DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010062-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: August 9, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Developments in Indochina
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9 August 1973
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Developments in Indochina
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CONTENTS
9 August 1973
CAMBODIA. 1
Friction between the Khmer Communists
and Vietnamese Communist forces in the
border provinces of Kampot and Takeo
has become more pronounced in recent
months. There are some reports of
armed clashes in mid--July.
SOUTH VIETNAM 4
The Communists are putting special em-
phasis on establishing commercial rela-
tions in areas controlled by Saigon.
Their objective is not only to purchase
needed non-military, supplies, but also
to make contact with the people and wi'.:h
local GVN officials.
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CAMBODIA
Bad Blood in The South
...the peoplea of Cambodia
and Vietnam [are as] two
brothers, neighbors, com-
rades-in-arms who have al-
ways fought side by side
and are ready to give mutual
support and assistance.
Pham Van Dong, Hanoi,
April 1973
Nothing and nobody can
separate us [Cambodia
and North Vietnam] from
one another. We have
always intimately shared
weal and woe. We have a
common goal...
Sihanouk, Hanoi,
April 1973
Effusive expressions of Vietnamese-Cambodian
solidarity such as these may have some propaganda
value to Sihanouk and his Vietnamese allies, but
they do not sell well in some sections of Cambodia.
Frictions between Khmer and Vietnamese Communist
forces, which have at times led to open hostilities,
are particularly conspicuous in areas bordering South
Vietnam. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in
those areas have complicated their relations with
the local Khmer Communists bit imposing taxes and by
restricting trade and travel of Cambodian villagers.
Although both sides try to minimize their differences,
recently relations are apparently getting worse in-
stead of better.
The problem is particularly evident in Kampot
and Takeo. A main irritant in these two provinces
has been the gradual--and sometimes forceful--dis-
placement of Cambodian villagers along the border by
the Vietnamese Communists. The loss of fertile rice-
lands, coupled with extensive i.-ice purchasing and
requisitioning by Vietnamese in Cambodian villages,
has resulted in a rice shortage in both provinces.
in an attempt to husband remaining rice stocks, Khmer
Communist officials have tried unsuccessfully to
curtail the flow of rice across the border into South
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Vietnam. Frustrations built up even further when in-
surgent forces in Kampot and Takeo had difficulty in
drawing ammunition and arms from Vietnamese stocks
stored near the border and were unable to extend
their nascent administrative system into Vietnamese-
occupied zones.
This past June, resentful Khmer Communists seized
Vietnamese supplies on several occasions and harassed
some Vietnamese Communist forces in Kampot and Takeo.
In mid-July, when Vietnamese units moved into two
districts in Kampot to quell the worst disturbances,
local Khmer villagers and insurgent troops resisted,
and in the ensuing fighting an estimated 50 to 200
Cambodians were killed or wounded. There have been
reports of subsequent armed clashes in this area.
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Khmer and Vietnamese Communist leaders will al-
most certainly try hard to restore orderly--if not
cordial--relations in Kampot. The incidents in that
province emphasize the fragility of the war-time
alliance between the Khmer and Vietnamese Communist
rank and file, and probably portend greater postwar
problems for the leaders of both sides.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Communists Stress Economic
Subversion
The Communists are working hard to develop bind-
ing commercial deals with local government authorities
and businessmen as part of their "political struggle"
strategy. The Viet Cong provincial party committee
in a border province north of Saigon reportedly told
subordinate district committees in early July that
such economic ties are still important because they
support Communist supply efforts, permit the develop-
ment of "liberated areas," and undercut Saigon's eco-
nomic and political controls at the grass-roots level.
While illicit trafficking with the Viet Cong has al-
ways been a problem for the government, the Communists
seem to be conducting a much more consistent and care-
fully planned campaign since the cease-fire. South
Vietnamese authorities in the same province reported
that more than half of the traders and merchants arrested
in July for trading with the Communists were Viet Cong
operatives.
Since the cease-fire in January, much of the Com-
munist commercial effort has been directed toward
setting up purchase and transportation agencies to
procure much-needed non-military supplies. In some
urban areas, such as Da Nang, the Communists reportedly
now have full-service organizations that take care of
procurement, storage, and transportation of goods.
In some provinces, including Long Khanh and Quang Ngai,
Viet Cong purchasing agencies operate "stations" that
buy from government-controlled markets. Although the
Communists nave found it necessary to establish their
own markets in some areas, they reportedly have been
able, for the most part, to utilize facilities already
existing in government-held areas. The Communists
prefer to do business with established firms because
it gives them access to both the people and local GVN
officials in Saigon-controlled areas.
9 August 1973
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In Quang Ngai Province the Communists have bribed
government officials and soldiers at remote outposts
to transport Communist supplies aboard military ve-
hicles. Similar success has been reported in Da Nang,
where the Viet Cong reportedly have used official gov-
ernment vehicles to move some of their goods. The
decline in military activity has left government motor
pools with idli equipment and under-employed drivers,
a situation the Viet Cong are working hard to exploit.
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How successful the Communists have been is not
clear, but government authorities in several areas
have become increasingly concerned in recent weeks.
In the northern coastal provinces, where the Viet
Cong appear to be the best organized, the inadequacy
of government attempts in May and June to stop the il-
:Iicit trade has prompted senior military and police
;'ficials to pool their intelligence and security re-
sources. On 31 July, the Military Region 1 commander
General Truong ordered the arrest of nearly 180 mili-
tary and civilian officials--ranging from a village
policeman to four Lower House deputies---in Quang Ngai
Province. By 2 August all but the four deputies had
been taken into custody. The involvement of local
political and law-enforcement officials in trade. as
well as the large profits to be made by both officials
and local traders, constrains the government from
moving effectively against the new Viet Cong drive.
Recent Communist assessments of their progress
also attest to the problems the government faces in
trying to stop this activity. According to a review
of the situation in a province north of Saigon by a
Viet Cong provincial party committee, government police
have been able to discourage a few small traders, but
have not hindered most Communist economic undertakings.
According to the review, Communist trade and money are
welcomed by government officials and businessmen in
the urban areas, as well as by troops and policemen
stationed along the supply routes. The review claims
that the replacement of government officials suspected
of dealing with the Communists has had little effect,
Senior government officials in the Saigon area have,,
in fact, admitted that payoffs, family relationships,
and high-level protectors in Saigon are severely un-
dermining the government's effort to cut off trade with
the Vi At Cnna_
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