THE SOUTH ASIAN MILITARY HANDBOOK

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CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2
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February 18, 1999
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August 1, 1974
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Approved For Release 1999/09/25~G1~~~P$5T008~~ R00 00030001-2 The South Asian Military Handbook 9te~re~- August 197 No Foreign I~issem i~? 314 Approved For Release 1999/09/25. ; CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Nu Uissrrrr ~t brood/i3uckgruurui Usr Only Cnnu?ulic~c! Ui.t?a?crrr 25X1A9a This publication was prepared jointly by the Central Intel- ligence Agency, ~)efense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. It is anticipated that the Handbook will be updated, when necessary, by issuing only relevant sections rather than re-issuing the entire publication. For this reason, the Handbook has been punched for insertion in a three-ring binder. Comments or queries regarding the contents of this publication are welcome. ~?hey may be directed to~Chief/South Asia Branch, OCI/c~lA, Code 143, Extension 60G2. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized nisclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 014522 Exrmpt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: ?SB(il, (2), and (3) Automatically declassified on: date impossible fo determine ,~ Approved For Release 1999/09/25 .CIA-RDP85T00875R001' 00030001-2 ~'.~ Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRE"T August 1974 No. 0992/74 I. BACKGROUND 19~i7-1974 A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary B. Pushtunistan 1 3 C. South Asia ar~d the Great Powers . 4 D. Threats to Internal Stability 8 II. RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES A. India 1 B. Pakistan . 6 C. Bangladesh 11 D. Afghanistan 13 E. Nepal 15 F. Sri Lanka 16 Tables: 1. Selected Armaments and Forces 20 2. Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border 24 3. India-Pakistan War Losses 25 4. Military Advisers in Foreign Countries 26 Maps: 1. India -Internal Administration 2. India -Army Order of Battle 3. India -Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle 4. India -Naval Order of Battle 5. Ground Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border 6. Jammu/Kashmir Area 7. Pakistan -Internal Administration 8. Pakistan -Army Order of Battle 9. Pakistan -Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle 10. Pakistan -Naval Urder of Battle 11. Ground Forces on Afghan-Pakistani Border 12. Bangladesh -Internal Administration 13. Bangladesh -Order of Battle 14. Afghanistan -Internal Administration 15. Afghanistan -Order of Battle 16. Nepal -Internal Administration 17. Nepal -Order of Battle 18. Sri Lanka -Internal Administration 19. Sri Lanka -Order of Battle SECRET ~ .. Approved Fo.r Release 199/09/25 ~CIA-I~-DP85~~da875R00~1^10~030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET III. MILITARY EXPENDITURES 1 A. India . 2 B. Pakistan 3 C. Bangladesh 3 D. Afghanistan 3 E. Nepal 3 F. Sri Lanka i Tables: es 1. Military Expenditures, South Asian Countr ~ 2. India: Gross Defense Expenditures 3. India: Distribution of Defense Expenditures 5 4. India: Percentage Distribution of Defense Expenditures 5. India: Functional Distribution of 6 Defense Expenditures 6. India: Percentage Distribution of 6 Defense Expenditures 7 7. Pakistan: Military Expenditures 8 8. Bangladesh: Military Expenditures 8 9. Afghanistan: Military Expenditures 9 10. Nepal: Military Expenditures 9 11. Sri Lanka: Military Expenditures 9 IV. DOMESTIC MILITARY PRODUCTION 1 A. India G 6. Pakistan 7 C. Bangladesh 7 D. Afghanistan 7 E. Nepal . 7 ~=. Sri Lanka 8 Tables: 1. India: Defense Production : 9 2. India: Aircraft Production V. FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY 1 A. India 5 B. Pakistan 8 C. Bangladesh . 9 D. Afghanistan ~ ~ 10 E. Nepal 11 F. Sri Lanka 12 ~i ablest 1. India: Foreign Military Imports 2. India: Soviet Military Supply Agreements 13 ii SECRET ;~ Approved For Release 1999/,09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R0011 d0030001-2 ~ ~ `ti ~ 4.~..e:~':u ~'-4' e.Ci ~3*~ ti.nn.~~.~~ k ~r ~ J.A~'iy n ~.; ilia .~. rti:~w, ?1 /.~ F ~d': !iw "'4~iry5piii~~ASatiaw~e+ta~ew~.wrre~ea~7R{ ~t.:6Sf~.~s~~'Y2. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET 3. Pakistan: Foreign Military Imports 14 4. Pakistan: Military Supply Agreements with China 14 5. Pakistan: Military Supply Agreements with France 15 6. Bangladesh: Foreign Military Imports 15 7. Afghanistan: Foreign Military Imports 16 8. Afghanistan: Soviet Military Supply Agreements 16 9. Nepal: Foreign Military Imports 17 10. Sri Lanka: Foreign Military Imports . 17 ANNEXES A. South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capability A-1 B. Biographic Sketches of Military Leaders B_1 C. Chronology of Major Events in South Asia 1940-1974 C-1 GLOSSARY Performance Characteristics of Selected South Asian Military Equipment G-1 SECRET t~ .. ,. _ ~r ,~ Approved For Release 1999/09/25..: CIA-RDP85T00875R001~'1 b0030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET I. BACKGROUND 1947-1974 A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary Partition and Kashmir In August 1947, following years of agitation by the predominantly Hindu Congress Party, Great Britain gave up its Indian Empire. At the same time, as a result of Muslim agitation, Britain partitioned India, creating Pakistan from the two largest predominantly Muslim areas. The two wings of Pakistan had little in common other than religion and were separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Even before partition became official, millions of Hindus had moved from Pakistan to India, and millions of Muslims had migrated in the opposite direction. Violence on both sides encouraged the exodus. Nevertheless, some 10 percent of India's population remained Muslim, and several million Hindus stayed in Pakistar~- almost all in East Pakistan. Large parts of the British Indian Empire h.~d been ruled by theoretically sovereign native princes. The British left to them the decision as to whether their states would join Pakistan or India, or remain independent. In instances where the religion of the prince and his subjects was the same, accession did not become a problem in Indo-Pakistani relations. A few Muslim princes ruled predominantly Hindu populations in states not contiguous ~ic~ Pakistan. Although several of these princes either acceded to Pakistan or decided to remain independent, all of their states were eventually incorporated into India. In Jammu and Kashmir, a Hindu Maharajah ruled a population that was mostly Muslim. When he delayed making a decision, some of his Muslim subjects rebelled, receiving assistance from some Pakistani tribesmen. At this point-on October 27-the Maharajah opted for India in return for Indian military assistance. Indian troops arrived in the state the same day. The Indians and the Pakistanis fought in Kashmir for over a year, and in the end India held most of the state, including the strategically important Vale. Pakistan annexed part of northern Kashmir and gained control of a small part of western Kashmir, the theoretically independent state of Azad Kashmir. The UN Security Council called for a plebiscite to determine the future status of Kashmir, but the plebiscite was never held. Acease-fire line was delineated in the summer of 1949, under UN auspices, and served as the de facto boundary until 1971. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 ., x .. ~;..~.: x.. ...r,.,;.M,:! C}. ~'"m:~A y'~ RrC'`, r~u"~v~u5 Lp w'.i il, ,k '. ..ii:'.. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 In Pakistan's general elections in December 1970, tine Awami League, which advocated provincial autonomy, Enron enough seats in East Pakistan to ensure an absolute majority in the projec`ed Pakistan National Assembly. The assembly was to write a new constitu'i~n, and the leaders of the league refused to compromise on principles many West Pakistanis felt would eventually dissolve the union. In early March 1971, the Awami League iii effect took over the administration of the province, and on March 25, the army moved to restore central authority. The Bengalees then proclaimed their independence. For over 15 years, despite continuing hostility, open fighting between India and Pakistan was limited to border incidents. In the spring of 1965, however, serious clashes broke out in a desolate area along the shore of the Arabian Sea known as the Rann of Klatch, where India and Pakistan had conflicting claims. loth sides eventually agreed to arbitration, and in 1968 a decisior, was announced that vvas generally regarded as favorable to Pakistan. In August 1965, Pakistan began sending "freedom fighters" into Indian- held Kashmir, India moved quickly to seal off the ~ccess routes, making incursions into Azad Kashmir in the process. In any case, no enthusiasm for rebellion developed among the Kashmiris. On September 1, Pakistan launched an attack against extreme southern Kashmir in hopes of cutting India's communications with its forces farther north iri the state. Five days later, India began afull-scale attack in the Lahore area of West Pakistan. The Pakistanis field the Indians outside of Lahore, and with little or r~o resistance captured extensive desert area in Rajasthan, but were unable to advance farther into Kashmir. By mutual agreement there was virtually Rio fighting along the border between India and East Pakistan. After three weeks of fighting in the West, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored cease-fire. The Pakistanis were running critically short of military supplies, while the Indians believed that their gains would not be worth the considerable cost of protracting the war. Under Soviet sponsorship, the two countries reached an agreement in January 1966 at Tu;'~kent that restored the border to that existing before the war. Bangladesh and Kashmir The Indian Government felt threatened by events in East Pakistan. Abc;ut 10 million Bengalees eventually f.^d to India, creating major eco- nomic proble~,ns and potentir~!ly serious political and social ones. sECRE~r SEC.'~ET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :-CIA-RDP85T00875R0011~00030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 s~,cRr~r Inside East Pakistan, extreme leftists became stronger, although they never became more than along-term potential threat to the moderates in the freedom movement. India supported the Bengali guerrillas, hoping to force Islamabad to grant the Bengalees' political demands. By fall, the Indians were clearly willing to risk war, and by late November regular Indian forces, in brigade strength, were conducting raids into East Pakistan. On December 3, Pakistan launched air strikes at air bases in western India, and full-scale war on two fronts began. In the East, on December 4, India invaded East Pakistan. Pakistani forces surrendered after two weeks of fighting, and Bangladesh became independent. In the West, the main Pakistani attack into Kashmir stalled, but both sides seized some territory along the cease-fire line. In the strategic Lahore sector, thrre was relatively little fighting, but in the Sind, the Indians seized over 5,000 square miles of territory. The Indians proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire along the western border effective as of December 17, and the Pakistanis concurreu. In July 1972, at Simla, the two sides agreed to withdraw their troops from occupied territory, except in Kashmir, where a new "line of control" was established. The agreement was implemented in December. In August 1973, India and Pakistan, with the concurrence of Bangla- desh, agreed to a three-way repatriaticr~ of Pakistani prisoners of war from India, Bengalees from Pakistan to Bangladesh, and Pakistanis and some non-Bengalee Muslims from Bangladesh to Pakistan. By February 1974, Pakistan was willing to extend official recognition to Bangladesh and, at a tripartite meeting in New Delhi in April, Bangladesh gave up all plans for holding war crimes trials for some of thr Pakistani prisoners of war. The repatriation of the POWs was completed b'; May 1. A new factor in Indo-Pakistani relations emerged with the explosion of a nuclear device by India on May 18, 1974, New Delhi's public assurances that the test was only for peaceful purposes did little to calm the strongly negative reaction in Pakistan. Moves toward normalization of relations between the two governments were expected to be more difficult in the aftermath of the nuclear explosion because the government of Pakistan could not afford to appear to be negotiating new agreements with India under the threat of nuclear blackmail. Pushtunistan is an Afghan term that generally refers to the two eastern provinces of Pakistan: Baluchistan, grid the North West Frontier. Sparsely SECRET .. ._ . "Approvec~~~For Release 1999/09125 : ~C~A-F~DP8~T~0875R00110003000'1-2 ~rti.~~:rii.~+?w..t4nlr_:tLft~+.v'..,.,i m~'!~~ ~.,d:.'Ftir.S. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 s~,cRET populated by tribesmen speaking Pushtu, Baluchi, or Brahui, the two provinces comprise more than half of the land area of Pakistan and have an extended Arabian Sea coastline. The Pushtu-speaking tribesmen were separated from their fellow tribes in Afghanistan in 1893 when aBritish-Afghan agreement esta~alished the Durand Line as the international boundary between British India and Afghanistan. This boundary was confirmed in a treaty between the two countries in 1919. When Pakistan became independent in 1947, Afghanistan stated that it considered the 1893 treaty invalid because it had been signed under duress, and further asserted that it did not recognize the line as tl~e border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Continuing at varying levels over the years, the dispute reached its peak in 19G0 and 1961 with oorder clashes, restrictions on the seasonal migration of Afghan nomads into Pakistan, and Afghani- stan's refusal to use its only railway link to the Indian Ocean at Karachi. Relations improved after the resignation of prime minister Mohammad Daoud in 1963. In July 1Q73, when a military coup returned Daoud to the presidency, he immediately reactivated the dispute and has since pursued it by diplo- macy and propaganda. In response, Pakistan instituted an aggressive policy th?t inclurJed an increased military and official civilian presence in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, and a firm iefusal to discuss its policies and programs in the two provinces. Afghanistan has never publicly gone further than demands for self- determination for the people of Pushtunistan, but most Pakistanis are convinced that incorporation is the Afghan goal. The Soviet Union has backed the Afghan position since 1955, while the US recognizes the Durand Line as an international boundary. C. South Asia and the Great Powers Relations between the Great Powers have important repercussions in South Asia. In the 1950s US?Soviet tensions played an important part in determining not only the relations of South Asian nations with the Great Powers, but relations among the South Asian nations themselves. The emer- gence of China in the 1960s and the detente in Sino-US and US-Soviet relations in the 1970s have also had a significant impact. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 sECxE~r Washington's policy of containment during t~~e 1950s put the US at odds with India and led to a military alliance with Pakistan: -India's policies, such as its ambiguous stand during the Korean conflict and its abstention on the UN vote to condemn the Soviet intervention in Hunr ary, led to serious strains between Washington and New Delhi; -US efforts to contain the USSr~ resulted in the inclusion of Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO, a,~d in bilateral defense agree- ments with the US in 19 ~4 and 195~~. Moscow, after Stalin's deat~~ in 1953, placed a high priority on develop- ing close relations with India as a large new nation advocating socialism. In South Asia, while India bought arms from Western Europe, prin- cipally Britain, a major US military supply program, including grant aid, enabled Pakistan to challenge Indian dominance. Nehru claimed the military assistance agreement prevented further progress on resolving the Kashmir dispute. China, not yet a Great Power, chose the Third World as its forum for international expression and also developed close ties with India. At the same time, India emphasized its own nonalignment and acted as a leader of the Third World. Beginning in the late 1950s, tha growing power of China began to change relationships in the sub-continent: SErR ET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 -China and India began to see each other as rival;; for leadership in Asia and in the Third World; -Sinn-Soviet rivalry encauragr ~ close Indo-Soviet relations; -Pakistan began to see China as a potential ally against India and as early as 1961, entered into negotiations with Peking for a border agreement, which was finally signed in 19~?; -The US, desiring both to offset growing Soviet influence in New Delhi and to contain China, took some tentative steps toward improving relations with New Delhi. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET The war in the Himalayas in late 1962 brought most of these trends tc a Dead. The US and UK rushed arms to India to demonstrate their support for New Delhi. Pakistani faith in the US as a protector against India was badly shaken by these actions. The war also pointed up the mutual hostility of Pakistan and China toward India. The USSR, forced to choose between a Communist and anon-Communist country, opted for India. Soviet arms shipments began arriving the following year. The US continued to be the major arms supplier to Pakistan, but, when the US imposed an embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, it was replaced by China. Decreasing strains in US-Soviet relations during the 1960s were both reflected and encouraged by the parallel policies of the two countries in South Asia: -Both sought to contain China; -Both worked for stability in the sub-continent; -In late 1965, US efforts with India and Pakistan undoubtedly ::ontributed to the receptivity of each country to the eventual Soviet mediation at Tashkent; -Both sought to increase their influence in India and Pakistan. Following the 1965 war, the USSR improved its relations with Pakistan slightly, at minor cost to its relations with India. In the early 1970s, there has been some swing back toward the relations existing in the 195Us The Sino-US detente obviated Washington's interest ire India as a vehicle for containing China. The detente also eliminated a major complication in Pakistan ~ foreign policy, allowing Islamabad to maintain relations with one of its Great Power allies without offending the other. US and Chinese policy toward the sub^ontinent began to coincide. For example, the policies of the two countries d;.~ring the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war were roughly parallel. Finally, the detente and the continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry, together with Indo-Pakistani hostility, resulted in closer relations between New Delhi and Moscow-symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Sovi;;t Friendship Treaty. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 s:>~cRE~r The independence of Bangladesh injected a new factor into the South Asian equation. Dacca's relations with the Great Powers tended to parallel India's. Bangladesh, however, stood in much greater need of economic aid from the US. Its relations with the USSR were limited to some extent by Soviet reluctance to undercut New Delhi's influence in Dacca. China origi- nally refused to have any dealings with the new nation but was expected to extend recognition itself following Pakistani's recognition of Bangladesh in early 1974 and abandonment by Dacca of all plans to place Pakistani POWs on trial for war crimes. The beginnings of further shifts in the Great Power -South Asian relationship are already visible. By May 1974, there were hints that China and India had begun moving toward rapprochement. Indo-US relations, badly h~.irt during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, were improving. The'JSSR wa:~ once again seeking better relations with Pakistan, and Pakistan, for its part, seemed to want a more amiable relationship with Moscow. The effect on Indian and Pakistani relations with the Great Powers of New Delhi's decision to detonate a nuclear device on May 18, 1974 was not yet clear as this edition of the handbook went to press. Regional Relations Relations between India and Pakistan have influenced and been in- fluenced by the policiF,s of the smaller nations of the area. Iran has usually supported Pakistan, providing limited quantities of military supplies and sanctuary for Pakistani civil aircraft during Pakistan's wars with India and using its diplomatic influence on Islamabad's behalf. The Iranian interest is in maintaining a stable and independent nation on its eastern border and in limiting Soviet, Chinese, and Indian influence both in South Asia and farther west. Iran has never, however, pressed its support of Pakistan to the point of actual involvement in combat operations. Sri Lanka and Nepal have pursued a policy of preserving their inde- pendence and freedom of action by playing not only India against Pakista~~, but the Great Powers against each other. India seeks, at a minimum, to have no other power dominant in these t:~~o countries, and-especially in Nepal- has made special efforts to increase Indian influence. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECIZE'T D. Threats to Internal Stability Afghanistan Traditionally, the main threat to any Afghan regime has come from the Pushtu-speaking tribes that have resisted the efforts of the central govern- ment to impose its authority on them. At present, the tribes are quiescent. Immediately after the Daoud coup of July 1973, communist sympathizers reportedly assumed positions of influence in the government and military. In mid-1974, however, President Daoud was said to be slowly removing these indiviauals from their posts. Bangladesh Almost from its establishment, the Bangladesh government has been plagued by general lawlessness throughout the country, including robbery, political assassinations, and localized armed resistance to authority. Dacca is hopeful that a campaign begun in Spring 1974 by its security forces, spearheaded by the army, will reduce these threats to its internal stability. There are several small radical groups identifying themselves as communists. These groups hold no political positions and pose little threat to the government. The communists do, however, exert some influence over radical students and labor groups. Widespread poverty and over-population together with language, ethnic, and regional differences and political instability on the state level all con- tribute to internal instability in India. In 1974, food riots erupted in the states of Gujarat and Bihar, and the army was called upon to assist state security forces to restore order. In the past, Naga and Mizo tribal elements in eastern India have rebelled against the central government in their attempts to gain independence. For the present, the two tribes are quiet, but their basic discontent remains. Although they do not pose a direct threat to stability, communists exert an important influence on the political life of India. The communist movement is presently split into two major parties and a number of small splinter groups. AI':hough total membership is only 165,000, the various parties have attracted 14 million voters, enabling them to win 49 of the 545 seats in the lower house of parliament as well as a number of state offices. SECRET ~ Approved For Release 19,99/09L25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R00'~100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 s~c~z~~r Nepal What threat there is to Nepal's internal security comes from a small group of Nepali Congress Party politicians led by former prime minister B. P. Koirala, all 01 whom arc presently in exile in India. Although Koirala's supporters have led student disorders in Nepal, they are not believed capable of mounting a nationwide uprising against the government. Two terrorist bombings occurred in early 1974, however, and more are likely. Communists in Nepal number an estimated 8,000 and are split into pro-Soviet and pro-Peking factions. Communists and their sympathizers have served in the government and in parliament, but the party has its greatest influence with urban groups, students, and educators. The greatest threat to Pakistan's internal stability remains the possi- bility of a further breakup of the country. Pushtu-speaking and related tribal elements in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan are pressing for a very large degree of autonomy, and in early 1974 aloes-level insurgency existed in Baluchistan. Civilian governments in Pakistan are also faced with the danger of a military take-over. Military dictatorships have ruled Pakistan for 13 of its first 27 years as an independent nation. At present, Prime Minister Bhutto appears to have the situation under control and to have the loyalty of the armed forces. The military, however, would probably step in to seize power if it appeared that civilian government was unable to function effectively. In April and May 1971, the Bandaranaike government was challenged by a loosely organized insurgency spearheaded by educated, unemployed youths dissatisfied with the government's failure to solve deep-seated eco- nomic and social problems. The genesis and development of the insurgency was indigenous and no material assistance was received from outside sources. More than 15,000 dissidents or suspected supporters were eventually apprehended, and the insurrection attempt was put down although isolated, small armed bands were continuing to operate in the jungle areas in 1974. Continuing social and economic problems could precipitate another insur- rection at some pont in the future. There are about 2,800 Communists in Sri Lanka. About 2,000 are in the pro-Moscow party, which is a member of the coalition government; the other 800 are members of the pro-Peking faction and oppose the government. Approved For Release ~1999~09/25 CYy4 RDPSvTt Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET The 1971 war with Pakistan demonstrated India's pre-eminence as a military power in South Asia. Although Pakistan's military capability re- mained largely intact following the conflict, the country's leaders recognize that their armed forces are no match for India's. There is little difference between the two forces in terms of leadership, morale, or logistic capability, but the Indian armed forces are much larger and better r:quipped, and would ultimately overwhelm their foe. India's military strength has, in fact, evolved to the point where it probably could defend itself successfully against a conventional attack by China or a combined Chinese-Pakistani attack. The key to India's strong position is its massive military expansion program, including development of a domestic armaments industry, begun after the 1962 hostilities with China. India is continuing to purchase sophis- ticated military equipment from the Soviet Union as well as from East European and Free World countries, and is arranging for production of such items whenever feasible. Pakistan, in turn, has increased its efforts to develop a domestic armaments industry and acquire sophisticated military equip- ment, primarily through France and the People's Republic of China. Never- theless, it is doubtful that military parity with India will ever be restored. Of the remaining countries in South Asia, only Afghanistan has a creditable defense establishment. Its military potential has traditionally been low, however, owing to the lack of effective training and the poor quality of its personnel. The armed forces of Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have no offensive, and limited defensive, capability. Ground: The Indian army is capable of successful offensive and defensive operations within South Asia. It could also constitute an effective expedi- tionary force within the region, using its own resources, or elsewhere in combination with a major power. The Indian army, in conjunction with the paramilitary forces, is capable of maintaining internal security and meeting any civil emergency. The army has a personnel strength of about 1,092,000. Service is not compulsory. Enlistment is permitted between the ages of 17 and 24 for 10, 12, or 15 years of active service. Based on the availability of organized reserves, arms and equipment, training facilities and cadres, admin- istrative machinery, and economic considerations, but without additional logistic support, maximum mobilization ^ould be reached on M plus 90 with 1,175,000 troops. The manpower would come from the Reserve Force (a pool of men who have completed active service), from the Territorial Army, .SECRE'T' . __ 'Approved For Release 1999%0925 CIA'-RDP8'STQ`Q$?5R~001 ~`000~0001 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET and from the National Cadet Corps. Among the principal weaknesses of the army are logistics problems stemming from a diversity of equipment and a shortage :~f junior officers, especially those with technical backgrounds. Combat and support units are divided into five geographic (territorial) commands, with the majority of troops conceni~ated either on the western border with Pakistan or in northeastern India. Maior tactical units include: 7 corps headquarters 15 infantry divisions 10 mountain divisions 2 armored divisions 2 (independent) infantry brigades 2 (independent) parachute brigades 3 (independent) artillery brigades 7 corps artillery brigades 5 (independent) armored brigades 4 (independent) air defense brigades Ten infantry divisions, an armored division, and several independent brigades are deployed against Pakistan, while six mountu~r divisions (in northeastern India) and one infantry division (in Ladakh) are stationed across the border from Chinese forces in Tibet and Sinkiang.* Arms and equipment area mixture of imported and indigenously produced or assembled equipment. The USSR supplanted the UK and the US as the principal provider of military equipment after 1965. Foreign technical assistance is minimal; the quality of maintenance is good. A small number of personnel are sent abroad for staff or advanced technical training, but the army itself conducts a program covering all requirements, from basic individual through advanced unit and high-level command and staff training. Many of the Indian army schools d~cept students from less-developed countries.** On occasion, training missions are sent out of the country. Despite problems stemming from a diversity of equiprrrent, the army logistic system is capable of maintaining the forces. Vulnerable lines of communication, however, could jeopardize Indian forces in Kashmir and *Chir:ese forces along the borders with India include three infantry divisions, one independent artillery regiment, and ten border defense regiments. No combat aircraft are stationed permanently at airfields in Tibet. **.~fghanistar:, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Chana, Egypt, Kenya, Iraq, Malaysia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Tanzania, Singapore, Sudar:, the Republic of Yemen, and Zambia send students. SECRET Approved For Re1e~~~"~~99/09125:-CtA-R~P85'FOfl875-R00'I~I00030001-=2 , ~` , ,(, ,.r ~`~ 1?~t 4 }~ ~'~`k:4ae5~ r~?_ ,L,s.a1r.;,n~~'~.1'~ .~Xr.,trii:,~.S~~,tta ~:it::MaJ. ._,.,. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET northeastern India. The Banihal Road is the only major land communica- tions link in Kashmir, and its severance would seriously hamper any opera- tions in the area. An alternate but less satisfactory route is available. Reliance on a single-track railroad from West Bengal to Arunchal Pradesh, opposite China, has also been a significant loyis~lic weakness, but this has been alleviated by the emergence of a friendly Bangladesh that would probably give transit rights to Indian forces. An extensive system of depots is maintained throughout India. Stocks of ammunition, POL, and other stores are considered sufficient to support a maximum combat effort of at least 45 days. Air: The air force is capable of providing air defense and engaging in strategic and tactical operations within South Asia, as well as assisting in civil emergencies. Its main strengths are: ? the availability of ample manpower; ? the high morale and individual capabilities of personnel; ? the ongoing program to acquire modern aircraft from outside sources, while simultaneously developing an indigenous manufacture/ assembly capability. The principal weakness is the diversity of aircraft (over 35 types). With such variety, there is considerable difficulty in resupply, procurement of spare parts, and training of qualified pilots and maintenance personnel. Other weaknesses include the lack of an effective strategic strike force, fuel shortages, maintenance problems with the MIG-21/Fish bed, easily disrupted landline communications in the air defense system, and lack of an all- weather air-to-air missile. There are 105,000 men in the air force, of whom 2,300 are pilots. The aircraft inventory totals 1,399, including 331 supersonic and 260 subsonic fighters, 38 light bombers, 213 transports, 16 reconnaissance, 218 helicop- ters, and 323 other aircraft. The air force is organized into 95 units: 8 day fighter; 9 fighter/interceptor; 15 fighter-bomber; 3 light bomber; 1 strategic reconnaissance; 1 maritime reconnaissance; 13 transport; 14 helicopter; 1 VIP; and 30 miscellaneous training and utility. Most of the major combat units are strategically located along the border areas. More than half of the flying units are based in the western portion of the country. Prior to any hostilities, a wide dispersal of fo~~ces and aircraft to numerous forward locations could be expected. Tf-~~ air defense network is composed of radar, aircraft, missile, and antiaircraft artillery units. The radar screen is oriented largely toward the SECRET / Approved For Release 1.999/09125 :CIA- RDP$5T00875R0011O0030'001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET north and northwest. The net provides radar surveillance over virtually all of the common land frontiers shared with Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir, the People's Republic of China, Bangladesh, and Burma. This system operates creditably, considering the limited resources available and the fact that the system must defend a 2,400-mile border facing the Himalayan mountains. The principal weaknesses are equipment shortages and vulnerable com- munications. The SA-2 SP.M system, used in the defense of significant military/in- dustrial targets, includes five main complexes consisting of 19 active sites (squadrons). The Fan Song F radar has been identified with the system, enhancing its electronic counter-countermeasure and low-altitude capability. Indian army antiaircraft weapons proved the most effective defense against low-level ground attacks and strikes on airfields during the 1971 war. The air force has a minor strategic bombing capability that would permit it to strike all targets in Pakistan. MIG-21/Fishbed are used in the interceptor or ground support role, depending on mission priority. Fifteen fighter-bomber squadrons (S1J-7/Fitter, HF-24 Marut, and F-56 Hawker Hunter day fighters) are also available for strike operations. Transport capability is built aruund 13 squadrons of medium and light transports, including aging C-47 and C-119G Packets, DHC-4 Caribous, AN-12 Cubs, and MI-4 Hound and MI-8 Hip helicopters. It is estimated that the air force is capable of transporting one of the army's parachute brigades on a single lift under optimum conditions. Inadequate logistic support would preclude sustained operations on this scale. Pilots are well trained and effective in aerial resupply under visual conditions. The air force sends students to the USSR for training on the various pieces of Soviet-provided equipr~ient, and Soviet technical specialists in India provide guidance in specialized fields. Students also attend staff colleges in the UK and Australia on an ex:hange basis, and Egypt and France have conducted training programs for air and ground crews. The Indian air force also trains a limited number of students from other Asian and African countries. Air force logistics are hampered by the many types of aircraft. Mainten- ance is further complicated by an inadequate number- of trained personnel, shortages of test equipment, insufficient spare parts, and lengthy lead times in the procurement of spare parts for foreign-made aircraft. The air force normally has an operationally ready rate of 70 percent, but current fuel shortages are probably degrading this rate. II -4 SECRET ,Approved For Release 1999/09/~5~-:-~-IA-R~~S5T0~087vR001-400030001-2 - Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET Navy: The Indian navy, with 33,000 men (including air arm) and the largest, most potent fleet in South Asia, is capable of successful offensive or defensive operations in the region. The navy has 1 antisubmarine warfare :support aircraft carrier, 2 light cruisers, 6 submarines (Foxtrot class), 19 destroyer/destroyer-escort vessels (including 9 Petya class and 1 indigenously produced Leander class), 8 Osa-class large guided-missile boats, 16 patrol vessels, 8mine-warfare ships, 3 amphibious ships, and a large number of auxiliary and service craft. The Osa boats, equipped with the Styx missile, are unmatched in the area and were a decisive factor in the naval engagements during the 1971 conflict. While the navy's antisubmarine warfare capability is effective within confined areas, the small number of antisubmarine warfare ships and aircraft would preclude simultaneous patrol of all coastal waters. Another serious shortcoming is the paucity of minesweepers. The main operating bases and principal activities of the navy are in the ports of Bombay on the west coast, Cochin in the south, and Vishakhapat- nam on the east coast. The majority of ships and craft are based at Bombay, with most of the remainder at Vishakhapatnam and a few at Cochin. The Western Fleet, operating out of Bombay, consists of the aircraft carrier, the 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers*, 12 destroyer escorts (including 4 Petyas), 17 coastal patrol ships/craft (including the 8 Osas), all 8 of the minesweepers, and the majority of the auxiliaries. The Eastern Fleet, working out of Vishakhapatnam, consists of 5 destroyer escorts (Petyas), all 6 Foxtrot-class submarines*, 3 coastal patrol ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 5 auxiliaries. In addition to operating along the east coast, some of these ships are based temporarily at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. Ships and craft based in southern India report to the Southern Naval Command at Cochin. These include 2 coastal patrol ships and 1 auxiliary. The navy sends a small number of personnel to the UK, US, and USSR for training, while at the same time it trains naval personnel from several Mideast, African, and Asian-Pacific na- tions. The logistic system of the navy has two major problems. First, the navy must depend upon outside sources for most of its ships and craft, supplies, and modern equipment. Second, Bombay is the only base capable of under- t~.~king major repair and resupply of the forces afloat. Nevertheless, the navy's logistic capability is increasing. **In the future, some submari-ies may be based at Bombay. II-5 SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET Modest facilities at Cochin and the east coast ports of Calcutta and Vishakhapatnam are being expanded in an effort to decrease reliance upon outside sources for logistic needs. The Mazagon docks at Bombay have successfu~ly undertaken the Leander project, and the Garden Reach work- shops at Calcutta have built a number of small naval ships. Stocks of fuel and ammunition could probably support a maximum rombat effort for two months. The Indian naval air arm has 1,500 men and 90 aircraft. During the December 1971 war, Alize and Sea Hawk aircraft, in conjunction with the surface blockade, effectively ensured the isolation of East Pakistan. The Nav~d Aircraft Repair Organization at Cochin is responsible for depot-level aircraft maintenance. Maintenance procedures are inadequate, however, and must be supplemented by technical teams from Hindustan ,aeronautics, Ltd. Paramilitary: India's numerous paramilitary forces, with occasional assist- ance from the army, are capable of maintaining law and order, conducting counterinsurgency operations, and functioning as light infantry under army control during wartime situations. The principal organizations are: Assam Rifles (AR) (21 battalions/30,000 men) Central Reserve Police (CRP) (63 battalions/57,000 men) Border Security Force (BSF) (80 battalions/76,000 men) The AR, BSF, and CRP are normally controlled by the cent; 4! Ministry of Home Affairs. The AR, BSF, and CRP battalions are equipped with standard infantry weapons and equipment. The BSF also has indigenous artillery units, a small naval force (two tugs an;; three small patrol boats), and a small air wing (four Dakota transport planes). Ground: In the event of full-scale war with India, the 390,000-man army could initially defend Pakistan successfully, but it ultimately would succumb to India's military superiority. Pakistan's offensive capabilities were rela- tively unaffected by the 1971 war, but the army could not mount an attack against India with any real expectation of success. Augmented by the paramilitary Civil Armed Forces and Federal Security Force, the army can maintain Pakistan's internal security. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET The 1971 war caused a morale problem within the ranks. There was a general belief that senior military officaldom rather than the army was responsible for the defeat and the loss of East Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto retired several military officials and replaced them with generals loyal to him. He has also sought to shift responsibility away from the army by focusing the blame on former President Yahya Khan and his supporters. There is a selective service system, but voluntary enlistments are more than sufficient to mf;et the army's manpower requirements. Enlistment is permitted from age 17 for aseven-yee:,r first term to be followed with re-enlistments of three?year increments. There are no organized reserve units, but personnel completir~rJ regular enlistment serve eight years on the reserve rolls. Pakistan is creating a national guard under army control to assist in internal defense and civic action tasks during periods of stress. Its present strength is unknown. In the event of war, reservists and the national guard would be called up, and should additional manpower be required, conscrip- tion could be implemented. Also available for integration into the regular forces is the paramilitary Civil Armed Forces composed of the Pakistan Rangers. the Frontier Corps, and the Frontier Constabulary, with an esti- mated combined strength of 38,500. No significant expansion of the army would be possible without substantial outside assistance. At present, with materiel assistance from abroad, the army mobilization capacity at M-plus-90 is estimated at 450,000 personnel. The army has deployed the majority of its fighting force opposing India. Eieven infantry divisions and two armored divisions are based in permanent cantonments or in field locations from the Rann of Kutch northward into the disputed Jammu and Kashmir state. Infantry divisions are stationed near Peshawar and Quetta to meet any possible threat from Afghanistan through the Khyber or Krrojak passes, respectively. Major tactical units include: 5 corps headquarters 13 infantry divisions* 2 armored divisions 3 (independent) armored brigades 5 corps artillery brigades 5 corps armored reconnaissance regiments 1 special services group (Special Forces/brigade equivalent) 2 antiaircraft artillery brigades * Another infantry divrsiv;t %s reportedly L?eing raised. SECRET Approved For Release, '~ 999/09/2,5.,..; CIA-RDP8.5TOQ875R001'~00030001-2 .. ,,. _ .. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET The army is equipped with an assortment of arms from both commu- nist and noncommunist nations. Because of inadequate inventories of spare parts and a lack of trained logistic personnel, this diversity of equipment is a major weakness for the army. Ground forces equipment requirements are currently met through Chinese and European sources and by limited indig- enous production. Only a small number of military personnel are sent out of the country for specialized training ~r attendance at senior military schools. The army has provided, and is continuing to provide, limited training assistance to several Middle Eastern and African nations, including Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, .Jordan, Libya, Nigeria, and Uganda. Most of this training is con- ducted at the combat arms centers in the respective nations or at their senior service schools. The logistic system is the army's weakest area. Logistics support in West Pakistan in 1971 appeared adequate, but toward the end of the fighting supplies-especially ammunition and POL-ran low. Depots for all classes of supplies are located near troop concentrations, and the army has sought to maintain a 30-day level. Present supply levels are unknown, but considering difficulties encountered during the war, it is anticipated that if the country is once again blockaded and fails to control the air, the army would be unable to carry on sustained combat operations for more than 30 days. Air Force: The air force is capable of performing air defense, ground support, and other tactical support tasks. Dependence on multiple foreign supply sources and a shortage of spare parts, however, tend to impair effectiveness. These logistic difficulties are offset to some extent by the overall capability of Pakistani pilots and technical personnel. The air force numbers 17,100 personnel, of whom 500 are pilots. The aircraft inventory totals 511, including 12 light bombers, 179 supersonic fighters, 93 subsonic fighters, 5 reconnaissance aircraft, 10 transports, 67 helicopters, and 145 utility/trainers. It is organized into 21 units: 1 light bomber, 12 fighter, 1 transport, 1 search and re,cue, and 6 training and miscellaneous. Air defense is the primary role of the air force, The mainstay of the air defense inventory is the squadron of all-weather Mirage III-E fighters. The Chinese-built MIG-19 and tie aging F-86 are used to supplement the Mirages but have no all-weather capability. While the shortage of all-weather aircraft SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 sECxrr degrades the effectiveness of the air defense system somewhat, Pakistani pilots, often reputed to be the best in South Asia, derive maximum effective- ness from the available combat aircraft. Pakistan's air defense aircraft are supported by contiguous radar coverage along most of the common border with India, the only exception being the Bahawalpur area of central Pak- istan. Air transport consists of eight C-130 transports, two of them on loan from civil airlines. The fleet of C-130s has a potential capability of lifting about a battalion (800 men) on a single lift under optimum conditions. It may also be configured to bomb area targets during hostilities. Pakistan International Airline's 16 civil transport aircraft, including Boeing 707s and DC-l Os and some 12,000 personnel, can readily be mobilized in an emer- gency situation. Prior to and during hostilities with India, PIA aircraft were used extensively to ferry troops from West to East Pakistan. The serviceabiliiv of the air force inventory is not known. Although the quality of maintenance is generally good, efforts to maintain a high state of operational readiness of aircraft are plagued by a severe shortage of spare parts and the diversity of sources of supply. There are no k~iown aviation trainees in foreign countries. A consider- able number of air force personnel were trained in the US prior to 1965. A limited number of pilots and ground crew personnel have also received training in France, and 60 personnel completed TU-16 training in the People's Republic of China in 1973. No TU-16s are in Pakistan, but they would ba available in the event of war with India. Pakistan has provided aviation training to several Middle East and African countries. Exporting the air force's technical expertise could continue to be one of Pakistan's major foreign commitments. Navy: The Pakistani navy is a small but expanding force capable of con- ducting limited escort, patrol, and minesweeping operations. The primary mission of the 9,900-man navy is the defense of coastal waters and the port of Karachi. Although a program of expansion and modernization is under way, the navy's regional importance will remain well below that of India. It could not conduct sustained combat operations without outside assistance. Its operational forces include 1 antiaircraft light cruiser, 3 attack submarines, 4 destroyers, 2destroyer-escorts, 13 motor gunboats, 4 hydrofoil torpedo boats, 7 minesweepers, and 3 auxiliary ships. Salient strengths include a small but relatively modern minesweeping and submarine force, good individual training, and the military traditions of 25X6A its personnel. Selected personnel are sent to the -and the US 'for II-9 SECRET ~pproved -For Release 1999/OJ/25 : C1~4-RDP85T00875R00110Q030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET specialized training. Weaknesses include the age of major surface combatants, inability to defend against high-speed attack aircraft, inadequate shore-based air support for naval operations, vulnerability to blockades, and a reliance upon outside sources for most materiel and logistic support. As a result of the 1971 conflict with India, the navy is seeking a variety of weapons platforms to offset the striking power of the Indian navy. Twelve Shanghai II -class motor gunboats and four Huchwan-class hydrofoil torpedo boats have been acquired from the PRC. France may provide Exocet cruise missiles, a fourth Daphne-class attack submarine, and a small n ber of Breguet-Atlantique aircraft for maritime reconnaissance. The has 25X6 agreed to provide six Sea King helicopters and two Whitby-class destroyer- escorts. The navy'r principal logistic facilities are located in the Karachi area. Progress is being made in the areas of supply, repair, and maintenance, but the navy still relies on foreign sources for much of its equipment and supplies. All of Pakistan's ships and craft can be overhauled or repaired at Karachi, using the naval dockyard or commercial facilities. A joint naval and commercial facility is under construction at Phitti Creek, 10 miles southeast of Karachi. When work at this site is comraleted, it is expected to accom- modate ships up to 50,000 tons, larger than any ship the navy is expected to acquire. Paramilitary: Pakistan's paramilitary forces, with the backing of the army, are capable of maintaining internal security, cr.nducting counter-guerrilla operations, and, during wartime, acting as light infantry. The principal paramilitary units are: Pakistan Rangers (8,000 men) Frontier Corps (24,000 men) Frontier Constabulary (6,500 men) Federal Security Force (13,000 mien) Under normal conditions, the paramilitary units arc subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. The Civil Armed Forces are organized into battalions and company units. The complete breakdown of uni is is not available because of expansion of the forces, on the one hand, and the loss or capture of personnel during the war, on the other. In time of emergency or war, the II-1f' SECRET ~;pproved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R00'1100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET Pakistan Rangers and Frontier Constabulary remain subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. The Civil Armed Forces units use standard light infantry weapons, primarily British WW II models; however, there is a deficiency in signal and transport equipment. The Frontier Corps also has some light artillery and armored cars. The Federal Security Force units, raised in 1973, are supplied with small arms, riot-control equipment, and sufficient motor transport to ensure mobility. C. Bangladesh Ground: The Bangladesh army is not capable of waging successful offensive or conventional defensive operations against neighboring countries. In con- junction with paramilitary forces, however, it :ould wage an extensive guerrilla campaign in defense of t'ne country. It is also capable of maintaining internal security in urban areas. The army has an estimated strength of 25,000. Information on enlistment and terms of service is sparse. Mobiliza- tion plans are unknown, but the potential for augmentation of ground forces is good. The large number of former guerrillas constitute a source of troops. Combat and support units are subordinated to five brigade head- quarters, which have both administrative and tac:i.ical functions. The heaviest concentration of troops is in the D%~cca area. Major tactical units include: 5 brigade headquarters 18 infantry battalions 3 artillery regiments 1 heavy mortar regiment 1 armored regiment Arms and equipment inventories contain a mixture of equipment pro- vided by India or captured from Pakistan. The principal weaknesses of the arnry are a lack of modern equipment, an inadequate logistic system, a low state of combat readiness, and a lack of experienced high-ranking officers. The Bangladesh gover nmen?c has indicated aii interest in obtaining modern military equipment for its army. SpeciGlized military schooling is being made available in InJia, but the government is interested in training students elsewhere as well. In-country training courses are few in number and poor in quality. Air: The mission of the Banglades+~ air force is to provide air defense and tactical air support for grcund and naval forces, and airlift support for national civic action and relief programs. Often described as an "air force in training," the force has yet to demonstrate a capability to perform any part of its assigned mission. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET There are between 1,000 and 1,500 personnel in the air force, including approximately 60 pilots, navigators, and flight engineers. Some repatriated Bengalees have probably been integrated into the force structure. The aircraft inventory totals 43 aircraft, including 27 fighters, 3 trans- ports, 7 helicopters, and 6 trainer/utility aircraft. Most of this inventory, including 17 MIG-21/Fishbeds, was acquired during 1973. The aircraft probably are organized into three squadrons: I fighter; 1 transport; and 1 helicopter. All aircraft are stationed in the Dacca and Chittago:~g areas. Air force operations, maintenance, and other support functions are severely degraded by a shortage of trained personnel. Extensive technical and flying training programs have been established by the Soviet Union. In addition to the programs conducted in the Soviet Union, training on the MIGs, helicopters, and transport aircraft is carried out in Bangladesh under the direction of Soviet advisers and instructors. Future operational effective- nesswill depend on the success of these programs. Navy: The Bangladesh navy is a small riverine and coastal patrol farce. Its strength is in excess of 450 personnel. Missions include the prevention of smuggling and other illegal activities, the protection of coastal maritime traffic, the policing of inland waterways, and participatiun in disaster relief operations. Naval headquarters is located at Dacca. Ships are deployed at Chittagong and Khulna. The naval ship inventory is m~-!~ up of four indigenously produced river patrol boats and one 150-ton seaward defense boat provided by India in April 1973. Future acquisitions may include an unknown number of Yugo- slav gunboats of World War II vintage and a second seaward defense boat from India. As the navy expands, Indian influence will continue to predominate. Approximately 100 personnel have been sent to India for training at Bombay and Cochin on such subjects as sonar, radar, and telecommunica- tions. The Indian navy has also sent an adviser to Bangladesh to assist in the establishment of indigenous training facilities. Paramilitary: Bangladesh's paramilitary :orces are capaole of coping with sporadic cases of internal unrest, but n~~t with widespread organized dissid- ence. They are not capable of policing the country's borders. In wartime they could function effectively as light infantry or guerrillas. The Bangladesh II-12 SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 i Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET Rifles (13,000) and the National Uefense Force (16,000) are equipped with small arms, mostly bolt-action rifles, and some signal equipment. National Defense Force personnel have received some training From members of the Indian Military Assistance Mission. D. Afghanistan Ground: The Afghan army is incapable of defending the country from outside aggression. Ire conjunction with paramilitary forces, however, it is capable of maintaining internal security, except possibly in a situation of widespread tribal unrest. The army has a personnel strength of about 78,700. Military service is compulsory, and personnel are selected by local leaders and tribes for two years' active service. Based on the availability of reserves, arms and equipment, training facilities and cadre, administrative machinery, and economic considerations, but without outside logistic support, the army's mobilization capacity is estimated to be 103,500 men at M plus 90 dais. The manpower would come from reserve officers and previously conscripted personnel. The principal weaknesses of the army include rudimentary administra- tive, logistic, and maintenance systems; a shortage of trained leaders and technicians; lack of adequate transportation and communication facilities; and dependence upon the Soviet Union for almost all of its materiel. Geographical areas of responsibility are assigned to three corps head- quarters and four provincial divisions. The bulk of the army-seven infantry divisions and all three armored divisions-is located around Kabul and along the border with Pakistan. Major tactical units* include: 3 corps headquarters 10 infantry divisions 3 armored divisions 2 artillery regiments 3 mountain brigades 1 commando regiment (Special Forces equivalent) 1 republican guard regiment 1 airborne battalion *The size of an Afghan infantry division is between 4,000 and 8,000 men; an Afghmi armored division is equivalent to a reinforced US armored battalion. The i~tdepe~rdertt regiments are comparable to an understrength US brigade. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET Almost all of the equipment in `he army's inventory is of Soviet origin. While most items, notably the artillery, are of World War I I vintage, modern equipment has been introduced in increasing amounts since the late 1960s. The army logistic system is only marginally capable of supporting th. forces. Shortages of spare parts and poor maintenance caused by technical incompetence continue to result in low levels of operational readiness. In the case of newer or more complicated equipment, Soviet advisers and tech- nicians are required to perform essential maintenance. Large numbers of personnel are sent abroad, primarily to the Soviet Union, for basic officer, staff officer, and technical training. Air: The air defense force is incapable of defendirig the nation's airspace and supporting large ground-force operations. The air defense force can effec- tively assist units conducting internal security operations, but its usefulness is based more on its psychological impact than its tactical capability. Tactical effectiveness is restricted by a lack ofair-ground communications, ashortage of qualified maintenance personne~, few dispersal airfields, insufficient fuel storage facilities and navigational aids, and inefficient logistical procedures and practices. There are 8,100 men in the air force, of whom 150 are pilots. The inventory totals 267 aircraft, including 54 supersonic and 89 subsonic fighters, 28 light bombers, 36 transports, 28 helicopters, and 32 other aircraft. These forces are organizFU into six wings: 3 day fighter; 1 bomber; 1 transport; arc! 1 training. The aircraft are concentrated in the vicinity of Kaul and at Shindand airfield, near the Afghan-Iranian border. Air defense capability rests with the small force of supersonic MIG-21, SU-7, and subsonic MIG-17 fighter aircraft, an antiaircraft artillery division, a surface-to-air missile brigade, and a radar brigade. This modest capability is keyed primarily to the defense of the Kabul area. The overall effectiveness of the air defense components is generally low. The force is capable only of relatively uncomplicated actions and is vulner- able to low-level, high-speed attack from any direction. The SA-2 SAM system, used in defense of the Kabul area, consists of three deployed firing sites. The last known practice firing occurred in 1971. The combat effective- ness of this force is probably limited. Ground support capabilities are negligible; bombing and interdiction can be carried out only under optimum weather conditions. Air transport capaaility is slight because of the lack o. suitable aircraft and trained crews. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET The training establishment in Afghanistan is rudimentary. Some pilot and aircraft technical training is performed in-country, and a technical refresher course for officers is conducted at the technical school associated with the Afghan Military Academy. Soviet advisers and technicians attached to the air defense force provide on-the-job training for radar, missile, antiair- craft, and aircraft maintenance personnel. Nearly all primary, advanced, transition pilot training, meteorological, and enlisted technical training is conducted in the USSR. The air defense force's ability to maintain aircraft and other air defense equipment is generally poor. The major deficiency is complete dependence on the USSR and other Communist countries for replacement aircraft, spare parts, armament, electronics, missiles, engineering, training, and POL. With- out continuing Soviet assistance, even the small existing capability to sup- portair operations would deteriorate rapidly. Navy: None Paramilitary: The Gendarmerie, Afghanistan's sole paramilitary force, is capable of coping with low-level tribal dissidence and minor civil disorders, policing the borders, and functioning as light infantry under army control during wartime situations. The 14,200-man force is controlled by the Min- istry of Interior. The organization's 13 regiments and 1 mobile unit are equipped with bolt-action rifles and a minimum amount of signal equipment and transport. E. Nepal Ground: The 20,000-man Royal Nepalese Army, the country's only military service, is incapable of waging offensive or defensive operations against neighboring India or the People's Republic of China. The army is capable of maintaining internal security in the Kathmandu Valley and the plains area across southern Nepal, but not throughout the country. There is no com- pulsory military service. Enlistment is permitted from age 17 for a period of ten years of active service. Mobilization capability at M-plus-90 is negligible. Internal security considerations dictate the general deployment of army forces. Three infantry brigades are deployed on the plains adjoining India, while a palace brigade, an infantry brigade, and a parachute battalion are located in the Kathmandu Valley. 5 brigade headquarters 12 infantry battalions II-15 SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09L.25 : ,CIA-RDP85T00875,R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET 1 parachute battalion 1 artillery regiment An airborne support transport wing, with two Short. Skyvan SRS 3 aircraft and one Alouette III helicopter, provides the lift capability to the parachute battalion. The army is equipped with an assortment of weapons, mostly abso~ete, obtained from either India or the UK, but an extensive modernization program is under way. Modern small arms are being obtained from India. Recent deliveries have included six 76-mm. howitzers and eighteen 120-mm. mor ?rs. Additional communications equipment and motor transport is under consideration. Basic military training is accomplished in Nepal. Advanced officer and most technical training is undertaken in France, India, the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. The army's logistic capability is extremely poor. Mobility and com- munications are severely restricted by the country's rugged terrain and lack of adequate transport. Staff planning at the highest levels frequently fails to consider logistics, and procedures for timely resupply of materiel do not exist. A scarcity of technically trained administrative and mainte~~ance personnel further compounds these problems. Present supply levels are unknown, but it is believed they are adequate to support the army's internal security mission. Air: None Navy: None Paramilitary: None ' F. Sri Lanlca Ground: The Sri Lanka army is a rudimentary military organization, pat- terned along British lines, with the missions o~f territorial defense and internal security. The army has only a token capability for defense against external attack; it is organized and trained primarily as an internal security force whose responsibilities include prevention of smuggling and illicit immigration, and participation in civic action and economic self-sufficiency programs. The army is capable, in conjunctioi: with the police, of maintain- ing internal security under normal conditions. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 .'..rx.v~a~u~,'~, ...o~Gims~:~l~~s'~~;x~~ailSi:..k~i~iai~d~sa'6~a~~Cxa~d~x~u!~.~...,s~~.: Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET The insurrection in 1971, however, underscored the inability of the army to cope quickly and effectively with widespread insurgency. While it acquired some combat experience in the insurgency, and has since received a considerable amount of new equipment, the army still suffers from a dependence on foreign sources for its materiel, and has not yet corrected the serious command and control problems evident in its 1971 operations. Presently more than half of the army is deployed near Colombo to protect the city's vital port facilities and assist the police in maintaining order. The army consists of the Regular Force backed up by three reserve components: the Volunteer Force, the Regular Force Reserve, and the Volunteer Force Reserve. The Regular Force, with a strength of 9,000, is composed of three infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, a reconnais- sance regiment, and various support elements. The Volunteer Force, used to augment the Regular Force, maintains about half of its 9,000 personnel on active duty at all times. The Regular Force Reserve and the Volunteer Force Reserve are inactive reserve manpower pools used to augment the Regular and Volunteer Forces when necessary. There is no compulsory service; enlistment is permitted from the age of 18 for five years of active service. At present, the army's mobilization capacity, without external logistic support, is 25,000 troops at M plus 90. External military assistance would increase the capacity to 29,000. Arms and equipment are mostly of World War II British manufacture. Some modern equipment, primarily armored personnel ~:arriers and field guns, was obtained from the Soviet Union and the Pecple's Republic of China, respectively, in 1971. Basic and some advanced training of army personnel is accomplished in Sri Lanka. Training of technical and senior officer.; is taken in India and, to a lesser extent, in the UK. The army's logistic system is adequate for the accomplishment of its internal security mission. Supply levels are believed sufficient to support full-scale operations for 30 days. The island's road and rail networks meet normal peacetime requirements. Air: The air force effectively performs its assigned mission, which includes provision of support to civic action projects, prevention of illicit smuggling and immigration, internal securit;~ operations, VIP transport, liaison, and air-sea rescue. There are 2,300 men in the air force, of whom 43 are pilots. The aircraft inventory totals 53, including 5 day fighters, 5 transports, 15 SECRET ~ __ .. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :-CIA-RDP8.5T~0875R001.1'00030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET helicopters, and 28 miscellaneous aircraft. The air force is organized into five units-1 fighter, 1 transport, 2 helicopter, and 1 training-which operate mainly from two airfields: Bandaranaike International, near Colombo, and China Bay, near Trincomalee. The air force has a modest close air support capability lasing five Fresco (MIG-17) day fighters and a small number of armed T-51 trainers and OH-13 Sioux helicopters. The transport inventory of one Convair 440 and four DH-114 Heron light transports, together with Sioux, Bell 206A Jet Ranger, and Hoodlum helicopters, is capable of supporting platoon (US-size) opera- tions. This capability is considered adequate to meet Sri Lanka's modest military transport needs. The helicopter force is also employed in short-range search and rescue operations, and adequately assists in anti-insurgency and anti-smuggling operations and prevention of illegal immigration. The only air defense capability is the army's 4th Field Artillery Reg- iment, which has antiaircraft batteries in the Colombo and China Bay areas. Equipment is obsolete and inadequate. The air force has instituted a successful and growing tourist flying service, and this has provided a major impetus to improving the air force's effectiveness. The operation has significantly increased pilot flying time, with a corresponding improvement in pilot proficiency. It has also provided a major boost to air force morale, and has created a foreign exchange earning capacity which can support spare parts acquisition and an aircraft replace- ment program. Air force training programs have been upgraded substantially during the past two years. Flight training now extends over a 24-month period, and the attrition rate is high as a result of the rigid standards recently imposed. A high safety record has been achieved through the development of a strict flying standards program. Pilots generally average between 40 and 100 hours per month; the tr,~nsportation and helicopter squadrons achieve the higher figures. Nonflying :~~ining of officers and technical training of enlisted men are increasingly being done at home. A few officers and enlisted men continue to train in India and the UK, but returning students are immedi- ately assigned as teachers. A good start has been made toward sei (-suf- ficiency in technical training. Supply and maintenance systems are rudimentary but are facilitated by the fact that all aircraft are stationed at two easily accessible airfields. While standards have improved, the air force remains capable of performing only II-18 SECRET ~~Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET minor maintenance. Major overhaul of aircraft normally is done in the country of origin, There is a shortage of spare parts in general, but parts for the recently acquired US aircraft should be readily available through com- mercial sources. Navy: The 2,600-man navy is a small coastal patrol and internal security force. Its operating inventory consists of a World War II -vintage patrol destroyer escort, 5 Shanghai I I -class motor gunboats, 23 small patrol craft,. 2 auxiliaries, and 1 service craft. One hydrofoil patrol boat is in reserve. The navy's small size precludes defense against even a minor naval attack. Its antismuggling capability is also inadequate. It has had slightly better success, however, in its operations against illegal immigration; these operations are conducted in conjunction with army and air force units. The navy's operational effectiveness has been severely restricted by a number of factors, including shallowness of coastal waters, uncharted and continually shifting sandbars, and lack of navigational aids in the Palk Strait between India and Sri Lanka. The navy is further hampered by poor seamanship and a lack of effective leadership at all command levels. Genuine professional interest is absent throughout the officer corps, and sea duty is considered a drudgery and a bore. Enthusiasm has increased somewhat with the acquisition of the PRC gunboats, and the captain of the navy is attempting to obtain a replacement for the aging patrol frigate. Inadequate maintenance and training facilities will likely offset this transitory surge of professionalism, however, and it is considered unlikely that the navy will significantly increase its capabilities in the near future. During 1973 the Soviet Union offered to supply Sri Lanka with a Petya-class destroyer-escort, but the Sri Lanka government decided against the offer. At present the navy is looking for a craft comparable to a 95-foot US crass guard cutter. Navy headquarters is located at Colombo. The principal operating base is at Karainagar, with secondary bases at Trincomalee, Tangalla, and Kalpitiya. The navy is constantly beset with supply problems caused by antiquated and poorly maintained equipment, cumbersome material procure- ment procedures, and poor administration. The problem of excessive delays in procuring materiel, especially spare parts, is compounded by the fact that the navy still has obsolete equipment for which spare parts are no longer in stock; these must be manufactured locally or procured in the UK at con- siderable cost. Spare parts for the Shanghai I I gunboats, however, are readily obtainable from the PRC. Paramilitary: None SECRET Approved For Release 1999/x9/25 .C1A; RDP85TOQ~~~5ROp11~0~,00300Q1-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET :11{\I India 1' Pnltis(un Bangladesh Afghanistan Ncpul Sri Lnnlcu I'ersonuel ............................ ' I,UU2,UU(1 3UO,C"U 35,000 18,700 2(I,IIIIU U,IIUO ( outbat- .......................... li?;i,l1UU 253,000 15,?'(IU 5(1,300 IG,(i0i1 fi 51)U 'I'u n l< ' .. , .... ~I24 ( butte (US) ................... .... .... .... ...? .... P'I'-ili (U3S12) ..................... 15(1 'I'u(ul l.i~ht......... '%IU .... 4 ('euturiutt (UK) .................... 180 .... .... .... \I-?I tihernuut (U5) ................. .... I(iU .... .... \I-4i,?IS Patton (l'N) ............... .... 36:1 .... .... 'I'-3?I (PHC) ....................... ' .... :il) .... 20U(USS12) I'-:i~l ............ .. .. .. .. .. ........ 220(C' ecb) :iU(USS[O .... 270(USSR) 'I'-55 ............ .. .. .. ............ 1140(0 iSR~ lU(USSR) .... 54(USSR) 'I'-lit (USSR) ...................... Pa untl) .... .... .... 14 ~'ickerxll'iju~?an(il(UI~IIn(II{;L'nOUti)... 4711 ,,,, ,,, ??.? Olhrr a ............................ 20:1 ill .... 30 'I'ota! i~lediunt ................... 1 , 71:1 1 , 2115 .... :1118 .... Artillor~? ?~ IIIII-~ttn.:uul over .................. 82(1 7011 12 4(iU (1 .... 0 Up to l(111-uun......? .......... .. .. 1,8.10 UU5 (i S1U I(1 :i2 \lorlat:e 1(10-nuu. untl over...... ? ........... 1211 2i:i 2U 270 2l I(1 l1p to IU0-nun ..................... 8,81(1 ?1,11(1(1 400 :i4U 23:1 5?I AAA', :ii-tu~n.:uui over ................... 0 2(1 (1 1 i0 0 0 2(1- Ut :i7-nt m ....... ? .............. ' I , 2(1(1 -12:1 C 185 ? 2.1 AP( a ............................... 420 ?111:1 U 330 (1 10 :lrnutred ' ........................... i 10 2::11 0 4F 0 54 ~ :Ill figurce me cslinralce: it alroulrl he aoled Kral the Pakislnni arutll is rnrrlcrrlaing rapid cxparrsimr; ittucnlorics ittchtrlc nutjor ilt ?n,e of cyu(pmrarl ri!lrcr iu Nre hands of lrnops or serviccuhlc iu rlcpol. "Coarlxil pcrsnancl arc dejincrl ns cilhcr conrbal, cornhul sapporl, nr comhnl sc:'t~icc supparl hoops serving wills rlfvisiort or separate Grigudc or Galmlion fnrmalion.c. hi,gurc inchules lacks ouljilled with bridge-lagiag, dazes, or n:iar.-Jlaifiap egaipntr.nl, pGrs recooer~ ve/ricles. .t h'igure iachrrlc.e self-propelled arlillcrp, ascnull guns, anli-lartb? gurrx, arts! rarkcl lau>chers. higure inchrde.c xclJ-propeller! :1 A:1. 't hiyure iar?lurles iaJanlr~ comhal achicles. % 1'iyru?c inrlurlcs recoanaissaacc r~clricles. ~ ~ - 20 SECREr.C ;'Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET ------ - Sri India PukisU-n Bangladesh Afghanistan Nepal Lanka AIR DE1~1~;NSls Pcrsonacl? ........................... Unkauw^ Unknown (I ri,30(1 Il 0 Missiles Sw?fucu-to-Air SA-3 ................. est d80 0 11 1311 (1 11 No. Launchers SA? ............... . est 13G G II `A 0 0 No, Sites 5r1-2 ..................... est IJ (1 ll 3 0 (1 AIR FORCI~. I'crsonnel ............................ 105,00(1 li,l(1(1 I,ll(I(1 1,51111 5,111(1 Included 2,300 in Army Aircraft .let l3omhers (light) Canberra 13 (I) 55 ((1 h, VCR' ~C:Llilild) . . . .. .. .. .. .. 35 11 G O O G Cunboi?ra 13-ri713 (U K) .............. 0 i'-' Il 0 0 0 IL-2Sll3uaglu (I'R(') ................ 11 0 (I 28 0 (1 'Total ........................... a5 I?, 0 ?35 (1 11 Jut Fighters 5upursnnic SU-711~ittcr (USSR)...... ?....... i0 II 11 31 ... .... \IICi=3lll~ishbud (USS13).......... I55+ 11 li 33 ..?. ???? II1~-'l4 illurut (Indigenous)........ li?I 11 II .... .... .... F-104A and 13 (US) ............... 0 :, _ 11 .... .... .... \IIG-1!Ill~al?nuv D (1'R(')......... 0 138 ~+ 11 .... .... .... \lirugr III-I'. 11'r;uu'o)............ 0 '-'I 11 .... .... ... \) irugr ;i (I~ r:ulcc) .. . .......... . . . (1 35 (1 .... .... .... Subtotal ....................... 331 1i0 17 bd .... ... Subsonic Gnat 1 (Ui~, Indigenous).......... lig 0 (1 .... .... .... Iluwkcr llunta? 1~-5G (UK)........ lit II 0 ...' .... .... Vampire F13-:i2 (UK) ............. 2U 11 0 .... .... .... h-SUF Sabre (US) ................ 0 li IO(Puk) .... ... .... S~tbrc i\lIC-G (1~-Sli) (1Vest Ucruutny), 0 41i 0 .... .... .... \IIG-lill'resco (USSR)........... .... ???? ???? SG "" Subtotal ....................... 21i0 03 10 50 .... '1'otul ...................... . ri!)I 3i ~~ r id3 .... 5 SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET :11R fUR('I: (C'unlinurdl Rccunnaissuncc Canberra PK-5"r (UK) .............. ~liruge 111-R (prance) .............. 1,1(14(1 Super Cunstcllution (US)...... '1'o t:t I .......................... . Transports ~9ediun: '1'U-1'L?1/Cookpot (USSR).......... C-I lOG Purkct (US) .............. r\N-121Cub (USSR) .............. IL-18/Coot (USSR) ............... C-13013 licrcules (US, Iran)....... Subtotal ....................... i,ight 1IS (Auto) 7.13 (l'K, Indigenous)..... C-47A Skytrain (CS, UK)........... UIIC-4 C;u?ibou (Canada)........... IL-I?IIC:atc (USSI;) ................ h ?7 (Ncthcrhuuls) ................. AN-'341Cokc (USSR) ................ AN-2(ilCut?I (USSR) ................ ~lystcrc 2(1/falcon (IrllnCL). . . ...... 1'ak-12/Creek (USSR.) .............. ('unt?air ?140 (US) .................. Dll II?Illlcvz,n (('unucht)............ Short 5kyt?nn Sts 3 (UK)............ A\-3l ('alt (l'SSR) ................. Suhtuu:I ......................... 'Total ......................... I Iclic?optcrs-'I'r:utspart III-4/Ilound (USSR) ............... illl-8/flip (USSR) .................. 1111-4313 (US) ...................... SubtoUtl ......................... I Iclicopters-Utility :\lourttc I11 ........... . ........... Alouettc II (f~nutcc) ................ OII-13F1 (US) ...................... Sikorsky S-:i5 (US) ? ................ UhI-19D (US) ...................... \Vestlund Wessex (UIi) ............. A91-I Illura (USSR) .. . ............. . hA-2Gllloodlutn (USSR)............ 13e11 20fiA Jet Ranger (US).......... aA-315/Cheetah (Indigenous)........ Subtotal ......................... Total ......................... 'I'ruiners ......... .. .................. Utility .............................. 8 0 0 3 0 2 8 0 1(i 5 3 0 .i3 0 37 0 Sri Bangladesh Afghanislnn Nepal Lunku .... .... .. .. 8 1'10 2 3 35 2 5 213 10 3 3G 2 i 37(hrance) 30(Fruncc, 1 Saudi Arabia) (1 2 8 12 ,.,. 107 52 21R G7 293. 85 80 (i0 ~ lnclurles Golh d11C-~1A1 (h'ishhcd ./) and dIlC-21 /'L afrcrafl. a 1 n sloragc. ~~ 80 of which are comhal-read. ^ Includes two C-130s on short Tenn loan jrom Saudi Ar?Gia. SECRET i,Approved For Release 1999/09/?5 :-CAA-R~E3P8-5Tfl087-5R00110,p030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET ?JC! i. p. .n , Sri NAVI' Personnel .................... ....... 33,000 9,!)0(1 950t SI711)S Carriers ...... . ...... . . ............ 1 (1 0 Cruisers ........ .................. 2 ~ 1 n 0 Destroyers ......... ................ 2 4 0 Destroyer Cscorts .................. lia 2 0 Submarines ........................ G 3 ~ 0 Alissilc Patrol ...................... 3 0 0 Other Catstul I'utrol ................ 17 1 i 5 elircraft ............................. rJ0 0 0 t F,slintalcrl slrenglk. FV IV /1 ulttla~e, one used as lraininq s/tip. a lV iV 11 viulagc. 't lnrhules / I,eaudcr-rln.e.c Dl;'/1 anrl9 Pcl~as. s Nol inclarlerl arc G S.C.Q. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 ,~~vt Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET ---- ---------------- India Pakistan Ground ................................ Current DI -i-15 days Current 17 + 1 ~i clays Combat-effective personnel Arm,,y .............................. 2G1,000 40~i,000 22A,000 253,00(1 Paramilitary IIot der Security I' oree .............. 3.1 ,000 34 ,000 .... .... Central Reserve Force ............. 3,000 5,000 .... .... Civilian Armed Forces ............. .... .... S ,000 'l0 ,000 7'otnl ........... . .............. 208 ,000 X147 ,OOU 232 ,000 273 ,000 Units Army Corps IIgs ........................ 9 5 5 5 Dlvlslan5 Inflmtry .......................? 10 -I-ld 11 13 Mountain ........... . .......... 0 2 0 0 Armored ........ . .............. 1 'l 2 2 Independent Brigades Armored ........................... 5 5 11 I Artillery ............................ 2 3 5 5 Infantry ............................ I 2 3 '3 Sp Svc Gp (Bde) (Abn) .............. 0 U 1 1 Parachute .......................... 0 1 0 (1 Air Defense ......................... 2 ~I 2 2 Paramilitary (Bas) Border Security rorce ................ 3G 3G .... .... Central Reser?.c Police ............... 4 lU ???? ???? Civilian Armed Forces ............... Aircraft .... .... ]0 25 Current deployment of aircraft in both India and P tkistttn (sec to transfer combat units to the border areas. 1 /n addition, eaclt armg carps Iteadquarlers has one armored r~cmutaissancc regiment (Gallal~on equivalent) assigned to il. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET Ycrsonncl: K1A ........................... 3,601 ri,0(]0 (csL.) 1\'lA ........................... 8,(iri0+ 11 ,(l0(1 (est.) i\l l A ........................... 275 1,0(10 (est. ) 't'otal ....... . ................ l2 ,(i 10 17,000 Lquipmm~t: 'funks- ........................ l25 187 Naeul Ships .................... I li rlit?crttPt ~t .. . .................... i I -13 Crnbcrra 13(1)58 .............. ]0 .,.. SU-7/ 1~ incr ................... 2(l .... ILnvkcr lluntcr r-5(i .......... 20 .... i\IIG-21l]~ishbed .............. ti .... Gnat I ....................... 5 .,.. \lystcrn IV r1 ................. 5 .... Ilh-'~~I Altu?ut ................. 5 .... 13regucL 15(1 Alirc............ 1 .... 'I'otul ...................... 71 .... I'-BfiI~ ........................ .... 2(1 Canbcrrn 13-5713 ............... .... 4 h-101 r\ . . ............. ....... .... 3 i\i[G-10/I~ttt?nu~r D............ .... 7 '1'-;i 3 r1 ....................... .... 2 U11-1S)U ..................... .... 2 ? 13cech Queen ;U81~)............ .... I '1'otttl r ...... . .............. .... X13 t appro:rirnalch/ 1,100 pcrsotu+cl rcrcircd rii.cahlin(1 utaunrlt;. Snntc tanks lialerl ax "lo.cse.c" acre .cuhttequenUl/ rchrrucrl to scruice after repair nl rlepol.c. ~+ ~lir-lo-air contlxN operations +ccrc rcladacly fcty during lltc 1771 cottflirl, anri rnacf. nircrafl lossex on Loflt ,cider resuhcrt front grnt+rtd fire. '+ /nchulcs rot rsiintalcrl cinl+l /'-SGT and one T-3,4 cnphu?ud and now in U~c /3nnpladc,:h air forrc, I I - 25 SECRET A(!pproved For Release 1399/09/25 : CfA-RDP85TOa875R00110403.0001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 sECRE~r MILITARY ADVISERS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (ESTIMATED) ---------- - Air All Country Army Nuvy Force Services Pakistanis in: Abu Dhabi......... 90 14 130 .... Oman .............. I10 !)2 .... .... Kuwait ............ .... .... 200 .... Saudi Arabia......:. 110 14 900 .... I r:tq ............... .... .... ~i .... ,lordun..... , '' .... .... .... Syria .............. ..~. .... 2(i .... L)bya .......... . . . . NA lfi 29f) .... Nigeria ............. :3 .... ..,. ,... Iran ............... .... .... 70 .... Q:(t a r .............. 1 .... .... .... Totals ........... 2G6 13fi 1 ,U i 6 1 ,9 i 3 lndinns in: 131(utun ~ ........... 3 ,100 .... ,... .... 13angladcsh~....,,,, NA NA NA ..,. Nigeria ............. 12 O .... .... Ir::q ............... .... .... :30 .... APghunistun......,, 3 .... :30 .... 'I'otuls........... :3,915 (i GO 3,9fi1 ~ Uocs rrol. i~)rludc scuernl ll(ouannd ~)ersonncl willt llac 13ordcr toads Orgrnaisaliou. ~lpproxrmaleh~ /0 /nrlinn n)ilifnrt/ personv)c! serve as a(1- ciscrs i)t l3?r:pladesh; Grcakdawn Gy service is anauoi.laGle. I I - 26 SECRET /#pproved f`~r~ Release 1~995t09/25 : CiA=RDP85T00875R00110~0030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 India South Asian Military Handbook 0992/74 June 1,1974 Jnmmu and Koshmir r ~??~'~ ~~ Himochlnl Pradesh Chnndigorlr.~~ ~?~ I Pun(ab r7'? ? ~,`F~aryana ~y ~.onnd ~?~~ ~ Uttar Rajasthan ~ ~ Arunachal Pradash ~ ,~ Slkklm ~? j ~??.~ Pradesh ~ ~ ~,~ 5 2 ~ ~. ~ ~? l?~ Bihar ,j Gujarat ~ Y Madhya '~ ~Jw?9i y Pradesh ti ?onpa1 1; ~ f~?L?>T'~ ~ ~ ?~ ^ r Orissa Dnm.S;~ ?ir' ~ Maharashtra D?dr? and' Nagar Huvell / ~^? ~'' f Andhra Pondlcharry ?\ Lnccodivc, Minicoy and Amindivi Islonds (Lakshndwcep) ~.....r Tamil Nadu m~ . .,..: ~.~ ~ ~ J;~` r(N~agntand f Meghnloya f? ~M?nipur Tripura~~ Mizorartr Andnm?n and Nicobn? Islands Approved For_Release,1999/09./.25 ,.CIA RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 ? , ,:~ ,~ Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Jodhpur?* *.Ahmedobad i ?Ranchl T~V~i 2?Baramula 'Loh ~RuJeori \ a ?.T~ J mmu 11 ~~ i?Pethenkot China f ~ Amritsar o Arabian Sea ~~.,, Larcr+dive Sea i 'Secunderabad )sri Lanka ~ (CeY~on)~ INDIA Army Order of Battle 'i Armored division Infantry division Mountain division 100 200 300 Miles i ' _-T~ 100 200 300 Kdomelcrs Secret No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release,1999/09/25...;, CIA-R~P85TOp875R001100030001-2 Bay of Bengal South Asian Military Handbo~ik 0992%,'4 lune 1,1974 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 South Asian Military Handbook r- ~' ~ .... ?-- ~ isLAMneAO r ~ Pethankot Adamputi 1 16 Gnat: 16(MIG-9t~ 1 16 HF-24 1~nunuiyarri F-56 -iJ 32 MIG?21 __ _ Ambala 7 Hunter F?56~'~ l3erellly 16MIG-21 IaEW '~; ~' Anra , 1 fi {',: 11SR 1 Approved For Release 19J9/09~25 Afgf~anistan 0 KA9UL CtA-RDP85Tfl0~875R001100030001-2 0992/74 June 1,1974 INDIA Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 South Asian Military Handbook June 1, 1974 0 100 400 300 Miles 0 100 400 300 Nilameters Arabian Sea i 1.Aircrall Carrier 2 Light Cruisers 14 Destroyer/Destroyer Escorts 13 Palrol Escorts ~'6 Large Guided Missile Boals 6 Coastal Palrol Boats t 8 Minesweepers Bombay Amindivi Islands; `Lacradivc Islands 1 Patrol Escort Cochin 1 Smell Submarine Chaser 5 Destroyer/Destroyer Escorls? 6 Submarines 2 Small ~ubmarlne Chasers 3 Coaslat Patrol Boals~Vlshakhapatnam Bay of Bengal ~'lFtt Yt~+t~?Ff .7 ikt"Sa '4-+..e~'. "P 1R~`a ^Y '~, - aa ~5 :---~af._ 141CLV ._.Ftti~9R~ies'..- -~~~'~=?- Andaman (~,, ,? Islands 'j,; r, 1 Small Submarine Chaser;~Port Blair ,~c Nicobar Islands `~} Secret No Foreign Dissern Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 South Asian Military Handbook Afghanistan lalko t 11 ~?pathenkot yy yy,, Lahore* ~? Amritsar Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Ground Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border ~ Indian armored division Indian infantry division 7~ Pakistani armored division Pakistani infantry division Beam Murreo?~ 1 0992/74 June 1, 1974 ISLAMABAD Rawalpindiy y Iy?RaJaorl JhTelumyyY `~ Y Kha~lan_ y *?i If? Jammu Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 South Asian Military Handbook 0992/74 ({/"rV U20}}9tatl i~~ Baltlt Nnin4ninni I I'n~~ ~~ Boundary of former state of Jammu and Kashmir International boundary International boundary, indefinite Line of Control delineated(December 1972) under theSimle Agreement (toad Track or trail `Approved For Release 1999%09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00'875R0011~b0030001-2 June 1, 1974 Jammu and Kashmir Area Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Pakistan South Asian Military Handbook 0992/74 June 1,1974 J / Gllglf (~ ~--t Agency ` Bnlf(slan North- ~ Selected Types of Isyuipmcnt Ordered Isight A N-12 hcucy-transports ................................................ 29 IL-19 medium transports ................. . ........................... . .... Light ;\tI-9 hclicoptcrs ....................................................... 11 11I-9 hclicopters .................. ....................................... 1S A N-12 heuv~~trnnsports ................................................... Plant facilities and license for production of 191i ~11C-211~L jet fighters; subsequent contracts were for importation of raw autteriul anti coutponents for production. ('I'bis figure represents the total projected foreign exchange cost of the progrutn.) (C) (~~) (~~) (L) (C) (L) c:.. ~ ~r ~ ~ ~------ ~---- -- : :.................................................... ~r...._ o ~ n _.. e.._n_ r~__, _. _ ~ .. .. .......... . ...... ..... V-13 SECRET ~ Approved for Release 1999/09/25 : ClA-RDP,~~5T00875R0011 Q0030001-2 ,.. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET 1')n9-7:3 'I'c ut l ................... 1 .75 i --_ __ I~rcc 1Corld C:ounu'ics........... I ,355 --- 13cll;iunt ..................... 17 Canada ......... .......... S I~runcc ...................... 280 1l'cst Certuun)' ............... 41 Iran ........................ S Itul~? ........................ 21 'l'ttrkev .. . ................... 3:3 United Kingdom ............. I72 United SGttes ................ i0(1 Othcrt ...................... 18 Conuuunist C'ountrics........... 3(i!1 1'cople'.. Republic of Chinu.... 305 Crcchoslo~?ukiu ............... 2.1 USSR ....................... 24 North Fonu ................. Ifi PAKISTAN: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS (d/illion US S) 1954-G5 19Gfi-73 19fiG i9G7 19G8 IvG9 197(1 19% 197: 1973 0(i0 i9"r 153 - 4:3 - 8!1 -- 110 90 - 53 IrtS 151 1150 ?1:38 8S lU .5(i -- U~J 88 ~_ ]r ~ 35 =~ 3~) -- --- --- -- .... 1i l(i .... 1 Negl. .... .... Negl. .. .. Neal. S 3 .... .... 39 2'11 2 2 90 49 43 9 2G 75 8 33 21 1 4 1 1 1 1 3 ???? 8 ??.. 2 1 I 1 I 1 1 .... 21 13 7 .. .... .... 1 I7 ' 1(i 10 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... Negl. 1( i2 10 8 .... .... .... .... Ne ~I. 6 2 ill - 73 4 9 8 l6 21 ]0 9 G r 1 1 ... .... 2 2 2 1 2 2 10 3ri9 li5 2"r 33 41 22 3G 73 tit IO 205 65 24 21 20 20 3G 64 45 .... 24 .... .... 8 7 I .... .... E .... 24 .... 3 9 14 1 .... 1 1 .... 1 G .... .... .... .... .... .... 8 S tAYLSTAN: MILITAIY SUPPLY AI:REEMENTS Wfffi CHINA (Million US E) Scp 1965....,...... Jul 1966............ May 1'?ti7 ... , ..... . Dec 19ti i .... , ..... , Nov 1970........... Nov 1911........... Feb 1912........... Nov 1913........,.. Apr ! 974.......... . Ist half 1974? ,... Selected Types of E~aipme~t Unierera Stalus t 75 79 AfIG-19 jet fi,.,hters, 4 IL-2R jet, bombers, 192 medium tanks, and artillery....... (C) 42 ] ]0 medium funks, and urtillery ............................... .............. (C) 50 60 1f[G~l9s, 252 medium tanks, and artillzry ................................... (C) 3 Aircraft engines ............................................................. (C). 40 Ground-forces equipment for two army divisions ............ .. .................. (C) 60 Ground-forces eq,aipment for two army divisions, 30'v1IG-19s, 8 Shanghai IIs, other (U) naval equipr.,ent. 6.5 Ground-force.; equipment for two army divisions, naval craft ...................... (U) 10 10 MIG-19s, naval end ground-forces equipment .. . . . . . ................... . ..... (U) 1 Tank engines, spares.. .............................................. (C) 20 50 M11IG-19s, FT-5 trnincr aircraft, naval and ground-forces equipment ............. (U) SECRET Approved -Far Release.-199.9/.0.9/25 ; .GIA_-RD,P85T~,Q$,Z5R0011 Q0030.001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRE"T Table 5 (,lfi/lion US S) 3 Daphne-clusssubmarincs ..................................... .............. 2q ,Mirage IlI jet fighters ..................................................... 7 Aloucttc III Ireliroptcrs ..................................................... 111u1.r;: 530 air-tu-uir missiles ......................... . ....................... . 1 Aloucttc III helicopter ..................................................... Aircruft engines ............................................................. Aircruft rockets ............................... ............................ . N uvulspares ................................................................ 1 M ystcre trunsport ......................................................... 28 Mirage 5 and 2 Dlirnge III jet fighters, ;1latns 530 uir-to-uir missiles, aircn~ft rockets and nmmunition. ]0 Aloucttc III helicopters; license to assemble Aloucttc Ills ...................... "~tiruge flight simulator, 0 Aloucttc III helicopters, ammunition ................... 1 f u mu helicopter ....................................... .. .................. Ammunition, support equipment .............................................. 50 1lfutr:~ .5.50 air-to-uir missiles ............................................... Ammunition ............................................ .................... 9 Aloucttc Ili helicoptcrs ..................................................... 3 I3requet-Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft .......... . ....................... . Cmtule surface-to-uir missile system .............. . ........................... . Oct 191i~?..... ... Dc?. 19C5......... .lun I!11i8........... Feb- 19(i8.......... . llec 1908........... Feb lOfi!l........... A1uy 1909.......... Feb 1970........... .lun 1910......,.... .lun 1910........... .lun 19i2........... Sep 1912........... Oct, Dec 19i2....... Jttn 19i3........... Apr 1973....... ... Negl. Sep 1"i3........... 0 Jluy 19'i4....... .. 24 Mu:? 1974.......... ?]0 '~ - 15 SECRET Approved For Release 1.999/09/25 ;CIA,-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 BANGLADESH: FORE2CN MILITARY IMPORTS, 1971-197:3 (dlillion US .S) 'T'otal ................ ................... 43.8 Free World Countries ................ ............ 1!I.8 Indi:r ........................................ 17.i United Kingdom ...... .. ...................... 2.1 (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C') (C) Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET USSR ... ...... . .......... . Czechoslovakia .............. United States ~,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1st half 1956........ 100 rlug 1959........... 23 2nd hull 1960....... 40 1st half 1961........ 1 Feb 1961........... ]6 Oct 1964........... 80 Nov 1966........... 44 Nov 1966........... 44 .fun 1911........... 40 blur 1971........... Negl. Jul 1971............ 67 2nd half 1973....... 7 378 140 238 15 17 46 23 23 .... .... .... .... 4.s 2.9 I.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 (,lfillion US ~E) Selected Tyres of lqu:pmenl Ordered Aircraft, T-34 funks, small arms ............................................... (C) Artillery, T-59155 tanks ...................................................... (C) SA-2 surface-t.u-air missile system ........... ................................. (C) Sparc parts ............................. .................................. (C) Aircrnftspare parts .............................. ............................ ,C) b1IG-21 jet fighters, a edium tanks, nntiaircn~fl artillery . . ....................... (C) T-5955 funks, artillery, support equipment, Darnall arms, ammunition .............. (C) SU-i jet fighter bomhr-s, MIG-2; jet figl:te:s, hfI-8 helicopters ........... ........ (C) Tanks, APCs, artillery, small arms .......... .. ................................ (U) 5A-2 missile modifications .................................................... (C) b1I-8 helicopters, tank transporters .......... .................................. (U) b11G-17 jet fighters, replacement aircraft ..................................... (C) V - ?'- ~. SE~.?ZET px~proved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 ~~ Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET NEPAL: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS, 1951-197:3 (d/iUion US S) Totul .............................. .. 9.b - -------- Free 1Vorld Countries ................ . ............ 3.0 Frunce ........................................ 0.3-- Germnny ............ .. .. ...................... 1.7 India ......................................... 0.7 Israel ................. ........................ 0.1 Jupnn ......................................... 0.:3 United Kingdom ... .. .. ........................ :3.0 United States .................................. 1.0 Communist Countries ............................. 1 .5 I'ItC .......................................... O.G USiR ......................................... 0.9 SRI LANKA: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS, 1954-1973 (Mill+~n US .R') 1'atitl ................................ ---37 . fi tree World Countries ............................ 29.1 Austrnlia ..................................... 0.1 Cnnudu ...................................... 0.2 Indiu ........................................ ~ 0.2 Isruel ........................................ 11 .G Itnly ......................................... .0.1 United Kingdom .... .. ........................ 13.1 United States ................................. 3.5 Communist County es ............................ R.5 PRC ......................................... ().0 USSR ......... ............................... 2.0 Yugosluvin ................................... O.fi V-17 SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 sECRE~r ANNEX A South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capabilities 1. India India became the world's sixth nuclear power on May 18, 1974, when it detonated a 10-15 kiloton device in an underground test. The nuclear materials for the blast carne from the Canadian-built CIRUS reactor at the Bhaba Atomic Research Center near Bombay. India. had promised the Canadians in writing that the reactor and its products tnr~uld be used only for peaceful purposes. The Indians, however, have never accepter; the Canadian and US interpretation that any nuclear explosion is tantamount to a weapons test. India has ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty but not the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The step from exploding a nuclear device to producing a primitive bomb deliverable by aircraft is not great, and India almost certainly has the technology to build such a weapon. Domestic pressure on the government to develop a military weapon alrr?ost certainly will be ntense, but the cost of creating an effective medium-range delivery system anc,' the loss of credibility to a government which has consistently denied that it would develop a nuclear weapons system would also be great. The CIRUS reactor in Bombay h~%s been in operation for over a decade, and the Indians probabl;~ have enough plutonium to make 15 ?~r 20 nuclear devices or weapons, each with an approximate yield of 15 kilotons. Produc- tion of plutonium would allow them to make about two more devices each year. A large Indian-built nuclear power plant at Kalpakkam, in south iodic, is scheduled to be in operation sometime after 19?7. With current and planned separation facilities, the plant, which will hav? ~~wo reactors fueled by natural uranium. could produce enough plutonium to make from 50 to 70 low-yield bombs a year in the 1980s. A prototype for a nPw generation of fast-breeder reactors producing U-233 from India's huge supplies of thorium may be ready in the 1980s. Current Indian delivery capabilities, like the prospective weapons them- selves, are modest. A fleet of about 40 Ca, iberra light bombers, with a radius of about 1,000 nautical miles and a payload of 5,000 pounds, could reach India's closer neighbors, including much of western and southwestern China, SECRET Approved For Release 19:99/09/25 .: CIA-RDP85T00875R0011.00030001-2 ,- , ~~, ,~ Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2 SECRET but not tl~e heavily populated Chinese i;ities farther east. India has no long-range bombers but could, with extensive modifications, use some of its civil fleet of Boeing 707s ari,-i 747s to carry weapons several thous~~nd miles. X111 of thesr~ aircraft would be vulnerable to Chinese air defenses. India's planned and :;lowly expanding capabilities in the nuclear and space-related fields will eventually remove many of the obstacles to a large-scale nuclear weapons program. In the late 1980s there will be enough plutonium and U-233 to make a number of intermediate-yield weapons. The Indian space program, which is still in its early stages, probably will have borne fruit by then. To date, only sounding rockets have been tested. A small test satellite was scheduled for launch in 1974, but the Indians have been unable to develop a suitable launch vehicle. As a result, the Soviets have agreed to orbit a satellite constructed in India. An Indian satellite launch is still at least five years away, and even the ~ ~auite a few additional years and ccnsiderable cost would be required to uavelop an operational missile system. India's nuclear test will spur a Pakistani effort to develop nuclear weapons, but Islamabad is unlikely to have any effective nuclear capability within the current decade. The Pakistanis are just beginning their nuclear power program, and are greatly dependent on foreign technological and financial assistance. They presently have a 125-megawatt reactor acquired from CanadG that began operating in December 1972. The reactor is sander !AEA safeguards, which call for periodic inspections by UN teams. Pakistan is constructing, with Canadian assistance, a fuel element fahri- cation facility at Nilore that will be cornpleterJ in 1975. Islamabad is also seeking to construct, with foreign assistance, a c.f,~.inical separation plant that would take about four years to comp!et~: i~h~'se ac~iities, when constructed and opQra'iona~, would enable Pakistan to rr,~, `u re plutonium and, after irradiation, extract it from the fuel elements c ~eactor. If Pakistan decides to undertake a nuclear weapons program, the plutonium yielded by its present reactor will be sufficient to produre from 10 to 20 nuclear weapons a year, if safeguards are disregarded. Studies of high-explosive development and nuclear d~+; ice design, however, could not be completed before the end of this decade without considerable foreign assistance. SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100030001-2