DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010034-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: April 10, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Developments in Indochina
C.i
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
10 April 1973
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10 April 1973
DEVELJOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
(.Cnformat'rion au cf' 1500)
Sihanouk's appearance in Hanoi and the
attention he is receiving provide the clear-
est indication to date that the North Viet-
namese are willing to support his return to
a position of power in Cambodia. Hanoi ap-
parently is calculating that the deterio-
rating situation inside Cambodia improves
the chances that negotiations with Sihanouk
will eventually prove acceptable to Phnom
Penh.
The shootdown this past weekend of truce
supervisory helicopters will. probably make it
even more difficult in the future to arrange
effective international inspection of Commu-
nist-held areas. Thieu's efforts to shake up
his government in order to make it more po-
litically effective should have an impact in
rural areas where the Communist threat is
greatest.
Significant progress has been made in
negotiating the shape of the new government
and some Lao politicians are saying that a
new coalition may be formed within a month.
The French are prepar'.ig to raise
their relations with both Hanoi and Saigon
to the ambassadorial level. They continue
to seek ways to reinstate French influence
in Indochina.
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,t.'ha )It/" /;COur 'aceu
Late last week Prince Sihanouk moved back into
his favorite spot--the political limelight. After
being out of the public eye for almost two months,
Sihanouk reappeared in Hanoi on 6 April claiming to
have made a one-month tour of the "liberated zone"
in Cambodia.
Whether he made the trip is academic. In prac-
tical political terms, the primary significance of
this affair lies in its being used by the North Viet-
namese to reinforce Sihanouk's claim as Cambodia's
"legitimate" chief of state. The attention that he
is now receiving in Hanoi is the clearest indication
to date that the North Vietnamese are willing to sup-
port Sihanouk's return to a position of power in Cam-
bodia. Hanoi apparently is calculating that the de-
teriorating situation inside Cambodia improl-es the
chances that Phnom Penh will eventually accept nego-
tiations with Sihanouk. Even in the absence of
negotiations, the new line helps convey an impression
of Khmer Communist unity and legitimacy.
Of equal importance is Sihanouk's contention
that the trip enabled him to obtain the unreserved
political support of Khmer Communist leaders in Cam-
bodia? On 9 April, Sihanouk referred to his trip
as a turning point in the Cambodian conflict because
he was able for the first time to meet with the in-
surgent leaders in Cambodia and win their support.
Consequently, he said, he is fully entitled to speak
and act for the Khmer Communists in international
matters.
Sihanouk indicated that in the process of ob-
taining the Khmer Communists' backing he helped
reduce factionalism within the insurgency. He con-
tended that his visit led to a political "marriage"
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between royalist and Communist elements under the
banner of his "National United Front of Cambodia,"
He added that the old monarchy is now purely a symbol,
but that it offers the "revolution" a solid juridicial
base of "legality" as a state., Sihanouk also acknowl-
edged that the Khmer Communists would hold the majority
in any future government.
Along with the Khmer Communists, the former Cam-
bodian leader also repeated his refusal to accept
any compromise with the Lon Nol government, any cease-
ri.re, or any "peace conference." In this context,
Sihanouk called on foreign countries to sever rela-
tions with Phnom Penh and recognize his "government."
On the military side, Sihanouk stressed that
his "army" is an "independent force," totaling
120,000 "effectives." (This is an obvious exaggera-
tion. The current US estimate of insurgent strength
is 40,000-50,000.) Despite his military boasting,
Sihanouk played down the possibility of a direct
assault on Phnom Penh. He claimed that, because of
US air support, it would be better to wait in the
expectation that the Lon Nol government will col-
lapse from within. Sihanouk also quoted Chinese
Premier Chou En-lai as saying that no new military
aid deliveries would be made to the Khmer Communists
because such deliveries are banned by the Paris
Agreement. He noted, however, that Peking and Hanoi
had given the Khmer,. Communists enough military aid
before the agreement was signed in January to allow
them to continue fighting until 1975.
During his lengthy absence, there was wide-
spread speculation that Sihanouk was visiting Cam-
bodia, but conclusive evidence to substantiate his
journey is lacking. A Khmer Communist rallier from
the Angkor Wat area told his Cambodian Army inter-
rogators; that Sihanouk arrived at the temple com-
plex in mid-March, Sihanouk stated that he met with
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1111 10 April 1973
Khmer Communist leaders at Angkor on 23 March. As-
suming that he began his return trip to Hanoi shortly
thereafter, he would have been hard pressed to
journey overland to a point near the Vietnam-Cam-
bodia border by 6 April, when he supposedly boarded 25X1
Aside from this tenuous evidence, there is
Sihanouk's own colorful description of his journey
across the isolated and sparsely populated northern
provinces of Stung Treng, Preah Vihear, and Siem
Reap. The pleasure-loving prince did not over-
dramatize the rigors of the trip--a fact that gives
his account a ring of truth. According to Sihanouk,
he, his wife, and key Khmer Communist official Ieng
Sary traveled in a convoy of 20 Soviet jeeps accom-
panied by 150 North Vietnamese. In addition to com-
munications and medical facilities, Sihanouk said
that he was provided with one of North Vietnam's
finest chefs. This prompted the sybaritic Sihanouk
to add that while he "traveled Soviet," he "ate
French." When they are available, an examination of
the photos, movies, and recordings that reportedly
were made will help verify the trip and perhaps,
shed new Ught on the identities of the shadowy
Khmer Communist leadership.
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SOUTI-I VIETNAM
1'he Slwo tdown and the ICCS
The shootdown this past weekend of an ICCS heli-
copter in Quang Tri Province will probably make it
even more difficult to arrange effective international
inspection of Communist-held areas.
The Communists claim that the "unfortunate acci-
dent" occurred because the two ICCS helicopters flying
along Route 9 toward Lao Bao deviated from their flight
plan, but this has not been established.
The Communist edginess over aerial penetration
of their sensitive border areas has also been reflected
in the pattern of ground fighting recently. In recent
weeks, the most consistent combat has occurred in the
Song Bo Valley northwest of Hue, around the Tonle Cham
Ranger camp in Tay Ninh Province, astride the Saigon
River corridors, and at border entry points in the
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de?.ta, such as Hong Ngu on the Mekong River just
inside the Cambodian border. Some of the fighting is
intended to divert government attention from the in-
filrration of supplies and men, but much of it sug-
gestF; that the Communists are bent on eliminating
any remaining South Vietnamese troops in these areas.
The ICCS shootdown, along with the firing on a
Joint Military Commission helicopter in the delta on
9 April, will further inhibit ICCS inspection efforts
in Communist-controlled areas. On the other hand,
it may induce the Communist members of the ICCS to lean
Uuyernme.nt Shake-up
The Thieu government is undergoing personnel
and organizational changes designed to make it more
effective against the Communists as well as to fur-
ther solidify President Thieu's control. Senator
Nguyen Van Ngai, a political ally of Thieu and one
of the key organizers of the government's Democracy
Party, has been appointed minister of rural develop-
ment. Ngai replaces Cao Van Than, who retains his
other hat as agriculture minister. Than's ministry
has been directed to focus more sharply on agricul-
tural development.
Thieu has been stressing the need to improve
the government's performance in rural areas because
the Communist threat is greatest there. Ngai's
appointment is part of this effort; his ministry
controls a nationwide network of officials who have
direct and regular contact with the people. 25X1
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In another step to offer improved official
guidance, Democracy Party members will receive
training at the Rural Development Ministry's Na-
tional Training Center. A presidential aide has
indicated that the first group, including deputy
province chiefs, will attend a training program
later this month. Thieu paved the way for this
program nct only by appointing Ngai, but also by
replacing the training center's politically inde-
pendent director, Colonel Nguyen Be, with a govern-
ment supporter. According to the US Embassy, at
least one province chief plans to use rural develop-
ment officials extensively in the village council
elections scheduled for later this spring.
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Mare Grumbling From the IHgj
Government and Communist negotiators have made
significant progress in negotiating the shape of the
new government. Some Lao politicians are saying
that a new coalition may be formed within a month
even though the Communists continue to take a tough
line on military matters and insist that these can-
not be separated from the political aspects.
The Lao rightists, who registered vehement but
futile opposition to the peace agreement of 22 Feb-
uary, are now focusing their concern on this tentative
political arrangement.
Trouble is also brewing in the National Assem-
bly where members are preparing to challenge Sou-
vanna's handling of negotiations. They sense an
opportunity to gain leverage because of the King's
insistence on strict compliance with the constitu-
tion. The King's exact intentions are unclear,
but he apparently wishes the Assembly in some man-
ner to approve any po'Ltical arrangements agreed
upon with the Communists before he gives his nec-
essary assent.
The delay in implementing the 22 February
agreement has given the rightists an opportunity
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to regroup and attempt to develop a common front
on the makeup of the new government. But it has
also given Souvanna time to take conciliatory steps
to avoid a messy confrontation. He has:
9
--decided to send his trusted subordinate
Pheng Phongsavan to "consult" with the Assembly
on the current negotiations.
--made new efforts to assure the King that the
Lao Constitution, and therefore the King's own posi-
tion, will be protected.
--given Nuon Sananikone, a leader of a very
powerful right-wing faction, a significant role in
working out details of the political settlement.
--consulted closely pith Lao Army generals
about the government's position on Communist mili-
tary demands.
in addition, his supporters have already begun
lobbying on his behalf. Vag Pao, for example, re-
cently met with several members of the Assembly to
seek assurances of support for Souvanna.
These measures to head off rightsst opposition
may prove insufficient, particularly if Souvanna
believes it necessary to make some pa,i.nf ul compro-
mises to get the Communists into the government.
In this case, he will again turn to the foreign
embassies in Vientiane for support. He can count
on the French to talk to their contacts in the mili-
tary and the Assembly, as well as on the Soviets and
Chinese for expressions of support. As always, how-
ever, he will depend mainly on the US.
Faced with strong foreign support for Souvanna,
the rightists would probably once more reluctantly
fall in line. They could be expected, however, to
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continue to snipe at the Communists and obstruct
their activities in a new coalition government.
Their longer term adherence to an agreement will
depend on their perception of the depth of the US
support for the coalition and the willingness of
the Pathet Lao to live with a continued rightist
role in Vientiane.
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Current 1'rcnc!s Viawo on V is tnram
Paris continues to watch developments in Indo-
china and to seek ways to restore French influence
there. The French are preparing to raise their
relations with both Hanoi and Saigon to the ambas-
sadorial level, and like some of Hanoi's other re-
cent suitors they are probably being pressed by the
North Vietnamese to extend some sort of recognition
to the People's Revolutionary Government as part of
Uie same package. The North will not insist the
French grant full diplomatic relations to the South-
ern Communists, however, and Parie is considering
granting delegation-general status to their repre-
sentatives in Paris.
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French officials
obviously intend to be as free as ever with their
advice to the various participants in the conflict.
Essentially the French seem to be angling for some
sort: of a mediating role, in the belief that they
thereby give themselves as much leverage as possible
and also stay in substantive contact with all sides.
In the field of economic aid the French seem
to be moving more deliberately on Vietnam than are
some other European Community members. The French
have discussed long-range aid plans with Hanoi, but
no specific commitments are known to have been made
known so far. They have earmarked $400,000 for
hospital repairs and may end up dividing $30 to $40
million between the two Vietnams.
Paris has indicated that it plans to emphasize
bilateral programs, because of Hanoi's known pref-
erence and because of its traditional preference for
bilateral arrangements on both the political and eco-
nomic levels. Nevertheless, a multilateral program in
an EC framework might also appeal to Paris, since it
is consistent with De Gaulle's 1966 speech in Phnom
Penh that called for "an international arrangement
organizing the peace and development of the area."
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