DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010039-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: April 27, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Developments in Indochina
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
A22
27 April 1973
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I I
Developments in Indochina
27 April 1973
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Takeo has been subjected to Communist
harassing attacks for nearly a month
now, and its fall--even temporarily--
would be a major military and psycho-
logical setback for the government.
The Khmer Communists, while carrying
the war to the government on a number
of fronts, are devoting considerable
attention to the political aspects of
the conflict.
Vietnamese forces are still on alert
in anticipation of some sort of re-
newed Communist attacks in the next few
weeks. A few continue to fore-
cast widespread ground action, but most
evidence is to the contrary. The sub-
stantial progress made by the government
over the last two months in the resettle-
ment of refugees has run into familiar
problems. The government is showing con-
cern about possible Communist penetration
of the labor movement and is trying to
strengthen its in' .uence among the ranks
of labor.
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I I
INTERNATIONAL DL'JNLOPMLNTS. . . . . . . . . . 9
Ranking Vietnamese, Lao and Cambodian
officials have been in Peking this
month ,and discussions at the policy
evel may have led the Chinese to
level'
prompt their Indochineso allies to
adopt a more moderate course.
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CAMBODIA
The Threat to 'l'akeo
The provincial capital of Takeo, 40 miles south
of Phnom Penh on Route 2, was once a quiet agricul-
tural center of some 30,000 people. Today, it is an
isolated, besieged city teeming with 70,000 people,
one-third of whom are refugees. Takeo has been sub-
jected to harassing attacks by Khmer Communist forces
for nearly a month. Since 10 April, the Communists
have been shelling Takeo with captured 3.05-mm. howit-
zers and have slowly whittled down the city's defen-
sive perimeter.
Communist strength in the Takeo area is estimated
at five battalions, or 1,000 to 1,500 troops. There
is little doubt that the Khmer Communists would like
In mid-April, government forces at Takeo were
estimated to total about 3,500 troops. They are or-
ganized into nine battalions, and occupy defensive
positions in and around Takeo. An additional 400
troops were airlifted into Takeo from Phnom Penh early
this week to replace casualties suffered over the past
month. There are occasional shortages of food and
ammunition in Takeo because these supplies must be
flown in. The morale of the government garrison at
Takeo is increasingly poor. During a recent- visit by
the US Air Attache, a large number of CambodiGn soldiers
mobbed his helicopter in hopes of obtaining space on
the return flight to Phnom Penh. In addition to Com-
munist military pressure, pay irregularities are con-
tributing to the morale problem.
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Takeo can probably hold out as long as the air-
lift: and intense US air strikes against suspected Com-
ical setback for the government.
munist positions in the surrounding area continue.
If Takeo should fall into Communist hands--even tem-
porarily--it would be a major military and psycholoa-
The Other Battlefield
While the Khmer Communists (KC) are carrying
the war to the government on a number of fronts, they
are devoting considerable attention to the political
aspects of the conflict. The KC are continuing to
expand and upgrade their political apparatus through-
out Cambodia. In a number of areas, the collapse of
Cambodian Army (FANK) defenses in the face of KC
pressure has enabled them to seize control quickly
and establish a rudimentary political apparatus using
new recruits and some who previously wo?cked for the
government.
In some areas, such as parts of Prey Veng Prov-
ince, KC political organizations have reached new
levels of sophistication that sometimes rival the
Viet Cong's apparatus in Communist-controlled areas
of South Vietnam. There is also evidence that the
KC are continuing to assert their independence from
the Vietnamese Communists, from regional down to the
hamlet level in many enemy-controlled areas. Despite
their increasingly strong position in Cambodia, how-
ever, the KC in some areas are having to resort to
more stringent control measures over uncooperative
local villagers.
As the KC have refined their administrative
machinery, they have al;;o stepped up their efforts
to subvert FANK and civilian government agencies.
They have put increased emphasis on the recruitment
of personnel, particularly young people, to serve
as low-level intelligence collectors or as fifth
columnists within FANK.
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A five-day KC congress held in Kompong Cham
Province in February shed some additional light on
the present and future KC obje:itives. The delegates
discussed such goals as establishing several "capitals"
and "instigating" violence and friction in both urban
and rural areas. More importantly, KC leaders at the
congress called for disruption of the economy in
both government-controlled and contested areas by
forcing prices up and by fos'-ering dishonesty among
government officials. The need to improve relations
with the Buddhists was stressed. Finally, the KC
are to expand their over-all training program, con?-
ceritzating on training personnel to serve on village
committees. A significant effort apparently has
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The Military Situation
South Vietnamese forces are still on alert in
anticipation of renewed Communist attacks in the
next few weeks.
L Recently, the Communists have re-
f's refu
resettlement and land development programs, partic-
ularly in areas where these efforts impinge on their
own territory or civic action projects.
Some of the heaviest fighting in the past few
days has occurred in the delta. South Vietnamese
regulars are still encountering stiff resistance to
clearing operations along the banks of the Mekong
River in the Hong Ngu area. They have succeeded in
opening the South Vietnamese portion of the river
for convoy passage, but they have taken as well as
inflicted substantial casualties. Senior South
Vietnamese officials believe, however, that the Com-
munists may soon make another try in the area. They
claim that elements of the North Vietnamese 5th and
9th divisions are either in or moving toward Hong
u.
The Communists have been active in several. delta
provinces, shelling and harassing government out-
posts and villages just enough to keep the government's
local defense forces tied down. The Communists have
also suggested that some main force units may be used
in future attacks, a threat apparently sufficient to
keep most of the government's regulars spread through-
out the region.
27 April 1973
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ressure nas in-
creased against government positions in Thua Thien
Province. The Communists have persistently directed
heavy mortar fire against South Vietnamese troops
trying to set up a new observation post overlooking
25X1
the Bo River Vv lley west of Hue.
partly in response to this government effort, Viet
Cong local forces in this area are building defensive
positions and are being reinforced by North Viet-
namese regulars.
The government last week quietly abandoned its
outermost nnRitinn west of Hue, ex - Fire Support Base
Abandonment or anotner
base west of the city has enabled the Communists
to move close to the boundary separating South Viet-
namese Army and Marine sectors--one of the weakest
points in the government's northern defenses. Both
of the abandoned government positions had come under
increasingly heavy shell fire during the past few 25X1
weeks.
Refugee Resettlement
During the past two months, the government has
made substantial progress in the handling and reset-
tlement of war refugees. Recent statistics show that
the number of persons in temporary government camps
has declined to the lowest level in eight months,
some 603,000 people. Since the cease-fire in Janu-
ary, an estimated 300,000 persons are said to have
been affected Ln some way or another by the fighting,
but only about 39,000 remain displaced from their
home areas. In Quang Tri Province, for example, al-
most 20,000 persons have been resettled in a program
that started in mid-March.
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The government's resettlement efforts in Quang
Tri and in some other provinces, however, are now be-
ginning to encounter increasing problems, including
poor security.
been trying to replace its elite marine units sta-
tioned in this area with territorial forces whose
morale is said to be low. Recent rumors of impend-
ing Communist attacks in this area have had an un-
settling effect on the refugees.
The Communists have steadily increased their
pressure against government strongpoints in northern
"Thua Thien Province, where many of the camps shelter-
ing refugees from Quang Tri are located. South Viet-
namese units in some instances have been forced back
closer to the coast, dampening the desire of the ref-
ugees to volunteer for resettlement in the exposed
areas.
The initial high priority and resources given
the resettjement,nroaram by the government seems to
be in question.
Administrative and logistic brea
downs have slowed the arrival of promised construc-
tion material, and what is available is not distrib-
uted equally.
in several other provinces, resettlement pro-
grams are being hampered by increasingly aggressive
Communist reaction to government cleaning and land
development projects. In Bien Hoa Province near Sai-
gon, Communist pressure has forced the abandonment
of a new refugee settlement. In Binh Dinh Province
on the central coast, the government has indefinitely
27 April 1973
The government has
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postponed plans to resettle another 10,000 people in
Tam Quang District because of poor security and an
insufficiency of government-controlled rice lands.
Roughly one half of some 7,000 persons already re-
settled in this district reportedly have returned
to their former camps, Similar problems are cropping
,.p in nearby Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces, par-
ticularly as government forces on land clearing op-
erations move closer to territory long held by the
Viet Cong.
The Government and the Labor Movement
The South Vietnamese Government is showing con-
cern over possible Communist penetration of the labor
movement and is trying to strengthen its influence
within the ranks of labor. When a railway workers'
union staged a brief walkout last week in defiance
of the ban on strikes, the government ordered the
arrest of the union's leaders. It also used the oc-
casion to arrest leaders of several other unions who
have long been suspected of pro - Viet Cong activity.
On the surface, the ra.i.lway dispute was a minor
demand for a pay raise, but the union leader who
directed the walkout has a history of t.r.volvement in
'
s
left-wing agitation. Reflecting the government
concern over any disturbances during the cease
that the strike had to be stopped immediately to pre-
vent other unions from turning it into a general
strike.
Despite the government's fears, militants are
only a small minority within South Vietnam's labor
movement. The country's major union, the Vietnamese
Confederation of Labor (CVT), is headed iy firm anti-
Communists who have frequently cooperated with Pres-
ident Thieu. Recently, however, strains have devel-
oped between the CVT and the Government over polit-
ical tactics. The government's Democracy Party has
formed a special unit for labor, and CVT leaders
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claim that the party has boon trying to force their
members to join. Moreover, CVT president Tran Quoc
13uu recently mentioned to the US Embassy fears that
Thiou's entourage is trying to set up a rival "gov-
ernment union."
Under IIuu's leadership, the CVT's political arm
has rejected overtures from the Democracy Party and
is instead participating in the newly formed inde-
pendent Social Democratic Alliance. As a result,
Thieu and his political lieutenants, while claiming
that they do not intend to compete with the CVT,
may have become less reluctant to step on the union's
toes in solidifying their o'an support among labor.
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
A review of the state of play in Indochina at
the policy level in Peking may have led the Chinese
to encourage its Indochinese allies to follow a more
moderate course. Ranking Vietnamese, Lao, and Cam-
bodian officials have been in Peking this month,
and there have been hints in the press of a subtle
shift in Pekiny,y's position on some key issues.
The outlines of China's current thinking seem
to be et~.srging in a series of authoritative state-
ments dealing with Indochinese Communist protests
of US activity in Laos and Cambodia and with the
third anniversary of the Indochina summit conference
held in China a few weeks after Sihanouk's ouster.
As in the past, Peking's statements are less biting
in tone and more sparing of US actions and motives
in Indochina than companion commentary by the Indo-
chinese Communists. Peking's latest statements, how-
ever, appear more moderate and flexible than those
of only a few weeks ago.
With respect to Cambodia, for example, a Peo-
ple's Daily editorial on 25 April made no mention
of the Khmer Communist line that any settlement re-
quires the ouster of Lon Nol and recognition of Si-
hanouk as Cambodia's chief of state. The editorial
used a softer formulation than heretofore in ex-
pressing Peking's terms for a Cambodian: settlement:
that the US Government stop bombing and all "mili-
tary interference" in Cambodia. Publicly and pri-
vately, Chinese spokesmen have long insisted that
an end to all US involvement--presumably political
and economic as well as military--was a prerequisite
to settlement. Chou En-lai advanced this formula
less than three weeks ago in formal remarks at a ban-
quet for Sihanouk.
Several times this week Peking has addressed
the question of "foreign" involvement in Laos and
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Cambodia in a way that infers that the Chinese may
have Hanoi in mind, as well as the U.S. Both in the
Peopio'o Daily editorial and in a message to the
summit participants signed by Chou, the Chinese re-
ferred to the Lao and Vietnam cease-fire agreements
as having "created conditions" for the Lao or Viet-
namese people "to settle their internal affairs free
from foreign interference," In a similar vein, a
Chinese commentary last week spelled out the provi-
sions of the agreemcnts dealing with "foreign" forces
in a deadpan way suggesting that Peking was referring
to the need for adherence by all parties.
If Peking does have Hanoi in mind, its recent
public statements suggest there has been much more
pointed private counsel. The Chinese, for example,
may have advised Hanoi that the time is right and
that there is little to lose by moving ahead on the
formation of a new government in Laos or by making
a display of compliance with the Paris Accords by
withdrawing some of its forces from Cambodia. Re-
garding South Vietnam, Chinese diplomats have indi-
cated for some weeks that Peking does not favor a
fresh Comm'.inist offensive.
Perhaps to ,:add weight to its less rigid views
on substantial issues, Peking's ritualistic expres-
sion of support for its allies is much briefer and
tamer in this year's anniversary editorial and mes-
sage than in 1972. Gone are references to Mao's
teachings, to Peking's "bounden internationalist
duty" and to China as "the reliable rear area."
The trimming here clearly reflecr?..; in part changes
in the situation since last year when the Communist
spring offensive was in full swing and a cease-fire
was still. months away. It also may signal that Pe-
king is attempting to dissociate itself from some
of its allies' more risky and provocative moves.
Peking may have been persuaded to moderate
its position by growing concern that recent mili-
tary and political developments threaten prospects
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for defusing Indochina as an issue in major power
politics any time soon. The Chinese may believe
the Communists control as much Laotian territory
as they can without stepping up military pressure,
which might invite US retaliation against the Ho
Chi Minh trail complex. Under these circumo tancos,
the Lao Communists, in Peking's view, are to a
strong position to negotiate a coalition arrange-
ment in Vientiane; this, in turn would tend to
formalize their territorial control. Regarding
Cambodia, Peking seems certain that hard Khmer
Communist terms for a settlement virtually preclude
any serious bargaining and that a more flexible
position might put more pressure on Washington
and Phnom Penh. The Chinese, moreover, may be
counseling Hanoi that a withdrawal of some North
Vietnamese forces would have no adverse effect on
Communist prospects and would place Hanoi's record
of compliance with the cease-fire agreements in a
more favorable lic,ht.
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