COLOMBIA--THE ANAPO: WHAT IS IT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: May 5, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
S
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum,
COLOMBIA--THE ANAPO: WHAT IS IT?
Secret
5 May 19 70
No. 0505/70
87
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WARNING
This document contains information a fecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
^RVLUD6O YIIOM AUTOMATIC
DOWNUIIADINO AND
ORCI.AANII'IC ATIDN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'
Directorate of Intelligence
5 May 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Colombia--The ANAPO: What is it?
Summary
In the presidential election held on 19 April
1970, ex-dictator (1953-1957)1 retired General
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla garnered almost 39 percent
of the total vote. He was the only one of the
four contenders with any charisma, and his elec-
toral machinery was remarkably efficient and per-
vasive in the major urban centers. Even so, Rojas
lost to National Front candidate Misael Pastrana
Borrero by little more than 66,000 votes, the
closest election in Colombian history. The close
vote did not result solely from Rojas' strength;
the three-way split in the Conservative Party
and Pastrana's lack of political appeal-were also
important.
This was the last election under the National
Front system. Under the Front, which went into
effect in 1958, the country's two major political
parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, alternate
the presidency. The constitution under the National
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the office of Current Intelli-
gence and coordinated with the Office of National
Estimates and the Clandestine Service.
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Front calls for 50-50 representation of Liberals
and Conservatives in the National Congress until
1974. In addition, parity is required between
the parties in governmental posts at all levels.
Because it was the Conservatives' turn, Rojas
was forced to run as a Conservative.
Rojas' phenomenal surge of popularity and
the possibility that he would win the election
caused consternation in the National Front and,
indeed, in the highest levels of government.
Because of fear that popular demonstrations on
Rojas' behalf would lead to serious violence and
possibly to an attempt to seize power, a state of
siege was imposed on 21 April and remains in effect.
General Rojas and his politically minded daughter,
Senator Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, are under
virtual house arrest for their attempts to call
popular demonstrations after the general declared
that the government was perpetrating fraud in an
effort to keep him from winning the presidency.
This memorandum will examine the origins of
Rcjas' political instrument, the National Popular
Alliance (ANAPO), its orientation, coherence, and
prospects for the future.
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Background
1. Following his ouster and exile in 1957,
Rojas returned to Colombia in October 1958 in an
effort to vindicate himself before the country.
He may also have hoped that his former supporters
and elements of the military would rise up in his
behalf. Instead, he was tried by the Senate on
charges of malfeasance in office and of having
brought indignity on the presidency. The charges
centered on his alleged use of the presidency to
acquire cattle ranches and to smooth the way for
illegal imports by his friends. Early in 1959 he
was deprived in perpetuity of all political rights,
including the right to vote and hold office; of all
honors as a retired member of the army; and of pen-
sions due him as a former military officer and
president. His political rights were not restored
until 1967, and the following year he was elected
to the National Congress as a representative from
Boyaca, where he was born,
2. Following Rojas' release from custody in
1960, he and some former associates and members of
his family (notably his daughter Maria Eugenia)
founded ANAPO, whose political aims were vague.
ANAPO declared its opposition to the National Front
and the "oligarchs" and sought to "revive" the
bonds between the people and the armed, forces. In
the elections of March 1962 it captured two seats
in the Senate and six in the House of Represent-
atives, thus establishing itself as a contender,
albeit a poor third, among Conservative factions.
The general was allowed to enter the presidential
race in 1962 despite the loss of his political
rights, but the votes he won were declared null.
He ran poorly, receiving only 54,562 votes of the
2.6 million cast.
3. By the time of the 1964 elections, the
situation had changed in three important respects.
First, the Supreme Court dismissed charges against
Rojas stemming from his actions while president
(his trial b afore the Senate had only been a civil
action). Second, the rise in the cost of living
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was causing disaffection with the Front. Rojas
used this effectively. His campaigns on behalf
of ANAPO candidates were built on criticism of
the government. One of his favorite tactics dur-
ing the course of a speech was to exhibit a cake
of panela (a kind of brown sugar basic to the
popular diet) and remind the audience of the rise
in its price since he left office. Finally, events
within the Conservative Party greatly improved
ANAPO's position. With the temporary union of the
two major wings of the party in March 1963, ANAPO
remained the only significant Conservative oppo-
sition to the government. The results were strik-
ing gains for ANAPO candidates, who increased their
seats in the House from 6 to 27.
4. Subsequent elections brought further gains.
In the congressional elections in 1966, ANAPO won
18 Senate seats and 37 in the House. It also
entered a presidential candidate, who won nearly
30 percent of the vote, a good showing considering
his late start in the race, his relative personal
obscurity, and the failure of other opposition
groups to unite behind him. In the congressional
contests of 1968, ANAPO suffered the loss of three
seats in the House, although it increased its per-
centage of the vote slightly. Preliminary figures
from the recent congressional elections indicate
that ANAPO won 37 Senate seats and 71 in the House,
almost doubling its previous strength but still far
under that of Pastrana. ANAPO will also be in a
strong if not a majority position in a number of
departmental capitals as well as in other major
cities. Because of the proportional electoral
system, it is probable that some seats in the House
will change when the final vote is determined.
What is ANAPO?
5. ANAPO is primarily a highly personalistic
political movement whose unsophisticated adherents
display fanatical belief and trust in Rojas. The
movement proclaims itself a revolutionary, nation-
alist and Christian movement, distinct from the
traditional Colombian political parties.
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6. ANAPO is also heterogeneous. Crusading in
spirit, it has become an umbrella under which dis-
affected and opportunistic elements can mutually co-
exist and advance their own interests by furthering
the interests of ANAPO as a whole. The political
grouping includes maverick Liberal and Conservative
factions, thereby allowing ANAPO to present two
separate electoral lists. It also includes some
Communists. The Communists, of course, are at-
tempting to use ANAPO for their purposes and will
do all they can to push anti-Americanism and in-
crease ultranationalistic sentiment.
7. Apparently the one basic theme that unites
these various groupings is their opposition to the
National Front, In addition there is a strong anti-
establishment zeal that probably heightens ANAPO's
sense of nationalism. The movement lacks a vigor-
ous, logical, or even traditionalist philosophy of
government. Its stated positions are a mixture of
nationalist-populist-corporativist ideas that lack
coherence. Moreover, ANAPO's solutions for complex
economic and social problems are naive and overly
simplistic. During Rojas' recent campaign, for
example, he promised to raise the peso to parity
with the dollar (it is now around 18 to 1) and to
nationalize all imports. Such easy solutions appeal
to the lower socioeconomic strata of Colombian so-
ciety, however.
8. ANAPO derives its strength from Rojas'
demagogic appeal to lower and lower middle-class
elements who do not like the National Front, from
the discontented elements of the population who
suffer most from inflation, and from other persons
who prefer dictatorship to what they conceive as
the ineffective, corrupt, and selfish rule of the
"oligarchy." The movement is a challenge to the
Colombian "establishment," and therefore it also
attracts the floating protest vote, ANAPO does
not consider itself and should not be considered
as just another political party concerned with
winning elections. By its doctrine of revolution-
ary nationalism and hostility to liberal democ-
racy, the movement is an authoritarian and poten-
tially totalitarian fore.
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9. Rojas` name is known to practically every
Colombian, and many give him credit for having ex-
pressed the frustrations and aspirations of the
poverty-stricken masses by popular gestures such
as denouncing wealthy landowners. During his
regime, Rojas provided a strong sense of tempo-
rary national unity at a time of serious political
turmoil. He also gained popularity through the
initiation of limited land reform. 1oreover, the
relative stability of the cities, the stability of
prices, and the fairly good economic conditions in
general during his regime are more clearly remem-
bered than the authoritarian way he ran his govern-
ment in later years, which led to his overthrow.
Rojas still has strong support among the urban and
rural poor, the unemployed, lower class government
employees, and some retired and active military
personnel, especially in the enlisted and lower
officer ranks. He has also attracted a variety of
minor politicians as well as members of the popula-
tion who have been squeezed by inflation.
10. ANAPO's largest and most vocal. source of
support is among the lower and lower middle-class
urban voters, who still identify the movement with
the national social welfare agency created during
Rojas' regime. To further its image, the movement
has drawn on the considerable oratorical and or-
ganizational talents of Rojas' daughter.
The ANAPO Organization
11. Although the movement has shown that it
is a force to contend with, it has.serious weak-
nesses. Most of its appeal is engendered by
General Rojas, without whom the movement would
founder. ANAPO has few leaders (see appendix)
of national stature capable of taking over the
direction of the movement in the absence of the
supreme leader. Although Rojas' daughter has a
dynamic and magnetic personality that attracts
followers, she probably would be.unable to take
over the leadership of ANAPO. The fact that she
4,s a woman is a difficult obstacle in Colombia.
L4oreover, she does not enjoy the intense personal
SJ.
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following that her father does. Despite her tal-
ents, most of her support is a reflection of his.
Aside from Maria Eugenia, the movement lacks well-
known political personalities at the secondary
level, and a leadership vacuum probably will occur
when Rojas leaves the scene. It is possible, when
this occurs, that diverse persons contending for
the movement's leadership will cause fragmentation.
12. Although ANAPO appears to function between
elections, it does so at a greatly reduced level.
Its grass-roots organization is not believed to be
strong. In the last few years, ANAPO has increased
its organizational efforts in the countryside, recog-
nizing its weakness in this area.
13. ANAPO finances itself in a variety of ways.
The most important is through traditional fund-rais-
ing means such as dances, dinners, the sale of the
;NAPO newspaper Alerta, and voluntary-contributions
of all kinds. Tie enhusiastic, if not fanatical,
nature of members tends to make voluntary contribu-
tions a very important financial resource. In
addition, ANAPO has received financial contribu-
tions from the private sector because businesses
wanted to protect their interests in the event of
a Rojas victory. 'Moreover, General Rojas probably
contributes heavily to the movement from his ample
personal funds.
14. ANAPO's National Command is located in
Bogota. Orders are transmitted to the next level,
the Departmental Commands, for implementation.
The lines of command continue down to the Munici-
pal Commands. In addition, the four major cities
of Colombia--Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and Barran-
quilla--are organized into special zonal commands
that divide the cities into specific areas for
operational purposes. Bogota, for example, is
divided into 13 zonal areas. On occasion, offices
at the local level dispense gifts and minor favors
to voters and intervene on behalf of private citi-
zens with grievances against local government of-
fices. ANAPO's influence at the municipal level
is believed to be strong.
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The Prospects
15. The future of the movement depends to a
great extent on how long Rojas lives. He is 70
years old and a diabetic
His age and health miti-
ga a against his participation in the 1974 elec-
tions. In the interim, he may be able to groom a
successor, but such a person would probably lack
the general's charisma and popular following.
16. General Rojas has threatened to undertake
guerrilla and urban warfare against the new gov-
ernment, and it is possible that in the coming
months such activity will occur. It is much more
likely, however, that Rojas will work against the
new government through his partisans in Congress,
At the very least, President-elect Pastrana will
have to devise a means of gaining sufficient co-
operation to have a majority in Congress. This
may prove difficult, as the legislature will in-
itially be divided into at least four blocs, each
representing one of the presidential hopefuls.
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ANAPO Leaders
1. Manuel Bayona Carrascal: A Conservative
and currently a Senator from the Department of
Norte de Santander. He is a relative newcomer to
ANAPO's ranks, and is also a physician and attor-
ney.
2. Benjamin Burgos Puche: A Conservative
and an experienced parliamentarian, he is cur-
rently a Senator from the Department of Cordoba.
3. Saul Charris de la Hoz: A Liberal from
Atlantico. His influence with Rojas has grown,
and he will be one of the major decision makers
in the movement.
4. Gregorio Duarte: A retired army general.
5. Hernando Forrero Gome.a: A Conservative
and currently a representative from the Department
of Caqueta. A retired army colonel, he was one of
the leaders of an unsuccessful coup attempt in
1958 against the military junta that succeeded
Rojas.
6. Jose Ignacio Giraldo: A Conservative and
currently a Senator from the Department of Valle,
he is believed to have considerable influence on
General Rojas.
7. Josefina Valencia de Hubach: A Conserva-
tive and the sister of former President Valencia.
She is currently a representative from Cundina-
marca and has some influence with Rojas.
8. Jose Jaramillo Giraldo: A Liberal and
presently a representative from Cundinamarca. He
was ANAPO's presidential candidate in 1966.
9. 11anuel Lemos Garviras: A Conservative,
and currently a representative. A retired army
major, he is the Anapista chief in Norte de San-
tander Department.
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10. Luis F. Millan: A Conservative, he is a
retired army colonel and the ANAPO chief in Bolivar
Department.
1]., Carlos Monroy Res ; A Conservative, and
currently-a Senator from Cundinamarca who has some
influence with Rojas.
12. Maria Euenia Rojas de Moreno: A Conserva-
tive, and currently a Senator from Cundinamarca.
The daughter of the ex-dictator, she is the driving
force behind ANAPO and, next to her father, enjoys
the highest prestige and power in the movement.
13. Samuel Moreno Diaz: A Conservative and
now Senator from Santander, He is the husband of
Rojas' daughter Maria Eugenia. His importance in
the movement derives from his influence with his
wife and General Rojas. He is not believed to be
a national political figure.
14. Jose Maria Nieto: A Conservative, and
currently a Senator from Boyaca. He was expelled
from ANAPO because of personal differences with
Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno in 1963, but appar-
ently has returned to the movement.
15. Fernando Pardo Quintana: A Liberal, he
is presently a representative from the Department
of Bolivar. He was a judge during the Rojas
Pinilla regime (1953-57).
16. Jaime Piedrahita Cardona: A Conservative,
he is the ANAPO chief in Antioquia, and is currently
a Senator, He is described as one of the less vio-
lent Rojistas.
17. Milton Fuentes: A Liberal, he has a dis-
tinct inclination to the left, and has been char-
acterized as 'a friend of the Communist Party. Dur-
ing the period 1947-50 he was reported to be in-
volved with the Gaitan faction of the Liberal Party.
18. Alvaro Ramos Muri.llo: A Conservative, and
currently a representative.
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19. Ov' 4.dio Rincon Palaez: A Conservative,
and p.,:esen y a representative from Quindio.
General Rojas respects his ability.
20, .1oaquin Rodriguez Gonzalez: A Conserva-
tive wh elaative y new to the movement.
21, tie,%rdo Segura Perdomo: A Conservative,
inclined ',.rips:; d Marxism. He is co-owner of Radio
Latina -,n Bogota and a director of the ANAPO news-
paper 7.lerta. He is presently a representative.
23. Moises Tarud: A Liberal, and currently
a representative from the Department of Atlantico.
24. Luis Carlos Turriago Olaya: A Conservative,
and a Senator from the Department of Meta. He is a
retired army general.
25. Luis Guillermo Velasquez: A Conservative,
he is a well-known newspaperman.
26. Arturo Villegas Giraldo: A Liberal. He
usually accompanies Rojas during campaign trips
because of his oratorical abilities.
27. Alberto Zalamea: A pro-Communist Liberal.
He is the son of the, deceased Communist "poet
laureate" of Colombia, and the leader of the Liberal
faction of the movement.
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