DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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A A F R I 2008/06117 CIA RDP85T00875R0011000100(7 8
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
LOAN COPT
Return fo Dse
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y Nq.
Developments in Indochina
State Dept. review
completed
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Top Secret
127
5 March 1973
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCI-I TNA
(Information ac of' 1500)
President Thieu orders better protec-
tion for truce teams. More fighting may be
in store in the central highlands. Both Bao
Dai and Big Minh seem interested in a role
in the "third force."
Eighteen foreign ships have now de-
parted Haiphong.
Only minor clashes are reported. The
Pathet Lao have completed a week-long Cen-
tral Committee meeting.
Hanoi intends to be flexible on recog-
nition terms.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
President Thieu directed government provincial
chiefs on 1 March to prevent further "violent"
demonstrations at compounds occupied by members of
the International Commission for Control and Super-
vision (ICCS) and the four-power Joint Military
Commission (JMC). Thieu pointed out in his order
that the demonstrations were being cited by the
Communists as evidence of South Vietnamese unwill-
ingness to honor the cease-fire agreement.
The directive was prompted in part by the
impasse over prisoner releases that developed last
week from Communist assertions that such demonstra-
tions were endangering their members of the JMC
teams, and that they could not participate further
in the cease-fire machinery in certain parts of the
country until conditions improved. Thieu also was
aware that the demonstrations were overshadowing
the government's claims of Communist infiltration
activity and cease-fire violations and were reflecting
badly on the government's attitude toward the cease-
fire agreement.
President Thieu told Ambassador Bunker that he
has agreed to provide escorted tours of Saigon and
surrounding areas for North Vietnamese delegates but
would refuse similar treatment for the Viet Cong
since "their delegates are from the South and know
the area." He also said he would permit the Commu-
nist delegates in Saigon to hold a weekly press con-
ference at their compound on Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
Although the Communists probably will not immediately
return their team members to posts in certain parts
of the country, Thieu's new measures may help ease
tension and smooth somewhat further prisoner release
negotiations.
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More l'ightin~_in the llighlande?
Both sides are engaged in military efforts
that could lead to increased fighting in western
Pleiku Province. Two North Vietnamese regiments
are clearing land and building permanent bases
near the Thanh An District capital. The govern-
ment has reinforced its forces at Thanh An to
guard against a Communist attack from Duc Co, a
few miles to the west.
Third Force in the Limelight
The approach of the scheduled political talks
between the Thieu government and the Viet Cong has
triggered increased activity by potential "third
force" aspirants. There are also signs that both
Saigon and the Communists are becoming more interested
in these elements.
One of those reportedly hoping to b-~ selected as
a member of the third segment in the National Council
of National Reconciliation and Concord (NCNRC), which
is supposed to be set up by Saigon and the Viet Cong,
pore ere he was trying to obtain a South Vietnamese
entry visa. The former emperor, who has been in exile
for almost 20 years, apparently believes that his
chances of being chosen for the NCNRC will improve
if he is residing in South Vietnam rather than abroad.
If permitted to return home, he hopes to establish a
working relationship with Big Minh.
Bao Dai left Paris in mid-February for 5i.nga-
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For his part, Big Minh has called on the govern-
ment to allow exiles to return, but there is no indi-
cation whether he would be willing to cooperate with
Bao Dai.
His earlier public statement
that he would accept a leadership role if "the people"
asked him apparently referred only to a new South
Vietnamese government.
For years the Communists have been attempting
to influence potential third force elements. Since
the cease-fire, there have been several indications of
their interest in the An Quang Buddhists. in addition
but it is plausible that President Thieu would try to
have reasonably cooperative figures appointed as third
Ithe Viet Cong are
concerned about the influence of third force elements
over which they have no control, citing a hypothetical
Bao Dai - Big Minh - Ky combination.
The Thieu government is keeping a close watch
on possible third force elements. it reportedly has
ordered its agents abroad to follow the movements of
Bao Dai and undoubtedly is keeping track of other
exiles as well. An independent Saigon paper recently
reported that the government has selected two An Quang
senators and two moderate opposition politicians to be
among its candidates for the third segment of the
NCNRC. There is no information to confirm this report,
force members of the council.
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
before US naval units began clearing operations,
strongly indicating that the North Vietnamese have
manacled to clear some mines from the main shipping
Seven Soviet ships trapped in Haiphong since
last May departed between 2 and 4 March. With these
departures, 18 foreign vessels have left the North
Vietnamese port since the cease-fire went into ef-
fect on 28 January. All of the ships got under way
channel on their own.
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several Chinese minesweepers arrived in Haiphong
last summer, and one of them was active in the mined
areas during the late fall and winter.
Nine foreign ships are still in North Vietnamese
ports. Eight of these--three Soviet, three Polish,
one British, and one East German--are in Haiphong,
and one Soviet vessel is at Cam Pha.
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Field commanders on 4 and 5 March reported
only minor contacts with the enemy. In the south,
a Lao Army battalion about three miles from Paksong
skirmished with a small Communist unit. The Lao
Army commander in this area has begun to send teams
into Paksong to determine enemy strength. At last
report, there was little Communist activity in the
town.
In the north, a brief clash southeast of Xieng
Khouangville caused a few government casualties.
General Vang Pao has ordered renewed T-28 strikes
in retaliation for recent attacks in this sector
and is preparing to move some 400 additional troops
to shore up his defenses near Route 4.
Communists Ready to Go
The Lao Communists may be ready to get down
to business in working out the details of the peace
agreement. The Pathet Lao central committee in Sam
Neua has completed a week-long meeting to map the
next steps in negotiations. According to a Commu-
nist spokesman, leading negotiator Phoune Sipraseuth
will return to Vientiane on 6 March
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NORTh VIETNAM
Hano.... would welcome ties with coun-
tries alreadv having relations with Saigon.
the North Vietnamese would not ne-
cessarily reject out of hand the idea of joint rec-
ognition of Saigon and the PRG, and "might even
settle for de facto recognition" of the PRG by
countries having relations wj,th on. After the
scheduled elections are held the com-
munists would expect such countries to recognize
formally the government formed by the elections.
Hanoi's apparent flexibility on the PRG rec-
ognition issue reflects its somewhat ambiguous
position on this matter. Hanoi apparently feels
that:
--Increased international recognition would
enhance the PRG's legitimacy inside and
outside Vietnam.
--It should, however, avoid publicly for-
malizing the existence of two competing
governments in the South when the Com-
munists' proclaimed goal is the quick
formation of a unified government of
"national conciliation" for all South
Vietnam.
--Few governments are likely to recognize
the PRG in view of its lack of the
normal attributes of nationhood, i.e., a
clearly defined territory, capital, and
government.
5 March 1973
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Thus Hanoi shows no inclination to tailor its
own diplomatic efforts to the PRG recognition ques-
tion, although it Aoes pick up opportunities such as
the just-concluded Paris conference to proclaim the
PRG's legitimacy. Far more important to Hanoi is
its own campaign for diplomatic recognition, and it
has avoided placing other countries into difficult
"either-or" situations involving the two South Viet-
namese competitors.
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