DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090032-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: February 15, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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op secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Developments in Indochina
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
127
15 February 1973
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DEVELOPMEN'rS IN INDOCHINA
Viet Cong members of the truce team
were harassed at Hue. Official Saigon
reporting of Communist holdings in the
countryside ma be understated.
Page
1
Opposition
Senators are seeking a special session
to try to get the decree on political
parties amended and to debate post
cease-fire political developments.
There is no change in the military
situation.
Phnom Penh is offering to let the in-
.surgents participate in new elections.
The government is not making much
military headway.
Air strikes are helping hold back
Communist forces in several areas.
Party leader Le Duan used the Tet
holidays to give logistic units in the
panhandle a pep talk.
ASEAN foreign ministers soft-pedal
the idea of a regional conference.
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Members of the North Vietnamese delegation to
the regional Four-Party Joint Military Commission
(JMC) were pelted with eggs and other objects fol-
lowing a visit to the ICCS office in Hue on 15
February,'the third such incident during the past
week. Neither of the two officials involved in the
fracas were injured. After what was possibly a
deliberate delay, South Vietnamese military police
intervened by clearing the way for the Communists
to return to the JMC compound.
The government is investigating this incident,
and may be issuing new instructions designed to
keep displays of anti-Communist sentiment under con-
trol. The recent appearance of a crowd carrying
rocks and effigies in a district of Binh Dinh Prov-
ince, however, suggests that sporadic popular outbursts
directed against Communist representatives will con-
tinue, particularly as the teams move out to the 26
subregional JMC offices.
Who Controls What?
There is some evidence that Communist holdings
in the countryside may be more extensive in certain
areas than is being officially acknowledged by the
government. Durin the past week, reports from both
American observers have
pointed out discrepancies in the official South Viet-
namese appraisals of the local security situation.
in the delta, for example,
although the security picture has improve
Communist cease-fire offensive, the provi chief
there is badly distor4.ing the situation.
the Communists held an estimated
hamlets before the cease-fire. This has been reduced
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to 46, but the province chief officially claims that
no hamlets are under Communist control. The 46 ham-
lets contain a little less than 10 percent of the prov-
ince's total population of 563,000.
In Chuong Thien, another delta province, the
government's local security evaluation shows that
only 13 hamlets are considered to be Viet Cong.
American officials in the province report that the
Communist control 53 of Chuong Thien's hamlets;
they held 25 prior to the cease-fire. The province's
senior American official believes that when inter-
national supervisory personnel arrive, the Viet Cong
will claim control over considerably more territory
in Chuang Thien than is generally expected.
Reports from Military Region (MR) 2 also shoe
some discrepancies. National police figures for
Phu Yen Province list only 24 hamlets as contested
or under enemy control. US officials in the prov-
ince, updating a local security survey for December,
repot that the Communists now hold 27 hamlets and
have enough presence in 27 more to threaten govern-
ment control. These 54 hamlets represent about 14
percent of the province's estimated 326,000 people.
General Lu Mong Lan, inspector general for South
Vietnam's Joint General Staff, told an American of-
ficial that he is aware province chiefs have not fully
reported the extent of Communist presence in local
areas, Moreover, he claimed that some hamlet chiefs,
contrary to instructions, have allowed unarmed Com-
munist cadre to enter certain localities, ostensibly
to live peacefully in the hamlets and befriend the
residents.
The South Vietnamese are understandably sensitive
about admitting to Viet Cong control in any area of
South Vietnam. As mvzre American military advisers
and observers are withdrawn from the field, however,
data on the status of local security will come al-
most exclusively from South Vietnamese figures, and
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it is probably fair to assume that this data will
tend -'?o portray the government's local security posi-
tion in the best possible light. Although the evidence
is subst-intial that Viet Cong control is more exten-
sive than admitted by the government, there is as yet
insufficient data, even from South Vietnamese sources,
to indicate how serious the discre anc is on a na-
tionwide basis.
Opposition Senators Seek Special Session
Opposition and independent senators are trying
to convene a special Senate session to debate the na-
tional situation following the cease-fire agreement
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and to seek amendment of the presidential decree on
political parties. The constitution states that a
third of the Senate membership may request such a
session, and the necessary number have already signed
up. Senate Chairman Huyen has not yet indicated when
such a meeting might be held. In addition tc their
unhappiness over the decree on parties, many senators
are increasingly frustrated because the National As--
3emb:ly has not played any role since the cease-fire
agreement. The legislature does not meet again in
regular session until April.
The opposition-is expected to seek a relaxation
of the decree's stiff membership requirements for
political parties and to try to extend the deadline of
27 March. One independent senator is trying to arrange
a'compromise that would avoid a stormy debate on the
Senate floor, but some political leaders apparently re-
main bitter toward President Thieu for issuing the decree.
Although Thieu has recently acknowledged to some poli-
tical figures that he is considering modifying the
decree on his own, some of his critics remain skeptical
that the President will agree to any changes.
Military Situation
There has been little change in the military
situation. In southern Quang Ngai Province, South
Vietnamese ranger un.ts have breached Communist
defenses a few miles north of Sa Huynh, but are
encountering heavy artillery fire. The US Embassy
reports that the Quang Ngai provincial council is
disturbed over the government's handling of mili-
tary operations near Sa Huynh and intends to call
on the province chief to develop a plan for the
"rapid reconquest" of the area. Normally, provincial
councils take no role in large military operations;
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the concern of the council probably indicates fairly
widespread public apprehension over Communist gains
around Sa Huynh, In the southern provinces, mili-
tary activity remains focused for the most part in
the western delta region adjacent to Cambodia./
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New Reaonoitiation Po7iejL
The government has taken a more flexible posi-
tion on its political terms for dealing with the
Khmer insurgents. A new policy of "national re-
conciliation" was outlined by First Minister Hang
Thun F_ak
Its most im-
portant feature is a provision to hold general elec-
tions for the Senate and the National Assembly with
all political parties--including the insurgents--
participating. Although Hak did not specify whin
such elections would be held,. Information Minister
Keth Reth told the press on 15 February th;.t the
government would not attempt to open negotiations
with the insurgents until after the Paris Confer-
ence on Indochina convenes on 26 February.
There were two important conditions for the
election set forth by Hak: the prior withdrawal
of all North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops and
the exclusion of Sihanouk from any role in nego-
tiations and presumably the election. Hak also said
that the government's plan entails the re-establish-
ment of the International Control Commission, pre-
sumably to supervise the withdrawal of North Viet-
namese and Viet Cong troops and to oversee new
elections.
Until now, the government's only approach to
the insurgent problem has been an ineffective
rallier program. Although the insurgents have
steadfastly opposed any political compromise with
the Lon Nol government, the anti-Sihanouk faction
within the insurger!.t movement may be tantalized by
the possibility of a Political solution that cludes Sihanouk.
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Pursai
Kompong Chhnang,
CAMBODIA
1\u111pu119 OPVu
-SOUTH Vl~
MILES 25
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The Military Situation
Government efforts to retake Banam and to re-
open Route 15 between Neak Luong and Prey Veng are
still stalled by stiff Khmer insurgent opposition.
The counteroffensive in this area has also been
hampered by disciplinary problems. Two Cambodian
battalions that had been participating in the
operation had to be withdrawn on 14 February be-
cause they refused to fight. The insurgents are
keeping up harassing attacks on small outposts
north of Banam and south of Neak Luong and on forces
trying to clear a four-mile section of Route 1 be-
tween Phnom Penh and the Mekong. In the past few
days, 12 government troops have been killed and 100
wounded in the fighting along Route 1.
The Cambodians have also taken some fairly
heavy losses in the southwest that resulted from
a flare-up of attacks against government positions
in the vicinity of Kampot City. These are the
first significant enemy actions in this area in
many months. The government has nine battalions
defending the region between Kampot and the former
coastal resort at Kep.
Elsewhere, government units from Takeo met no
opposition on 14 February when they moved down
Route 2 toward the South Vietnam border. Although
the southern leg of the highway is open, that por-
tion between Phnom Penh and Takeo apparently is
closed. In the north, there has been some improve-
ment in the situation at Kompong Thom. Insurgent
harassing attacks seem to be diminishing, and the
government garrision in the isolated town has been
airdropped two tons of ammunition.
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171
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wotlp,
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ccu illtv4
THAILAND
VIETNAM
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Government irregulars moved in behind air strikes
on 14 February to occupy positrons atop two hills over-
looking Paksong on the IIolovens Plateau, but were unable
to dislodge enemy troops entrenched on a third hilltop.
in the central panhandle, Communist artillery
crews on 14 February shelled units west of Muong Phalane,
and a battalion of the North Vietnamese 29th Regiment
braved air strikes to cross the Se Sangsoy and routed
an irregular battalion south of the town. Most Com-
munist units, however, are still east of the river.
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NORTH VIETNAM
Party First Secretary Le Duan visited military
units and the local populace in Quang Binh Province
and the Vinh Linh Special Zone in the southern part
of North Vietnam during Tet, according to recent
Hanoi radio broadcasts. Le Duan had high praise
for logistic units engaged in moving supplies south
to the battlefields, but he also cautioned that
they could not rest on past accomplishment's because
"the revolutionary undertaking is not yet completed,"
and more sacrifices would be necessary before final
victory is acMeved and the country is united.
Le Duan spent much of his time with the "Quang
Trung Army Group"--almost certainly the North Viet-
namese 559th Transportation Group, the unit that
has overseen the logistics effort since 1959. Le
Duan talked to several logistic units subordinate
to the 559th, including the one responsible for
delivering supplies to Communist forces in South
Vietnam's Quang Tri Province. He acknowledged
that the "Quang Trung" group had "struggled hard
in the Troung Son Mountains for 13 long years and
fulfilled the task of aiding the frontline, in
defiance of all hardships and dangers." Le Duan
credited logistic units with having made a signifi-
cant contribution "to our people's great victory"
of getting the US out of Vietnam.
In an unusual bit of public candor, Le Duan
admitted that despite the regime's "correct and
creative political, military, and diplomatic line,"
victory would be impossible without "a nation en-
dowed with the traditions of stalwartness, bravery,
resourcefulness, and vividness," and without adequate
motivation among all 40 million Vietnamese. Le Duan's
pitch was doubtless aimed in part at acknowledging
the tremendous sacrifices his listeners had already
made, while calling for more of the same. He may
also have been hinting, however, that the southern
Communists' failure to achieve final victory could
be attributed to their own inadequate motivation and
not to an erroneous line or inadequate support from
the North.
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?.
Le Duan noted that "some" people wanted to
relax now that a measure of victory had been achieved.
tte urged continued discipline and devotion to the
party line and called on his listeners to honor the
"scores of thousands of compatriots and comrades"
who had sacrificed themselves by practicing humility
and learning how to "live in love."
Le Duan also visited the people living in the
areas next to the Demilitarized Zone and told them
much the same thing. In addition, he called on
southerners who are now living in the North to as-
sist in production and do their part so that the
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The foreign ministers of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)--Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines--have de-
cided not to press for the convening of a regional
conference on post-war developments in Southeast
Asia. A joint communique issued at the end of the
ministerial meeting on 15 February in Kuala Lumpur
expressed the desire to expand ASEAN into a regional
forum that includes Burma and the states of Indo-
china, but acknowledge that efforts in this direc-
tion would have to be postponed until "an appropriate
time in the future." The communique'3 soft-pedaling
of this question suggests a consensus within ASEAN
that any such broad regional meeting would be neither
feasible nor productive pending clarification of the
political and military situation throughout Indochina.
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