THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100070003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 2, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh
1.02 25X1
2 February 1968
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 February 1968
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh
Summary
Enemy preparations for the long expected offen-
sive at Khe Sanh appear at an advanced stage, and a
major attack could be launched at any time.
Two full Communist divisions--comprising at
least six infantry regiments with artillery support--
are emplaced within striking distance of the outpost.
In addition, at least two infantry regiments of the
North Vietnamese 320th Division have been deployed
to an area in the north-central DMZ from where they
could move to interdict and harass allied reinforce-
ments moving from the east toward Khe Sanh.
During the last two weeks enemy forces near Khe
Sanh have continued to build up their supply caches
and strengthen their fortified positions in the
area. They have also bolstered their antiaircraft
(AAA) defenses in the area, adding a number of heavy
machine guns and possibly 37-mm. and 57-mm. AAA.
Having launched their major offensive against
the urban areas in South Vietnam, the Communists prob-
ably now view the Khe Sanh front as a major new pres-
sure point with which to help overextend and weaken
the allied military nnsi ti nn in moth Vi af-nam _ r-~
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Note: This memorandum, an update of I of 25X1
the same title issued on 10 January, was produced soZeiy
by CIA. It was prepared jointly by the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Vietnamese Affairs Staff.
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The Build-up
1. Developments in recent weeks strongly sug-
gest that the Vietnamese Communists intend once again
to increase military pressure against the strategically
placed outpost at Khe Sanh, on Route 9 in Quang Tri
Province.
2. The post, approximately nine miles from the
Laotian border, is used as a base for observation and
interdiction of enemy infiltration activities in the
area. It was last besieged in the winter of 1967,
following the movement of the North Vietnamese 325C
Division into the western DMZ area. This division
has again moved into the region, after a period of
rest and refitting in North Vietnam. 25X1
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The Current Situation
4. Since the outbreak of major enemy activity
on 30 January, the military situation in the Demili-
tarized Zone/western Quang Tri Province aria--the
anticipated focal point of a Communist offensive--
has remained unusually quiet.
5. The Communists' timetable for major attacks
in this sector, presumably in concert with the wide-
spread attacks elsewhere, is believed to have been
delayed in part at least by the unusually heavy
allied aerial bombardment against North Vietnamese
positions threatening Khe Sanh and the network of
allied strong points just below the zone. The Com-
munists may also be waiting for the most advantageous
weather conditions.
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9. Meanwhile, regimental strength elements of
the North Vietnamese 325 "C" and 304th Divisions have
continued to maneuver into battle positions to the
north, west, and south of Khe Sanh. Sharply intensi-
fied aerial photoreconnaissance of the Khe Sanh area
has provided tentative indications of a major at-
tempt by the North Vietnamese to dig their way toward
the strategic US combat base--an "encroachment with
fortifications" reminiscent of the Dien Bien Phu
tactics. Photography indicates that the Communists
have been preparing positions ever closer to the
Marine garrison but not occupying them. Should the
North Vietnamese begin to construct communications
trenches leading forward from these positions, the
parallel to Dien Bien Phu would become even stronger.
10. Moreover, US aircraft during late January
reported the presence of 37-mm. and/or 57-mm. enemy
antiaircraft artillery weapons in the hills north and
west of Khe Sanh. In addition,
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were being towe y vehicles through Laos to firing
positions near Khe Sanh. The introduction of these
weapons would significantly enhance the enemy's fire-
power capability against both the Khe Sanh garrison
and allied aerial resupply and reinforcement efforts
in the area.
Rockpile. Two additional North Vietnamese regiments--
11. To the east of Khe Sanh, regimental-size
elements of the North Vietnamese 320th Division,
supported by reconnaissance and artillery/rocket
units, have concentrated near Camp Carroll and the
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Enemy Objectives
12. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn
from the build-up around Khe Sanh is that the enemy
may hope to wipe out the US garrison there and the
Civilian Irr;sgular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at
Lang Vei, about five miles to the southwest on
Route 9. The Communists have long regarded Khe Sanh,
located near the infiltration corridors in Laos, as
a thorn in their side. According to the latest
available information, the garrison at Khe Sanh is
defended by four infantry battalions, and an artil-
lery battalion of the 26th Marine Regiment. In
addition, an ARVN ranger battalion is deployed along
the garrison's outer defense perimeter. The CIDG
camp at Lang Vei has about 320 men,
13. The Communists,. however, do not need a
force of upwards of 20,000 men to overrun Khe. Sanh
and Lang Vei. If the build-up is as extensive as
suspected, and all of these units are destined to
be committed to an offensive in the area, the pri-
mary purpose of the Communists may prove to be much
broader. By attacking Khe Sanh, they would hope
to draw US reinforcements into the area, tie them
down to static defensive positions, and inflict
maximum casualties on US forces over a protracted
time period. By occupying the high ground around
Khe Sanh and setting up ambushes along Route 9,
the only overland route into the area, the enemy
could make resupply and reinforcement a difficult
and costly proposition, especially if he has de-
veloped an effective antiaircraft capability. Mon-
soon rains have closed large portions of Route 9,
compounding the problem and making resupply largely
dependent on airlift.
14. Allied reinforcement difficulties would
be increased if the enemy managed to sustain his
current offensive around and in the urban areas of
the country. Reaction. to this thrust has so far
tied down numerous allied maneuver battalions and
reserve forces.
15. A final objective of the Khe Sanh build-up
would be to harass and foil the strong-point barrier
system which is being implemented in the DMZ north
of Khe Sanh and in the infiltration corridors of Laos.
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16. Enemy strategy as outlined above fits in
with the enemy's efforts during 1967 in fighting the
main force war partly from peripheral areas adjacent
to border sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. By
positioning his forces in these areas, the enemy
sought to lure US units away from populated areas,
disperse them, and inflict a maximum number of cas-
ualties in the process. This relieves pressure on
main force units operating in populated areas and
enables them to coordinate with local force units to
disrupt the pacification program and attack allied
outposts and base camps around urban areas. Since
the start of the "winter-spring campaign" in October,
the enemy has employed this strategy in II Corps and
III Corps.
17. The next few days are expected to bring
poor flying weather to the Khe Sanh/DMZ area, thereby
seriously restricting allied tactical air support
and resupply efforts. Moreover, sizable numbers of
allied forces who otherwise would be available as
reinforcement to positions under siege in northern
and western Quang Tri Province have been diverted
to clearing and securing the many areas recently
attacked from Quang Tri city southward to Hue. These
factors weigh heavily in favor of possibly imminent
offensive activity at Khe Sanh, probably in coordi-
nation with major thrusts against allied positions
along the central and eastern portions of the DMZ.
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