CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES IN THE KHE SANH AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100070004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 7, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Construction and Logistic Activities
in the Khe Sanh Area
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7 February 1968
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Construction and Logistic Activities
In the Khe San Area
Summary
The deployment of more than 22,000 North Vietnam-
ese Army (NVA) troops in the Khe Sanh area and up-
wards of 12,500 troops in the north-central DMZ
area has been paralleled by a rapid acceleration
of enemy logistic and construction activities.
These activities point to the acquisition of a
capability for sustained offensive operations.
The construction of two new roads from Laos
toward the Khe Sanh area will facilitate the enemy's
ability to sustain the resupply of his forces. Con-
struction of new fortified positions and weapons
emplacements in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh
appears to be well advanced. These emplacements
will be extremely difficult to neutralize and will
provide the enemy with an improved capability to
defend areas he now holds and to interdict friendly
movement in and out of the Khe Sanh area. These ac-
tivities are hampered and disrupted by intensive US
air strikes, but the enemy appears to be pressing
his preparations and they could be nearing completion.
Information on logistic operations during the
past five months indicates a sharp increase in the
volume of supplies moved into the area. The esti-
mated traffic has been more than adequate to meet
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared jointly by the Office of Economic
Research and the Vietnamese Affairs Staff and co-
ordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence.
It should be read in conjunction with the CIA memo-
randum, "The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh" of 2 February
1968.
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the logistic requirements of these forces, particularly
for ammunition, at greatly intensified rates of com-
bat for a period of 60-90 days. There is no reason
to doubt that the Communist rear service units can
continue to move drily both the estimated 35 tons of
supplies required by the forces at Khe Sanh and the
additional 20 tons for the forces in the north-central
DMZ area under heavy combat conditions.
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New Road Construction
1. j ias revealed two new
roads being built by the North Vietnamese from a
point near Ban Dong in Laos on Route 9 eastward
to the Khe Sanh area. These roads, detected in
the past month, parallel Route 9 to the north and
south and converge on the Khe Sanh area from the north-
west and southwest. (See Figure 1). Work on both
roads has progressed to the Laos - South Vietnam
border, which is within 12 to 15 miles of Khe Sanh,
and probably is continuing into South Vietnam.
This new road network significantly increases the
North Vietnamese logistic capability near the DMZ,
and reflects the intensive nature of enemy prepara-
tions for major operations in the Khe Sanh area.
2. The Communists have also gained the use
of Route 9 at least as far as the Vietnamese border,
having driven off in late January the Lao Army bat-
talion (BV-33) which had controlled the Ban Houei
Sane area and blocked the use of Route 9 to the Com-
munists since mid-1961. Large bunkers and storage
areas have been detected near the terminus of the
southernmost of the two new routes, and numerous
secondary explosions have followed B-52 strikes in
the area.
Supply Depots
3. The Tchepone area of Laos, about 20 miles
west of the Vietnamese border, has long been known
to be a major staging point for the movement of
supplies from North Vietnam through the southern
Laos panhandle. Numerous new depots and .( 1(: i m + Mr t+rir
An glm, C
- Surface profile shown on Figure 3
Mortar position (position, shown are repn~enfotir. of
the many such position, in the area.)
Q Single foxhc'a ? Bunker
Multiple foxhole ee...... Trench
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Figure 3
KHE SANH BASE
SURFACE PROFILES
FROM SELECTED POSITIONS
SHOWN ON FIGURE 2
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