DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010072-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 72
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Developments in Indochina
State Dept. review
completed
IT et
17 October 1973
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i
Developments in Indochina
CONTENTS
18 October 1973
CAMBODIA . . .
(Prime Min-
ister In Tam has decided to stay on and Lon
Nol is considering a complete cabinet re-
organization.
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Communists may be seizing on recent
government air strikes against their in-
stallations north of Saigon to justify
planned attacks in the area. Meanwhile,
the rice situation seems to have improved
considerably as the pace of deliveries
from the delta has increased. In Paris,
bilateral talks between Saigon and the Viet
Cong are suspended, but neither side appears
likely to force a complete break.
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NORTH VXETNAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S
A recently published article reaffirms
that the North Vietnamese continue to
be concerned with the role of the over-
seas Chinese minority in the country.
The generals are still unhappy over
Souvanna's personal handling of the
implementation of the protocol. It
will be difficult for him to keep on
ignoring them if he is to maintain an
even political keel in Vientiane.
INTERNATIONAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Chinese continue to treat Vietnam
developments with great restraint.
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Koh
Kong
"Dunn Dao
Nam Du
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In Tam Still In
Prime Minister In Tam has returned to the polit-
ical fold--at least for the moment. The erratic In
Tam, who submitted his resignation to Lon Nol on 6
October, announced on 14 October that he had decided
"in principle" to stay in office and also to remain
on the ruling High Political Council. He claimed
that he had changed his mind in order to help main-
tain political stability and unity while Phnom Penh's
credentials are under attack at the United Nations.
The three other council members had generally
agreed that In Tam could give up the prime minister-
ship, but they were opposed to his quitting the
council. Lon Nol had difficulty finding a new prime
minister, however, and thus apparently decided that
In Tam should carry on in that position as well.
In any case, the return to the status quo clearly
is a stopgap. In Tam told the press on 15 October
that he would remain in office until the recognition
situation at the United Nations has been resolved.
After that, he said, he would again consider whether
he should resign.
Lon Nol, meanwhile,,is considering a complete
cabinet reorganization.
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the President wants to group
ministries in unc onal "clusters." Ministers
primarily responsible for specific economic ac-
tivities, for example, would be directly responsible
to a person in overall charge of the economy. The
President is also thinking of changing the political
makeup of the cabinet by giving more portfolios to
members of Sirik Matak's Republican Party and to
independents, while reducing the number held
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Communists May Be Planning
Retaliatory Strikes
The Communists may be seizing on recent govern-
ment air strikes against their installations north
of Saigon to justify planned attacks in the area'.
Vietnamese Communist propagandists also appear
to be building a case for stepping up the level of
fighting. They have intensified their charges that
Saigon, with US complicity, is committing increasingly
flagrant violations of the cease-fire. On 14 October,
a Phan Dan editorial charged that Saigon had taken
"new, escalated step" in indiscriminately bombing
PRG-controlled, areas. The editorial claimed that the
situation has become increasingly tense since early
October and warned that the more "crimes" Saigon
commits, the "stronger the counterblows will be." It
implied that US support of Saigon's actions "might
lead to the danger of a fierce war."
South Vietnamese commanders in the region around
Saigon are braced for major Communist military action
centered in Tay Ninh Province sometime in late October
or early November These
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officials have been told that the Comunists have been
issued at least ten days' supply of rice and ammuni-
tion. They believe that the Communists may use as
many as three divisions with armor and artillery sup-
port, and that the fighting may spill over into areas
close to Bien Hoa city or Saigon itself. The com-
manders are putting South Vietnamese forces on alert
and may move another overnment division to the area
of Tay Ninh city.
Rice Situation
Recent unusually. high rice.:shipments to.
Saigon from the delta have considerably eased fears
of a severe crisis later this year and concern over
the timing of additional arrivals of US PL-480 rice.
It now app-tars that during September about 65,000
tons of rice moved out of the delta into government
rrtocks, nearly double ,the normal average for that
month. The increased shipments apparently resulted
from continued heavy government pressure on delta
merchants to reduce inventories and suppress specula-
tion. Some 25,000 tons of PL-480 rice--currently
being tendered in the US--are still expected to ar-
rive sometime in December, but the higher delta ship-
ments have reduced the urgency of their arrival.
EarlierLmbassy estimates had indicated that govern-
ment rice stocks would be critically low by the end
of November.
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if delivery rates from the delta during the
October-December period are maintained at normal
levels, government stocks will probably be suf-
ficient to avert any rice crisis for the rest of the
year. The rice situation for the country as a whole
will nonetheless remain tight. Retail rice prices
are liltely to move further upward, despite a govern-
ment ceiling on wholesale prices, aid the black
market for .rice will continue to coexist with government
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sales as a result of persistent local supply problems
in traditional rice--def.cit areas. If the government
increases its already strong controls over distribu-
tion and price levels, as now appears ikely, some
farmers may cut production next year.
Saigon - Viet Cong Talks
The bilateral talks in Paris between the Saigon
government and the Viet Cong currently are suspended,
but ieither side seems likely to force a complete
break. Both have been trying to exploit the talks
in an effort to maneuver for propaganda advantage,
and neither has shown any disposition to compromise
its position and move toward a final settlement of
the war.
Despite a lack of progress, the two sides had
been holding regular weekly meetings until 4 October.
On that date, the Viet Cong delegation walked out to
protest alleged US and South Vietnamese violations of
the cease-fire agreement. The Viet Cong had wanted
to hold a regular meeting the following week, but the
Saigon delegation rejected this and has proposed that
the next session take place on 25 October. As yet there
has been no Communist response
The Thieu government reportedly believes that the
regular sessions will resume soon but will remain
unproductive. Saigon also anticipates that the Viet
Cong may stage more such walkouts in the future. Any
end to the impasse in the talks, Saigon feels, would
have to come as a result of secret talks. Thus far
the Viet Cong have rejected all of Saigon's overtures
for secret talks.
18 October 1973
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NORTH VIETNAM
Bringing The Locai
C ineo'e Into Line
Hanoi apparently remains unhappy with the
Overseas Chinese minority in North Vietnam. A re-
cently available article, published last July in a
Chinese-language newspaper in Hanoi, reminded the
Chinese that "their right to survival and happy
living is closely linked to the integrity of Viet-
nam society and Vietnam territory." Calling on
them to "join their Vietnamese brethren to build
a happy community in which they live together,"
the paper advised the Chinese "to heighten their
class and socialist consciousness." The article
placed particular emphasis on the need for further
"education reform" in the Chinese schools.
The Overseas Chinese in North Vietnam, as in
other Asian countries, have been clannish and slow
to identify themselves with their country of residence.
The North Vietnamese, for their part, are giving
vent to a centuries-old xenophobia. In addition,
of course, Hanoi would like to have all elements
of the population marching to the same tune during
the reconstruction period.
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More rompZu2ita From the Ria ht
During the final stages of negotiations this
past summer, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma went
to considerable lengths to overcore rightist wJ.s-
givings about the settlement that he was working
out with the Communists. He could have asked his
foreign backers to help keep his rightist critics
in line, but he instead went back repeatedly to
the Communists to seek concessions on points the
rightists found objectionable. Souvanna handled
the rightists gingerly because he knew he would
need their good will, not only to get a protocol
signed but also to get through the delicate early
phase of the implementation period.
Nevertheless, Souvanna at the moment is in
some danger of losing the good will he accrued with
the right. On 10 October, for instance, Lao Army
Deputy Commander in Chief General Kouprasith ex-
pressed displeasure over Souvanna's failure to press
the Communists to convene the Joint Committee to
Implement the Agreement (JCIA). Kouprasith also
complained about Souvanna's personally handling a
number of matters--such as the arrangements for
billeting and transporting Communist personnel--
which fall within the JCIA's purview.
When the first contingent of Lao Communist
troops arrived in Vientiane on 12 October and the
JCIA had still not met to define their responsibil-
ities on the joint security force, army leaders
moved to delay any further arrivals. The generals
succeeded in halting the airlift from Hanoi for two
days, but Souvanna reportedly interceded, and the
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Communist troop lift resumed on 16 October. By the
end of this week, 525 Communist military and c.ivl,l-
ian personnel are scheduled to be in Vientiane and,
unless the JCIA has met, the generals' agitation
seems sure to increase.
Souvanna probably has his reasons for circum-
venting at this early stage the formal machinery
established by the peace settlement. He may, for
instance, believe it essential to generate some
early momentum toward implementing the protocol and
thus is taking personal charge of things. Souvanna
r:annot, however, keep igrnring the sensitivities of
the rightists if he is to maintain an even political
keel in Vientiane.
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INTERNATIONAL 25X1
W
China Stiii Cautious
The Chinese continue to treat Vietnam develop-
ments with great restraint even as Vietnamese Com-
munist statements increasingly adopt a menacing tone
and may be building a case for stepped-up fighting
in South Vietnam.
Peking has issued no comment of its own in sup-
port of official Vietnamese communist sta?:smeuts
and, as in the past, has deleted harsh criticism
and threatening language prior to carrying accounts
in the Chinese press. In a major policy address at
the UN early this month, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao
Kuan-hua stressed that the Vietnam war hed ended and
said nothing of cease-fire violations, even though
Hanoi had just issued a protest note to participants
of the International Conference on Vietnam.
The Chinese have passed up other opportunities
to register strong support for the Vietnamese Com-
munists. Although Puking and Hanoi wrapped up the
details of their 1974 military assistance pact in
a protocol on 5 October, Peking did not announce
additional military aid as it has in past years. The
1974 agreement, hammered out last June, presumably con-
tains far less military aid than Peking had granted
during the war. -Furthermore, the PRG delegation, that.
attended the recent nonaligned conference in Algeria
bypassed Peking--ordinarily a stop for high-level
groups--during its return flight to Vietnam, suggesting
the Chinese did not want an occasion to speak out on
Vietnam.
if Hanoi recently has been seeking support from
its patrons for accelerated military action in South
been publicly forthcoming.
Vietnam, even if retaliatory,, Peking so far has not
i8 October 1973
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