DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 8, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

 Approved For Release 20 7 ff CI~~R9P85T00875R0011 C pSecret
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Develop ants in Indochina
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
8 March 1973
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00 100010010-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100010010-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100010010-4
 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100
010010-4
DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
(Information as of 1,500)
The Buddhists
are having pro ems among themselves.
LAOS
The Communists have rebuffed an effort
by Vang Pao to reinforce units near the
Plaine des Jarres. Souvanna consults the
King about the make-up of a new cabinet.
Lao Army generals are organizing for
political competition with the Communists.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Some exchange of artillery fire continues
along the western Thach Han River defense line.
Buddhist Internal Divisions
The An Quang Buddhists i,.re facing increased
problems among themselves brought on by the cease-
fire. According to the US Embassy, there are per-
sistent rumors of such difficulties, related to
personal and regional rivalries and to differing
views on the sect's role in the coming months.
The Buddhists recently issued an innocuous action
program for the post - cease-fire period, calling
on the faithful to restore war-damaged pagodas,
assist war victims, defend moral values, and re-
store the faith of the young. The non-controver-
sial agenda could mean that An Quang leaders were
unable to agree on any politically oriented ac-
tivities, although many of them still believe the
Buddhists should carefully avoid a partisan cast.
Approve4l For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00110001p010-4
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An Quang leaders are continuing their efforts
to work for the release of Buddhist political prison-
ers as part of the cease-fire agreement, but the
moderates and the militants of the sect apparently
are each going their separate ways.
the moderates have es a is e
a "committee 15'r tne relief of prisoners," which
will seek the release of Buddhists held both by
Saigon and by the Viet Cong. The moderates plan
to move cautiously in choir dealings with the Viet
Cong to avoid arousing the suspicions of the gov-
ernment. Some An Quang leaders who are strongly
anti-government, however, are working in a rival
committee concerned exclusively with prisoners held
by Saigon.
An Quang's attitude toward the government's
popular front may have been another bone of con-
tention. Four Buddhist senators attended the
front's initial organizational meeting, and sub-
sequently indicated their interest in cooperating
with the new group. The An Quang religious hier-
archy apparently vetoed Buddhist participation,
however, and the senators were not present at the
front's public inauguration.
The recent deaths of An Quang's titular head
plus one of the leading active monks may contribute
to internal divisions. The deaths create a vacuum
that mal' encourage internal struggling for position.
Personal rivalries and policy differences are
not new to the An Quang movement. In recent years,
however, under Tri Quang's dominance, An Quang has
been able to patch over its differences and follow
a relatively moderate course, avoiding confronta-
tions with the government and keeping its opposition
activities within the system. Tri Quang may prove
able to impose his will on the contending An Quang
elements, but the atmosphere of more intensive
political struggle between the Thieu government
and Communists could put greater pressure on the
Buddhists and increAqp the likelihood of an open
split among them. F7
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Combat increased slightly on 7 March in the
north. Communist units sharply rebuffed an effort
by General Vang Pao to reinforce units southeast
of the Plaine des Jarres. Ground attacks supported
by heavy weapons fire scattered elements of three
government battalions imme,.iately after they were
airlifted to high ground not far from Route 4. 0
PoZitieaZ Ducks StiZZ Not in Line
With the deadline for the formation of a new
government approaching, Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma is preparing to visit the royal capital of
Luang Prabang to discuss the future cabinet with
the King. Souvanna particularly would like to
retain the ministries of defense and interior.
The Communists probably also covet these posi-
tions, but they have not yet staked any open claims
to them or to any other cabinet portfolios.
The joint commissions that are to work out the
arrangements for implementing other provisions of
the peace agreement met again on 8 March. The
military commission surmounted earlier disagreement
on procedural points and began discussing the
mechanics of supervising the cease-fire. Little
substantive progress was reported by the political
commission, which is attempting to draft a protocol
dealing with the Joint National Political Council.
Second-ranked Communist negotiator Phoune Sipraseuth,
who returned to Vientiane on 8 March, may have new
instructions for the Communist representatives
that will enable them to be more forthcomin .
I
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The Generals Plan for the Future
During a convocation in Vientiane on 28 Feb-
ruary, Lao Army generals displayed a more realistic
appraisal of what should be done to compete polit-
ically with the Communists. The generals agreed
that Prime Minister Souvanna should form a single
political party to represent all non-Communist fac-
tions and thus prevent a split in the pro-government
vote in future elections. In addition, they recom-
mended that Souvanna send intelligent, young organ-
izers into the provinces to assist local chiefs in
rallying support for the government.
The generals also urged that corrupt civil ad-
ministrators be cashiered, and talked about curbing
the more blatant forms of military malfeasance.
Since the generals apparently did not set forth any
specific anti-corruption programs, however, it is
likely that few of them will make any real effort
to clean house. Still, the military leaders' recog-
nition that they must improve their images and shun
factionalism shovld be at least temporarily encour-
aging to Souvanna.
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