DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE 01-
l NTELL1GENC1?
evc opments in Indochina
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
5 January 1973
25X1
STAT
STAT
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DEVELOPMENTS IN :INDOCHINA
(infornation ae of 1500)
SOUTH VIETNAM
So far, the intensification of enemy military
activities predicted for early January
has been slight. New moves by
the An Quang Buddhists could generate fric-
tions with the Thieu government.
LAOS
Bouam Long defenders have enjoyed four relatively
quiet days. The irregulars are not having much
success retaking Vieng Pou Kha.
CAMBODIA
The government is sending reinforcements to Tram
Khnar.
NORTH VIETNAM
Rapid progress is being made in construction of
a new airfield south of V.inh.
5 January 1973
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The intensification of enemy militar activities
predicted for early January has
been slight. So far most of tie ;tction has been con-
centrated in the southern provinces where there has
been a moderate rise above the daily incident level
of the last two months; government civil and military
installations have been shelled and roads and bridges
sabotaged. Casualties and damage have been light.
It appears that the Communists are still tem-
porizing somewhat in directives to their forces and
that they have not yet issued firm orders and fixed
dates for a substantial new campaign. Although most
reflections of Communist directives currently in-
dicate a desire to try and influence the negotiations
at Paris by a show of military strength in South
Vietnam, the enemy high command appears to be moving
cautiously in deciding when and where to call for a
major effort. This is doubtless because of the
frequent changes in the status of the negotiations
over the past few weeks, as well as a desire to
avoid another mistiming of military operations, such
as the one that committed many enemy units to a
costly, premature offensive last October in antici-
pation of a cease-fire.
The Communists nevertheless apparently believe
that the next few months will be critical in outcome of the war.
5 January 1973
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1AI t.#t
is substantial criticism o recen enemy mi itary
efforts. It would appear that the inability and
unwillingness of some Communist elements to carry
out combat orders fully and adequately are a growing
problem for the Communist command in deciding the
timing and scope of new offensive operations. The
Communists also have to consider the need to main-
tain their forces in a posture and at a strength
adequate to launch the military operations they have
long planned to strengthen their position as much
as possible on the eve of a cease-fire.
planning along this line is still under
way, even though the enemy is clearly less optimistic-
about an early cease-fire-agreement.
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Buddhist Political Activities
Current efforts by the An Quang Buddhists could
lead to renewed friction with the Thieu government.
They are attempting to compile a list of persons de-
tained "illegally" or "arbitrarily" by the government.
An Quang has had a long-standing grievance with the
government over the detention of Buddhists involved
in the 1965-66 "struggle movement," and the church
is also concerned over allegedly unjustified arrests
during the Communist offensive last year. The Budd-
hists sent a letter to President Thieu last November
requesting the release of those being held, the Budd-
hists have so far not been able to present a documented
case.
Local An Quang pagodas are asking families of
those being held to provide names of detainees and
5 January 1973
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descriptions of the circumstances of detention.
A leading monk has informed US Embassy officers that
the church will focus on Buddhist detainees, but that
it also hopes to obtain information on non-Buddhists.
While the An Quang leadership has not indicated how
it intends to use such information, it may hope to
secure the release of the jailed Buddhists under a
cease-fire agreement.
Meanwhile, a new An Quang political group is
preparing to increase its organizational activities.
Senator Vu Van Mau, the leader of the Buddhist Par-
liamentarians' Liaison Group, has informed US Embassy
officers that the group will hold meetings in Hue on
12 and 13 January--its first activities outside of
Saigon. If successful, the group will expand its
activities to other areas. Despite the recent decree
requiring that candidates for national office must be
backed by a political party, there is no indication
yet that the Buddhists plan to develop the group as
their own party. They are concerned, however, that
the government may try to disrupt their organizational
effort. Senator Mau says there has been no harassment
thus far, but he sees the Hue meetings as a test of
the government's attitude.
Since the Buddhists still see the Communists as
the greater threat to their position, they are re-
luctant to challenge the government for fear the Com-
munists will be the ultimate beneficiaries. For this
reason, they may decide to back off if they see trouble
brewing. Nevertheless, their current activities in-
dicate that An Quang leaders do not want to remain on
the political sidelines when they feel their vital
interests are at stake.
5 January 1973
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UU ,1)1 IIIOp
End of nnw 1 Nam tha .,,.
construction
,, yon 14 Novamlwr
Vieng Pou Khoo )o
Irr~:S?ilars -- ~
s
a' 11)
a 6r
V
hiang Rai / r Pak Bong r
Fak Tha
Vientiane
0 Government held position ? Communist held position
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X ieng Lom?
THAILAND
l,)/
Pakla
Luang Lull in Communist attacks rl
Probang,
Bouam Loon
} ~y
L',A 0 IS, Sour
11
/
?
INr
Sala Photo."
Khoun urs
inHRts
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There have been no Communist ground attacks
against Bouam Long in the past four days, and
shelling of the government stronghold has slackened
considerably. Irregular defenders are gradually
extending their patrols around the base and so
far have clashed with only two small Communist
units.
Government Operation Fizzling in the Northwest
Since early December irregular troops have been
trying without success to retake Vieng Pou Kha, a
former government refugee center in Houa Khong
Province. Lead elements of the small government
force were less than a mile from the settlement
two weeks ago, but since then Communist attacks
have forced the irregulars to pull back.
Vieng Pou Kha is astride old Route 3, which
connected the village with Nam Tha, now a Pathet
Lao administrative center. Chinese construction
crews last October began building a new road along
the alignment of a 12-mile stretch of the old track
southwest of Nam Tha, but work halted in mid-November
at about the same time a Pathet Lao force overran
Vieng Pou Kha.
5 January 1973
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.Bottamhang
.Siom Hoop
Kc; ipumg Thom
CAMBODIA
Kompong?Sgu.
Fighting continue I' Tram rhnar
Thnal Totung
Communist harassing attacks`,(
Svay Prey
Takeo
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CAMBODIA
The government on 4 January dispatched three
battalions of reinforcements to Tram Khnar on
Route 3, but press reports claim that Communist
forces have prevented these units from moving
into the embattled village. The remnants of the
two Cambodian battalions defending Tram Khnar
rel..ortedly are receiving some air support. To
the southeast, the Communists are continuing to
harass small government positions on Route 2 at
Svay Prey and Thnal Totung. A government para-
troop battalion that has been participating in
Cambodian - South Vietnamese clearing operations
along Route 2 south of the town of Takeo has been
5 Jar,::.-ary 1973
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rNor.th Vietnam ...New_.AirfieltI Under Construction.
CHINA
NORTH\ VIETNA Mng Dang
THAILAND
Ngon Rao Phoo Airfield
Quang TO
-Hue
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_Nor.th__Ui~tftarn:.. New..Airt eld Under Construction
THAILAND
\,Dong Hoi
Quang TO
Hue
so-
VIETNAM
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NORTH\ VIETNAM
Ngon Rao Pheo Airfield
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NORTH VIETNAM
Photography has revealed
rapid progress in construction of a new airfield ,t-
~~y~n icao rneo at~out 40 mites south of Vinh.
iiic 11CW LJ. ?U
is on high ground and is less susceptible to flood-
ing than the Dong I-ioi airfield which has not been
used for over a year.
Photography reflected construc-
tion of another possible airstri 1.5 miles north-
west of this field.
NGA Review
Complete
5 January 1973
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