DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010035-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: April 13, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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op secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Developments in Indochina
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Top Secret
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13 April 1973
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13 April 1973
DLVI.;LOPMEWT!S IN INDOCHINA
The Communists may be planning to
step up military pressure against Phi.om
Penh. Although a major ground assault
still seems unlikely, the Khmer Communists'
capabilities for carrying out commando-
style actions in the city appear to be
growing.
The Communists see little reason to
launch a major military offensive in Laos
at this time and intend to drag their feet
in the current negotiations.
Thieu s political opponents continue to ma-
neuver among themselves with little success.
Pie
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ii
Peking has made it clear that it con-
siders some of its interests in Cambodia were
enhanced during Sihanouk's recent trip to
Cambodia. Indochina will be high on the list
for discussion at the foreign ministers' meet-
ing of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions this weekend in Thailand. the People's
Revolutionary Government and the Soviets is-
sued different versions of the coinmunique fol-
lowing Madame Binh's Visit to the USSR.
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The Threat to Plinom Penh
The Communists' current propaganda offensive,
centered on Sihanouk's recent visit to the "liberated
zone," paints a contrasting picture of insurgent
unity and government political and military tail-
spin in Phnom Penh. The Communists may now be plan-
ning to drive this line home by stepping up pressure
against the capital itself.
According to the latest estimate by the US de-
fense attache in Phnom Penh, between 20 and 25 Khmer
Communist battalions are within a 25-mile radius of
the capital--roughly the same force the insurgents
have had in this arc a for some time. Although the
Communists apparently intend to use some of these
units to attack positions close to Phnom Penh, a
major assault against the well-manned capital de-
fenses still seems unlikely.
The Communists probably judge they have less
to risk and more to gain by mounting a campaign of
sapper raids, sabotage, and terrorism in the cap.:tal
itself. At a time when Phnom Penh ;.s still recove-:ing
from a major political crisis, faces a serious short-
age of POL and other essential commodities, and re-
mains under heavy military pressure, such a guerrilla
campaign could be psychologically damaging. The Com-
munists, at a minimum, would expect to lessen public
confidence in the Lon Nol government further. They
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may hope that a major outbr.^ak of violence in the
capital could provoke a new political crisis that
might collapse the regime.
In any case, the Khmer Communists' capabilities
for carrying out commando-style actions in the city
appear to be growing.
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Military ProapecGa
With the negotiations in Vientiane at an impasse,
it is tempting to draw a parallel between the present
situation and the events leading to the formation of
the coalition government in 1962. At that time the
Communists successfully used military pressure to in-
fluence the course of negotiations. Their defeat of
General Phoumi Nosavan's troops at Nam Tha broke a
13-month deadlock at the conference table and forced
the rightists into joining in a troika government with
the neutralists and Communists. This raises an obvious
question: are the Communists now casting about for
another Nam Tha? Apparently not.
In contrast to 1962, it is the Communists who
are dragging their feet in the current negotiations.
The Communist stalling strategy probably has a
variety of objectives, one of which is to frustrate
the Souvanna government through delays into soften-
ing its terms. Overall, the stalling strategy is
probably grounded in a general belief that the Com-
munists' strategic political position throughout
Indochina will gradually become stronger in the
coming months as their forces refit and rebuild in
Vietnam and Laos. They are pursuing a similar stall-
ing game in Paris with the South Vietnamese.
The Communists can ensure a continued impasse
merely by sticking to their present unacceptable pro-
posals for implementation of the 22 February agree-
ment. Sharply increased military pressure would gain
them little in this respect and could prove counter
productive. The Communists probably have concluded
that heightened combat would invite at least a limited
resumption of US bombing--which they would obviously
prefer to avoid. In terms of the negotiations them-
selves, increased Communist military activity would
bring Prime Minister Souvanna under pressure from
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his right wing to take a harder line. This would
only make it. more difficult for the Communists to
get what they want at the conference table once
they begin to negotiate seriously.
The nature of the fighting in Laos since the cease-
fire went into effect bears out this point of view.
The North Vietnamese attacks under way in the Tha
Viang area, for example, have been characterized
by the Pathet Lao as a legitimate reaction to what
they view as government encroachment into an area
nominally under Communist control at the time of the
cease-fire deadline. Communist resistance to govern-
ment efforts to re-establish a presence in areas only
nominally under Vientiane's control at the time of
the cease-fire have resulted in a series of small en-
gagements southeast of Thakhek and northeast of Khong
Sedone. Pathet Lao units clearly have been the ag-
gressors in the remote northwest where government
territory has been significantly reduced. But this
area has never been of vital interest to Vientiane,
and the attacks are more likely designed to clear
the way for Chinese road builders or to round out
Communist holdings rather than to influence the ne-
gotiations.
The only area in which there are signs that the
Communists may be prepared to break this pattern is at
Sala Phou Khoun. Communist defectors claim that a
move on the key road junction between the royal
capital. of Luang Prabang and Vientiane is in the offing.
So far, however, there is little evidence to confirm
such plans, and the Communists, after weighing the
possible gains against the likely consequences, may
have scrapped or delayed any plans to retake Sala
Phou Khoun.
not likely to change.
Government and Communist units will continue to
skirmish in areas such as Thakhek and Tha Viang if
one side believes the other is aggrandizing his terri-
tory. But as long as the Communists are primarily
motivated by a desire to delay implementation of the
Laos accords, the character of military activity is
13 April 1973
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SOUTH VIETNAM
A Look at thel i yh ! z na
Communist military action--at scattered loca-
tions throughout the country--has fluctuated greatly
during the past: few days, Shellings in the northern
provinces, for example, fell to the lowest number re-
corded in the past year on 11 April, but rose sharply
the following day to near the daily average since the
cease-fire.
There have been sharp clashes in Kontum Province,
but at least some Communist and government units there
apparently have reached a tentative accommodation and
fighting is dropping off. The Communists are main-
taining pressure on the government outpost at Tonle
Cham, although the intensity of the shellings has
dropped substantially..
Action in the southernmost provinces remains
largely confined to Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong, and
the western delta near the Cambodian border. 1-Iere,
as elsewhere in the country, most of the enemy-initiated
action has been harassing shellings.
past few days,
ally large quantities of arms and ammunition in the
Saigon's forces have also been busy during the
past week. In the northern provinces they have fired
some 2,000 artillery rounds daily, nearly double the
rate from Communist gunners, Security operations have
also been mounted in numerous parts of the country.
In the western delta, for example, the South Vietnamese
9th Division has been attacking close to and across
the Cambodian border in an effort to blunt the Com-
munist thrust at Hong Nhu. In addition, government
forces patrolling from newly constructed outposts in
or near Communist-held territory have captured unusu-
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Maneu?'ering Among Thieu's Political Opponents
Opposition forces and independents are still
adjusting to the changed political climate brought
on by the cease-fire and the presidential decree on
political parties. The efforts of some of these groups
to strengthen their positions by combining forces con-
tinue to be plagued by rivalries among p-'.iticians.
All of these groups see the Communists at a greater
evil than the Thieu government, but despite their
generally weak position, few- seem ready to join the
government camp at this point.
Two new coalitions trying to qualify as legal
political parties have internal difficulties. The
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six-faction Social Democratic Alliance has two
large groups, each working to control the alli-
ance. Leaders of the Progressive Nationalist Move-
ment (PNM) faction reportedly believe they have
isolated the other large group--the Farmer-Worker
Party--by gaining the backing of three of the
smaller factions.
The second coalition, the Freedom Party, which
includes three Catholic-based factions, may have
even more severe problems. The party has decided to
disband its leadership bodies in favor of a more
informal arrangement, and also has decided not to
put up a slate of candidates for the Senate elections
in August. Leaders of cwo of the factions, apparently
believing the party must have the government's toler-
ance if it is to survive, want to remove a leader of
the third because of his "constant anti-administration
outbursts." The third faction has reluctantly agreed
to this move, but believes Lhe party's new policies
will eventually be the "death knell" of the Freedom
Party.
Some consistently anti-government legislators and
other political figures have sent two separate appeals
to the US calling for the implementation of "democratic
freedoms" in South Vietnam under the cease-fire agree-
ment. Some of these figures are close to Big Minh, and
their assertions that the third element of the Council
of National Reconciliation and Concord should represent
an alleged "silent majority" that does not support either
side reflect Minh's views. The appeals have not been
published in the Saigon press and have had little impact
within the country.
Backers of former vice-president Ky, who has been
politically inactive since his term ended in late 1971,
reportedly are seeking support for him, either as a
spokesman for "neutralist elements" or a candidate for
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office in any future election. A member of the
Saigon city council is contacting students, re-
ligious leaders, junior civil servants, and junior
military officers on Yy's behalf. The councilman
claims that the former vice-president has strong
support among the military officers, who are ready
to take whatever action Ky requests. Many military
officers do regard Ky sympathetically, but the claims
of active support appear greatly exaggerated. =
13 April 1973
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
China and Siiitancul<
Poking has made clear that it believes at least
some of its interests in Cambodia were enhanced dur-
ing Sihanouk'9 recent trip to Indochina. Chinese
satisfaction was expressed by the high-level turnout,
led by Chou En-lai, that greeted Sihanouk at Peking's
airport on 11 April and by a generally laudatory edi-
torial in People's nai Zy.
The editorial suggests that, in Peking's view,
much of the factionalism that has characterized the
Khmer Communists was dissipated during Sihanouk's
visit, and Sihanouk himself won c~evet al acknowledge-
ment as leader of the insurgents' political and mili-
tary front. More important, People's Daily implies
that Peking is particularly satisfied at indications
that the North Vietnamese are willing to support
Sihanouk's return to power.
Chinese interests have been bound up with Si-
hanouk's ever since his ouster in March 1970 and
subsequent retirement to Peking. The depth of this
commitment was clearly reflected this week when Chi-
nese representatives walked out of a session of the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)
in Tokyo to protest the seating of a delegation repre-
senting the Lon Nol government. People's Daily in-
dicates that new signs of Khmer solidarity behind
Sihanouk add weight to long-standing Chinese claims
that he heads Cambodia's only legitimate government
and that he must be a decisive factor in any postwar
arrangement.
Less clear is Peking's view of Khmer Communist
political and military strategy in the wake of Si-
hanouk's trip. People's Daily contains the familiar
vague formulations regarding a seti.1Qment. but, as in
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the pant, refrains from calling Sihanouk'F, 1970 five-
point proposal the only way to resolve the problem.
The editcrial does include the strongest statement
Poking has yet made regarding the US bombing, call-
ing it a "complete violation" of the Paris agreement.
Chou En-lai also used some stiff language in remarks
at a banquet for Sihanouk on 12 April, calling for
an end to American bombing and indicating that with-
drawal of US support for Lon Nol was the key to a
Cambodian settlement. Chinese spokesmen have used
such themes before, although rarely in pttblic at
Chou's level.
Peking has never, in fact, wholly endorsed Si-
bar uk's terms for a settlement, although there have
been sketchy indications that China has recently
moved closer to his position. Barring an early mili-
tary take-over by the insurgents or a collapse of
Phnom Penh, the Chinese almost certainly favor a
negotiated settlement--involving Sihanouk--as the
best way of enhancing their own larger political in-
terests. In this connection, Sihanciiuk himself has
claimed that Chou told him no further Chinese mili-
tary aid would be sent to the Khmer insurgents be-
cause the Paris agreement flatly prohibits such de-
liveries.
China's apparent reticence in clarifying its
position after Sihanouk's trip suggests continued
reserve over whatever terms and political strategy
Sihanouk and his allies in Indochina have fashioned.
ASEAN and Indochina
Indochina will figure prominently in discus-
sions during the foreign ministers' meeting of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) sched-
uled for 16-18 April in Pattaya, Thailand. Indonesia,
which sees itself as the natural leader of Southeast
Asia, has for some time taken the initiative in try-
ing to create an independent Southeast Asian voice
or, Indochina. It can be expected to take the lead
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problem.
in discussing future relations with Indochina, in-
cluding ASEAN's possible role in reconstruction and
the feasibility of ASEAN membership for the four
Indochina nations. Jakarta will also report on the
discussions at the Paris Conference and on its re-
cent experiences with the 1CCS.
ASEAN's inc,:easing interest in Indochina af-
fairs reflects the members' growing confidence in
the organization and their commitment to increased
regional cooperation. With the reduction of hos-
tilities in Indochina, the members see greater
prospects for creating a large and cohesive re%ional
bloc that would lessen the opportunities for great
power intervention in the area. ASEAN has invited
Burma and the Indochina states to send observers to
next week's meeting, but is still uncertain which
ones will attend. In any case, the members will
continue pursuing their expansion plans.
Indonesia, which has ties with Hanoi and the
PRG as well as the other Indochina capitals, strongly
supports close relations between North Vietnam and
ASEAN. Jakarta believes this would increase ASEAN's
credibility as a regional spokesman and also be a
first: step toward weaning the North Vietnamese away
from what the Indonesians consider to be Hanoi's
close association with Peking.
Other ASEAN members are becoming increasingly
receptive to the Indonesian point of view. Kuala
Lumpur recently opened full diplomatic relations
with Hanoi, and Singapore has a permanent, quasi-
official North Vietnamese trade mission. Bangkok
is attempting to open talks with Hanoi on refugee
repatriation and would like to see such a channel
develop into a full political dialogue that could
lead to diplomatic ties. Although there has been
some talk in Manila about the need for official re-
lations with Hanoi, the Philippine Government is
lagging behind other ASEAN states in focusing on the
13 April 1973
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Ph(. .Taouoo Unuoua! t.-,onu,tuni.quc After Moncow Viait
The "joint" communique issued by the PRG fol-
lowing Foreign Minister Binh's visit to Moscow ear-
lier this month contains some striking differences
from the Sc~,tet version. Normally, both participants
issue identical communiques after such a visit. This
time, however, the PRG obviously did not get what it
wanted in the Soviet version, even though Madame
Binh herself received exceptionally good treatment.
The separate communique appears to underscore PRG
dissatisfaction with Moscow's Vietnam line.
to the Paris agreement.
piicit in calling upon "all" parties to live up
The most notable discrepancy is the language
concerning the PRG's role in the South. In its
text, the PRG calls itself the "sole legitimate
representative of the aspirations of the South
Vietnamese peoples"; the Soviet version merely
credits them with being the "true spokesman." In
addition, the Soviet version is a little more ex-
13 April 197:
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