re-
luctant to do business with Vietnamese Communists
on matters that probably had to do with the talks.
Chink's meeting with Suslov indicates that no per-
sonal snub was intended, and Ustinov's inclusion
on the Soviet side could mean that the general
sub-ect of military assistance could have been dis-
cussed. If Chinh was not deeply involved in the
talks at this sensitive point in their history,
the question arises whether he has ever been so in-
volved. It may be that the talks are the special
concern of First Secretary Le Duan and Premier
Pham Van Dong, among others, with Truong Chinh
occupying himself elsewhere.
One other aspect of Chinh's trip remains un-
explained. When his delegation arrived in Moscow,
it included Chinh's politburo colleague, Hoang
Van Hoan, a shadowy figure about whom very little
is knoa.?n. On the way back through Peking, Hoan's
name was conspicuously missing from the delega-
tion's roster. The easiest explanation is that
Hoan stayed on in Moscow. One of the few known
facts about Hoan is that he has had extensive
dealings with the Chinese; he is not known to have
had any particular experience with the Soviets.
His mission this time, like others in t111-1 ast
'
remains a mystery. F7
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LAOS
O.uang Prabang
d.-. I Refugee, settlements
ilttiicI cd
10
0 fl,"
Government battalion
dispersed
I iion(.
Soul
$Ieng Khouangville J NORTH
~Auong Kassy
~g~ ong
long Plia Dong
Ban Sony '
Enemy shelling attack
B011arn
Long
VIETNAM,
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Communist attacks and ambushes along Route 13
between Vientiane and. Luang Prabang are keeping
government units off balance and disrupting planned
counterattacks. On 3 January, Pathet Lao and dis-
sident neutralist units drove Lao Army garrison
troops from several refugee settlements along Route
13 south of the royal capital. Smaller Communist
units are ambushing convoys and attacking govern-
ment outposts near Muong Kassy and Vang Vieng. A
rocket and mortar shelling against Vang Vieng on
4 January temporarily closed the airstrip at the
logistic base there.
A government column quickly retook at least
one of the villages south of Luang Prabang, but
countermeasures farther south are foundering. An
irregular battalion airlifted onto Route 7 east of
Sala Phou Khoun was dispersed by Communist shelling
on 2 January. Efforts to regroup the Lao Army units
driven from the road junction in the initial Co-*nmu-
nist attack apparently have failed, and most of
these units are filtering soutY,
and Muong Kassy. F7
4 January 1973
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