DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010061-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: August 2, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Developments in Indochina
Secret
122
2 August 1973
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I I
Developments in Indochina
This publication is prepared by the Far East Division, Office of Current
Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
2 August 1973
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Communist capitals throughout the world
are highlighting direct diplomatic and
trade ties with the PRG.
NORTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Pham Van Dong did not get a cancellation
of war debts or any new aid commitments
from Warsaw.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Phoumi Nosavan's supporters are once again
agitating for his return to Laos. Bangkok's
embargo on rice exports is already being
felt in Vientiane.
ANNEX: The Quest for Peace in Cambodia . . . . . 6
Some members of the government are at
least thinking about possible negotiation
approaches to the Communists, but
Sihanouk and his Khmers are turning a
deaf ear.
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SOUTH VIETNAM 25X1
Stroking the PRG
Communist countries of all colorations have been
making much of their direct ties with the PRG in re-
cent weeks. Ambassadors from many Communist countries
were accredited in early June and subsequently pre-
sented their credentials in Quang Tri Province. Com-
munist countries have also been breaking new ground
in the aid and propaganda fields. China, Mongolia,
and Yugoslavia have announced that they will supply
direct aid to the PRG, and a Mongolian delegation
has just handed over 2,400 tons of goods to Commu-
nist representatives in northern South Vietnam. Up
to now all assistance has gone through North VietnameFe
channels. Moreover, during Le Duan's and Pham Van
Dong's recent visit the Soviets finally came out with
the assertion that the Liberation Front and the PRG
"alone" represent the genuine aspirations of the South
Vietnamese people.
These recent events are to some extent a logical
development of a trend that began even before the
signing of the Paris accords, when Peking gave a gala
welcome to Madame Binh on one of her trips home from
the Paris talks. The Soviets accorded her similar
honors as long ago as March and April. As time passes,
the importance of playing up the PRG as a separate
entity from Hanoi is looming larger. Beating the
drums for the PRG is a safe way to help offset the
unpalatable messages the Communist countries have been
transmitting to their Vietnamese allies on other topics.
It should be noted that all this is being done
with one eye on Wash'_ngton. Aid agreements and showy
receptions are one thing; root-and-branch support for
all the PRG's demands is quite another, and in this
area the allies of the Vietnamese Communists are still
treading carefully. Only the Hungarians have recently
echoed Vietnamese Communist charges of US and South
Vietnamese cease-fire violations, and no country has
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officially endorsed the PRG's political demands. At
an aware ceremony for the PRG ambassador last week,
Soviet President Podgorny merely expressed vague
"solidarity" with the DRV and PRG positions and pointedly
reminded the Vietnamese Communists that the USSR ex-
pects all parties to abide by the cease-fire agreement.
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NORTH VIETNAM
Hanoi and Warsaw
Premier Pham Van Dong's delegation concluded a
six-day visit to Poland on 28 July and departed for
Romania. The chief topic of discussion, judging
from press reports, was the post-war reconstruction
of North Vietnam. The United States was rarely men-
tioned during the visit, and the few public refer-
ences to Poland's participation in the ICCS dealt
with the contribution of the ICCS to peace. Prob-
lems of Poland's role in the ICCS were ignored. The
joint statement issued at the end of the visit was
fairly bland, with much mutual praise but little
hint of the substance of the talks.
Separate "documents" dealing with economic,
scientific, and technical cooperation for 1974 and
following years were signed, but no details were an-
nounced. A Warsaw paper reported that industrial
cooperation would increase, and Radio Hanoi claimed
that the two sides signed "agreements on loans, de-
ferral of payments on loans, and exchange of goods."
The Poles apparently did not follow the lead of Mos-
cow and Budapest in canceling North Vietnam's obli-
gation to repay loans. The language also suggests
that--like the Soviets, but unlike the Hungarians--
the Poles did not conclude a formal aid agreement.
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Persistent Phoumi Nosayan
Supporters of former rightist strong man Phoumi
Nosavan are again agitating for his return to Laos
from exile in Thailand. At least some southern right-
ists would like to see Phoumi return and take up his
former post head of the right wing in a coalition
government.
Some of the current rumors in Vientiane predict-
ing Phoumi's homecoming assert that even members of
the Sananikone family are seriously abetting his re-
turn. The powerful Vientiane-based Sananikone fac-
tion has long bitterly opposed Phoumi, and if they
have voiced some sort of approval, it is probably a
mischievous ploy designed to frighten the Communists
and cause Souvanna difficulties in the negotiations.
Pathet Lao envoys reportedly have already reacted to
the rumors, indicating they would oppose Phoumi's
return to Vientiane.
Phoumi Nosavan's re-entry onto the Lao political
scene could only cause trouble for Souvanna. In the
past, he has responded to pressure on the Phoumi is-
sue by saying Phoumi could return, but only after a
new coalition government is well established. He al-
most certainly will continue this line. Souvanna may
also expect the US to try to prevail upon Phoumi not
to upset the political equilibrium in Vientiane.
The Rice Shortage
Laos, which relies heavily on Thailand for the
bulk of its 75-100,000 tons of annual grain imports,
is encountering shortages this year because of an
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embargo on rice exports imposed after crop short-
falls in Thailand. Despite a letter from Lao Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma to Thai Prime Minister Thanom,
the Thai cabinet has failed to make any emergency
exemption for Laos. Thanom had earlier assured Sou-
vanna that Thailand would supply both commercial and
US requirements in Laos.
High rice prices in Vientiane have caused mem-
bers of the National Assembly to complain about the
government's economic policies. Those hardest hit by
the rice shortage, however, are Lao military units
and the large numbers of refugees in the countryside,
whose only source of glutinous rice is US Government
purchases from Thailand. To cope with the shortage
and stretch existing stocks, the rice ration for these
groups has been cut by about 40 percent, with an in-
crease in dry rations and canned meat. The net effect
of this dietary change is maintenance of the highest
possible protein content but a reduction in caloric
intake. The new rice ration is the minimum level that
can be provided without serious medical problems.
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The Quest for Peace in Cambodia
More than three weeks ago Phnom Penh issued a
new six-point peace initiative that seeks an imme-
diate cease-fire, negotiations with the "other side,"
reactivation of the International Control Commission
(ICC) in Cambodia, and strict implementation of Arti-
cle 20 of the Paris agreement--which calls for the
withdrawal of all foreign forces. Although the Lon
Nol government was not unduly surprised by Sihanouk's
quick and caustic rejection of the initiative, it
probably hoped that the proposed peace plan would
focus favorable international attention on Phnom
Penh's interest in ending the fighting and open-
ing negotiations. Thus far the response from abroad--
with the exception of Washington's endorsement of the
proposal--has not been encouraging.
The government was especially hopeful that the
request for reactivation of the ICC would prompt
some public statements of support or perhaps even
a conference of ICC member nations. Those. countries
connected with the Cambodian ICC, however, have shown
little enthusiasm for the initiative. Unofficially,
the Canadians have indicated a strong distaste for
any further peace-keeping role, and the British have
displayed a reluctance to second the call for the
ICC's reactivation until prospects for a cease-fire
and a political settlement improve. Soviet, Polish,
and Indian officials have been similarly noncommittal.
Some Soviet officials have called reactivation of the
?CC under present conditions "premature." The Soviets,
moreover, have failed to respond to Foreign Minister
Long Boret's request to visit Moscow for discussions
on the initiative. Moscow's foot-dragging has led
Boret to delay similar trips to New Delhi. Warsaw,
London, and Ottawa.
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The only Asian nation that has shown any in-
clination to involve itself in the Cambodian situa-
tion is Indonesia. President Suharto in mid-July
reportedly was planning tc send two envoys to North
Korea--where Sihanouk is now visiting--to explore
the prospects for a compromise solution. Suharto
claimed that an Indonesian representative had pre-
viously tried to persuade Sihanouk that a military
victory for the insurgents was not possible, but
the prince was not convinced. Long Boret is plan-
ning to visit Jakarta in early August f'r discus-
sions on a possible role for Indonesia :;,n arranging
a cease-fire and negotiations.
High-level interest in actually talking with the
other side includes several government leaders in
Phnom Penh. Last week, High Political Council mem-
bers Cheng Heng and In Tam, apparently acting inde-
pendently, reportedly planned to send unofficial em-
issaries abroad--most likely to Paris--in an attempt
to establish contact with members of Sihanouk's gov-
ernment-in-exile. Both emissaries are lesser known
government officials who have past associations with
members of Sihanouk's entourage in Peking. One of
the emissaries admits that his chances of opening
up a dialogue are poor.
Another prominent Cambodian, former prime minis-
ter Son Sann, is also continuing his indepe:ident search
for peace. Sann, who has spent most of the past three
years in Paris, is not., on one of his infrequent visits
to Phnom Penh. Before leaving the French capital, he
told a US Embassy officer that he sees two major prob-
lems in negotiating with the Communists. The first
is Sihanouk's claim that his "government" ".lone is
legitimate. The second is the variety of groups now
included on the other side. He said that the na-
tionalists within the insurgency must be encouraged
to break away from the Hanoi-dominated elements. Ac-
cording to Sann, the latter are opposed to negotia-
tions because a protracted conflict enables them to
expand their political control over the countryside.
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Son Sann's scenario for a peaceful settlement
includes the removal of Lon Nol from Cambodia as the
first step. Sann claims that Lon Nol is opposed to
negotiations. Sirik Matak also would have to leave,
either at the same time or as soon as he sees that
his presence prevents a settlement. Cheng Heng and
In Tam would rule without a formal government, gov-
erning directly through technicians, most of whom
would be drawn from the Democratic Party because it
is more receptive to a policy of a negotiated set-
tlement and has many friends on the Communist, side.
Son Sann himself would attempt to form a popular
political movement which would give him the creden-
tials to deal with Sihanouk's "prime minister,"
Penn Nouth.
Sann floated some of these ideas during a trip to
Phnom Penh a few months ago. Although Lon Nol showed
little interest, Sann claimed that Cheng Heng and In
Tam support his program. Sann thinks that the situa-
tion is becoming so "desperate" that the people are
now ready for his scheme.
Deaf Fars on the Other Side
. Even if Son Sann's scenario should attract more
interest in Phnom Penh, it almost certainly will have
little or no appeal at this juncture to Sihanouk and
the Khmer Communists, who appear bent on maintaining
their hard line on a cease-fire and negotiations.
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