DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010054-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: June 19, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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D~evelop~~~~~s i~ I~dochinu
Secret
~. 2 2
19 June 1973
No. 2039/73
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Developments in Indocl,~ina
CONTENTS
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NORTH VIETNAM 1
Pham Van Dong will soon lead a delegation
to North Korea and Mongolia.
Pham Van
Dong wig,. a so visa as ern ur pe and may
stop in P,frica and Cuba. Presumably a trip
try the USSR is also in the offing .
SOUTH VIETNAM 3
It is very difficult i;o determine how mazy
members of the Viet Cong's political infra-
structure are now operating in the South.
The South Vietnamese estimate between 45,000
and 50,000; CIA estimates between 55,000 and
70,000. VCI strength has fluctuated greatly
since late 1970, but there are numerous indi-
cations that the Communists feel politically
weak at this time. The rebuilding process
will not be short or easy. President Thieu
seems likely soon to get firm control over
the Senate, the only official body in which
his non-Communist opponents now have con-
siderable strength. The country's main
independent opposition groups are sitting
out the coming election, convinced they have
no chance against Thieu's well-organized.
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machinery. With a stro~,zg ma;~ority in the
Senate, he expects to be able tc push through
certain constitutional amendments
t at wou s rang en m po ca y. ere
were some last-minute effort~,s to improve
local positions as thss new cease-fire went
into effect, but neither side attempted a
major land-grabbing campaign.
CAMBODIA . 7
Phnom Penh's students and teachers, who
protested governments economic policies
and poor living conditions early this
ye$r, are now lying low, still feeling
the affects of the political crackdown
that followed the bombing attempt on Lon
Nol's residence. Some students and lead-
ers were then arrE:sted, others went into
hiding, and still other3 fled to the in-
surgents. The le.a~lers are still badly
divided acid demoralized; the students
have adopted a "wait and see" attitude
toward the government.
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NORTH VIETNAM
flano~ is L~aadQrn 7'o Go on 4'our
Premier Pham Van Dong will visit North Korea
and Mongoli~x soon at the head of a party and govern-
ment delegation, and National Assembly Chairman Truong
Chink may visit Japan later this year.
Tho exact dates of Pham Van Dong's tour were not
announced, but Ulan Bator has stated publicly that he
will be in Mongolia in late ~'une . '!'he trip appar-
ently w5.11 fulfill a directive in Ho Chi Mink's will
that all of the rountriea that atded Hanoi during the
war be tl-.anked personally. Pham Van Dong reportedly
will also visit Eastern Europe, and possibly Africa
and Cuba. Presumably, he will stop in Moscow for
talks, at least in part to balance off the recent
visit by Dong and Le Duan to Peking.
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SQ~JTH VIETNAM 25X1
/lore S~r~~on~ the VCT?
Estimates as to how many memb
Cong's political "infrastructure"--
ers of the Viet
the VCI--are now
operating in the South vary widely. The last offi- 25X1
ci.a1 estimate by the US military command--in Decem-
ber 1971--was 65,000.
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The South Vietnamese guvernment's Phuong Hoang
Cc.~mrnittee, operating under the guidance of the National
Police, can identify only 26,000 active VCI and esti-
mates total s~~rength at between 45,000 and 50,000.
CIA analysts, on the other hand, e,~timate VCI strength
at somewhere between 55,000 to 70,000. The discrepanc.-Y
between US and South Vietnamese estimates reflects,
at least in part, a broader US definition o# the VCT,
which includes categories like couriers and suppliers,
who may or may not be fully committed to the Viet Cong,
and work for them only part time: The South Vietnamese
apparently include only those holding full-time posi-
tions, such as party administrators, members of party
cells, and covert agents.
VCI strength is believed to have fluctuated 25X1
greatly since late 1970. Membershi declined dur-
ing 1971 and 1972,
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spring offensive, there was a major recruitment ef-
fort that was probably somewhat successful. VCI
strength almost certainly declined again as a result
of the spring offensive, particularly in view of the
widespread arrests by the South Vietnamese.
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Thera are numerous indications that the Commu-
nists believe they aro politically weak, and they
have been putting new emphasis on VCI recruitment
since the signing of the cease-fire agreement in Janu-
ary. They have reportedly lowered party membership
criteria in order to tap the population in areas that
they gained access to after their 1972 offensive. In
addition, North Vietnam has been sending down cadre
to flesh out the VCI, and many of the 5,000-6,000
infiltratorc~ this year are
believed to be c?.v. an po - ca conomic spe-
cialists. Some of these specialists were formerly
residents of South Vietnam's no~:thernmost provinces
who f1Pd North during the 1972 offensive, or military
"regroupees" or their families who went North after
1954. Others are reported to be~native northerners
going South in advisory roles.
The Communists concede that much needs to be
done to rebuild their political apparatus in the
South and that the process will not be a short or
easy one. Recent directives have stated that Viet
Cong administrations in "liberated areas" will be
brought up to full strength before efforts are un-
dertaken to build up the apparatus in contested and
government-controlled areas. The Communists recognize
that they have become increasingly divorced from the
bulk of the population and axe i:rying to offset this
by repopu?.sting the liberated zones with people from
the North and building "showcase" villages to attract
settlers from the South. They express confidence
that ?.:hese measures will serve both to populate
Communist-held lands and to re'uvenate the VCI over
the long run.
Government Fietds Strong Senate SZates
President Thieu seems likely soon to gain firm
control over the Senate, the only official body in
which his non-Commun.'~st opponents have considerable
strength. Its members are now almost evenly divided
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between pro- and anti-government forces. Government-
backed candidates are heavily favored to wi.n when 31
of the 60 Senate seats come up for election next August.
Voters will elect two out of four slates of
candidates currently in the race. Two of the lists
are composed of prominent members of 'Ihieu's Democracy
Party and ot:.her well known pro-government personalities.
The other two contain little known individuals whose
political ~~ienta~~ion is not entirely clear. Some
opposition figures are charging that they represent no
more than a government-contrived show of ~:omFetition.
The countr.?y's main indepen3ent and opposition
groups are sifting out the election. Some were con-
vinced that they had no chance against Thieu's well-
organized political machinery and others werd unable
to agree on slates by the filing deadline last week-
end.
Thieu has indicated i;:at the Senate election
is an important part of his long-range play. for con-
solidating his political position, suggesting that he
does not anticipate any early political settlement
with the Communists. He evidently believes that.,
with a strong majority in the Sei:ate, ne can put
through certain constitutional amendments that ~-ill
enable him to strengthen his hand politically.
"Nato" Cease-Fire Taking Hold?
There were some last minute efforta3 to improve
local positions as the new cease-fire went into ef-
fect over the weekend, but neither side attempted a
major land grabbing campaign. The government had
received numerous reports that the Communists would
carry out,. limited operations, especially in the
19 June 1973
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^`~ CAMBOD\
Tone ~~.~
S sAa-\~_
~~' ~~~1.
Cammurist gains' '
r_
~, ~ ~ i:i`
.~ .
' '' Sauth
';,C6ina
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southern two thirds of the country, and much of the
fighting that did occur was in these provinces. South
Vietnamese forces were not only on alert but also con-
ducted spoiling operations in several areas to pre-
empt possible Viet Cong moves and acquire a few
eleventh hour gains of their own.
By mid-week, the levels of military activity
had returned to a low level. Some increased action
is continuing in the delta, primarily light Commu-
nit~t spellings and ground probes. The Communists
leave made some gains there in An Xuyen and Chuong
Thien provinces, el~.minating a number of government
outposts near Communist supply lines and base areas.
On the government side, South Vietnamese troops have
established a presence in a long-time Viet Cong base
area of the northern delta and have pushed back some
Communist forces in Uinh Tuong Province. North of
Saigon, the Communists wire able to thwart govern-
ment efforts to reopen Route 13 ~o An Loc, but the
government did open up an overland link to Phuoc Long
Province to military traffic.
The Communists registered their greatest succ~:ss
in the highlands, where North Vietnamese forces are
still holding two villages they captured 10 days ago
a few miles west of Kontum City. A sizable govern-
ment effort to recapture the villages has made only
limited progress. Fighting has now slackened in the
area and the Communists have made no further moves
toward the provincial capital. Earlier reports had
indicated that the Communists were after a strip of
land to serve as a buffer between government terri-
tory and a major storage complex they have estab-
lisiled in western Kontum Province.
In the northern provinces, most of the fighting
is in Qvang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces. Government
units in these provinces are still trying to extend
them defenses closer to the Communist-he.ld foot-
hills but are encountering heavy artiller.~ and mortar
fire. In the Far north, military actin;ity in Thua
Thien and Quang Tri provinces has fallen off to the
lowest level in several months.
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CAMBODIA
Students, Teaahera. and the
Government
Phnom Penh's stuceents and teachers, who earlier
thin year staged strikes and other forms of protest
against government economic policies and poor living
conditions continue to ??a low politically. They
are still feeling the effects of the government
crackdown on the opposition carried out after the
i7 March bombing attack on Lon Nol's residence and
a violent incident the same day that involved students,
teachers, and some Cambodian Arm3r Troops. Several
student and teacher leaders were arrested, others
went into hiding, and still others are said to have
fled Phnom Penh and to have joined the ~,nsurgents.
The closure of the schools for most of the month of
April and the government's ban on demonstrations or
any other type of "public gathering," under the state
of emergency decree, have further dampened political
activities among students and teachers and contrib-
uted to theix present apathy.
the teachers
are sti a y iv a an emora xz The so-
called "intellectual" faction blames the "govern-
ment" faction for fomenting the 17 Marcy: demonstra-
tion and for the subsequent wave of government re-
pression. Most of their energy since then has been
sp~:nt in attempts to locate missing instructors.
,Altho~:gh there has been some desultory talk of dem-
onstrations for price reductions and academic fre~:-
dom, the teachers ganera],ly favor Frime Minister In
Tam's new government.
For their part, the .students reportedly have
adoptad a "wait and see" attitude toward the govern-
,nent. The main student organizatioi:, the Kl.mer Re-
public Student Association (KRSA~,., has met or:ly
19 Juice 1973
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irrnyular],y ginc? March, and ib boo ryas dovotnd most
of ibs nfforta to locating missing studnnt laadors.
'1'hn at3l30Ciabion hnarti~.y wolcomnd tho dnparturo o~
thn Prnsid^~r'b brother, Lcn Non, and gonnral].y
approvos thn make-up of thn now cabinab. As for the
war, some stud?nts believe the fighting must stop
immediately and nngot~tations must bc~g~ n if Cambodia
is to survivo.
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