DINESH SINGH AND US-INDIA RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090018-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 10, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Dinesh Singh and US-India Relations
State Dept. review completed
Secret
10 April 1970
No. 0500/70
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WARNING
This docnnient c-onhrins information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
t%CLI,DED MNOM AUTOMATIC
D(Iw,,IIIAUIN(I ANTI
D- ,..ANYIPICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
10 April 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Dinesh Singh and US-India Relations
Introduction
Over a year ago, Prime Minister Gandhi selected
one of her closest confi%.tants, Dinesh Singh, as her,
minister of external affairs. A leftist with no po-
litical base of his own, he has risen to the top on
the strength of his association with Mrs. Gandhi.
His appointment was initially interpreted in the US
as bad news for'American relations with'India.
This memorandum assesses Singh's role in sev-
eral episodes in Indian foreign relations during the
past year. The probability is that there will be
additional rough spots ahead for US-India relations,
resulting at least as much from Singh's style in
conducting affairs as from his leftist bent.
Note: '?his memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office. of Current Intelligence,
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates
and the Clandestine Service:..
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Dinesh Singh's Career
1. On 18 March this year, External Affairs
Minister Dinesh Singh told the lower house of In-
dia's parliament, "We must pay the highest tribute
to the people of Vietnam for the struggle they have
waged now over two decades for their independence."
His speech--possibly the most favorable to Hanoi
ever made by an Indian official--is only one indi-
cation of the leftward drift in Indian (.)reign policy
since Prime Minister Gandhi chose him as her foreign
minister over a year ago.
2. With no independent political base, Dinesh
Singh has risen to power largely bezause of his as-
sociation with Mrs. Gandhi. Bot! his father and
grandfather were closely allied with her father--
Jawaharlal Nehru--in the straggle for independence,
and Dinesh began his career in 1947 as one of Nehru's
assistant secretaries. Since then, his rise has been
rapid, at least by Indian standards.
3. He was elected to parliament in 1956 and
became a deputy minister--the lowest of the three
tiers in the Indian Council of Ministers--in 1962.
Mrs. Gandhi promoted him to minister of state when
she became prime minister in 1966 and also directed
him to perform additional functions "as assigned to
him by the prime minister." A year later she':gave
him the Commerce portfolio; at the age of 41, Dinesh
became the second youngest of the 13 major ministers.
in 1969, the prime minister appointed him to the more
important post of minister of external affairs.
4. Dinesh appears to have been the primary
advocate in the Indian Gc'-ernment of upgrading
representation with North Vietnam--India has long
had consulates in both Hanoi and Saigon--and of
stronger informal relations with the Provisional
Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam.
He also has championed the closing of US informa-
tion centers in India. Dinesh's role::is lless:.
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clear in a variety of other potential or actual ir-
ritants in US-India relations, but'since he. took of-
fice, the External Affairs Ministry, has at best been
unsympathetic when US interests appeared endangered
b~ Indian pressures on foreign oil companies, plans
to nationalize foreign insurance companies, and meas-
ures to discourage Indian travel on foreign airlines.
5. Two recent episodes--the attempt to grant
formal recognition to Hanoi, and the closing of sev-
eral USIA offices in India--illustrate both Dinesh
Sinc;hls methods and the degree to which he is able
to determine foreign policy.
Recognition of Hanoi
6. Dinesh argues that Asia must be left to the
Asians but, at the same time, he sees.a danger to In-
dia from Chinese dominance in southeast Asia. Work-
ing from the assumption that the Vietnamese Commu-
nists will be the eventual victors in the current
struggle, he believes that India can counter Peking
only by increasing its influence in Hanoi.
7. Late in the summer of 1969, India was un-
der no unusual pressure from either local Communists
or the Communist nations for a new initiative toward
North Vietnam. But increased contacts with Hanoi--
due in part to Dinesh's attendance at Ho's funeral--
and some North Vietnamese pressure for recognition of
the PRG gave Dinesh a reason to review India's policy
regarding Southeast Asia. Mrs. Gandhi was preoccupied
with domestic politics, and Morarji Desai--the lead-
ing conservative in the cabinet--had resigned in July,
so that Dinesh probably believed he had greater free-
dom of action,
7. By September, he was telling a number of
people--including newsmen, off-the-record--that In-
dia had decided to raise its consulate-general in
Hanoi to an embassy. By November, however, after
New Delhi became fully aware that adverse reaction
from Washington would probably be strong, official
recognition had been indefinitely postponed.
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8. Dinesh?s original decision to upgrade rela-
tions with Hanoi was probably not designed to damage
US interests or to help the Communists, Nevertheless,
in judging which policy best served Indian interests,
his frame of reference was such that he either badly
underestimated the probable US reaction, or--more
likely--did not give great weight to the value of
good relations with the US.
9. Dinesh clearly led the effort to make an
upgrading of relations with Hanoi the official gov-
ernment policy, and his calculated leaks to the press
and others may well have been designed to force Mrs.
Gandhi?s hand. Nevertheless, he had good reason to
believe that his policy had at least the tacit sup-
port of the Indian Government. Most senior officials
in the External ?'ffairs Ministry--including some of
his rivals--supported his policy. Opposition poli-
ticians and the press were aware of what he hoped to
do. Mrs. Gandhi--despite her preoccupation with do-
mestic politics--could hardly, have been ignorant of
Dinesh?s plans. Apparently, she was willing to give
him a considerable amount of freedom in formulating
Indian foreign policy and may have stepped in even-
tually only because of US representations.
10. Mrs. Gandhi herself has taken pro-Hanoi
positions in the past, although she has never gone
as far as did Dinesh in his 18 March speech to par-
liament. Probably her most strongly worded statement
came in a joint communique from Moscow.in 1966, which
spoke of "the aggressive actions of imperialist and
other reactionary forces" in the world and blamed
the "dangerous situation" in Southeast Asia on US
bombing.
Closing the Cultural Centers
11. In December 1969, nine workmen were killed
when a wall collapsed during the construction of a
Soviet cultural center at Trivandrum in Kerala State.
The incident quickly became a political issue. The
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Soviets not only lacked perrinissi.on to establish a
center in Trivandrum, but were acting in violation
of a 1954 ban on such centers in cities where.-the
foreign power had neither a consulate nor a trade
mission. Under pressure from the political right,
the government ordered construction stopped.
12. Communist diplomats and left-wing politi-
cians then began demanding that similar Western
cultural and information centers also be closed.
Prior to the 1954 ban, the US had established six
centers in nonconsular cities, and five of these
were still functioning--with Indian permission--
at the time of the Trivandrum incident. The UK,
West Germany, and France also had cultural centers
in nonconsular cities, though these were less closoly
tied to their respective governments than were the
USIA installations.
13. On 10 February, India circulated a note to
foreign missions asking them within 30 days to fur-
nish details on their cultural centers. On 20 Febru-
ary, an Indian official told US diplomats that the
request was designed merely to help India investigate
the question,an.d that although no final decision on
the fate of the centers had been made, it might go
against the US. The next day, the same official re-
ported that she had spoken to Dinesh Singh about the
concern of the US and that he had promised to look
into the matter.
14. On 24 February, however, the Americans
learned that in a note dated 18 February--which was
not sent to the US Embassy--the Indians had ordered
the closing of foreign cultural centers in nonconsular
cities by 18 May. Subsequently, Dinesh Singh announced
that the fate of the French, British, and German cen-
ters was still under study.
15. On 26 February, during a stormy session of
the lower house of parliament, Dinesh denied that
India was discriminating against the US. He wain'
tamed that India was merely ending a practice that
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had discriminated in favor of the Americans. On the
same day, his deputy charged in the upper house that
foreign centers were being closed because of their
"political and other undesirable activities." The
implication was clear--with only US centers being
closed--although other Indian officials have since
privately denied that they had any intention of ac-
cusing the US centers of engaging in "undesirable
activities."
16. The Indians probably chose what appeared
to be the easiest solution to a problem that they
had no desire to face. The government could not
allow the USSR to continue construction without
giving support to right-wing charges that Mrs.
Gandhi is under Soviet influence. Domestically,
however, Mrs. Gandhi?s minority government depends
on leftist support--including the pro-Soviet Com-
munist Party of India--and so had to appear re-
sponsive to left-wing demands. In such a situa-
tion, the best solution was one that alienated the
least support at home, could be justified as re-
moving rather than imposing discrimination, and
showed the government uniformly enforcing estab-
lished policy. The resulting decision may not have
been consciously anti-US--the Americans may simply
have had the misfortune to be standing in the way.
17. Dinesh, once again, was probably out in front
of the rest of the Indian Government. On 10 February,
the Indians apparently intended to wait until at least
10 March before announcing a decision, but by 18 Feb-
ruary had changed their minds. During this time, Mrs.
Gandhi was negotiating the formation of two state gov-
ernments and rewriting a bank nationalization law
that the Supreme Court had just overruled, Never-
theless, here again, she must have had some knowledge
of so widely a debated issue.
18. Dinesh probably had enough authority to
:move up the date of the formal decision. on his own.
Why he did so is unclear. Either he or Mrs. Gandhi
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may have hoped to end the problem before parliament
-opened on 20 February. It is also possible, however,
that Dinesh rushed matters to make sure that the
prime minister did not back away from what he re-
garded as the "correct" solution. There are some
indications, in fact, that she is now trying to do
precisely that.
Conclusion
19. In both cases, Dinesh seems to have decided
on policies that--at least from his leftist point of
view--seemed best for India. He tried to force the
implementation of those policies by moving ahead of
Mrs. Gandhi, and--when he was given the opportunity--
pre-empting h.er.
20. Mrs. Gandhil 25X1
has been growing increasingly displeased with Dinesh
^ince late last year. Her failure to appoint him to
any high position in the Congress Party may be one
indication of her disaffection. But his lack of an
independent power base and his unpopularity with some
party leaders are probably more important reasons for
her neglect. 25X1
On 13 March, the New Delhi Statesman reported a
relations between the two were so bad that Dinesh
had submitted his resignation, which Mrs. Gandhi re-
fused to accept. According to the newspaper, matters
came to a head over appointments in the government,
but the prime minister also believed that Dinesh
Singh should have discussed the cultural centers is-
sue with her more fully before issuing any orders.
21. Mrs. Gandhi probaYhly objects more to
Dinesh's methods than to his solutions. In both
the Hanoi and the ir::oriaation centers affairs, he
annoyed the US when more skillful handling might
sr?URET
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have achieved the same end with less strain on India-US
relations. It might be argued that Dinesh's slights
to the US--such as his failure to send the cultural
center closure note to the US Embassy and the accusa-
tion by his deputy that the US information centers
were engaging in undesirable activities--are delib-
erately calculated affronts. Dinesh, however, is
capable of blunders that help neither himself nor
India. For example, by including a non-Moslem in the
delegation to the Islamic Summit at Rabat, Dinesh an-
noyed India's Arab friends and pleased only Pakistan.
22. Even if Mrs. Gandhi is dissatisfied with
Dinesh's performance, she will find it difficult to
dismiss a man who has been so closely identified with
her and for whom she may still hold personal re~+jard.
Moreover, her enemies could claim either that his dis-
missal was a repudiation of her own policies or -what,
in her efforts on his behalf for a number of years,
she had exercised poor judgment.
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